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Abstract
History and national consciousness are central to the creation and sustaining of national 
identity. Although much has been written on German national identity, there has been 
little examination of how the 60th anniversary of the Allied air campaign or expulsion of 
ethnic Germans are remembered from the perspective of the Germans as victims. 
Reflecting the changing status of the National Socialist past as it continues to affect the 
present, this thesis argues there were significant disparities between official and popular 
perceptions of national identity and memory.
Presenting a focussed examination of current developments in German society and 
politics from a German perspective, this thesis examines why many in Germany have 
rejected a national identity based on a constitutional patriotism and collective 
atonement. Debates conducted by prominent intellectuals, journalists and academics in 
leading newspapers and magazines have been compared to statements from Ministers 
and official reports in order to ascertain the extent to which elite conceptions of national 
identity find resonance within Germany. Providing fresh evidence from periodicals, 
archive publications, eyewitness testimonies and books, this informative and arguably 
compelling thesis makes a significant and original contribution on how German history 
and identity are now being perceived and represented in Germany.
Competing perceptions of the past and present warrant urgent recognition because so 
long as a disparate national identity and culture of remembrance continues there can be 
no effective reconciliation with either the German elite or with others. A greater 
understanding and recognition of the themes addressed however could not only 
encourage greater toleration, but also perhaps dispel the increasing sense of bitterness 
concerning recent aspects of the country's past.
vin
Introduction
1. Post-reunification national identity and memory.
Although various academics have addressed German national identity, xenophobia and 
memory in journals such as Debatte, German Politics and The Historical Journal, there 
has been little examination of neo-Nazi Kameradschaften (comradeships), heathen 
female right-wing groups, the suffering of ethnic Germans during their flight and 
expulsion from East and Central Europe, or the 60th anniversary of the Allied Air 
Campaign.' Writing in 1992 and 1995, for example, British historians Jose Harris, 
Jeremy Noakes and the German author Winfried Georg Sebald claimed that so far, there 
has not been a comprehensive examination of the impact of the Allied bombing on 
German civilians during the Second World War. 2 Along similar lines, the editor of the 
periodical Schlesien Heute, Alfred Theisen, contended in 1995 that teachers, academics, 
politicians and journalists in Germany all failed to convey the extent of the crimes 
against and suffering of millions of ethnic Germans at the end of the Second World 
War. 3 According to the Director of the Silesian Museum at Gorlitz, Martin Bauer, for 
example, schoolchildren have never discovered the truth about the expulsions of 
Germans from Silesia. 4 Until 2002, the need for atonement for National Socialist crimes 
took precedence over examinations and commemorations of the Germans as national, 
collective victims.
Since reunification, sub-cultural right-wing groups have become more prevalent, but, at 
the same time, largely ignored within academic studies. Addressing the gaps within 
three interrelated and relatively new themes of contemporary and continuing 
significance, this thesis suggests there were key dissonances between official and 
popular understandings of national identity and memory since reunification.
1 See: Brandt, P. German identity. Debatte, 1993 (2), pp. 30-41 and: Staab, A. Xenophobia, ethnicity and 
national identity in Eastern Germany. German Politics, Aug 1998: 7(2), pp. 31-46. See also: Wilds, K. 
Identity creation and the culture of contrition: recasting 'normality' in the Berlin Republic. German 
Politics, Apr 2000: 9(1), pp. 83-102.
2 See: Gregor, N. A Schicksalgemeinschaft? Allied bombing, civilian morale and social dissolution in 
Nuremberg, 1942-1945. The HistoricalJournal, 2000: 43(2), pp. 1051-1052 and: Sebald, W. G. On the 
natural history of destruction. Translated by A. Bell. London: Penguin Books, 2004, pp. 3-32.
3 See: Theisen, A. Die Vertreibung der Deutschen - Bin unbewaltigtes Kapitel europaischer 
Zeitgeschichte. Aus Politik undZeitgeschichte, 10.02.95 (B7-8), pp. 20-33.
4 See: Burger, R. Gorlitzer Schliisselerlebnisse. Im Schlesischen Museum wird sehr behutsam an die 
Vertreibung erinnert. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 03.09.03 (204), p. 3.
2. Setting the scene.
Before reunification in October 1990, questions of national identity appeared to have 
settled down into an awkward, but mutual recognition of the status quo. One state, the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR), was compelled to look east and adopt the mantle 
of the 'innocent state of workers and peasants'. Such inferences were evident from 
academic contributions in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte and from Mary Fulbrook when 
assessing German identity and the causes of xenophobia within the former GDR.5 
Dispensing with Prussian militarism, the other, the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG), adopted western values and institutions whose most obvious expressions of 
national consciousness were a ' Westbindung'', or bond to the west, the 'Bonn Republic' 
and a Verfassungspatriotismus or constitutional patriotism.6
However, with the fall of the Iron Curtain and an increase of ethnic German re-settlers, 
non-ethnic German immigrants and asylum seekers re-opened questions of nationhood, 
underlining and exacerbating tensions between exclusive and inclusive definitions of 
national identity. Due to the unresolved issues of citizenship, immigration and 
multiculturalism, the question of how Germans and non-Germans relate to each other 
has gained increasingly in significance since reunification. In a 1993 edition of Debatte, 
for instance, it was evident that a regressive nationalism and an ethnically orientated 
identity, apparently in the ascendance, were not the answers to an alleged allusive 
national unity, but rather a broader and more inclusive German national identity. 7
Before reunification, Germany was the only major European country that adhered to 
and defended an exclusive jus sanguinis (law of descent) as the main principle in 
defining citizenship. Indicative of this phenomenon was the virtually inviolable right of 
thousands of ethnic Germans to enter Germany and claim citizenship. 8 Yet, since the 
1990s there have been moves away from former official self-definitions, indicating 
ethnicity no longer constitutes such an important part of German identity.
5 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. German national identity after the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999,
pp. 20, 55-58. See also: Poutrus, P. G., Behrends, J. C. and Kuck, D. Historische Ursachen der
Fremdenfeindlichkeit in den neuen Bundeslandern. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 2000 (B39), pp. 15-
21.
6 See: Zimmer, M. From the national state to the rational state and back? An exercise in understanding
politics and identity in Germany in the twentieth century. German Politics, Dec 1999: 8(3), pp. 21-31, 34-
35 and: Wilds, K. op. cit., pp. 86-92.
7 See: Brandt, P. op. cit., pp. 30-41 and: Brunssen, F. ,,Angst vor Deutschland" and German self- 
definition. Debatte, 1994 (1), pp. 56-63. See also: Kolinsky, E. Multiculturalism in the making? Non- 
Germans and civil society in the new Ldnder. German Politics (Special Issue), 1998: 7(3), pp. 192-214.
8 See: Hogwood, P. Citizenship controversies in Germany: the twin legacy of Volkisch nationalism and 
the Alleinvertretungsanspruch. German Politics, Dec 2000: 9(3), pp. 125-144.
Developments, such as the opening up of boundaries in East and Central Europe, 
prompted restrictions on the migration of ethnic Germans whose former right to 
automatic citizenship have been increasingly curtailed. Advocates of change, such as 
liberal intellectuals, social and political reformers, along with members of the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) and Greens, contended, for example, that this right was rather 
outdated and no longer justified, arguing instead for a less selective approach to 
citizenship.9
Another related key theme of self-definition during the early 1990s and beyond was 
how the ruling national political elites and some of the public dealt with and responded 
to immigration. In response to the large flows of immigrants as a consequence of the 
collapse of Communism, during the 1990s protracted and often very emotional debates 
surrounding the question of whether or not Germany was a land of immigration, such as 
the United States and Canada, polarised the country. 10 Since the 1998-2005 
SPD/Alliance 90/The Greens government (hereafter referred to as SPD/The Greens) and 
their supporters promoted continued immigration whilst the media and elements of the 
public sought to end it, another source of conflict was the ongoing issue of 
multiculturalism. Reflected in debates within the Bundestag, a greater public acceptance 
of multiculturalism became a key demand from supporters of ethnic plurality in their 
quest for a more positive attitude to immigration and foreigners." From the opposite 
pole of the political spectrum, there were claims of a revived Uberfremdungsangste 
(fear of being inundated with foreigners) and search for a non-rational, emotional and 
ethno-nationalist concept of national identity. 12
Posing the question of German identity in new and different ways, the integration of the 
East not only exposed disputed identities, but also competing and contradictory values. 
Whilst some intellectuals and parts of the media claimed that German identity was an
9 See: Lemke, C. Crossing borders and building barriers: migration, citizenship and state building in
Germany. In: Klausen, J. and Tilly, L. A. (eds). From European integration in social and historical
perspective 1850 to the present. Oxford/New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1997, pp. 85-
102 and: Hogwood, P. op. cit., pp. 132-133, 138-140.
10 See: Kurthen, H. Germany at the crossroads: national identity and the challenges of immigration.
International Migration Review, 1995: 29(4), pp. 914-938 and: Hogwood, P. op. cit., pp. 125-144.
" See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/28. Stenographischer Bericht 28 Sitzung. Bonn,
19.03.99, pp. 2306-2325 and: Kahane, A. and Prantl, H. ,,Wasser auf die Miihlen der volkischen
Stimmung." Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 15.04.97, p. 10. See also: Dirke, S. von, Multikulti: the German debate
on multiculturalism. German Studies Review, 1994: 17, pp. 513-536.
12 See: Schonwalder, K. Migration, refugees, and ethnic plurality as issues of public and political debates
in (West) Germany. In: Cesarani, D. and Fulbrook, M. (eds). Citizenship, nationality and migration in
Europe. London/New York: Routledge, 1996, pp. 159-178.
unresolved issue, key representatives of the Bundestag political elite and left-liberals 
continued to seek consensus, promoting a Verfassungspatriotismus as a suitable model 
for German identity based explicitly on the Grundgesetz (Basic Law). 13
Since the Catholic and Protestant churches first introduced the term 'multiculturalism' 
to the FRG in 1980, there have also been ongoing debates about the extent to which 
Germany represents a multicultural society. On the one hand, there have been claims 
that Germany has moved way from an allegedly ethnically homogenous nation to a 
multicultural society. 14 On the other, some in Germany have contended that 
multiculturalism is a belated and rather unwelcome concept in the former GDR and 
even within some areas of the FRG. Aside from claims that the GDR had only a small 
number of foreign contract workers with whom the locals had little or no contact, 
official doctrine proclaimed that what ethnic identities and attendant tensions there were 
had effectively disappeared. Hence, until reunification, multiculturalism was never an 
issue for the GDR. 15
Closely linked to issues of societal tolerance and self-understanding, reunification and 
the compulsory re-distribution of asylum-seekers within the new Lander (states) has 
forced Germans to rethink who they are. On the insistence of officials from various 
West German Lander, the unification treaty stipulated that the new Lander must take at 
least 20% of all asylum seekers. 16 Whilst not exclusively German, since reunification 
anti-foreigner violence has also been a major social issue. Although prompting 
candlelight demonstrations in Munich, Hamburg, and other major cities against right- 
wing violence, in response to unprecedented levels of asylum seekers between 1991 and 
1992, racist attacks against foreigners and asylum centres reached an all-time high. 17
13 See: Bohrer, K-H. Why we are not a Nation - And why we should become one. In: James, H. and 
Stone, M. (eds). When the wall came down: reactions to German unification. New York/London: 
Routledge, 1992, pp. 60-70 and: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 10-11. See also: StrauB, B. ,,Anschwellender 
Bocksgesang." Der Spiegel, 08.02.93 (6), pp. 202-207 and: Hogwood, P. op. cit., pp. 125-144.
14 See: Haselbach, D. Multicultural reality and the problem of German identity. In: Haselbach, D. (ed). 
Multiculturalism in a world of leaking boundaries. Miinster: LIT Verlag, 1998, pp. 211-223 and: Zimmer, 
M. op. cit., pp. 34-35.
15 See: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., pp. 513-536 and: Kolinsky, E. op. cit., pp. 192-214. See also: Staab, A. op. 
cit., pp. 40-43 and: Kahane, A. and Prantl, H. op. cit., p. 10.
16 See: Kolinsky, E. op. cit., pp. 201, 213.
17 See: Brunssen, F. op. cit., pp. 56-63 and: Panayi, P. Racial exclusionism in the new Germany. In: 
Larres, K. (ed). Germany since unification: the domestic and external consequences. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998, pp. 134-139.
Following restrictions to the asylum law in May 1993, racist attacks fell in comparison 
to the two previous years by one third, but xenophobic incidents have continued to 
attract media and official attention - particularly since the former SPD/Green ruling 
coalition introduced the Green Card for foreign workers in 2000. Yet, as various 
political scientists pointed out, the vast majority of Germans have generally distanced 
themselves from xenophobia, ethnocentrism and racial prejudice. 18 Nevertheless, the 
central question of what constituted German identity remained. Raising divisive 
questions about who could and who could not be classed as German, the controversies 
surrounding German identity were played out in the political and public debates about 
citizenship, immigration and xenophobia.
Not only were there widespread anxiety and resentment towards immigration and 
asylum, but also an increasing impatience from some with the historical shame and 
singularity of the Holocaust. Dismissing open assertions of national identity and 
relegating national consciousness, the prevailing historical paradigm in the FRG 
increasingly became one of a collective remembrance of atonement after 1945. 19 Up to 
1989 and beyond, what some historians, such as Rainer Zitelmann and Lutz 
Niethammer, described as 'a negative interrogation of the past' remained central to 
German identity - both in the FRG and, to a lesser extent, the GDR. 20 Although by no 
means exclusive to the Bundestag political elite, demands for an ongoing and critical 
engagement with the National Socialist past also became part of the basic political 
consensus amongst the major political parties in the FRG. For various representatives of 
the Bundestag, collective guilt in the form of an Erinnerungsarbeit, or labour of 
remembrance, was a key component of German historical consciousness and identity. 21
However, there are often discrepancies between reported and actual attitudes. 
Challenging official portrayals of the National-Socialist era and German guilt, the 
Historikerstreit (Historians' Debate) provoked Germany's first real comprehensive
18 See: Kurthen, H. op. cit., p. 928 and: Kuechler, M. Germans and 'others': racism, xenophobia or 
'legitimate conservatism'? German Politics, Apr 1994: 3(1), pp. 47-48. See also: Brunssen, F. op. cit., pp. 
58, 62.
19 See: Zimmer, M. op. cit., pp. 21-42 and: Sebald, W. G. op. cit., pp. 3-32.
20 Cited from: Niethammer, L. The German Sonderweg after Unification. In: Alter, R. and Monteath, P. 
(eds). Rewriting the German past: history and identity in the new Germany. New Jersey: Humanities 
Press, 1997, pp. 129-151. See also: Berger, S. The search for normality: national identity and historical 
consciousness in Germany since 1800. Providence/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997, pp. 177-197.
21 See: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 177, 191 and: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/48. 
Stenographischer Bericht 48 Sitzung. Bonn, 25.06.99, pp. 4087-4119.
public self-interrogation about national consciousness and collective guilt. 22 On one side 
of the debate, conservative historians attempted to minimise the significance of the 
Holocaust by advocating that National Socialist transgressions ought to be qualified 
with other genocides. Conversely, liberals and those from the left demanded that the 
Holocaust ought to be remembered for what it was; namely, an indispensable part of 
German collective memory. Intervention by the then FRG President Richard von 
Weizsacker and common sense ensured that recognition of historical responsibility 
prevailed.23
As well as prompting a reassessment of post-national identities, reunification also 
seemed to have rekindled a re-examination from some quarters of the historical basis of 
a collective identity based around Auschwitz. Raised again by the conservative historian 
Ernst Nolte and others following reunification, doubts were expressed once more about 
the whole concept of German collective guilt, contesting official and liberal 
representations of the past and collective memory. 24
Following on from the Historikerstreit of the 1980s, a second controversy surrounded 
the 1998 Frankfurt am Main Paulskirche speech by the German novelist Martin Walser. 
Provoking considerable criticism, Walser condemned all those he claimed had exploited 
the Holocaust for political purposes and insisted that Auschwitz was not a public, but a 
private affair of recollection. 25 Although not initially a question of collective guilt, 
Martin Walser's acceptance speech for the 1998 Peace Prize for Literature certainly 
developed into one. It was in this re-configured context that Walser's 1998 speech broke 
a former taboo, openly challenging the Bundestag political elite's insistence on 
collective atonement.26
A more serious and constructive debate was that initiated by the Hamburg Institute for 
Social Research to the alleged popular myth that the Wehrmacht was a principled and
22 See: Miiller, J-W. Another country: German intellectuals, unification and national identity. New 
Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 60-61 and: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 125-127.
23 See: Kansteiner, W. Mandarins in the public sphere: Vergangenheitsbewdltigung and the paradigm of 
social history in the Federal Republic of Germany. German Politics and Society, Fall 1999: 17(52/3) pp. 
84-120 and: Brinks, J. H. Children of the new fatherland: Germany's post-war right-wing politics. 
Translated by P. Vincent. London/New York: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000, pp. 101-109.
24 Along with Nolte, other historians included Hellmut Diwald, Imanuel Geiss, Michael Prinz, and Rainer 
Zitelmann. See: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., pp. 108-109 and: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 124-141, 177-200. See also: 
Jennerich, C. Discomfort violence and guilt. Debatte, 2000: 8(1), pp. 55-69.
25 See: Wilds, K. op. cit., p. 97 and: Kansteiner, W. op. cit., pp. 84-120.
26 See: Mohr, R. Total normal? Der Spiegel, 30.11.98 (49), p. 42 and: Geyer, M. (ed). The power of 
intellectuals in contemporary Germany. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 2001, pp. 6-7.
honourable military institution. Breaking years of silence, the exhibit provided an 
opportunity for the descendants of former combatants to acknowledge, question or deny 
the past actions of loved ones on the Eastern Front.27 Since the opening of the first anti- 
Wehrmacht exhibition in Hamburg in 1995, hundreds of academic articles and 
newspaper reports have been published on the behaviour of the German army on the 
Eastern Front during the Second World War.28 Central to the claims of the exhibition 
was the extent of the crimes of the Wehrmacht committed by individual soldiers. 
Historian Christian Hartmann asked in the academic quarterly the Vierteljahrshefte fur 
Zeitgeschichte, for example, 'Was it few or was it many?' 29 Perceived by many in 
Germany as having a direct bearing on questions of German identity and memory, the 
reverberations of a Vergangenheitsbewaltigung, or a coming to terms with the National 
Socialist past, showed no signs of abating at the time of writing. There have been 
various claims that public and intellectual discourse concerning German suffering has 
changed.
Although challenged, indicative of a re-writing of the recent past was the depiction and 
remembrance of the 60th anniversary of the Allied Air Campaign and German suffering 
during and following the Second World War. On the one hand, FRG portrayals of the 
past were alleged to have ignored or downplayed the suffering of the survivors of the 
Allied Bombing Campaign between 1943 and 1945. As German author Winfried Georg 
Sebald and Fulda historian Giinter Sagan contended, the theme was effectively sidelined 
within the official Erinnerungskultur or culture of remembrance. 30 On the other, the 
conduct of the Red Army in 1945 along with the fates of thousands of ethnic Germans 
were also claimed to have been ignored, misrepresented or classified as taboo by the 
GDR authorities. 31 In short, there were various allusions to what author Volker Hage 
described as a ' Darstellungsverbof (representational prohibition) in the FRG
27 See: Nolan, M. The politics of memory in the Berlin Republic. Radical History Review, Fall 2001 (81), 
pp. 118-124.
28 See: Rosenhaft, E. Facing up to the past - again? "Crimes of the Wehrmacht", Debatte, 01.05.97 (5), 
pp. 105-118. See also: Wiegrefe, K. Abrechnung mit Hitlers Generalen. Der Spiegel, 26.11.01 (48), p. 84 
and: Kellerhoff, S. F. Unklare Vorstellungen. Die Welt, 19.03.04, p. 27.
29 Cited from: Hartmann, C. Verbrecherischer Krieg- Verbrecherische Wehrmacht? Uberlegungen zur 
Struktur des deutschen Ostheers. Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, 2004: 52, pp. 1-3.
30 See: Sebald, W. G. op. cit., pp. 3-32 and: Sagan, G., Heiler, T. and Kann, B. Der Tod kam in der 
Mittagszeit. Fulda im Bombenkrieg 1944-1945. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Stadtarchiv Fulda/Wartberg 
Verlag, 2004, pp. 3-5. See also: Lau, M. 'Der Brand' und das Zweisrromland. Die Welt, 19.12.02, p. 7.
31 See: Grass, G. Crabwalk. Translated by K. Winston. London: Faber and Faber, 2004, pp. 29, 50, 94, 
103 and: Surminski, A. Das Trauma einer Generation. Flucht und Vertreibung. 60 Jahre danach: ein neuer 
Blick auf das Drama im Osten. Geo Magazin, Nov 2004 (11), pp. 112-114.
concerning the Air War and in the GDR in respect of the so-called 're-settlement' of 
ethnic Germans (Umsiedler). 32
Understandably, perhaps, as far as past and current members of the German ruling 
political elite were concerned, German grief and suffering was a logical consequence of 
the explicit or tacit support for National Socialism. During a speech by the former FRG 
President Roman Herzog, commemorating the 50th anniversary of the destruction of 
Dresden, it was apparent that Germans were the guilty perpetrators, whose grief both 
during and after the war was 'their just punishment'. 33 Evidently, Germans were held 
collectively responsible for the crimes of the National Socialists. What claims there 
were for national victim status of the Germans were usually confined to expellee 
organisations or neo-Nazis. Most Germans, or so it was claimed, did not want to know.34 
In sum, German suffering was considered as secondary to the suffering of the victims of 
National Socialism.
However, it is now becoming unreasonable to reject claims of national victim status on 
the grounds of past German crimes or fears of the theme precipitating charges of equal 
culpability. Indicative of this phenomenon was the growing tendency of local historians 
and some of the media to want to evaluate the Air War and expulsions from an 
analytical concept, highlighting oppression and injustice as a means of interpreting and 
dealing with the past. That is, from a so-called Geschichte von unten or a history from 
below. 35 This was particularly evident within publications concerning the Air War in 
Darmstadt and Osnabriick.36 Catalysts for this alleged new Zeitgeist were Giinter 
Grass's Crabwalk (Im Krebsgang) and military historian Jorg FriedricrTs Der Brand 
(The Fire}.
32 Cited from: Hage, V. Feuer vom Himmel. Der Spiegel, 12.01.98 (3), pp. 138-141. See also: Rohl, K. R. 
Verbotene Trauer: Ende der deutschen Tabus. Tubingen: Universitas Verlag, 2002, pp. 76, 219 and: 
Meyer-Rebentisch, K. Angekommen. 60 Jahre Fliichtlinge und Vertriebene in Ltibeck. Liibeck: 
Hansestadt Liibeck, Bereich Kunst und Kultur. Kulturforum Burgkloster, 2005, pp. 1-5, 101.
33 See: Ansprache von Bundesprasident Roman Herzog in Dresden. Bundespraesident [Online]. 13.02.95 
[Accessed 26.02.04]. <http://www.bundespraesident.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_l 1996.htm>
34 See: Sebald, W. G. op. cit., pp. 3-32 and: Grass, G. op. cit., pp. 103-104, 29, 63, 194-195.
35 See: Berhausen, E. Zeitzeugen geben der Geschichte ein Gesicht. Banner General-Anzeiger, 13.05.05, 
p. 9 and: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 1-5, 18-25,40-46, 95-112.
36 See: Honold, K. Darmstadt im Feuersturm. Die Zerstorung am 11. September 1944. Gudensberg- 
Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag, 2004 and: Rickling, M. Der Tag, an dem Osnabriick ging unterging. 13. 
September 1944. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Kulturgeschichtliches Museum Osnabriick (KGM)AVartberg 
Verlag, 2004.
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On the 57l anniversary of the end of the Second World War, former German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder declared that nations are communities of consent, not 
descent.37 Although the German ethno-national state has effectively disappeared from 
official rhetoric, there have been claims of a revived national socialist 'Blut und Boden\ 
or 'blood and soil', mentality amongst neo-Nazi Kameradschaften and female heathen 
groups.38 Promoting the preservation of the Germanic race, new social identity protest 
groups have become associated with disaffected German youth, ethnic identity and 
xenophobia - in both the west and the former GDR.39 There has also been a revival of 
interest in Germany's ethnic past and origins concerning the confirmation of an ancient 
battle site known as the Varus-Schlacht (Varus Battle).40
Whilst critics of conventional interpretations of national identity, such as Hans-Ulrich 
Wehler and Heinrich August Winkler, held nationalism and its assertions as responsible 
for numerous conflicts both past and present, for many, national identity remains one, if 
not the most important and enduring symbol of self-identification.41 Enabling mankind 
to comprehend itself and reality, without national identities we know neither who we 
are nor where we are going.
Although not the only politically relevant identity at the time of writing, the impact of 
national identity is unquestionably beyond doubt. Having the capacity to inspire exalted 
acts of bravery and instil incredible crimes of brutality, millions have willingly given 
their lives in its defence - however misguided. It has also given rise to some of the most 
creative pieces of music, literature and art in the world, as well as some of the most 
destructive ideologies. Without the aforementioned, the history of mankind would not 
be the story of mankind as we know it, just merely, perhaps, a tale of elevated if 
commendable ideals that nearly always fall short of man's expectations. Whatever the 
merits or otherwise of national identity, nations and national identities remain essential
37 See: Nation, Patriotismus, Demokratische Kultur. Debatte mil Gerhard Schroder. News Archive. 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [Online]. 31.05.02 [Accessed 23.02.04]. 
<http://www.berlin.spd.de/servlet/PB/menu/1534815/1016827.html>
38 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001, Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg. Hamburg: Behorde fur Inneres, 
Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Hamburg, Apr 2002, pp. 92-120 and: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., pp. 23-35. 
See also: Richter, A. "Blood and Soil": what it means to be German. World Policy Journal, Winter 1998- 
1999: 15(4), pp. 91-98.
39 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 Niedersachsen. Hannover: Niedersachsisches Innenministerium, 
2000, pp. 10, 36-38, 79-80 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht Land Brandenburg 2003. Potsdam: 
Ministerium des Innern des Landes Brandenburg, Mai 2004, pp. 92-96, 120-121, 143.
40 See: Schulz, M. Che Guevara im Nebelland. Archaologie. Der Spiegel, 08.03.04 (11), pp. 152-158.
41 See: Zimmer, M. op. cit., p. 22 and: Wilds, K. op. cit., pp. 84-89. For defenders of national identity, 
such as Dieter Stein and Andreas Staab, see: Staab, A. op. cit., pp. 31-46 and: Springate, C. Germany: this 
land is our land. New Statesman & Society, 19.05.95, pp. 24-25.
to self-understanding. Nevertheless, one might well ask, whose interpretation of the 
nation and identity? Arguably, national identity only becomes a social reality if 
sufficient people choose to believe in some or other constructed collective identity.
Whilst most Germans accept the legitimacy of political authority, at the same time, 
public contentment with the Federal Republic has not been so widespread as in the 
past.42 Summarising national identity, Professor of Political Science Walker Connor 
argued: 'National consciousness is a mass, not an elite phenomenon. Seldom have the 
generalities been applicable to the masses; very often the elites' conception of the nation 
does not extend to them.'43 As with all generalisations, much is oversimplified. 
However, with all generalisations, there is also some element of truth.
It is often claimed that political elites possess distinctive idioms or ways of talking and 
thinking about nationhood - one of whose main tasks is to represent the nation. This is 
usually affected by what academics Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson called the 
'invention of tradition' or 'imagining communities' that form an elite's basis for their 
claim as self-appointed representatives of national identity.44 Yet, popular idioms or 
ways of discussing and expressing nationhood and identity formation may differ 
considerably from those of the political elite. Along with the official idioms of what 
Professor Lewis J. Edinger called the 'top-level participants of the ruling policymaking 
German national elite', there are also those of the popular classes of the masses, such as 
gender, ethnicity, and public discourses of the past or collective memory.45 So, what 
were the prevailing idioms of German nationhood between 1990 and 2005, and were 
they what the Bundestag elite claimed? How did popular cultural idioms of nationhood 
differ from those of the Bundestag political elite and to what extent did an officially 
endorsed Verfassungspatriotismus find resonance with what academics Klaus von 
Beyme, Mary Fulbrook and Rheinhold Kruppa have defined as 'the masses'?46 In sum,
42 For these claims see: Dahrendorf, R. Germans lack the key to their identity. In: James, H. and Stone, 
M. (eds). op. cit., pp. 230-232 and: Springate, C. op. cit., pp. 24-25. See also: Backes, U. and Mudde, C. 
Germany: extremism without successful parties. Parliamentary Affairs, 2000: 53, pp. 457-468.
43 Cited from: Connor, W. Ethnonationalism: the quest for understanding. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994, p. 223. See also: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and 
Germany. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992, pp. 163, 235.
44 Cited from: Anderson, B. Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. 
Rev. ed. London/New York: Verso, 1991, pp. 6-7, 19, 67-69 and: Hobsbawm, E. The nation as invented 
tradition. In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (eds). Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 
pp. 76-83. See also: Brubaker, R. op. cit., pp. 1-16, 163, 184.
45 Edinger, L. J. West German politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 93, 117, 125.
46 For comparisons to the masses in the context of a Verfassungspatriotismus or national identity, see: 
Beyme, K. von, Deutschland zwischen Verfassungspatriotismus und Neo-Nationalismus. Forum:
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to what extent were there key dissonances between official and popular conceptions of 
national identity and collective memory?
3. The elite group under consideration.
Whilst not exhaustive, the term 'elite' could be defined as those literate members of 
society holding dominant positions in various institutions, expressing and formulating 
opinions. Holding public or private power, elites often possess wealth, are usually 
educated to a high standard, accept certain values and usually strive to uphold the 
established social order. Seeking to maintain and limit social control, they also attempt 
to a greater or lesser degree to restrict the impact of competing value systems of a given 
society.
Although this thesis revolves around Germany's political elite, attention should also be 
paid to the often acrimonious, personal, generational, professional and ideological 
rivalries between elites. On the one hand, there are the national political elites in 
Germany. Drawing on Edinger, this thesis identifies the national political elite as those 
political leaders from both the ruling and opposition parties of the Federal Parliament, 
who derive their authority from Article 21 of the Basic Law.47 On the other, there are 
also social cultural elites, comprising academics and the opinion-making media. Both 
seek to or affect considerable influence on public attitudes. Although all elites may be 
determined by status, wealth and education, political elites do not necessarily represent 
the interests or opinions of social elites or the masses. Based on that premise, this thesis 
contends that some of Germany's social elites have become the self-appointed 
representatives of the masses over key issues in Germany, exposing major dissonances 
between official and popular conceptions of identity and memory.
As far as shaping public opinion goes, the influence of Bundestag elites and the mass 
media is often apparent within established dailies and weeklies, such as the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Zeit, Der Spiegel and the Suddeutsche Zeitung.  Reacting to 
implied and explicit political messages, the Bundestag elite, social elites and the masses
Deutschland nach Solingen. Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 1993: 8, pp. 457-460 and: Fulbrook, M. op. 
cit.,pp. 13-18, 118, 140-147, 155, 166-172.
47 'Under Article 21 of the Basic Law, leaders of both the principal governing and opposition parties are 
invested with key participating roles, even when they do not hold public offices.' Cited from: Edinger, L. 
J. op. c/A, pp. 13-16, 111-112,116-125.
48 For these claims see: Ibid., pp. 111-117 and: Ardagh, J. Germany and the Germans: After Unification. 
New Rev ed. London/New York: Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 354-367.
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often adapt their outlook on the basis of information supplied to and from the media - 
particularly from television and newspaper interviews. Attracting media attention, 
public opinion may also be determined by political campaigning or going on walkabout 
from political elites to win the hearts and minds of prospective voters.
Indicative of the influence of regional political elites on public opinion is the role of 
leaders and representatives from the 16 state parliaments (Landtage) from across the 
political spectrum. In January 1999, for example, the former Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) Prime Minister of Hesse, Roland Koch, personally collected signatures in 
Wiesbaden against dual citizenship for foreigners.49 Along with their 1999 campaign 
against dual nationality, public sympathy was also garnered for suitable remembrances 
of the expulsions and the Air War by CSU (Christian Social Union)/CDU regional 
elites, such as CSU Chairman Edmund Stoiber and CDU Mayor of Frankfurt am Main 
Petra Roth, by way of their 'Sunday speeches' and interviews in the media. 50 Pressure 
groups associated with the Federation of Expellees (BdV), such as the Landsmannschaft 
Munster and the Berliner Landesverband, have also recently sought or obtained media 
coverage in order to attract maximum public attention and support. 51
Representing a break from 'traditional polities' and German national identity, so-called 
left-libertarian 'citizens' initiative groups', such as the one launched by German 
television celebrity Lea Rosh for a Holocaust Memorial in Berlin, have also attracted 
public sympathy. 52 Another example was the successful campaign in 1988 by political 
opposition parties, churches, the media and various interest groups against the draft of a 
new Foreigner Law, effectively restricting immigration. Proposed by the former CSU 
Federal Minister of the Interior, Friedrich Zimmermann, the draft had to be withdrawn. 53 
Determining the political relationship between people and the state, political leaders of
49 For a photograph depicting Koch collecting signatures in Wiesbaden during 1999, see: Deupmann, U., 
Hildebrandt, T. and Mestmacher, C. Kulturkampf ums Vaterland. Der Spiegel, 06.11.00 (45), p. 27.
50 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., p. 186. See also: Darnstadt, T., Emke, C. and Mascolo, G. Der 
Kampf um die Passe. Der Spiegel, 11.01.99 (2), pp. 22-32 and: Graw, A. Stoiber streichelt die Seelen der 
Vertriebenen. Die Welt, 03.09.01, p. 4. See also: Roth erofmet ,,Marz 1944" Ausstellung zum 
Bombenkrieg. Frankfurter Rundschau, 24.03.04, p. 34.
51 See: Solidaritat mil Vetriebenen. Miinstersche Zeitung, 10.10.01, p. 1 and: Uhl, G. and Graw, A. 
Vertreibung aufarbeiten - von Sarajewo bis Berlin. Die Welt, 20.10.03, p. 2.
52 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. A concise history of Germany. Updated ed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991, p. 222 and: Edinger, L. J. op. cit., pp. 142-147, 178-179, 183, 223. See also: 
Kramer, J. Letter from Germany: the politics of memory. The New Yorker, 14.08.95, pp. 49-56.
53 See: Hoffrnann, C. Immigration and nationhood in the Federal Republic of Germany. In: Brady, J. S., 
Crawford, B. and Wiliarty, S. E. (eds). The postwar transformation of Germany: democracy, prosperity, 
and nationhood. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002, pp. 369-370.
12
organisations and other notables - both national and regional - seek to influence public 
opinion via the mass media.
Although often critical in their appraisals of certain controversial themes, the role and 
stance of the media in Germany is not always oppositional to official policies. On the 
one hand, social elites, such as journalists, justify the policy-makers' actions to the 
public or support official interpretations of controversial events. On the other, they may 
also act as powerful partisan opponents of official policy. Adopting the self-appointed 
role of interpreters of the news for the public, Germans interested in public affairs 
usually rely on information provided by reputable journalists and academics. Local 
historians, art historians, museum experts, memorial educators, along with publicists 
and journalists play a major role in discussions of public memory. 54
Prominent intellectuals, such as Karl Jaspers, Jurgen Habermas, Hans Mommsen and 
Jorg Friedrich, also play influential and competing roles as they interpret and criticise 
the ongoing policies and historical issues for the public.55 Often perceived as the 'moral 
voice of the nation', they are usually highly respected in German society. 56 Along with 
political scientists and historians, key participants and arguably major influences on 
national identity, memory and coming to terms with the past have also been leading left- 
liberal writers, such as Marion Gra'fin Donhoff, Heinrich Boll, Christa Wolf and Giinter 
Grass. Grass and Habermas, for instance, have participated in almost every major 
debate since reunification, touching on the political self-understanding of Germany and 
questions of national identity. 57
4. Key Terminology.
So, what exactly is national identity and can it be defined and refined? National identity 
can mean many things to many people. In contrast to neo-conservatives, nationalists, 
and the extreme right, many left-liberals reject an ethnic construction of identity, 
seeking instead to construct post-national forms of identification, such as a 
Verfassungspatriotismus. National identity based on a Verfassungspatriotismus is
54 See: Till, K. E. Staging the past: landscape designs, cultural identity and Erinnerungspolitik at Berlin's 
Neue Wache. Ecumene, 1999: 6(3), pp. 267-268.
55 Peter Gauweiler (CSU) and Angelika Kriiger-LeiBner (SPD) admitted Jorg Friedrich was instrumental 
in precipitating a new debate on German suffering. See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. 
Stenographischer Bericht 48 Sitzung. Berlin, 05.06.03, pp. 4103-4106.
56 Cited from: Till, K. E. op. cit., p. 267. See also: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 1-11.
57 For these claims see: Miiller, J-W. op. cit., pp. 8-9 and: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 90, 125-127, 159-171, 
187-188, 222. See also: Ardagh, J. op. cit., pp. 193, 298-301, 483.
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usually understood to mean a political culture and identity founded on the constitutional 
principles of the Grundgesetz, such as liberal democracy and equal rights for all 
irrespective of ethnic, social or cultural origins. 58 However, as far as the remits of this 
thesis are concerned, based on theories outlined by academics Anthony D. Smith and 
Mary Fulbrook, national identity is defined as a collective sense of belonging based 
around a common ethnicity, fate, historical consciousness and memory, shared by 
significant numbers of people.
Given that three chapters focus on key aspects of the Second World War and its legacy, 
Vergangenheitsbewdltigung constitutes a major feature of this thesis. Drawing on local 
historians Matthias Rickling (Osnabruck), Karen Meyer-Rebentisch (Liibeck) and Bonn 
journalist Elena Berhausen, a Geschichte van unten is taken to mean the history of the 
alleged under-mentioned in Germany in the context of the Air War and expulsions. 59 It 
has often been claimed, for example, that many former expellees - particularly German 
women - were still coping with the events of 1945 and the following months.
In chapters one and six, ethnic Germans are classified into four groups: Vertriebene, 
Aussiedler, Spataussiedler and Fluchtlinge. Following the provisions of the 
Bundesvertriebenengesetz (BVFG), Vertriebene are German nationals and ethnic 
Germans who have lost their former domiciles in recognised areas in connection with 
the Second World War because of expulsion. Yet, according to the Federal Ministry of 
the Interior (BMI), the Vertreibungsmafinahmen ended in 1949.60 It is in this connection 
that a distinction is often made between Aussiedler and Vertriebene. Aussiedler were 
ethnic German re-settlers from Central and Eastern Europe that have voluntarily 
relocated to Germany between 1950 and 1987.6 ' In chapter one, there are also numerous 
references to the term Spataussiedler (late re-settlers). Mostly originating from 
territories within the former Republics of the Soviet Union, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, Spataussiedler are ethnic Germans that have migrated to Germany since
58 See: Wilds, K. op. cit., pp. 83-102 and: Hogwood, P. op. cit., pp. 125, 136-142.
59 See: Rickling, M. op. cit., pp. 3-51 and: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 3-41. See also: Berhausen, 
E. op. cit., p. 9.
60 See: Vertriebene. Aussiedler Spataussiedler. In: Mueller-Bajohr, Maria (Bundesministerium des 
Innern). Personal communication, 10.07.07 and: Vertriebene. Bundesministerium des Innern [Online]. 
[Accessed 27.09.07]. <http://www.bmi.bund.de> See also Theisen, A. op. cit., p. 31.
61 See: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. Germany and its immigrants: a socio-demographic analysis. Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, Jan 1998: 24(1), pp. 25-30.
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1987." Based on a definition by the Lower Saxon Regional Centre for Political 
Education (NLPB), Fluchtlinge (refugees) are classified as those ethnic Germans who 
either elected, or were compelled, to abandon their former homes during or at the end of 
the Second World War. 63 Unless otherwise stated, the term 'minister 7 refers to a member 
of the Bundestag holding a specific post, appointed and dismissed by the German 
president on the suggestion of the German chancellor.64
5. Methodology and parameters of the study.
Drawing on theories of collective memory and national identity, as defined by Anthony 
D. Smith and Mary Fulbrook, this thesis assumes there were significant discrepancies 
between official and popular perceptions of national identity and memory. In order to 
address the validity of this claim, a determinedly interdisciplinary approach has been 
adopted using content analysis to investigate six selected themes of national identity.
Content analysis can be used to analyse a wide range of material from newspaper 
reports, television programmes, radio broadcasts, films, government reports and official 
speeches. 65 Employed as a technique for analysing the actual content of 
communications, content analysis is particularly useful for demonstrating how 
contemporary issues are taken up by the media in a positive or negative way and how, 
in turn, this affects their acceptance or dismissal by the ruling political elites.
How six topical themes of identity and memory were appraised in the media in 
comparison to the official line have been examined in order to ascertain the extent to 
which official conceptions of identity and memory were reflected at a popular level. 
Although this thesis has drawn on numerous sources of contemporary evidence, it is 
primarily based on what Edinger termed "supra-regional dailies and weeklies', 
publications from local archives and local newspapers, Bundestag minutes, press
62 See: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit., pp. 25-30. See also: Hogwood, P. op. cit., pp. 132-133 and: 
Amherst College Senior Noelle Noyes to Study German Immigration on von Humbolt Foundation 
Scholarship. Amherst College [Online]. 15.02.02 [Accessed 14.01.07]. <https://cms.amherst.edu/news/ 
news_releases/2002/feb_2002>
63 See: Hoffmann, P. and Winkler, M. (eds). ,,hier geblieben. " Zuwanderung und Integration in 
Niedersachsen von 1945 bis heute. Hannover: Niedersachsichen Landzentrale fur Politische Bildung, 
2002, p. 76.
64 See: Edinger, L. J. op. cit., pp. 19-22.
65 'Whenever somebody reads, or listens to, the content of a body of communication and then summarises 
and interprets what is there, then content analysis can be said to have taken place', noted Frank 
Baumgartner and Bryan Jones. See: Burnham, P. et al. Research methods in politics. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 236-237.
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releases and speeches. 66 Eyewitness testimonies in local newspaper and archive 
publications have been examined in order to convey a sense of how the Air War and 
expulsion themes were experienced from a grass roots level or a Geschichte von unten.61 
Responding to numerous claims that German national identity and memory have 
become problematic since reunification, this thesis evaluates the impact of citizenship, 
immigration, xenophobia, the Holocaust, the Air War and the expulsions. Presenting a 
focussed examination of significant developments in German society and politics since 
the beginning of the 1990s to 2005, a key aim of the thesis is to examine the legacy of 
the past as it continues to affect the present. This study does not provide an exhaustive 
account of the themes addressed, but it does go some way in providing a greater 
understanding of one of the most important states in Europe.
6. Structure of thesis.
This thesis has been divided into six chapters. Chapter one provides an overview of the 
origins of jus sanguinis and official motives for its retention, examining how citizenship 
policy has adjusted since reunification in relation to ethnic and non-ethnic Germans. 
This chapter also reviews the degree to which a Verfassungspatriotismus and German 
intellectual Johann Gottfried von Herder's interpretation of the Volk continues to enjoy 
contemporary relevance in both popular and official discourses of identity. Contrasting 
official stances on immigration with developments since reunification, chapter two 
looks at populist reactions to the former SPD/Green government's promotion of 
immigration in the face of continuing unemployment. It also considers the related issues 
of the preservation of German identity and the integration of foreigners that have arisen 
since reunification.
Responding to official claims that xenophobia is generally the preserve of the former 
GDR, chapter three considers the extent of racially motivated violence within both parts 
of Germany. Identifying key challenges to a Verfassungspatriotismus, the first three 
chapters of the thesis assess official and populist reactions to three subjects intricately 
connected to national identity. Another central theme of this study is to examine how
66 Cited from: Edinger, L. J. op. cit., pp. 116-117.
67 For academic defence of a Geschichte von unten, see: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 5-4. See also: 
Gelderblom, B. and Truchsefi, W. F. 60 Jahre Kriegsende. Eine Dokumentation iiber die letzten Tage des 
Zweiten Weltkrieges in und urn Hameln. Edition Weserbergland. Hameln: C W Niemeyer, 2005, pp. 11- 
18. See also: Sagan, G., Heiler, T. and Kann, B. op. cit., pp. 3-4, 52-56. See also: Ballerstedt, M. and 
Buchholz, K. Es regnet Feuer! Die Magdeburger Schreckensnacht am 16. Januar 1945. Gudensberg- 
Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag, 2003, pp. 3, 23-48.
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the past is being re-interpreted and presented in Germany. Beginning with how German 
guilt is being re-assessed from some quarters, chapter four examines the extent to which 
Auschwitz continues to inform to German national understanding. With the notable 
exceptions of Hamburg and Dresden, W. G. Sebald and others contended that the Allied 
Air War remained largely unarticulated at national level. Assessing the impact of the 
60th anniversary of the Air War, chapter five examines how the Allied Bombing 
Campaign between 1943 and 1945 is being remembered in popular and official 
discourses of the past.
Given popular pressure for a national Centre against Expulsion, chapter six asks to what 
extent the New Guardhouse (Neue Wache) fulfils its alleged official function as the 
central site of collective national remembrance and mourning. Is there a sense of an 
inadequate Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in Germany, as has been suggested by various 
German historians? Raising further questions over collective memory, reactions to the 
removal of official plaques honouring former war 'hero' Group Captain Wemer 
Molders are also considered. There have also been official and other concerns about a 
growing heathen subculture influenced by right-wing extremist ideology that is 
increasingly being embraced by female groups. Evaluating claims of a revival of 
interest in Germany's ethnic origins, ancient Germanic symbols and their 
misappropriation by various identity protest groups, chapter six examines how the 
ethnic past continues to determine German national self-understanding at a popular 
level. Focussing on key debates in the Bundestag about citizenship, immigration, 
xenophobia, and commemoration, this thesis examines the extent an official 
Verfassungspatriotismus and Erinnerungskultur reflected private and collective 
remembrance.
7. Justification of themes, source material and its challenges.
Primary sources were selected from leads found within print searches of various areas 
of secondary evidence, such as footnotes, bibliographies and textual references within 
books and articles. Official and other key sources of evidence were located from online 
searches using German search engines, online catalogues from higher educational 
institutions, official websites and British national bibliographic databases, based on 
their contemporary relevance and quality.
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Forming the essence of numerous press releases and debates in the Bundestag since 
reunification in October 1990, three themes in particular have constantly re-appeared in 
slightly varying combinations and intensity concerning self-definition. These were 
citizenship, immigration and xenophobia. Conferring not only political but also social 
and economic rights, citizenship and membership of the nation are inextricable from 
nationhood and national identity.68 Although the integration of millions of ethnic 
Germans in the post-war years was officially hailed as a great success, since 
reunification the admission, integration and ultimately questions of national belonging 
of the Russlanddeutsche, or ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union, have 
become topical issues of official and public concern. Questions have been raised not 
only over their numbers, but also concerning the integration of more recent arrivals into 
German society and their privileged access to citizenship based on ethnicity or alleged 
discrimination suffered within their host states.69
Over the centuries, citizenship has gradually endowed individuals with civil, political 
and social rights. Although citizenship is inclusive, it has often been exclusive, 
excluding foreigners based on their nationality. Perhaps debates on citizenship should 
primarily focus not on who we are, but what we are. Nevertheless, although some may 
contend an ethnic basis of citizenship is somewhat outdated, it is plausible to claim that 
what we are is who we are. 70 Examining amendments to citizenship entitlement for 
ethnic Germans and public reactions to dual nationality for non-ethnic Germans, which 
conception of national identity underlay official and popular self-understanding can, to 
some degree, be established.
Throughout chapter one and subsequent chapters, opinion polls have been utilised to 
measure public response to Spataussiedler, non-ethnic German immigration and dual 
nationality. Whilst public opinion surveys provide a useful medium for sounding out the 
mood at the time, opportunities for the articulation of mass concerns can be rather 
limited. Firstly, they only permit people to express their views in response to restrictive
68 See: Brubaker, R. op. cit., pp. i-ix, 1-34 and: Green, S. Citizenship policy in Germany: The case of 
ethnicity over residence. In: Hansen, R. and Weil, P. (eds). Towards a European nationality: citizenship, 
immigration and nationality law in the EU. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, pp. 24-51.
69 See: 22. Hilfenfiir Spataussiedler. Berlin: Bundesministerium flir Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung, 
01.01.03, p. 727 and: Sturzbecher, D. Jugend und Kriminalitdt in Brandenburg. Eine Materialsammlung. 
5.000 ed. Potsdam: Ministerium des Innern des Landes Brandenburg, Jan 1998, pp. 9-25. 
70 The Greens have long campaigned for a non-ethnic conception of citizenship. See: Lemke, C. Crossing 
borders and building barriers: migration, citizenship and state building in Germany. In: Klausen, J. and 
Tilly, L. A. (eds). op. cit., pp. 85-102. See also: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., pp. 513-536.
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questions. Secondly, they may not shed much light on the individual's motives or 
reasons for expressing something. Clearly, survey data has its limits.
National consciousness and identity can also be analysed by examining emotive issues 
triggering public responses, such as immigration. Immigration in Germany has 
provoked from some quarters an alleged Uberfremdungsangste and concomitant fears 
of a loss of German identity. What may seem as a justifiable or essential concern to 
preserve one's own identity for some, for others, national identity may appear as 
exclusionary, selfish, unacceptable or even dangerous. 71 Whilst German television 
stations and newspapers can offer a rich and variegated source of political information, 
at the same time, they also raise ethical and political problems. During the early 1990s 
and beyond, elements of the German media, such as Der Spiegel and Bild Zeitung, have 
stood accused of presenting negative images of asylum and fostering racist attitudes. 72
Although insensitive reporting about immigration can sometimes prompt attacks on 
asylum hostels, open discussion of immigration can also have positive effects, such as 
the campaigns for voting rights for foreigners in local elections and peaceful protests 
against racist violence in Germany. 73 Without a clear understanding of what actually lies 
behind xenophobia or the ideological changes said to have occurred since the fall of 
Communism, racist violence in Germany will perhaps never be effectively tackled or 
fully comprehended.
National identities tend to be created in contrast to other external identities, such as a 
perceived enemy. 74 By examining some of the reasons for xenophobia as perceived from 
within, what being German means can be established to some degree from without by 
analysing what it is not. Addressing the overarching question of the thesis, the theme of 
immigration underlined the official inclusive and populist exclusive definitions of 
nationhood being contested at the time of writing.
71 For some of these debates see: Kuechler, M. op. cit., pp. 47-74 and: Zimmer, M. op. cit., pp. 34-35.
72 The liberal philosopher Jurgen Habermas and the head of the employment agency for foreigners in East 
Germany, Anetta Kahane, have both criticised some of the German media for inflammatory reporting. 
See: Habermas, J. Die Zweite Lebensliige der Bundesrepublik. Die Zeit, 11.12.92,p. 48 and: Kahane, A. 
and Prantl, H. op. cit., p. 10. For criticism of Bild Zeitung see: Ardagh, J. op. cit., pp. 364-365.
73 See: Schonwalder, K. Migration, refugees, and ethnic plurality as issues of public and political debates 
in (West) Germany. In: Cesarani, D. and Fulbrook, M. (eds). op. cit., pp. 169-173.
74 For these claims see: Ekman, J. National identity in divided and unified Germany: continuity and 
change. Orebro: Orebro University, 2001, pp. 74, 80-81 and: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 16-17.
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Comparisons between statements on controversial themes from political elites and texts 
within the media go some way in demonstrating emergent disparities between official 
and popular discourses of collective memory. Revived attempts from some quarters to 
avoid historical responsibility concerning the Holocaust warrants urgent attention, 
because a prescribed memory serves no viable function per se if it does not reflect all 
those it is supposed to represent. Evidently, several political journals, weeklies and 
books have adopted a selective interpretation of how some of the German public 
perceived their country's past. Attracting condemnation in the left-liberal weekly Die 
Zeit, however, such depictions of alleged social reality were contested. According to 
academic Karl Wilds and Hungarian novelist Gyorgy Konrad, for instance, Walser's 
allegations that Auschwitz was being used as a 'moral club' brought 'a moral cosh 
crashing down on his head'. 75 Thus, texts from the media addressed to certain audiences 
whose political message, whether implied or explicit, often signifies different things to 
different readers.
Along with immigration, xenophobia, and a re-appraisal of the National Socialist past, 
how the 60th anniversary of the Air War was remembered represented another major 
quest for a consensual national memory in Germany at the time of writing. Since 
commemorations tend to construct national images of the past by presenting participants 
and observers with selected visions of history, their depiction constitutes an important 
element of German national identity.
In the 2002 book Der Brand (The Fire), Germany's first comprehensive analysis of the 
Air War against German towns and cities between 1940 and 1945, Jorg Friedrich 
questioned the ethics and official justification for the deaths of thousands of civilians by 
pre-empted and scientifically calculated firestorms. Although firestorms were 
undoubtedly a hideous weapon of war, perhaps their effects ought to be put into 
perspective. Anyone caught in the draught of a firestorm had little chance of survival, 
but as Friedrich and various city archive publications failed to point out, more Germans 
actually survived the firestorms than perished. 76 Despite the dropping of eighty million 
incendiaries, for example, only 0.7% of Germany's entire population were killed by
75 Cited from: Wilds, K. op. cit., p. 97. See also: Konrad, G. Die Freiheit des Erinnerns. Die Zeit, 22.12.98 
(53), p. 38 and: Kansteiner, W. op. cit., pp. 88, 90.
76 See: Friedrich, J. Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940-1945. 12th ed. Munchen: Propylaen, 
2003, pp. 27, 63-176 and: Ballerstedt, M. and Buchholz, K. op. cit, pp. 37-50. See also: Hils-Brockhoff, 
E. and Picard, T. Frankfurt am Main im Bombenkrieg. Mdrz 1944. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Frankfurt am 
Main Institut fur Stadtgeschichte/Wartberg Verlag, 2004, pp. 36-45.
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firestorms between 1943 and 1945. 77 Although Grass and Friedrich raised important 
issues, they and many other authors often overlooked the fact that German suffering 
would not have occurred if Germans had rejected Hitler and National Socialism.
Expressing reservations about the impact of The Fire, various members of the 
Bundestag accused Friedrich and his supporters of fostering a nationalist 
Erinnerungshdtur  Although studies dedicated to collective memory, such as The Fire 
and the Frankfurt Historical Institute's Frankfurt am Main in the Bombing War (2004), 
perhaps lapsed into a populist culture of emotionalism, these sources were fitting and 
very useful for comprehending Germany's new Erinnerungskultur, Both publications 
and others like them included numerous eyewitness testimonies on the Allied Air 
Campaign. 79
Memory is a useful medium for understanding the past and people whose stories have to 
be recorded in order to ensure their survival. There was a widespread perception 
amongst the media and local historians that the generation who experienced the Air War 
and expulsions are dying out, along with a concomitant sense of urgency to record their 
testimonies before they die. In short, eyewitness accounts have become progressively 
important in Germany - particularly in Darmstadt, Magdeburg and East Friesland. 80
Whilst oral history can sometimes convey a sense of the categories in which people 
think, it may also involve the bias of the observer, the exponent and comprise small 
samples from which it is difficult to generalise. Informants, for example, may have 
consciously or otherwise omitted or revised their recollections of the past. Nevertheless, 
oral history can make a vivid and significant contribution to historical analysis, 
provided it is dealt with critically and tested as to how relevant and representative it is. 81 
In relation to the contemporary relevance of the selection of numerous local articles and 
publications by newspapers on the Air War within the remit of the thesis, German
77 See: Honold, K. op. cit., pp. 7-8.
78 These allegations were made by Ministers Angelika Kriiger-LeiBner, (SPD), Hans-Joachim Otto (FDP) 
and Silke Stokar von Neuforn (Alliance 90/The Greens). See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 
15/48. op. cit., pp. 4106-4107.
79 See: Friedrich, J. op. cit., pp. 193-194, 204-205, 231-232, 350-352 and: Hils-Brockhoff, E. and Picard, 
T. op. cit., pp. 28-55. See also: Sagan, G., Heiler, T. and Kann, B. op. cit., pp. 17-56 and: Ballerstedt, M. 
and Buchholz, K. op. cit., pp. 23-48.
80 See: Honold, K. op. cit. and: Ballerstedt, M. and Buchholz, K. op. cit. See also: Herterich, P. and 
Schroder, H. Vertrieben nach Ostfriesland. Leer: Ostfriesen Zeirung, ZGO Zeitungsgruppe, 2005.
81 Hamelin historian Bernhard Gelderblom raised these points. See: Gelderblom, B. and Truchsefl, W. F. 
op. cit., pp. 16-17.
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history can perhaps best be understood in conjunction with local history. Although the 
effect of information obviously varies with different media, audience and location, 
evidence to-date suggests that local memory of the impact of the Air War was 
considerable throughout Germany.
Particularly striking was the manner in which the Air War was engaged by both local 
newspapers and 'supra-regional dailies' and weeklies in Germany. 82 Many seemed to 
have adopted the mantle of representative of this new culture of remembrance - 
especially in the form of what both German and foreign observers have described as an 
extensive Opferkult (victim cult). 83
Although the media sometimes functions ideologically, what perhaps should be 
remembered is that they neither represent nor express a single ideology.84 That said, 
newspapers and their publications can offer a unique approach to the study of the past 
since they are time-specific and are not usually written for posterity. Written for 
contemporary audiences, newspaper material often reveals a great deal about a certain 
period or topic. Unfortunately, however, the reliability, accuracy and actual reporting of 
newspaper material cannot always be assured. 85 As a corrective for the deficits and 
problems that inevitably arise from the use of newspapers, parliamentary minutes can 
provide a greater balance and insight to the theme under review. It is sometimes 
possible, in parliamentary minutes, to find the views of members of the Bundestag not 
necessarily always made open to the public. Reflecting on the merits of official sources 
of evidence, Professor of Contemporary History Rodney Lowe noted: 'The great 
advantage of government records is that they reveal the range of influences to which 
government was subjected at any given time.' 86
Prompted by Grass's 2002 publication Crabwalk, another important influence on the 
then German government was the popular demand for a national symbol and Centre
82 See: Edinger, L. J. op. cit., pp. 116-117.
83 For allusions to a new victim discourse see: Sontheimer, M. Schillerndes Ungeheuer. Der Spiegel, 
02.12.02 (49), pp. 156-157 and: Krzeminski, A. Die schwierige deutsche-polnische 
Vergangenheitspolitik. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 2003 (B40-41), pp. 3-5. See also: Kiihne, H-J. Der 
Tag, an dem Paderborn unterging. 27. Marz 1945. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag, 2005, p. 7.
84 See: Larsen, P. Media contents. Textual analysis of fictional media content. In: Jensen, K. B. and 
Jankowski, N. W. (eds). A handbook of qualitative methodologies for mass communication research. 
London/New York: Routledge, 1991, pp. 123, 129-130.
85 See: Wilkinson, G. R. Newspapers. In: Catterall, P. and Jones, H. (eds). Understanding documents and 
sources. Oxford: Heinemann, 1994, pp. 50-53.
86 Cited from: Burnham, P. op. cit., p. 177.
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against Expulsion for the thousands of ethnic Germans who died during their flight or 
expulsion from East and Central Europe during and after 1945. Places of collective 
remembrance and mourning can offer useful insights into understanding national 
identity.
Beginning around 1150, the colonisation of the Slav lands east of the river Elbe by 
Germans proved to have significant repercussions for Germany. 87 Becoming a central 
interpretive factor of history and identity for some in Germany, any comprehensive 
engagement with German politics, history, identity and memory needs to be understood 
against the background of ethnic Germans in East and Central Europe. Providing the 
backdrop for Crabwalk, the former West Prussian port of Danzig (now the Polish city of 
Gdansk) was, after all, the 'trigger' for the most destructive war in history. 88 Described 
by some in Germany as 'one of the biggest expulsions of recent history', by 1950, 
Vertriebene constituted 16.5% (one-sixth) of the total population of the FRG. 89 In the 
former GDR, meanwhile, one in every four of its inhabitants was a Vertriebene or 
descended from such a family.90 In other words, they are a part of German identity. 
Together with the Second World War, the legacy of the so-called 're-settlement' of 
ethnic Germans, along with their ethno-cultural and historical dimensions of national 
identity, continues to be felt in Germany at the time of writing.91
'Although Pomeranian, Silesian and East Prussian Vertriebene did not leave a 
perceptible cultural imprint on their new Heimat of East Friesland, what remains are 
their stories', claimed local authors Petra Herterich and Dr. Heiner Schneider.92 
Moreover, from such stories history and identities are made.
As with the relatively recently published accounts from the Air War, previously unheard 
testimonies of the Vertriebene have been enthusiastically aired, printed and discussed
87 See: Fulbrook, M. A concise history of Germany. Updated ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991, pp. 20-26 and: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 3-41.
88 See: Overy, R. and Wheatcroft, A. The road to war. London: Macmillan London Ltd., 1989, pp. 1-20 
and: Grass, G. op. cit., pp. 30-31, 56, 67, 107, 112, 133-134. See also: Lynch, M. Nazi Germany. London: 
Hodder Headline, 2004, p. 29.
89 See: Hirsch, H. Flucht und Vertreibung. Kollektive Erinnerung im Wandel. Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, 2003 (B40-41), p. 19 and: Brubaker, R. op. cit., p. 168. See also: Jaenecke, H. Der Wahn 
der reinen Nation. Flucht und Vertreibung. 60 Jahre danach: ein neuer Blick auf das Drama im Osten. 
Geo Magazin, Nov 2004 (11), pp. 128-135.
90 See: Theisen, A. op. cit., pp. 21, 31 and: Hirsch, H. op. cit., p. 19.
91 See: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 3-41, 106 and: Franz, M. 60 Jahre nach Kriegsende: Flucht und 
Vertreibung als Gegenstand der Erinnerung in Deutschland. Bayerische Zeitschrift fur Politik und 
Geschichte. [Online]. 2005 (2) [Accessed 21.06.06]. <http://www.km.bayern.de/blz/eup/02_05/2.asp>
92 Cited from: Herterich, P. and Schroder, H. op. cit., pp. 186-187.
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by local historians, radio stations, local newspapers and regional journals. Focussing on 
sensational themes likely to enhance their circulation, illustrated weeklies and monthlies 
also featured interviews with well-know writers, such as Giinter Grass. As far as some 
public attitudes went, however, it seemed the media had a good sense of what was going 
on within sections of the population in the wake of Crabwalk (2000). Take, for instance, 
the response to the publication Crabwalk. With more than 300,000 copies sold within a 
few months of publication, it seemed that Crabwalk met a popular demand for this 
particular aspect of the past. 93
As with all sources, the sincerity and motivation of the author ought to be considered. 
Perhaps Grass may have written an exaggerated account with the view of ensuring 
wider public acceptance and fostering the impression of the current Zeitgeist. Although 
Crabwalk may have shaped rather than reflected popular discourses of the past, that in 
itself did not necessarily make it any less relevant as a useful source. Perhaps Crabwalk 
and other articles on the expulsions helped bring closure for some with their past trauma 
and personal Vergangenheitsbewaltigung.
Although sometimes charged with dismissing or ignoring alternative views, at the same 
time, journalists bring a much-needed awareness to issues and events bypassed or even, 
sometimes, officially repressed. There have been claims that the flight and expulsions of 
ethnic Germans have not been adequately addressed in Wittenberg and Berlin.94 In 
addition to the subjective conditions under which sources are written, there is also the 
ideological manipulation of topical themes for political advancement to be considered. 
Established in 1991 and 2000, dissident organisations, such as the radical breakaway 
youth section of the Landsmannschaft Ostpreufien, the Junge Landsmannschaft 
Ostpreufien (JLO), and Die Preufiische Treuhand, were particularly noteworthy in this 
connection. 95
93 See: Noack, H-J. Die Deutschen als Opfer. Der Spiegel, 25.03.02 (13), pp. 36-39 and: Jahsnowski, M. 
"Im Krebsgang" - bei Dussmann gibt's das Grass-Buch wieder. Lokales. Berliner Kurier, 16.02.02, p. 6. 
See also: Seewald, B. Deutschland entdeckt seine Leiden und die Trauer darum. Die Welt, 09.12.02, p. 
27.
94 See: Everwien, A. Zwangsarbeiterinnen in Sibirien - Deportiert und Vergessen. Kontraste 1. Rundfunk 
Berlin Brandenburg [Online]. 09.12.04 [Accessed 19.02.05]. <http://www.rbb-online.de/_/kontraste/ 
beitrag_drucken_jsp/key=rbb_beitrag_1610533> and: Nitz, C. Stimmen zu Flucht und Vertreibung. 
Mitteldeutsche Zeitung, 16.02.04, p. 21. See also: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 3-5, 101.
95 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2003. Freistaat Sachsen. Dresden: Staatsministerium des Innern, 
Landesamt fiir Verfassungsschutz Sachsen, 31.12.03, pp. 51-53. See also: Hoftnann, G. Jetzt schreien wir 
wieder ,,Verrat." Die Zeit, 05.08.04 (33), p. 6.
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Remembering the past from a selective perspective also carries the danger that the 
expulsions could be taken out of their historical context, damaging relations and 
inhibiting a genuine reconciliation between Germany and its neighbours. However, if a 
comprehensive Vergangenheitsbewdltigung is to be properly affected and the past 
finally laid to rest, those who have suffered because of the errors of the past have to be 
remembered collectively. Moreover, remembering collectively is not an obstacle to, but 
a condition of reconciliation. Given the concerns expressed within the Bundestag 
regarding the public's reception of Crab-walk and The Fire, the Air War and expulsion 
themes were evidently key parameters of an official national identity and memory.
Evaluating key political and social developments in Germany since reunification, the 
theme of this project was decided given an alleged renaissance of an ethno-nationalist 
doctrine and a changing Erinnerungskultur concerning how German suffering was 
depicted and remembered in the wake of Crab-walk and The Fire. In sum, the reporting 
of attitudes and explanatory factors are far from consensual, which ought be kept in 
mind when assessing the limitations and merits of the influence of the media and 
academics in determining public opinion. Evaluating events since reunification, the 
informational cut-off point of the thesis and source material is November 2005.
8. Recent research and deficits in the literature.
According to key members of the Bundestag ruling political elite, any collective 
remembrance of German suffering must be expressed in a European context. As well as 
the merits of this stance, such as harmonious diplomatic relations and tolerance for 
others, there were also a number of problems. Firstly, since each respective state 
presented itself as the antithesis of the other, the demise of the GDR was, arguably, 
problematic for establishing a collective past. Berlin historian Annette Leo noted in Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte that there was no historical consensus concerning appraisals 
of the GDR or its classification within either a national or a European context.96 
Secondly, along with multiculturalism and the GDR's euphemistic depictions of the 
expulsions, the history of the Air War also required integrating with official 
representations of the past.97
96 See: Leo, A. Keine gemeinsame Erinnerung. Geschichtsbewusstsein in Ost und West. Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, 2003 (B40-41), pp. 27-32.
97 For criticism of the GDR's portrayals of the past see: Theisen, A. op. cit., pp. 20-22 and: Surminski, A. 
op. cit., pp. 112-114. See also: Grass, G. op. cit., pp. 29, 50, 105-107, 148, 160.
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On the one hand, the GDR authorities were far from silent about the Allied air raids. 
Referring to the Allied bombers as Luftgangster, the GDR authorities apparently rarely 
missed an opportunity to question the moral and strategic legitimacy of the air raids. 
According to Rolf-Dieter Miiller and Joachim Bolsche, for instance, the former East 
German Communist Party (SED) held a regular remembrance ceremony during which 
they exploited the firestorm of Dresden for anti-western propaganda purposes.98 On the 
other, criticism and questions about the mass rape and abduction of women and young 
girls to labour camps by the Red Army were strictly taboo in the GDR."
Whilst there were no official taboos in the FRG concerning events in eastern and central 
Europe, there have been numerous allegations of official taboos against portraying the 
Germans as innocent collective victims of the Allied firestorms. Because of real or 
imagined official pressure and fears of being labelled a neo-Nazi, representing the Air 
War from the perspective of the victim remained suppressed or simply ignored within 
mainstream German literature. Instead, previous debates about German history and 
memory usually focussed on the identity, behaviour and motives of the perpetrators and 
on the appropriate commemoration for the victims of National Socialism. 100
Existing German literature tended to focus on the Air War at local level. In 1955 and 
1984, for example, former chief of the Brunswick fire brigade Rudolf Prescher and local 
historian Armin Schmid published accounts of the firestorms in Brunswick and 
Frankfurt am Main. 101 Although FriedricrTs The Fire addressed the strategic and 
physical aspects of the Allied Air Campaign on towns and cities throughout Germany, 
what became apparent was a deficit in this and other literature concerning the 
psychological and emotional effects of the air raids against German civilians - 
particularly amongst those who were children at the time. 102
98 See: Miiller, R-D. Barbarisch und inhuman. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12.02.05 (36), p. 7 and: 
Bolsche, J. ,,So muss die Holle aussehen." Der Spiegel, 06.01.03 (2), p. 42.
99 These claims issued from Alfred Theisen, Arno Surminski and Annette Leo. See: Theisen, A. op. cit., 
pp. 20-22 and: Surminski, A. op. cit., pp. 112-114. See also: Leo, A. op. cit., p. 31.
100 See: Sebald, W. G. op. cit., pp. 3-32 and: Gleich bist du tot. Literarische Welt. Die Welt, 16.11.02, pp. 
1-2. See also: Wiborni, M. Bochum im Bombenkrieg. 4. November 1944. Eine Dokumentation des 
Stadtarchivs Bochum. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag, 2004, pp. 3-4.
101 See: Zauner, E-J. Chronist der Zerstorung. In: Raue, P-J. Die Bomben-Nacht. Der Luftkrieg vor 60 
Jahren. Braunschweiger Zeitung Spezial, 2004 (10), pp. 56-57 and: Prescher, R. Der rote Hahn uber 
Braunschweig. Braunschweig: Waisenhaus-Buchdruck, 1955. See also: Schmid, A. Frankfurt im 
Feuersturm. Die Geschichte der Stadt im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Frankfurt am Main: Societats-Verlag, 1984.
102 See: Friedrich, J. op. cit., pp. 13-176, 491-514.
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In studies, such as Wido Spratte's Approaching Osnabruck: The Air Raids Between 
1940-1945 (1985) and even within the second edition of Dieter Wolfs Events of the Air 
War in Mannheim 1939-1945 (2003), there was little use of eyewitness material. 
Instead, these historians focussed on the immediate aftermath and statistics of the 
heaviest raids based on local and Allied sources. 103 Whilst Dr. Mark Connelly provided 
statistics of Germans lost during the Air War in the 2001 publication Reaching for the 
Stars. A New History of Bomber Command in World World War II, the British historian 
concentrated on justifying RAF raids against cities such as Diisseldorf, Mannheim and 
Mainz. 104 Moreover, although authors Winfried Georg Sebald and Alexander Kluge 
raised moral questions over the bombing, there was no comprehensive critical appraisal 
of the legitimacy of the air raids themselves. 105 Evidently, the social and contemporary 
historical aspects of the Allied Bombing Campaign were clearly under-researched both 
in German and in English literature.
Another area of memory in which there were remaining gaps in English contemporary 
literature was how the flight, expulsions and abductions of ethnic Germans from Eastern 
and Central Europe were remembered post-Crabwalk. In his best seller Crabwalk, 
Giinter Grass claimed that discussing the sinking of the refugee ship the Wilhelm 
Gustloff and the fates of its passengers and others that had fled East Prussia and 
Pomerania, were forbidden in the GDR. Neither did the events surrounding the Gustloff 
make any waves in the West because of German guilt and a lack of public interest, 
alleged Grass. 106 Nevertheless, other German authors have addressed former events in 
East Prussia and Pomerania.
In 1997, the German political scientist Christian von Krockow described the exertions 
and fates of German women during their flight from Pomerania in the publication The 
Hour of Women. Report from Pomerania 1944-1947. A year later, German historian 
Ulla Lachauer addressed the trials and tribulations of 13 ethnic German families from 
the former East Prussia during and at the end of the Second World War in the book East
103 See: Spratte, W. Im An/lug auf Osnabruck. Die Bombenangriffe 1940 bis 1945. Osnabruck: Wenner, 
1985 and: Wolf, D. Luftereignisse in Mannheim 1939-1945. 2nd ed. Mannheim: Stadtarchiv Mannheim, 
2003.
104 See: Connelly, M. Reaching for the stars. A new history of Bomber Command in World War II. 
London/New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001, pp. 3, 35, 43-46, 140-141, 160-163.
105 See: Sebald, W. G. op. cit., pp. 17-25, 34.
106 See: Grass, G. op. cit., pp. 29, 50, 94-95, 103-105, 119, 162-166, 174-175.
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Prussian Lives. 101 Although official censorship disappeared with reunification, for many 
years eyewitnesses from the former GDR, who suffered at the hands of the Red Army 
and in Soviet labour camps, remained silent about past events. 108 Whilst Grass and 
others have brought back into public attention the events surrounding the Wilhelm 
Gustloff, there has been no appraisal in English of how the flight and expulsions of 
Germans from Eastern Europe were remembered since Crabwalk or the debates 
surrounding the requests for a national Centre against Expulsion.
Neither has there been a comprehensive engagement with the phenomenon of female 
xenophobia. Although academics Gertrud Siller and Birgit Meyer addressed female 
membership of neo-Nazi groups and their attitudes to foreigners, female support of, or 
capacity for, right-wing orientated violence and participation in other identity protest 
groups constitute areas of research that are still rather limited. It was evident within a 
review of contributions by Siller and Meyer for the 1993 volume Radical Right-Wing 
Violence in Unified Germany by Hans-Uwe Otto and Roland Merten, that female 
support for extreme right-wing parties and xenophobic behaviour were often 'neglected 
topics'. 109
9. German national identity and contribution to the wider body of knowledge.
One of the main aims of the thesis is to raise an awareness of why there is a necessity in 
Germany for a comprehensive collective identity and memory and suggests that to learn 
from history means to learn in contrast to history. On the one hand, the respect of 
individual testimonies, national identity and the need to place them in the appropriate 
historical context leaves future German generations with an unenviable and difficult 
legacy of grief and responsibility. On the other, such developments are positive for 
facilitating a greater understanding of the past and ultimately for helping to foster a 
more constructive Vergangenheitsbewdltigung.
107 The full titles of these publications were: Krockow, C. Die Stunde der Frauen. Berichte aus Pommern 
1944-1947. Munchen: Dva Verlag, 1997 and: Lachauer, U. Ostpreufiische Lebensldufe. Reinbeck: 
Rowohlt, 1998. See also: Hirsch, H. op. cit., p. 14.
108 See: Herterich, P. and Schroder, H. op. cit., pp. 7-8, 83-164 and: Dreher, S. ,,Frauen brechen ihr 
Schweigen, urn kunftiges Leid zu verhindern." Pressemeldung zur Fragebogenaktion. BdV. 
Frauenvervand im Bund der Vertriebenen e. V. Berlin, 23.01.05, pp. 1-2.
109 Cited from: Schonwalder, K. Right-wing extremism and racist violence in Germany. Review Article. 
West European Politics, Apr 1995: 18(2), pp. 448-456. See also: Otto, H. and Merten, R. (eds). 
Rechtsradikale Gewalt im vereinigten Deutschland; Jugend im gesellschaftlichen Umbruch. Opladen: 
Leske undBudnch, 1993.
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According to academic Rudi Koshar, 'Many scholars have emphasised the continuities 
and discontinuities of German history. But few have done little to analyse an 
Erinnerungslandschaft or landscape of memory in all its forms.' 110 Aside from the 
previously unheard interpretation of events from the perspective of Germans as victims 
in Hanover, Darmstadt and Dusseldorf, other new details have also emerged about 
events elsewhere in Germany. These included the firestorm of Leipzig in December 
1943 and the real objective of the RAF raid on Koblenz in November 1944.
By providing fresh evidence in the form of previously unpublished eyewitness 
testimonies and historical reports from newspaper publications, local historians and city 
archives, post-reunification reflections of a Geschichte van unten offer a more informed 
debate about a Vergangenheitsbewdltigung and the internal dimensions of German 
memory. This study, therefore, provides a synthesis of six highly topical and 
comparatively new debates of national identity in one of the most important states in 
Europe. Enhanced by eyewitness testimonies and other reports from journalists and 
historians in cities such as Hanover, Mannheim and Magdeburg, future studies could 
perhaps benefit from this thesis since many survivors have hitherto remained silent over 
past events. Given these considerations and the inter-disciplinary nature of the study, 
this thesis could make an original and credible contribution to the field of contemporary 
German history.
110 Cited from: Koshar, R. From monuments to traces: artefacts of German memory, 1870-1990. 
Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2000, pp. 9-13.
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Chapter 1.
German Citizenship - the Legacy of Blood
One method of establishing which conception of the nation determines national self- 
understanding is, arguably, the legal entitlement of the residents of a nation to 
citizenship. Along with former legal adviser to the 1982-1998 CDU/CSU-FDP 
(Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union and Free Democratic Party) ruling 
coalition on citizenship, Kay Hailbronner, Rogers Brubaker in his Citizenship and 
Nationhood in France and Germany claimed:
The distinctive and deeply rooted ethno-cultural and differentialist 
understanding of nationhood has remained surprisingly robust. Nowhere is this 
more striking than in the contrast between the policies and politics of citizenship 
vis-a-vis ethnic Germans and non-German immigrants. 1
Before 2000, non-German immigrants and their children were unlikely to be granted 
automatic German nationality or dual nationality. This selective policy was based on the 
official assumption that ethnic German re-settlers relocating from East and Central 
Europe after 1950 (Aussiedler) would be easily absorbed and accepted within the 
community.2 As the former Federal Commissioner for Foreigner Issues Marieluise Beck 
(Alliance 90/The Greens) stated: 'Following the Second World War many ethnic 
Germans were absorbed and subsequently integrated whose immigration to Germany 
was both politically and socially accepted.' 3
In the light of more recent evidence, however, Hailbronner and Beck's conclusions were 
questionable - both from an official capacity and increasingly in a more extreme sense, 
a public one. Assessing the significance of a Staatsnation (civic-territorial nation), 
Kulturnation (ethno-cultural nation) and the principle of citizenship based on jus
1 Kay Hailbronner claimed that German self-understanding of the nation is not a political, but a cultural, 
linguistic and ethnic one. See: Hailbronner, K. Citizenship and nationhood in Germany. In: Brubaker, R. 
(ed). Immigration and the politics of citizenship in Europe and North America. New York/London: The 
German Marshall Fund of the United States/University Press of America, 1989, p. 74. For quotation by 
Rogers Brubaker see: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992, pp. 3, 14, 184.
2 For these claims see: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, op. cit., pp. 
172-173 and: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. Germany and its immigrants: a socio-demographic analysis. 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Jan 1998: 24(1), pp. 25-56.
3 Cited from: 1. Fur einen neuen integrationspolitischen Dialog. AnstoBe zum Thema Integraton III. In: 
Beck, M. 4. Bericht zur Lage der Ausldnder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Berlin: Die Beauftragte 
der Bundesregierung fur Migration, Fliichtlinge und Integration, Feb 2000, pp. 226-227.
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sanguinis or descent for German identity, this chapter suggests there has been a 
significant revision in official self-perceptions.4
On the one hand, Spataussiedler (German re-settlers post-1987) can no longer claim 
automatic citizenship in Germany, and on the other, dual nationality has now become 
more accessible to the children born of foreign parents in Germany. Both, arguably, 
represented significant breaks from a citizenship based almost exclusively on blood 
descent. On the other, Germanness was still defined and understood in terms of 
common descent, language and culture from some public quarters, in contrast to liberal 
conceptions of self-understanding, such as the 1998-2005 Social Democratic Party 
(SPD)/Green ruling coalition's more civic and inclusive re-orientation of citizenship.5
Despite the SPD/Green ruling coalition's attempts to foster a more inclusive citizenship, 
this chapter suggests that significant sections of the public still adhered to an exclusive 
jus sanguinis principle of blood descent. It is against these developments that the claims 
of Hailbronner, Brubaker, Beck and various members of the Bundestag, or lower house 
of the German Parliament, are reassessed. Although Brubaker suggested the gulf 
between popular and official idioms, or the ways of talking and thinking about national 
identity, were particularly pronounced in the French case, at the same time, no such 
claim was made for the German one. Embodying an ethno-cultural national self- 
understanding, Brubaker argued that elite German definitions of citizenship continued 
to be based on jus sanguinis.6 Before demonstrating the disparities between official and 
popular idioms of citizenship and, therefore, national identity, it is useful to comprehend 
past events that led to jus sanguinis as one of the key, but not only, determinants of 
German citizenship.
4 For discussion of these terms see: Hogwood, P. Citizenship controversies in Germany: the twin legacy 
of Volkisch nationalism and the Alleinvertretungsanspruch. German Politics, Dec 2000: 9(3), pp. 125- 
144.
5 See: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit., pp. 29-30 and: Hogwood, P. op. cit., pp. 125-144. See also: 
Hoffinann, C. Immigration and nationhood in the Federal Republic of Germany. In: Brady, J. S., 
Crawford, B. and Wiliarty, S. E. (eds). The postwar transformation of Germany: democracy, prosperity, 
and nationhood. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002, pp. 357-377.
6 See: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, op. cit., pp. 16, 162-163, 184 
and: Brubaker, R. Civic and ethnic nations in France and Germany. In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. 
(eds). Ethnicity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 168-173.
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The Origins of jus sanguinis
For most of its history, Germany has been politically fragmented. Highlighting this 
political division of Germany, Francis Robin Housemayne du Boulay described late 
medieval Germany as a 'sea of political fragments in which some of the large pieces 
floated'. 7 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this political fragmentation led 
intellectuals, such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Johann Gottfried von Herder, to 
console themselves, and others like them, by the idea that Germans should think of their 
nation as a cultural, linguistic and ethnic unit. 8 Echoed by Friedrich Ludwig Jahn and 
Ernst Moritz Arndt, a philosophical and military call to arms against the French during 
the Napoleonic Wars inspired an ethnic and later ultimately exclusive definition of 
German identity.9
In contrast to political nations bom out of political revolution, such as France, or 
founded on immigration, such as America, the cultural nation assumes that primarily 
ethno-cultural and ancestral ties should constitute the basis of its identity. 10 In his 
Addresses to the German Nation (1808), the philosopher Fichte stated: '[...] even if our 
political independence were lost, we would nonetheless keep our language and literature 
and would always remain a nation..."'
From the late eighteenth to the nineteenth century, 'Germany' had been a psychological 
and cultural reality rather than a political one - its language being the most tangible 
aspect of that reality. What was lacking in Germany was the idea of territorial 
sovereignty that was characteristic of most Western European nation-states. Helmuth 
Plessner in his The Belated Nation referred to Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's 
Germany as an Empire without the idea of the state, without any cohesive political force 
that by contrast had, perhaps, already been rooted for some time in political nations,
7 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. A concise history of Germany. Updated ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991, pp. 27-28.
8 See: Kurthen, H. Germany at the crossroads: national identity and the challenges of immigration. 
International Migration Review, 1995: 29(4), p. 929 and: Craig, G. A. The Germans. New York: 
Meridian, Penguin Group, 1991, pp. 30-32.
9 See: Brinks, J. H. Children of the new fatherland: Germany's post-war right-wing politics. Translated 
by P. Vincent. London/New York: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000, pp. 85-86.
10 See: Muller, J-W. Another country: German intellectuals, unification and national identity. New 
Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2000, p. 38 and: Kurthen, H. op. cit., p. 929. 
" Cited from: Jarausch, K., Seeba, H. and Conradt, D. The presence of the past. Culture, opinion and 
identity in Germany. In: Jarausch, K. H. (ed). After unity: reconfiguring German identities. 
Oxford/Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997, p. 32.
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such as Britain and France. 12 Instead, German national consciousness centred on the 
ethnic community based on a shared language, tradition, destiny and ancestry from and 
among the many different German states - a Kulturnation or ethno-culrural nation. 13 
Sociologist and authority on national identity, A. D. Smith employed the term ethnic 
(ethnic community) to describe and analyse such formations that in his view make up 
the cores of all modern nations. 14 According to Smith:
Locating such ethnic cores tell us a good deal about the subsequent shape and 
character of nations. It helps us to answer in large part the question: who is the 
nation? A state's ethnic core often shapes the character and boundaries of the 
nation; for it is very often on the basis of such a core that states coalesce to form 
nations. 15
German national identity developed, therefore, outside and against the territorial 
framework of existing German states due to the disparity in scale between supranational 
Empire, the sub-national patchwork profusion of sovereign and semi-sovereign political 
entities. In this sense, German nationhood was an ethno-cultural not a political fact. 16
Although unified in 1871 under Prussian hegemony, 'the relatively high degree of 
fragmentation and regional disparities [...] and the federalist structure of the Reich 
made equalising national citizenship an arduous task'. 17 According to Christiane Lemke 
and Mary Fulbrook, these rival ethno-national and state-national ideologies prevented a 
coherent national citizenship from being implemented until 1913 - particularly from 
states such as Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria. 18
These competing ideologies between the Staatsnation (an active self-determining 
political nation) and Kulturnation (or cultural nation) were first formulated by the
12 See: Weisbrod, B. Discussion: national paradigm German unification and the national paradigm. 
German History, 1996: 14(2), p. 195. See also: Miiller, J-W. op. cit., p. 38.
13 See: Hogwood, P. op. cit., pp. 125-144.
14 See: Koshar, R. From monuments to traces: artefacts of German memory, 1870-1990. Berkeley/Los 
Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2000, p. 20.
15 For Smith's analysis of the term ethnie or ethnic community, see: Smith, A. D. National identity. 
London: Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 19-22, 38-44. See also: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (eds). op. cit., 
pp. 4-10.
For these claims see: Craig, G. A. op. cit., pp. 16-17 and: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in 
France and Germany, op. cit., pp. 51-52. See also: Hogwood, P. op. cit., p. 127.
17 Cited from: Lemke, C. Crossing borders and building barriers: migration, citizenship and state building 
in Germany. In: Klausen, J. and Tilly, L. A. (eds). From European integration in social and historical 
perspective 1850 to the present. Oxford/New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1997, p. 87.
18 Ibid, and: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 101, 103, 106, 125.
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twentieth century German historian Friedrich Meinecke in 1908.' 9 Employed by German 
academics Bernd Weisbrod, Sabine von Dirke and Christiane Lemke when assessing 
German national identity, Peter Alter provides a particularly illuminating summary of 
their main tenets.20
By Staatsnation (political nation), Meinecke referred to the nation that centres on the 
idea of individual and collective self-determination based on the concepts of individual 
free will and subjective commitment to the nation, noted Alter. By contrast, the cultural 
nation is founded on criteria such as common heritage and language, religion, customs 
and history. It does not need a state to mediate a consciousness of unity since the sense 
of national belonging can develop independently of the state. 21
Alongside the state nationalism of Germany's first national Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck, Johann Gottfried von Herder's interpretation of the Volksgeist, or spirit of the 
people, effectively became distorted by various pedagogues promoting a violently 
inflated anti-Semitic ethnic nationalism. Embodying the new Romantic Movement of 
the nineteenth century, these intellectuals included Julius Langbehn, Paul Botticher, 
Wilhelm Marr, Eugen Duhring and others.22
Published in more than 39 editions, Julius Langbehn's 1890 Rembrandt the Educator 
advocated an investigation into people's ancestry as a condition for German citizenship. 
Although voicing no objection to orthodox Jews, to Langbehn, modern Jews could 'no 
more become German than a plum could turn into an apple'. Allegedly, this was 
because they were democratically inclined and 'a nation within a nation'. 23 Reflecting a 
more extreme perspective, alias Paul de Lagarde, Gottingen University Professor 
Botticher declared: 'any alien body within a living organism creates ill feeling, disease, 
even festering sores and death. The Jews as Jews are aliens [...] and as such nothing but
19 See: Smith, A. D. National identity, op. cit., p. 8.
20 See: Dirke, S. von, Multikulti: the German debate on multiculturalism. German Studies Review, 1994:
17, p. 513. See also: Lemke, C. Crossing borders and building barriers: migration, citizenship and state
building in Germany. In: Klausen, J. and Tilly, L. A. (eds). op. cit., pp. 86-89 and: Weisbrod, B. op. cit.,
p. 197.
21 See: Alter, P. Nationalism. 2nd ed. London/New York/Melbourne/Auckland: Edward Arnold, 1994, pp.
8-9.
22 For the analysis of the impact of Herder, the Volksgeist, anti-Semitic ethnic nationalism and the
mystical attributes of German Romanticism on German national identity, see: Hogwood, P. op. cit., pp.
126-127 and: Craig, G. A. op. cit., pp. 30-32, 126-139, 205-209, 190-212. See also: Kohn, H. The mind of
Germany: the education of a nation. London: Macmillan, 1965, pp. 49-68.
23 Cited from: Carsten, F. L. The rise of Fascism. 2nd ed. London: Batsford Academic and Educational
Ltd, 1980, pp. 26-27. See also: Craig, G. A. op. cit., pp. 206-207.
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carriers of putrefaction.' 24 So for these academics, political and state systems were the 
expression rather than the determinant of characteristic cultural and historical entities. 
As Brubaker stated: 'The Romantic understanding of nationhood was fundamentally 
ethno-cultural with the Volksgeist constitutive, the state merely expressive of, German 
nationhood.'25
Within Imperial Germany, a new state-centred nationalism did not displace an ethno- 
cultural understanding of nationhood. In fact, the two co-existed rather uneasily, 
reflected in the terms 'German' and 'national' that sometimes referred to the state and 
citizenry as a whole, sometimes to an ethno-cultural Germandom alone. Nevertheless, 
on 22 July 1913 a national citizenship was finally codified in the Reichs-und 
Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz (Imperial Nationality Law (RuStAG)) that defined Germany 
on ethno-cultural lines, thereby reflecting a Kulturnation. 26 This law primarily defined 
citizenry as a community of descent - thus confirming an ethno-cultural rather than a 
political territorial definition of citizenship. One of the most important features of this 
law was the definition of German citizenship primarily based on the principle of blood 
and descent (jus sanguinis), rather than on the French territorial principle of jus soli that 
defined citizenry as a territorial community.27
Following the defeat of Germany in 1918 and concomitant territorial divisions of the 
1919 Treaty of Versailles, both the reduced German state and the concept of citizenship 
became even more homogeneously ethnic in character. In order to make state- 
membership more consistent with Fo/£-membership and Nazi racial policy, during the 
1930s the Nazi government proposed to exclude all Jews and other Volksfremde, or 
'foreigners of the people", from state-membership as outlined in the Nuremberg Race 
Lawsofl935.28
24 Cited from: Carsten, F. L. op. cit., pp. 25-27. See also: Craig, G. A. op. cit., pp. 138, 204-208.
25 Cited from: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
26 See: Green, S. Citizenship policy in Germany: The case of ethnicity over residence. In: Hansen, R. and 
Weil, P. (eds). Towards a European nationality: citizenship, immigration and nationality law in the EU. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, p. 25 and: Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz. (Datum: 22. Juli 1913. 
Fundstelle: RGBI1913, 583), pp. 1-9.
27 Introduced in 1889 to give citizenship to second-generation immigrants or those born in the country of 
immigration, the concept of French nationality was primarily based on the nationality of one's country of 
birth or jus soli. See: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, op. cit., pp. 85- 
137, 207. For full details of the 1913 German Citizenship Law see: Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz. op. cit., 
pp. 1-9.
28 See: Fulbrook, M. German national identity after the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, pp. 61, 
182 and: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, op. cit., pp. 166-167. See 
also: Layton, G. Germany: The Third Reich. 1933-45. 3 rd ed. London: Hodder Murray, 2005, pp. 95-96, 
99, 103.
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After 1945 the principle of ethnic descent was again strengthened.29 Germany was 
divided amongst the Allies into four Zones of Occupation, with the United States, 
Britain and France occupying the west of Germany, and with the Soviet Union 
controlling the rest of Germany east of the river Elbe. When it became clear that 
ideological differences between the western Allies and the Soviet Union were 
increasing, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was founded in May 1949 with its 
attendant Basic Law (Grundgesetz). In October that year, the Soviets responded by 
establishing the German Democratic Republic (GDR).30 Although the racial laws were 
abolished in the post-war Federal Republic, final defeat in 1945 did not result in a clean 
break with past nationality legislation.31 Whilst racism was banned from the 
construction of the new national identity of the Germans, jus sanguinis (blood descent) 
still remained an important part of citizenship. Although the National Socialists 
racialisedyws sanguinis by enacting the Nuremberg Laws in 1935, the liberal founders 
of the German post-war constitution, the Basic Law, did not abolish the ancestral 
principle of citizenship in favour of jus soli. 32
Within the Basic Law, the framers recognised a certain class of rights that adhered to 
the quality of being German - irrespective of formal state affiliation.33 Although an 
ethno-national understanding of membership 'had definite exclusionary implications', 
the framers of the Basic Law stipulated in Article 116 (2) that: 'Former German citizens 
who, between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945, were deprived of their citizenship on 
political, racial or religious grounds, and their descendents, shall on application have 
their citizenship restored.' 34 These were the only group of would-be migrants who were 
considered to be culturally and ethnically German, and thus automatically entitled to 
become German citizens. 'This emphasis on German descent was extended still further 
in the 1953 Federal Expellees' and Refugees' Act (BVFG) to include the millions of
29 See: Kurthen, H. op. cit., p. 918.
30 See: Roberts, I. German language, life and culture. London: Hodder Headline, 2000, pp. 136-137. See 
also: Fulbrook, M. A concise history of Germany, op. cit., pp. 209-211.
31 See: Smith, A. D. National identity, op. cit., p. 21.
30 See: Lemke, C. Crossing borders and building barriers: migration, citizenship and state building in
Germany. In: Klausen, J. and Tilly, L. A. (eds). op. cit., pp. 88-89.
"Ibid.
34 Cited from: Klusmeyer, D. Four dimensions of membership in Germany. SAIS Review of International
Affairs, Winter-Spring 2000, p. 10. See also: Article 116 (2) XI. Transitional and Concluding Provisions.
[Definition of ,,German"; restoration of citizenship]. In: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.
Text edition - Status: December 2000. Berlin: German Bundestag - Administration Public Relations
Section/Ebner Ulm, 2001, p. 77.
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Volkszugehorige or ethnic Germans still living behind the Iron Curtain', noted Simon 
Green. 35
Citizens of the GDR and ethnic Germans remaining in Eastern Europe as a result of 
German loss of territory after 1945, for example, were to be included into the citizenry 
of the FRG - officially regarded as German citizens, 'jure sanguinis'?6 It was this 
common citizenship that paved the way for the re-establishment of a common statehood 
and meant that the Wilhelmine law of 1913, with its emphasis on jus sanguinis, 
remained in force and became the law of the FRG. Supplemented by Article 116 of the 
Basic Law, what should also be noted is that the RuStAG granted citizenship to the 
children of German citizens, irrespective of their ethnic identity. Although modified 
since 1913, elements of the RuStAG were still valid at the time of writing.37 
Nevertheless, official and other evidence suggested that jus sanguinis took priority over 
jus soli in post-war Germany as the key determinant of citizenship.38 So why did 
citizenship initially continue to be based primarily on descent? Hermann Kurthen and 
Mathias Bos suggested the following reasons:
1. The referral to common ethno-cultural bonds promised to guarantee national 
stability and identity when Germany was still recovering from the ravages of 
war; the post-war policy of the Allied victors themselves stipulated a collective 
and ethnic definition of Germanness. Germans were to be isolated and contained 
within the four occupation zones until 1949.
2. Additionally, the West German government tried to avoid an official recognition 
of the Cold War division of Germany. East German citizenship was ignored and 
any Ubersiedler or former GDR citizens fleeing the Soviets were automatically 
granted citizenship.
35 Cited from: Green, S. Citizenship policy in Germany: The case of ethnicity over residence. In: Hansen, 
R. and Weil, P. (eds). op. cit., p. 26. See also: Kurthen, H. op. cit., pp. 920-922. For official provisos of 
the BVFG, see: Gesetz tiber die Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen und Fltichtlinge. (Fundstelle: BGBII 
1953, 201). Bonn: Bundesministerium der Justiz, 19.05.53, pp. 1-17.
36 Cited from: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, op. cit., p. 169. See also: 
pp. 163-178 and: Kurthen, H. op. cit., pp. 929-930. For territorial settlement of the German border 
between the Allies see: Fulbrook, M. A concise history of Germany, op. cit., pp. 204-206.
37 See: Kurthen, H. op. cit., p. 929 and: Green, S. Citizenship policy in Germany: The case of ethnicity 
over residence. In: Hansen, R. and Weil, P. (eds). op. cit., p. 25. See also: Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz. op. 
cit., pp. 1-9.
38 For appeals by the SPD and Greens for a change in citizenship legislation, see: Antrag der Fraktion 
SPD. Erleichterung der Einburgerung unter Hinnahme der doppelten Staatsangehorigkeit In: Deutscher 
Bundestag, Drucksache 13/259. Bonn, 19.01.95, pp. 1-4 and: Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion Biindnis 90/Die 
Griinen. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Anderung des Staatsangehorigkeitsrechts (StG) In: Deutscher 
Bundestag, Drucksache 13/423. Bonn, 08.02.95, pp. 1-7.
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3. Finally West Germany wanted to be a refuge for Germans from either expulsion 
or ethnic cleansing (in the Soviet Union and East European countries).39
In sum, ethnic definitions of citizenship consequently provided a more flexible and 
more acceptable solution than a shift to jus soli. Any other form of German citizenship 
at the time would have deprived Germans in the former eastern parts of Federal German 
citizenship, or implied the tacit acceptance of the GDR.40
So what had been primarily a community of descent in Imperial Germany became even 
more ethnic in conception owing to the particular circumstances of the early post-war 
period, effectively reinforcing the ethno-cultural focus of citizenship in the FRG. 
Instead of discrediting the ethno-cultural nation, the division of Germany during the 
post-war period and expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, ironically 
perhaps, reinforced and powerfully re-legitimated former official self-understanding. 
Indicative of a significant change in official self-perceptions was the former 
unquestioned right of automatic citizenship and other privileges for the millions of 
ethnic Germans living in the former Eastern bloc, who have allegedly long been eager 
to settle in Germany.41
During the 1990s, the Red Cross estimated there were approximately 3.2 million ethnic 
Germans in Central and Eastern Europe, with 1.9 million in the CIS or Commonwealth 
of Independent States.42 In spite of the fact that the former Soviet Union had a large 
German minority within its borders, only 110,000 of them (8% of all Aussiedler) were 
allowed to emigrate between 1950 and 1987, noted Miinz and Ulrich. 43 Since the lifting 
of administrative restrictions on travel in the late 1980s, however, the migration of 
ethnic Germans continued more or less unabated, with official statistics suggesting they
39 Cited from: Kurthen, H. op. cit.. p. 930 and: 919, 937. See also: Bos, M. Ethnisierung des Rechts? 
Staatsbiirgerschaft in Deutschland, Frankreich, Grofibritannien und den USA. Kolner Zeitschrift fur 
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (KZfSS), 1993: 45(4), pp. 475-490, 626, 638.
40 For this claim see: Kurthen, H. op. cit., p. 930.
41 See: Richter, A. "Blood and Soil": what it means to be German. World Policy Journal, Winter 1998- 
1999: 15(4), pp. 91-98 and: Dahlkamp, J. et al. Sozialer Sprengstoff. Immigranten. Der Spiegel, 24.02.03 
(9), pp. 40-42.
42 The former CIS states included the eleven former Soviet Republics of: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Krgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. See: Munz, R. 
and Ulrich, R. op. cit., p. 30.
43 The majority of ethnic Germans relocated from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. For figures of 
ethnic Germans still abroad and claims by the Red Cross, see: Munz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit., pp. 25-28.
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will continue to do so. According to Kurthen and Minkenberg, between 1988 and 1995, 
200,000 to 400,000 ethnic Germans re-settled in the FRG.44
Although figures have fallen slightly since 1997, Russlanddeutsche, or ethnic Germans 
from the former Soviet Union, continued to arrive in significant numbers.45 In 2002, for 
example, approximately 99% (91,416) of all Spataussiedler were from current and 
former Russian territory - mostly from the Russian Federation, Kazachstan, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan.46 Their admission was based on official assumptions that their departure 
from those territories was primarily determined by discrimination suffered within those
areas. 47
Representing three inter-related legacies of the Staatsnation, populist Kulturnation and 
the latter's most extreme variant, the Volksgemeinscha.fi (an organic national 
community), the alleged anomalous status of Spataussiedler epitomised the distinction 
between state and ethno-cultural ideologies. In a sense, they arguably signified key 
disparities between official and popular national understanding.
»48
'Germans who are not German.
As a legacy of German occupation of Central and parts of Eastern Europe during the 
Second World War, by 1950 about 12 million ethnic Germans fled west, or had been 
expelled from the lost eastern territories known as the Ostgebiete in western Poland and 
the Russian district of Kalingrad, along with other districts of ethnic German settlement 
in Eastern Europe.49 Consequently, the occupying powers of Britain, France and the US 
were compelled to redistribute the second biggest enforced migration of people in
44 See: Kurthen, H. and Minkenberg, M. Germany in transition: immigration, racism and the extreme 
right. Nations and Nationalism, 1995: 1(2), p. 179. See also: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit., pp. 25-28.
45 In 1997, 131,895 Russlanddeutsche migrated to Germany. Cited from: Aussiedlerstatistik seit 1950. III. 
Stabsstelle. Statistik-Dokumentation. Koln. In: Jahresstatistik Aussiedler und deren Angehorige. Alter, 
Berufe, Religion, Verteilung und Herkunftsldnder 2002. Koln: Bundesverwaltungsamt, 2002, p. 9.
46 See: Migrationsbericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung fur Migration, Fliichtlinge und 
Integration im Auftrag der Bundesregierung (Migrationsbericht 2003). Bonn: Beauftragten der 
Bundesregierung fur Migration, Fluchtlinge und Integration, Dez 2003, pp. 31-32.
47 See: Hoffmann, P. and Winkler, M. (eds). ,,hier geblieben." Zuwanderung und Integration in 
Niedersachsen von 1945 bis heute. Hannover: Niedersachsichen Landzentrale fur Politische Bildung, 
2002, p. 76. See also: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit, pp. 27-28.
48 Cited from: Forsythe, D. German identity and the problem of history. In: Tonkin, E., McDonald, M. 
and Chapman, M. (eds). History and ethnicity. London: Routledge, 1989, p. 147.
49 See: Kurthen, H. op. cit., pp. 919, 937 and: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and 
Germany, op. cit., p. 168.
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history.50 By the end of 1946, the occupying powers had re-settled over six million 
ethnic Germans. 51
Since the early 1950s, complete integration rights, inclusion in the welfare state and 
access to all segments of the labour market were the requisite right of all Aussiedler.^ 
Their desire to move to the FRG was officially regarded as an act of patriotism and 
adherence to the concept of Germanhood. 53 Although their bond to Germany was largely 
ethno-cultural, ethnic Germans outside the borders of West Germany continued to be 
eligible for West German citizenship. Even if they were unable to speak German, jus 
sanguinis allowed Germans of ethnic origin from Central and Eastern Europe the 
constitutional right to work and settle in Germany. 54 Summarised by John Hutchinson 
and A. D. Smith, the terms 'ethnic identity' and 'ethnic origin' refer to the 'individual's 
level of identification with a culturally defined collectivity - the sense on the part of the 
individual that she or he belongs to a particular cultural community'. 55 In the German 
case: 'It is the organic or ethnic interpretation of nationalism that sees human beings 
simply as specimens of their national group', noted Smith, hi other words, ethnic 
identity lies at the core of German identity. 56 Provided that they could prove their 
German descent:
Article 116 (1) of the 1949 Basic Law granted the right of repatriation to any 
person who had been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the 
frontiers of December 31, 1937, as a refugee [Fliichtling] or expellee 
[Vertriebener] of German ethnic origin [Volkszugehorigkeit] as the spouse or 
descendent of such person.57
50 For these claims see: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, op. cit., p. 168.
51 See: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit., p. 27.
52 See: Seifert, W. Admission policy, patterns of migration and integration: the German and French case 
compared. New Community, Oct 1997: 23(4), pp. 441-460.
53 See: Kurthen, H. op. cit., p. 921. See also: Delfs, S. Heimatvertriebene, Aussiedler, Spataussiedler. Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 1993 (B48), pp. 3-11; Ronge, V. Ost-West-Wanderung nach Deutschland. Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 1993 (B7),pp. 16-28.
54 See: Giesen, B. National identity and citizenship: the cases of Germany and France. In: Eder, K. and 
Giesen, B. (eds). European citizenship between national legacies and postnational projects. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 46.
55 Cited from: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (eds). op. cit., p. 5.
56 Cited from: Smith, A. D. Nations and nationalism in a global era. Oxford: Blackwell/Poliry Press, 
1995, p. 152.
57 Cited from: Lemke, C. Crossing borders and building barriers: migration, citizenship and state building 
in Germany. In: Klausen, J. and Tilly, L. A. (eds). op. cit., p. 89.
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Article 116 (2) of the 1949 Basic Law based on jus sanguinis (law of descent) also 
guaranteed automatic citizenship to the Volksdeutsche, or ethnic Germans abroad, and 
their descendants. 58
Although German citizenry was defined expansively towards ethnic Germans, it was 
distinctly restrictive towards non-German immigrants. Whilst ethnic Germans had an 
automatic right to citizenship, on the other hand, non-German immigrants already 
resident in Germany were unlikely to be granted citizenship - even in the case of second 
or third generations. 59
According to Rainer Miinz and Ralf Ulrich, some 20,000 to 25,000 Poles successfully 
reclaim German citizenship because they themselves, or at least one of their parents, 
held German citizenship during the German occupation of Poland.60 Indicative of the 
former official preferential treatment accorded to Aussiedler and impact of jus sanguinis 
was the case of the Silesian ethnic Germans in Poland. As well as holding a Polish 
passport, the Banner General-Anzeiger estimated more than 200,000 ethnic Germans 
also held a German one without ever setting foot in the Fatherland.61 Until 1990, ethnic 
Germans in the former Soviet Union, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were also entitled to 
a German passport on application within their host states.62 By the end of 1999, the 
German government expected 100,000 citizenship applications from Russlanddeutsche 
or ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union. 63
Formerly, German citizenship law effectively distinguished three categories of people: 
citizens, foreigners and ethnic or 'status' Germans. Foreigners under 18 who were born 
in Germany or who had resided in Germany over many years by comparison did not 
have a right to naturalisation.64 And in contrast to other migrants, the immigration of 
ethnic Germans from East and Central Europe, as well as Ubersiedler, or migrants from
58 For Article 116 (2) of the Basic Law, see: (1) XI. Transitional and Concluding Provisions. [Definition
of 'German': Restoration of Citizenship]. In: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, op. cit., p.
77.
59 For this and other similar lines of arguments, see: Seifert, W. op. cit., p. 441 and: Green, S. Citizenship
policy in Germany: The case of ethnicity over residence. In: Hansen, R. and Weil, P. (eds). op. cit., pp.
36-37, 50.
60 See: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit., p. 53.
61 CSU in Polen: Doppelte Staatsbiirgerschaft mufl bleiben. Banner General-Anzeiger, 14.07.95, p. 2.
62 For these claims see: Seifert, W. op. cit., p. 448 and: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit., p. 29.
63 That was Otto Schily's estimate. See: Schmid, B. Alles ist besser als Kasachstan. Russlanddeutsche. 
Der Spiegel, 08.02.99 (6), p. 43.
64 See: Kanstroom, D. Wer sind wir wieder? Laws of asylum, immigration and citizenship in the struggle 
for the soul of Germany. Yale Journal of International Law, 1993: 18(1), p. 177.
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the former GDR, were not subject to any restrictions from the FRG during the 1970s 
and 1980s.65 The following statistics give an indication of the scale of this exodus. 
According to Miinz and Ulrich, between 1953 and 1987 an average of 37,000 
Aussiedler per year arrived in Germany from Eastern Europe; between 1957 and 1989 
East Germany alone lost over two million Ubersiedler to West Germany.66 Conversely, 
during the same years 230,000 West Germans left for East Germany and East Berlin.67
With liberalisation under way in the Soviet Union during the mid 1980s, and fall of the 
Iron Curtain in 1989, the last migration barriers for ethnic Germans vanished via East 
Germany. In 1988, '203,000 ethnic Germans came to the FRG - almost three times the 
number in the previous year', noted Miinz and Ulrich. 68 In the aftermath of 
reunification, Mary Fulbrook reported the stream of East Germans flowed at a rate of 
1,000 to 2,000 a day.69 In 1990, however, the immigration of ethnic Germans reached its 
peak: 397,073 Spataussiedler had moved to Germany, reported the former Federal 
Government's Commissioner for Foreigner Issues. 70 In total, by 2003, 4,387,267 
Aussiedler had settled in Germany since 1950 from the former Soviet Union, Poland, 
the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the former Yugoslavia and other areas 
of ethnic German settlement, reported the Federal Administration Office (BVA).71 Their 
right of entry was not only officially regarded as an act of loyalty to the homeland, but 
as an alternative to the inclusion of ethno-culturally more distant and allegedly less easy 
or willing to integrate immigrants. 72 Summing up the situation, Christhard Hoffman 
noted:
Thus, on the one hand the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) government gave 
temporary immigrant foreign workers money to return to their countries of 
origin from the mid-1980s whilst on the other it was simultaneously paying for
65 See: Seifert, W. op. cit., p. 448 and: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, 
op. cit., pp. 168-189.
See: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit., pp. 25-28.
67 The Federal Office for Statistics reported that 232,462 West Germans left for East Germany between 
1957-1989. See: Wanderungen zwischen dem friiheren Bundesgebiet und den neuen Ldndern einschl. 
Berlin-Ost. VI B. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005, p. 1.
68 Cited from: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit., p. 29.
69 See: Fulbrook, M. A concise history of Germany, op. cit., p. 245.
70 In 1991, figures had fallen to 221,995. Cited from: Migrationsbericht der Beauftragten der 
Bundesregierung fur Migration, Fliichtlinge und Integration im Auftrag der Bundesregierung 
(Migrationsbericht 2003). op. cit., p. 31.
71 See: Aussiedlerstatistik seit 1950. III. Stabsstelle-Dokumentation. Koln. In: Jahresstatistik Aussiedler 
und deren Angehorige. Alter, Berufe, Religion, Verteilung und Herkunftsldnder 2003. Koln: 
Bundesverwaltungsamt, 2003, p. 4.
72 See: Kurthen, H. op. cit., p. 921.
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ethnic Germans to immigrate to Germany and then generously assisting them 
once they arrived.73
Yet, modification of citizenship entitlement for ethnic Germans and immigration 
legislation since reunification, suggested blood descent (and, arguably therefore, an 
exclusive ethno-cultural identity) no longer constituted such an essential element for 
official self-perception.
Under the former CDU/CSU-FDP ruling coalition, on 1 July 1990, the Ethnic Germans 
Admissions Act (Aussiedleraufnahmegesetz) came into force. This required applicants 
to remain in their former state whilst their application for admission was processed and 
a waiting period for a reception permit at German consulates or German embassies 
abroad. 74 After 2010, ethnic Germans born after December 1992 will no longer be 
entitled to ask independently for admission to Germany and they must also prove 
discrimination from their host state - thus reducing official significance attached to 
descent. Former automatic citizenship entitlement is no longer the requisite right of all 
ethnic Germans - from 1996 German ethnic origin must be proved with language and 
cultural tests. 75
The official representative for Spataussiedler, Jochen Welt (SPD), explained that 
anyone who wants to come and settle in Germany has to prove a basic level of 
competence in German in his or her host country. Welt went on to say that current 
legislation planned to introduce a language test for all ethnic Germans and for 
Russlanddeutsche, in particular from January 2003 - not just for the main claimant of 
the family group, as was previously the case. 76
Welt explained that Paragraph 85 of the Auslandergesetz (Foreigner Law (AuslG)) 
required any applicant for German nationality to undergo a language test. When
73 Cited from: Hoffmann, C. Immigration and nationhood in the Federal Republic of Germany. In: Brady, 
J. S., Crawford, B. and Wiliarty, S. E. (eds). op. cit., pp. 368-369, 370-371. See also: Hogwood, P. op. 
cit., pp. 126-133.
74 For details of legislation, see: Aussiedleraufhahme. Aufnahme und Verteilung der Aussiedler. 
Zustandige Organisationseinhet: Abteilung III, Referate III Bl bis III B5. Bundesverwaltungsamt 
[Online]. [Accessed 21.06.05]. <http://www.bva.bund.de/aufgaben/aussiedleraufnahme/index.html>
75 For details of restrictions on the admission of Aussiedler, see: Mtinz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit., p. 29 
and: Hoffmann, P. and Winkler, M. (eds). op. cit., pp. 9-10.
76 For comments by Jochen Welt see: ,,Sprache ist der Schliissel zur Integration." Bundesministerium des 
Innern [Online]. 31.01.01 [Accessed 20.05.03]. <http://www.bmi.bund.de/dokumente/Rede/ 
ix_30126.htm> and: Starkere Integration von Aussiedlern. Bundesregierung [Online]. 31.07.02 [Accessed 
15.06.05]. <http://fr.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix_8920.htm>
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questioned on whether or not mere blood descent should be sufficient enough for 
settlement, Welt replied that until recently that was officially the case - 'however, 
anyone who now fails the test should remain in the country of origin'. 77 A year later and 
Welt's wish appeared to have been granted. In 2002, the then Federal Minister of the 
Interior Otto Schily (SPD) confirmed that: 'In future, dependents of German origin will 
only be included in a decision of acceptance if they can already demonstrate adequate 
German language skills in the country of origin.' 78
For Spdtaussiedler, though, these new requirements made no sense. They saw little 
relevance in language tests or any other questionnaires in order to determine whether 
they were German. In other words, though many might not be able to articulate the 
thought, they were still wedded to the literal jus sanguinus definition of nationality. 79 It 
was this literal interpretation of jus sanguinis that was further indicative of the disparity 
between official and collective national self-consciousness reflected in the anomalous 
and poignant status of the Russlanddeutsche.
Whilst politicians of all parties invoked the alleged 'limited absorptive capacity' 
(Aufnahmefahigkeit) with respect to foreigners, it remained politically unacceptable to 
make the same argument about ethnic Germans, as they were expected to be easily 
absorbed into German society. 80 Referring to the millions of ethnic German refugees 
that were returned to Germany, CDU Chairman Alfred Dregger maintained in 1982 
that: 'After the Second World War we [the Christian Democratic Union and Christian 
Social Union CDU/CSU governing coalition] affected one of the world's most 
successful programmes of integration.' 81 Similar comments were made in 2003 by the 
Federal Ministry of Health and Social Security (BMGS), which claimed that during the 
post-war years: 'Millions of German expellees [Vertriebene] and refugees [Fluchtlinge]
77 Cited from: ,,Sprache ist der Schlussel zur Integration." op. cit. For text of the Ausldndergesetz see: 
Siebenter Abschnitt Erleichterte Einburgerung. AuslG 85; Einburgerungsanspruch fur Auslander mil 
langerem Aufenthalt: Miteinbiirgerung auslandischer Ehegatten und minderjahriger Kinder and AuslG 
86; AusschluBgriinde In: Gesetz uber die Einreise und den Aufenthalt van Auslandern im Bundesgebiet. 
(Fundstelle: BGBI11990, 1354, 1356). Bonn: Bundesministerium der Justiz, 09.07.90, p. 42.
78 Cited from: Germany: Schily, labour. Migration News [Online]. Aug 2002: 9(8) [Accessed 02.08.02]. 
<http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn.archive_nin/aug_2002-10mn.html>
79 For these claims see: Richter, A. op. cit., pp. 91-98 and: Dahlkamp, J. et al. op. cit., p. 42.
80 Cited from: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, op. cit., p. 176 and: 
Munz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit., pp. 31-32. See also: Seifert, W. op. cit., pp. 441-443, 448.
81 Cited from Bundestag speech by Alfred Dregger in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 9/83. 
Stenographischer Bericht 83 Sitzung. Bonn, 04.02.82, p. 4894.
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were successfully integrated.' 82 Implying that Spataussiedler (late re-settlers post-1987) 
were also first and foremost Germans (and hence, arguably, their loyalty to Germany 
was unquestionable) to support liberal proposals for a future modification of German 
nationality, liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) member of the Bundestag, Cornelia 
Schmalz-Jacobsen, cited the officially endorsed retention of dual citizenship by ethnic 
Germans.83 According to the former Federal Commissioner for Foreigner Issues, 
Marieluise Beck, public acceptance of ethnic Germans was never in question.84
Thus, one may be tempted to infer that Spataussiedler integration was assumed and 
were accepted as if they were Germans returning to their Homeland. But a closer 
reading of both past and more recent developments painted a different picture to the 
official one. Evidence suggested that German officials, from both the left and right of 
the political spectrum, who based their former policies of integration on the basic 
assumption that the Russlanddeutsche were 'Just like us', was unreciprocated within the 
German public.85 Three regions that seemed to personify the problem were North Rhine- 
Westphalia, Lower Saxony and Brandenburg.
Although millions of ethnic Germans were expelled from East, Central and South East 
Europe, many remained within their traditional areas of settlement in Eastern Europe, 
such as Upper Silesia (Poland), Transylvania (Romania), Banat (Hungary), the Ukraine 
and Volga districts (Russia). Jochen Welt estimated in 2002 that up to 950,000 ethnic 
Germans still remained in Russia and Kazakhstan. 86 As part of the Allied re-settlement 
agreement for the redistribution of German refugees (Fluchtlinge), during 1946 2.7 
million ethnic Germans were relocated back to the Soviet zone of occupation. 87 At least 
a million of them were used as forced labour in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
82 Cited from: Aufgabe der Leistungen. In: 22. Hilfen fur Spataussiedler. Berlin: Bundesministerium fur 
Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung, 01.01.03, p. 727.
83 For discussions by Schmalz-Jacobsen, see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/18. 
Stenographischer Bericht 18 Sitzung. Bonn, 09.02.95, pp. 1228, 1234.
84 See: 1. Fur einen neuen integrationspolitischen Dialog. AnstoBe zum Thema Integraton III. In: Beck, 
M. op. cit., pp. 226-227.
85 For these claims see: Richter, A. op. cit., p. 96 and: Seifert, W. op. cit., p. 448. See also: Schmid, B. op. 
cit., pp. 42-44 and: Betz, H-G. Perplexed normalcy: German identity after Unification. In: Alter, R. and 
Monteath, P. (eds). Rewriting the German past: history and identity in the new Germany. New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1997, pp. 46-47.
86 For interview with Jochen Welt see: ,,Sprache ist der Schliissel zur Integration." op. cit.
87 See: Darnstadt, T. and Wiegrefe, K. ,,Eine teuflische Losung." Vertreibung (III) Spiegel-Serie uber 
Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten. Der Spiegel, 08.04.02 (15), p. 64.
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Union after 1945. In areas east of the rivers Oder and NeiBe, for instance, the Red Cross 
reported there were 1,200 labour camps for Germans.88
Whilst they became official citizens of their host states, such as Poland, Romania and 
the former Soviet Union, the status of ethnic Germans both in their former and new 
homeland remains contentious. Although officially Polish or Russian in their host states, 
they were often treated with disdain as Germans on account of the past. Whenever 
recognised as ethnic Germans in the former Soviet Union, they frequently experienced 
hostility, such as being ostracised as 'fascists' and 'Nazis', as well as social 
disadvantage. 89 German political circles tended to interpret their migration as a response 
to political and social discrimination.90 For example, youths of German extraction were 
forbidden to speak or learn German at school.91 National identities fulfil intimate, 
internal functions for individuals in communities, claimed A. D. Smith. One of the most 
obvious of these is the socialisation of the members as nationals and citizens.92 But just 
how integrated were the Spataussiedler!
Most ethnic Germans abroad have no ties with Germany and cannot speak German. 
According to the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel, a large section of 
Spataussiedler could not even understand the simple 'Wie heifien Sie?' or 'what's your 
name?'93 Difficulties resulting from an inadequate command of German and social 
isolation of the Russlanddeutsche prevented integration where, on the streets, Russian 
was often more spoken than German.94 As a consequence of this lack of competence in 
German, according to the Criminal Research Institute of Lower Saxony (KFN), contacts 
with the indigenous population were subsequently complicated, strained and hindered 
the quick integration of young Spataussiedler.95
88 See: Wiegrefe, K. Hitlers letzte Opfer. In: Darnstadt, T. and Wiegrefe, K. op. cit., pp. 62-63 and: 
Theisen, A. Die Vertreibung der Deutschen - Bin unbewaltigtes Kapitel europaischer Zeitgeschichte. Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 10.02.95 (B7-8), pp. 27-30.
89 For these claims see: Forsythe, D. German identity and the problem of history. In: Tonkin, E., 
McDonald, M. and Chapman, M. (eds). op. cit., pp. 145-146 and: Schmid, B. op. cit., pp. 43-44. See also 
testimonies from Russlanddeutsche in: Hoffmann, P. and Winkler, M. (eds). op. cit., pp. 40-48.
90 Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit., pp. 27-28 and: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and 
Germany, op. cit., p. 171 and: Hoffinann, P. and Winkler, M. (eds). op. cit., pp. 7-12,40-48.
91 See: Pfeiffer, C., Brettfeld, K and Delzer, I. Kriminalitat in Niedersachsen - 1985-1996. Eine Analyse 
auf der Basis der Polizeilichen Kriminalstatistik. Forschungsberichte (60). Hannover: Kriminologisches 
Forschungsinstitut Niedersachsen e. V. (KFN), 1997, p. 35.
92 See: Smith, A. D. National identity, op. cit., p. 16.
93 Cited from: Dahlkamp, J. et al. op. cit., p. 42.
94 See: Schmid, B. op. cit., p. 43.
95 See: Pfeiffer, C., Brettfeld, K and Delzer, I. op. cit., p. 35 and Dahlkamp, J. et al. op. cit., p. 40.
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In contrast to the 1980s, Russlanddeutsche can no longer expect social or economic 
privileges and must, for that reason, wait longer for their ambitions to be realised. As a 
result 'youths, especially young males, lose patience in this frustrating situation and 
take what they cannot acquire legally illegally', noted the KFN. In areas with 
particularly high Spataussiedler immigration, such as Osnabriick, Cloppenburg and 
Gifhorn, according to investigations by the KFN, young Russlanddeutsche came into 
increasing conflict with the authorities at a rate above the average. 96 Given the alleged 
poor prospects for integration, they remain predominantly on the social periphery. 
Consequently, Jochen Welt wanted all Spataussiedler after 2001 to be compelled to 
participate in an Integrationsvereinbarung (integration agreement) for the swift 
acquisition of the German language, cultural awareness and employment programmes 
and for German host communities to support them.97
Yet, according to Der Spiegel, there was increasing resentment among many 
communities and states in Germany against the former SPD/Green government's 
'burdening of local authorities with their integration programmes'. In the North Rhine- 
Westphalian town of Waldbrol, for example, where every one in six of the population 
was of German extraction from the former Soviet Union, unemployment and integration 
were considerable problems, exacerbated by a lack of German skills - and alleged local 
resentment. 98 Social workers in North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony reported 
that there were increasing problems in finding individuals and Patenfamilien (step- 
families) for the voluntary care and accommodation of new arrivals. In addition, charity 
associations appeared very reluctant to become involved in assisting with the integration 
of ethnic Germans, claimed the KFN.99 There was particular antipathy towards the 
continued, albeit now limited, immigration of Russlanddeutsche in Brandenburg, 
reported the local Ministry of the Interior and Holger Stark. 100 In June 2000, Forsa 
(Society for Social Research and Statistical Analysis) found that 68% of the 1,006 
Germans surveyed spoke in favour of a reduction of Spdtaussielder, with only 24% not
96 See: Pfeiffer, C., Brettfeld, K and Delzer, I. Kriminalitdt in Niedersachsen -1985-1996. op. cit., pp. 35- 
45. See also: Schmid, B. op. cit., p. 42.
97 For details of the SPD's Integrationsvereinbarung programme for ethnic Germans see: Starkere 
Integration von Aussiedlern op. cit. and: Vehlewald, H-G. Schnellkurs in Leitkultur. Aussiedler. Der 
Spiegel, 22.01.01 (4), p. 57.
98 See: Vehlewald, H-G. op. cit., pp. 56-57.
99 See: Pfeiffer, C., Brettfeld, K and Delzer, I. op. cit., p. 35 and: Vehlewald, H-G. op. cit., p. 57.
100 See: Sturzbecher, D. Jugend und Kriminalitdt in Brandenburg. Eine Materialsammlung. 5.000 ed. 
Potsdam: Ministerium des Innem des Landes Brandenburg, Jan 1998, p. 48 and: Stark, H. Deutsche 
gegen Deutsche. Brandenburg. Der Spiegel, 01.07.02 (27), pp. 42-43.
47
in favour of such measures. 101 12 years earlier, the Allensbach Institute for Public 
Opinion Research asked whether the immigration of ethnic Germans from the former 
Soviet Union, Romania and Poland was a good thing. 22% of 1,000 West Germans 
surveyed believed it was; 61% had serious doubts that it was. 102
Prejudice against ethnic German minorities in their former host countries was also 
evident within their new one. Particularly sad was the situation in which Spdtaussiedler 
found themselves. Their anomalous status in their former homelands reported by Diana 
Forsythe, the Lower Saxon Regional Centre for Political Education (NLPB) and Der 
Spiegel, also extended to their official status as Spdtaussiedler. 103
Despite Marieluise Beck's claim to the contrary, on arrival in Germany they 
experienced much the same reaction from the local populace - though this time not as 
Germans, but as Russians. 104 Youth centre worker Christel Kirsch claimed: 'Aussiedler 
were abused in Russia as Germans and experience much the same in Germany as 
Russians."05 Evidence suggested that it was the latter - whether Spdtaussiedler 
constituted being accepted as true Germans - that epitomised the distinction between 
state and ethno-national self-understandings.
'A 16-year-old ethnic German born in Russia, whose family has re-settled in Germany, 
is on average seen as a Russian', concluded the Youth 2000: Shell Study on Young 
People in Germany} 06 Whenever Spdtaussiedler were treated as foreigners by their new
101 Carried out on behalf of the German newspaper Die Woche, from 29.06.00-30.06.00. See: Es sind der 
Meinung, dass die Aufnahme von Auslandem beschrankt werden sollte. Aufmnahmebschrankung fur 
Aussiedler? 4. Meinungen zur Aufhahme von Aussiedlern. In: Meinungen zur Einwanderung und zum 
Asyl Forsa Bericht P020326/8229 Sb/Sc, 03.07.00, p. 4.
102 In November 1988 a 'representative cross-section' of 1,000 West Germans from the age of 16 years 
were polled by means of a random sample survey. For survey details see: Frage: ,,In einigen 
Ostblocklandern wie in der Sowjetuinion, Rumanien und Polen leben ja noch viele Deutschstammige, die 
in die Bundesrepublik iibersiedeln mochten. Was meinen Sie: 1st das eine gute Sache, dali in der letzten 
Zeit viele deutsche Aussiedler in unserer Land kommen, oder haben Sie da Zeifel?" Zweifel. D. 
Aussiedler - Auslander- Asylbewerber. November 1988. In: Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, K. (eds). 
Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1984-1992 Band 9. Miinchen/New York/London/Paris: K. G. 
Saur, Verlag fur Demoskopie Allensbach am Bodensee, 1993, p. 521.
103 See: Forsythe, D. German identity and the problem of history. In: Tonkin, E., McDonald, M. and 
Chapman, M. (eds). op. cit., pp. 145-147 and: Stark, H. op. cit., pp. 42-43. See also: Hoffmann, P. and 
Winkler, M. (eds). op. cit., pp. 40-48.
104 For Beck's comments see: 1. Fur einen neuen integrationspolitischen Dialog. AnstoBe zum Thema 
Integraton III. In: Beck, M. op. cit., pp. 226-227.
105 Cited from: Schmid, B. op. cit., pp. 43-44.
106 See: Preface. In: Thomas, V. Youth 2000: Shell study on young people in Germany. Bonn: Inter 
Nationes Press, Basis-Info 18-2000/Social Policy, 2000, p. 1. The study was compiled by Arthur Fischer 
head of Psydata in Frankfurt am Main, based on in-depth polls and interviews of 6,000 young Germans in 
1998/99. See also: Thomas, V. Youth 2000. Shell study on young people in Germany. Inter Nationes
48
hosts, they tended to associate in their own groups and distance themselves from the 
local population. 'Consequently, young Aussiedler become isolated', noted Christian 
Pfeiffer, Katrin Brettfeld and Ingo Delzer. 107
Spataussiedler Edurad was one of those surveyed by Shell, whose family originated 
from the former autonomous Soviet Republic of the Volga Germans dissolved by Stalin 
in 1941. During and shortly after World War Two, ethnic Germans in the former Soviet 
Union were re-settled, mostly in Siberia with the note 'German citizenship' remaining 
in their passports. 108 Edurad and his family claimed they were German. Yet, although 
they tried to mix, 'Most of the local Germans do not want anything to do with us', 
explained Edurad. 109 During an interview with the NLPB on behalf of Spataussiedler in 
Lower Saxony, 'Waldemar H.' from the former Siberian village of Reichenfeld 
declared: 'We are foreigners here." 10 Another survey appeared to corroborate the 
findings of the Shell study, Der Spiegel and the NLPB. December 1989 revealed 64% 
of the 1,000 Germans surveyed in West Germany expected that further Spataussiedler 
immigration would result in tensions between them and the local population, according 
to the 1984-1992 Allensbach Report of public opinion research surveys. 25% expressed 
the opposite view. Only 28% expected it would lead to enrichment for German culture 
as a result of more German re-settlers - 51% remained sceptical it would." 1
Tensions first became apparent between ethnic Germans and the local population in 
1946. Reception of the 'strangers' from the former eastern German territories was 
anything but cordial. According to Der Spiegel, resentment was evident even before the 
conclusion of the Second World War. German refugees (Fliichtlinge) from the former 
Ostgebiete were derided as 'riff-raff, Poles and seen as an additional burden of a lost
[Online]. Mar 2000 [Accessed 06.06.03]. <http://www.internationes.de/d/presse/basis/e/bil8-2000-e-f-
html>
107 Cited from: Pfeiffer, C., Brettfeld, K and Delzer, I. op. cit., p. 35. See also: Sturzbecher, D. op. cit., p.
71 and: Schmid, B. op. cit., p. 42.
108 See: Hoffmann, P. and Winkler, M. (eds). op. cit., p. 47. See also: Thomas, V. Youth 2000. Shell study 
on young people in Germany. Inter Nationes. op. cit.
109 Cited from: Thomas, V. op. cit., pp. 15-16.
110 Cited from: Hoffrnann, P. and Winkler, M. (eds). op. cit., pp. 9, 40.
111 See: Frage: ,,Wenn innerhalb kurzer Zeit so viele Menschen in unser Land kommen, wie es jetzt durch 
den Zustrom von Aussiedlem und Ubersiedlern geschehen ist, dann kann das auch ganz verschiedene 
Auswirkungen fur unser Land haben. Verteilen Sie birte diese Karten auf das Bildblan hier, je nachdem, 
was Sie erwarten und was Sie nicht erwarten." Der Zustrom von Aussiedlern und Ubersiedlern ist eine 
Bereicherung fur unsere Kultur. Chancen und Risiken. D. Aussiedler Auslander - Asylbewerber. 
Dezember 1989. In: Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, K. (eds). op. cit., p. 519. Allensbach polled a cross- 
section of 1,000 West Germans from the age of 16 years by means of a random sample survey.
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war', noted Christian Habbe." 2 Ethnic German refugees were considered as unwelcome 
competition for the scarce resources of food and perceived as aliens with a different 
mentality. Expelled from the former West Prussia, President of Germany's Federation 
of Expellees (BdV), Erika Steinbach, recalled that: 'We were compelled to accept 
dwellings little better than pigsties. There was no milk - not even half a litre for the 
infants." 13 East Prussian Protestants quartered in predominantly Catholic areas, such as 
Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia, also sometimes resulted in denominational 
conflicts: a Lower Saxon pastor allegedly described the refugees as a 'plague of 
Colorado beetles'."4
Although by 1970 the FRG had received and integrated almost ten million Aussiedler, 
initially the GDR had to cope with a relatively bigger wave of immigration, claimed 
Habbe." 5 During the post-war years almost 4.5 million ethnic Germans from the former 
territories of West Prussia, Pomerania or Silesia were halted on the borders of what was 
later to become the GDR during their flight westwards. In 2002, East German dramatist 
Heiner Muller recalled that Aussiedler in the former GDR were allegedly as unwelcome 
as non-ethnic German asylum-seekers were in West Germany. 116 Although officially 
Germans by passport, evidence suggested Spataussielder have not been accepted as 
equal compatriots in the eastern part of the country either. In some areas of the former 
GDR they were treated with considerable contempt. In the Wittstock Gymnasium within 
the state of Brandenburg, for example, Der Spiegel reported that local schoolchildren 
refused to let the 'stinking Russians' use their toilets." 7
Alleged public hostility to the integration programmes of the former SPD/Green 
government, along with rejection from some quarters of the Spataussiedler's literal 
interpretation of jus sanguinis, not only suggested continued ethno-national attitudes,
112 Cited from: Habbe, C. Der zweite lange Marsch. Vertreibung IV. Spiegel-Serie iiber Flucht und 
Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten. Der Spiegel, 15.04.02 (16), pp. 63-64.
113 Cited from: Ibid. For similar claims in Bremen and Celle, see: Jaenecke, H. Der Wahn der reinen 
Nation. Flucht und Vertreibung. 60 Jahre danach: ein neuer Blick auf das Drama im Osten. Geo Magazin, 
Nov 2004 (11), pp. 134-135 and: Seibold, K. Durch das todliche Konzert der Stalinorgeln. Zeitgeschichte. 
Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, 26.03.05 (70), p. 12.
114 Cited from: Habbe, C. op. cit., p. 64.
115 See: Ibid., p. 63.
116 According to Miinz and Ulrich, by 1950, 3.6 out of the 18.4 million GDR citizens were expellees. 
Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit., p. 25. For report by Heiner Muller see: Habbe, C. op. cit., p. 63.
117 Cited from: Stark, H. op. cit., p. 43. For other claims of hostility to Aussiedler in the former GDR, see: 
Forster, P. and Friedrich, W. Politische Einstellungen und Grundpositionen Jugendlicher in 
Ostdeutschland. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 1992 (B38), p. 8 and: Kolinsky, E. Multiculturalism in 
the making? Non-Germans and civil society in the new Lander. German Politics (Special Issue), 1998: 
7(3), pp. 201, 212.
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118but also the persistence of a National Socialist-inspired Volksgemeinschaft mentality. 
In 2002, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in the former eastern state of 
Thuringia reported that local neo-Nazis followed the 1920 25 Point Party-Programme of 
the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP), based on Adolf Hitler's book 
Mein Kampf. National Socialist and current neo-Nazi philosophy maintains that the 
German people should be protected from an infiltration of foreign blood 
( Volksvermischung). ' 19
Similar reports of neo-Nazi appeals to preserve a racial Volksgemeinschaft were also 
made by the Saxon and Brandenburg regional authorities. 120 One of the victims of this 
concept in practice was the 24-year-old Russlanddeutscher Kajrat Batesov, from 
Wittstok in Brandenburg, who later died of his injuries. 121 This was not an isolated 
incident, however. Ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union became the targets of 
xenophobia - particularly in Brandenburg. Brandenburg's Secretary of the Interior Eike 
Lancelle (CDU) admitted in 2001 that every weekend special police units had to patrol 
the area in order to protect the Russlanddeutsche from right-wing violence. In August 
2001, five Spataussiedler were attacked on Freyenstein's market place in Brandenburg 
and a week later there was a similar assault on a housing settlement centre in Wittstock, 
where over half of all the occupants were Russlanddeutsche} 22 Three regional 
authorities in the old Lander (states) also reported right-wing extremist preoccupation 
with the Volksgemeinschaft and preservation of the German race. Organisations, such as 
the Bewegung Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft (Movement for a National Ethnic 
Community), were active in North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Wurttemberg and 
Rhineland-Palatinate. 123
118 Although the exclusion of Jews and other fremdvolkisch (alien elements) had deep roots in German 
history, it was the National Socialists who first racialised German citizenship in the Nuremberg Laws. 
See: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, op. cit., pp. 166-167.
119 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002. Freistaat Thuringen. Erfurt: Thuringen Innenministerium, 
Thiiringer Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz, Aug 2003, p. 66.
120 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht Land Brandenburg 2002. 4.000 ed. Potsdam: Ministerium des Innern 
des Landes Brandenburg, Mai 2003, pp. 310-311 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001. Freistaat Sachsen. 
Dresden: Staatsministerium des Innern, Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Sachsen, 31.12.01, pp. 33-34.
121 See: Stark, H. op. cit., p. 42. See also: Erstes Todesopfer rassistischer Gewalt in Brandenburg 2002. 
Monitor. Rundbriefdes apabiz e. V., Jul 2002 (6), p. 2.
122 See: Stark, H. op. cit., pp. 42-43.
123 See: Rechtsextremismus in Stichworten. Ideologien -Organisationen -Aktivitaten. Freie und Hansestadt 
Hamburg. 4.000 ed. Hamburg: Behorde fur Inneres. Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Hamburg, Jun 
2001, p. 21 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004. Rheinland-Pfalz. Mainz: Rheinland-Pfalz Ministerium 
des Innern und fur Sport, Apr 2005, p. 40.
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Often applied to describe the states to the west of the river Elbe not in the former GDR, 
the old Ldnder include the eight states of Baden-Wiirttemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Lower 
Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and Schleswig- 
Holstein. Reinstated by the East German regime between 1988 and 1989, the five new 
Ldnder include the states of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Saxony, 
Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia. Interestingly, the former Federal Director of the Policy 
Analysis and Speech-Writing Unit, Michael Mertes, claimed they are 'new' because 
'West Germans perceive them as such'. 124 Despite official claims to the contrary, 
evidence suggested this was not a concern merely of the extreme right. Concerns about 
maintaining the purity of race were not only the primary concerns of neo-Nazis, whose 
racist agenda clearly found resonance in other quarters.
In March and April 1992, the Research Institute of Social Analysis in Leipzig undertook 
a study of East German youth in order to ascertain the extent to which 4,300 
participants agreed with certain extreme right-wing statements. One of the 
aforementioned included: 'We should take care to keep das Deutsche [Germanness] 
pure and prevent the Volkervermischung [mixing of our race]."25 According to the 
survey, 39% of schoolchildren from class grades 8-10, 65% from grades 11-12, along 
with 33% of college trainees from the states of Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt agreed with 
the above declaration. 126 In early 1989, '24% of the population in the FRG agreed with 
the aforementioned statement', noted Professor Hans-Georg Betz. 127
Miinz, Ulrich, Anthony Richter and, to some extent, Allensbach, implied that one of the 
reasons for the rejection of the Russlanddeutsche was the frequent mixed marriages of 
the latter - ethnic Germans from Russia and Central Asia who apparently 'bring along 
non-German spouses and children'. 128 This phenomenon was actually suggested by 
Russlanddeutsche themselves, such as Helene Weimer, Katharina Suhowa and
124 See: Mertes, M. Germany's social and political culture: change through consensus? Words and things. 
Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Social Sciences, Winter 1994: 123(1), p. 1.
125 The question was put by the Research Institute of Social Analysis in Leipzig (Forschungsstelle 
Sozialanalysen Leipzig e. V.), whose conclusions were analysed in the political journal Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte. The study was based on a random sample survey of 4,300 trainees and young people aged 
from 14-25 in Saxony and Saxon-Anhalt: See: Tabelle 1: Rechtsextreme Orientierungen ostdeutscher 
Jugendlicher 1992 (Angaben in Prozent). In: Miiller, H. and Schubarth, W. Rechtsextremismus und 
aktuelle Befindlichkeiten von Jugendlichen in den neuen Bundeslandern. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 
1992(B38),pp. 16-28.
126 See: Tabelle 1: Rechtsextreme Orientierungen ostdeutscher Jugendlicher 1992 (Angaben in Prozent). 
In: Miiller, H. and Schubarth, W. op. cit., pp. 16-17.
127 Cited from: Betz, H-G. Perplexed normalcy: German identity after Unification. In: Alter, R. and 
Monteath, P. (eds). op. cit., pp. 47-61.
128 Cited from: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit., p. 30. See also: Richter, A. op. cit., pp. 30, 91-98.
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Waldemar 'H.', who believed that the multi-racial mix of Russlanddeutsche families 
accounted for the prejudice and rejection from the local population. Suhowa explained 
to Der Spiegel that she no longer wanted her current name. She wished to revert to the 
name Warkentin of her ancestors who were brought to Russia two centuries ago by 
Catherine the Great of Russia - herself a German. 129 Apparent rejection by some in 
Germany of ethnic Germans on account of their Mischehen, or mixed marriages, must 
be taken into account when assessing the disparities between official and popular self- 
understanding. Acceptance of Spataussiedler subject to German racial purity suggested, 
for instance, the continuing legacy of a National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft mentality 
and challenged Marieluise Beck's and Jochen Welt's appeals for a less exclusive 
citizenship based on blood descent and, hence, national identity. 130
Indicative, perhaps, of the significance attached to race as a condition of social 
acceptance from some sections of the population of the Russlanddeutsche, were the 
following conclusions from Allensbach. According to Allensbach, in 1989 31% of the 
1,000 Germans surveyed in the old Lander did not consider ethnic Germans from East 
Europe as 'richtige Deutsche', or real Germans, and 29% did not consider them German 
at all. 131 Three years later, Allensbach found that 44% of the 1,000 Germans surveyed 
within the old Lander considered that German descent should play an important role in 
determining whether Spataussiedler should be admitted into Germany; within the 
former GDR it was 42%. l32 Further indicative of the apparent disputes about which 
sense of self should animate Germany was some of the public's reaction to the former 
SPD/Green ruling coalition's proposals to allow long-term foreign residents dual 
nationality.
129 For allegations by Katharina Suhowa, Helene Weimer and Waldemar H., see: Schmid, B. op. cit., pp. 
42-44 and: Hoffmann, P. and Winkler, M. (eds). op. cit., pp. 40-42.
130 For official claims of the continued adherence to a National Socialist-inspired Volksgemeinschaft in 
Hamburg, Saxony and Baden-Wurttemberg, see: Rechtsextremismus in Stichworten. Ideologien 
Organisationen -Aktivitdten. op. cit., p. 21.
131 See: Frage: ,,Betrachten Sie die Aussiedler als richtige Deutschen, oder sind es keine richtige 
Deutschen?" Sind Aussiedler Deutsche? D. Aussiedler Auslander - Asylbewerber. Oktober 1989. In: 
Noelle-Neumann, E. and Keener, K. (eds). op. cit., p. 520. In 1989 Allensbach polled a 'representative 
cross-section' of 1,000 West Germans aged from 16 by means of random sample survey.
132 See: Frage: ,,Eine Frage zu den Leuten, die aus anderen Landern kommen und in der Bundesrepublik 
aufgenommen werden wollen. Sollten es bei der Entscheidung tiber die Aufnahme eine Rolle spielen, ob 
jemand deutschstammig ist, also seine Familie einmal aus Deutschland ausgewandert ist, oder sollte die 
Abstammung keine Rolle spielen?" Cited from: Deutschstammigkeit. D. Aussiedler Auslander - 
Asylbewerber. Mai 1992. In: Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, K. (eds). op. cit., p. 521. A 'statistical 
representative cross-section' of 1,000 Germans from both the old and new Lander were surveyed in 1992 
by means of a nationwide random sample survey.
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The Dilemmas of Dual Nationality - "a dance at two weddings'? 133
Karen Schonwalder, Der Spiegel and Statewatch claimed that many Germans reject the 
introduction of the territorial principle of jus soli since it would effectively allow dual 
citizenship for non-German immigrants. 134 On the other hand, federal ministers of the 
then SPD/Green ruling coalition government, such as Minister of the Interior Otto 
Schily, Commissioner for Foreigner Issues Marieluise Beck and Commissioner for the 
Armed Forces Willfried Penner, all actively promoted and encouraged the extension of 
dual nationality to children bom of long-term foreign residents in Germany. 135
Amendments in citizenship legislation for immigrants and foreign residents in Germany 
were of particular interest for two reasons. Firstly, France and Germany were often 
regarded as the leading motors of European integration within the European Union 
(EU). In an era when de-emphasising the national cultural implications of citizenship 
has become important at the European level, reunification revived the urgency of 
affecting a collective national identity. Secondly, a French civic-based citizenship based 
on jus soli appeared to represent a threat to the traditional concept of citizenship for 
some Germans, who continue to assert the importance of ethno-linguistic and cultural 
communities. 136 Given that Germany's ruling political elite and its western neighbours 
arguably promote a multiethnic setting for Europe, the adherence to and defence of an 
ethno-cultural conception of citizenship from sections of the German public presented 
considerable challenges for an extended EU. 137
Since its first inception in 1913, national citizenship law in Germany has primarily 
followed the model of jus sanguinis. In principle, Germany has always been opposed to 
dual nationality and, along with several other countries, was a signatory to the Council
133 For comments by the Bavarian Minister of the Interior Dr. Giinther Beckstein, see: Jach, M. and 
Krumrey, H. Wer darfDeutscher werden? Focus, 29.12.97 (1), pp. 34-37.
134 See: Schonwalder, K. Minority rights at home and abroad: The German debate. In: Hudson, R. and 
Reno, F. (eds). Politics of identity, migrants and minorities in multicultural states. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000, p. 116 and: Damstadt, T., Emke, C. and Mascolo, G. Der Kampf um die 
Passe. Der Spiegel, 11.01.99 (2), pp. 22-25. See also: Citizenship reform law disputed. Statewatch, Mar- 
Apr 1999: 9(2), pp. 2-3.
135 For official encouragement of dual nationality by Schily and Penner see: Darnstadt, T., Emke, C. and 
Mascolo, G. op. cit., pp. 22-23, 27. See also speech in the Bundestag by Beck in: Plenarprotokoll 
Deutscher Bundestag, 14/28. Stenographischer Bericht 28 Sitzung. Bonn, 19.03.99, pp. 2305-2307.
136 See: Smith, A. D. National identity, op. cit., pp. 9-12.
137 With the exception of Polish nationality for German Aussiedler, in contrast to Germany, France and 
Britain usually permit dual nationality and the retention of other foreign passports. See: Ertel, M. 
Regelmaflig akzeptiert. Der Spiegel, 11.01.99 (2), pp. 33-34 and: Kunstliche Minderheit. Der Spiegel, 
23.03.98 (13), p. 34.
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of Europe's Convention on the Avoidance of Dual Citizenship of 1963. 138 Officials were 
guided by the basic principle, consistently upheld by German courts, that an applicant 
may be naturalised only if the naturalisation was in the public interest. 139 Until 2000, 
Germany generally favoured citizenship entitlement through ethnicity and descent in 
contrast to Britain or France, who have tended to decide matters of inclusion and 
exclusion based on jus soli, or the law of territory, and democratic traditions. France in 
particular bases its citizenship law on jus soli, in which a civic-territorial principle takes 
precedence of jus sanguinis or law of descent. 140
German philosopher Jurgen Habermas and Dr. Marianne Takle provided a lucid 
explanation of this civic interpretation of the nation. In contrast to the ethnic model that 
interpreted citizenship from a cultural and racially determined perspective, the civic 
stance of democratic citizenship does not necessarily have to be rooted within the 
national identity of a people. There are no core values to defend, such as a common 
heritage, ethnicity, language, religion or customs; cultural values are common for all 
members. 141 So whilst the ethnic pattern ensures it remains difficult to include people in 
the political community, the civic model makes it problematic to exclude people and 
extends citizenship status to members of the polity regardless of class, race or gender. A 
corresponding attachment to jus soli, or the territorial concept of the nation-state, is the 
guiding principle of citizenship status. 142 Thus, the French nation is usually perceived as 
one where people choose to belong - la conception elective - as opposed to the former 
German determinist or organic ethno-cultural membership of association. 143
With continued immigration and settling of immigrants in Germany from the 1960s 
onwards, official relegation of jus soli to the principle of descent became legally and 
politically problematic. During the early 1980s, for instance, debates in the Bundestag
138 See: Green, S. Citizenship policy in Germany: The case of ethnicity over residence. In: Hansen, R. and 
Weil, P. (eds). op. cit., p. 36.
139 See: Hailbronner, K. Citizenship and nationhood in Germany. In: Brubaker, R. (ed). Immigration and 
the politics of citizenship in Europe and North America, op. cit., p. 69.
140 See: Bomhoft, P. and Ertel, M. Wo gibt es doppelte Staatsbiirgerschaft? Warten auf ein Wunder. Der 
Spiegel, 16.11.98 (47), pp. 33-34, 56.
141 For analysis of the differences between the civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation and citizenship 
by Jurgen Habermas and Marianne Takle, see: Takle, M. German policy on immigration and European 
integration: two challenges to the nation-state and the role of the political community in the democratic 
process. Paper prepared for presentation at ARENA-seminar, 19.03.02, pp. 13-19.
142 See: Smith, A. D. National identity, op. cit., pp. 9-12. See also: Kohn, H. Western and eastern 
nationalisms. In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (eds). Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994, pp. 162-165.
143 See: Favell, A. Philosophies of integration. Immigration and the idea of citizenship in France and 
Britain. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. 64.
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reflected official concerns with the social and political marginalisation of thousands of 
long-term immigrants. Arguing that citizenship legislation was ambiguous, 
contradictory and could lead to a future identity crisis for the 4.6 million foreigners in 
Germany, SPD representative Hans-Eberhard Urbaniak asked in the Bundestag during 
1982: 'Is the national identity of foreigners to be respected or rejected?' Questioning the 
CDU policy of rotation of foreign workers and proposed programme of repatriation, in 
the same Bundestag debate, Dietmar Holscher of Germany's liberal FDP party 
maintained that 'immigrants do not know what to do for the best - stay, go or wait and 
see' - a situation described in the Bundestag by Reinhard Biihling (SPD) as a 'post-card 
naturalisation'.' 44
Since more and more children were being born to foreigners in Germany, by 1995 the 
question of naturalisation had again become acute for the German government. As far 
back as 1982, for example, an FDP representative of the Bundestag pointed out that the 
foreign population had an increasingly higher rate of births than the German one. 145 
During the early 1990s, Germany attracted more immigrants than any other European 
country, claimed Jost Halfmann and Hermann Kurthen; between 1989 and 1992 about 
one million people migrated annually to Germany. 146 According to official figures, 
between 1991 and 2002 almost 12.2 million people migrated to Germany. 147 At the same 
time, immigrants neither applied for citizenship nor, aside from a few exceptions within 
the former CDU/CSU/FDP ruling coalition, along with most members of the 
SPD/Green opposition (1982-1998), were actively encouraged to do so by a German 
government. 148 'The Federal Republic of Germany does not strive to increase the 
number of its citizens through naturalisation', ran the former SPD/FDP government's 
1978 guidelines on naturalisation. 149
144 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 9/83. op. cit., pp. 4973, 4895-4901, 4888, 4891- 
4895,4909-4914.
145 See Bundestag speeches by Hirsch and Dregger in: Ibid., pp. 4893, 4916.
146 See: Halfmann, J. Two discourses of citizenship in Germany: The differences between public debate 
and administrative practice. In: Brady, J. S., Crawford, B. and Wiliarty, S. E. (eds). op. cit., pp. 378-379 
and: Kurthen, H. op. cit., p. 935.
147 See: Migrationsbericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung fur Migration, Fluchtlinge und 
Integration im Auftrag der Bundesregierung (Migrationsbericht 2003). op. cit., p. 5.
148 For speech by Schmalz-Jacobsen and support by some CDU politicians promoting the facilitation of 
naturalisation for foreigners, see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/18. op. cit., pp. 1228, 1234 
and: Green, S. Citizenship policy in Germany: The case of ethnicity over residence. In: Hansen, R. and 
Weil, P. (eds). op. cit., pp. 30-44.
149 The guidelines on naturalisation Einburgerungsrichtlinien (EinbRili) were agreed by the SPD/FDP 
ruling coalition in 1977. See: Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt. Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innem, 
12.01.78 Z 3191 A. Ausgabe A. 29. Jahrgang (2), p. 16.
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During the early 1990s, though, efforts were made to address the problem. Former CDU 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl began considering naturalisation for foreigners already 
resident in the country at the apparent expense of those outside the territorial 
boundaries, whose claim was based on ethnic links. Governing the conditions of entry 
and residence of foreigners in Germany, the Foreigner Laws (AuslG) were formally 
introduced in 1991 to simplify the naturalisation process for foreigners. 150
However, naturalisation remained conditional on the applicant relinquishing his or her 
former citizenship between the ages of 16 and 23. 151 Despite modification of earlier 
naturalisation legislation in 1994, according to the then SPD-led opposition and others, 
the former CDU/CSU-FDP ruling coalition had still failed to address one of the central 
problems of the AuslG. For Manfred Steger, F. Peter Wagner and others, for example, 
the problem still remained that thousands of foreign children born in Germany were, in 
the words of Simon Green, 'effectively restricted from becoming German citizens until 
their formative years were over'. 152 It was a point not lost on Green representative 
Kerstin Muller and the former Federal Government's Commissioner for Foreigner 
Issues. 'Compared to most of Germany's neighbours, in 1995 the FRG had the lowest 
rate of naturalisation - less than 1%', claimed Muller of the Alliance 90/The Greens. 153 
According to the then Federal Government's Commissioner for Foreigner Issues, in 
1996 only one in two of Spaniards, former Yugoslavians, Greeks, Italians and Turks - 
'expressed an interest in naturalising'. 154 And whilst the naturalisation rate among Turks 
rose from 1.57% in 1995 to 2.26% in 1996, it fell again to 1.86% in 1997. Overall, in 
comparison to 1996, this represented an average decrease of 5.3% in naturalisation rates 
of foreigners in 1997. 155 Those not intending to naturalise were asked the reasons for 
this. By far the most common answer was that the respondent wanted to remain a 
citizen of his country of origin. In 1995, when Turks were asked by the Federal Ministry
150 See Green, S. Citizenship policy in Germany: The case of ethnicity over residence. In: Hansen, R. and 
Weil, P. (eds). op. cit., pp. 32-44 and: Hogwood. P. op. cit., pp. 130-144.
151 For Auslandergesetz (AuslG) legislation, see: Siebenter Abschnitt Erleichterte Einbiirgerung. AuslG 
85; Einburgerungsanspruch fur Auslander mit langerem Aufenthalt: Miteinbiirgerung auslandischer 
Ehegatten und minderjahriger Kinder. In: Gesetz iiber die Einreise und den Aufenthalt van Ausldndern im 
Bundesgebiet. op. cit., p. 42.
152 Cited from: Green, S. Citizenship policy in Germany: The case of ethnicity over residence. In: Hansen, 
R. and Weil, P. (eds). op. cit., pp. 40-41. For protests by Steger and Wagner over an impending identity 
crisis of Germany's immigrants see: Kurthen, H. op. cit., p. 933.
153 For comments by Kerstin Muller see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/18. op. cit., p. 1224.
154 Two thirds of foreigners were surveyed from the age of 15. Cited from: 2. Einbiirgerungen. In: Bericht 
der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung far die Belange der Ausldnder iiber die Lage der Ausldnder in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bonn: Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur Migration, Fliichtlinge und 
Integration, Dez 1997, p. 22.
155 See: 4.0 Einbiirgerungsquoten. In: Beck, M. op. cit., p. 20.
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for Work and Social Order if they intended to naturalise, only one in four responded 
positively, whilst fewer than half (46.7%) unequivocally rejected the idea. 156
Along with Bundestag politicians Kerstin Miiller and Joschka Fischer (Alliance 90/The 
Greens), Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen (FDP) and Dr. Herta Daubler-Gmelin (SPD) also 
criticised the principle of blood descent taking precedence over jus soli and demanded 
that naturalisation procedures for foreigners should be eased. 157 Despite the introduction 
of the so-called Kinderstaatszugehorigkeit (children's citizenship) in 1997, proposing a 
guarantee of naturalisation to children born to foreign parents in Germany between the 
ages of 18 and 27, as a result of intense opposition within the CDU/CSU, dual 
nationality and hence, arguably, jus soli were rejected. 158
As a result, naturalisation still remained conditional on applicants abandoning their 
former nationality. So why were the CDU/CSU so inveterate against dual nationality 
during the 1990s? Effectively, between 1982 and 1998, most members of the CDU/CSU 
believed that an applicant for German citizenship must actively elect for German 
citizenship - not have it imposed, regardless of his or her inclinations. Naturalisation 
had to remain essentially an individual process - not a collective one as in France. In 
France, for instance, assimilation and naturalisation are usually expected, whereas past 
German governments usually viewed naturalisation as the exception. Indicative, 
perhaps, of the French citizenship ideology were the comments by the then French 
Prime Minister Jacques Chirac in 1987: 'It is a joy for France to receive supplementary 
children [naturalised citizens]." 59
In the past, former conservative German ministers defended their stance with the 
argument that naturalisations should only occur at the end of a successful integration 
process - and then only if the applicant elected to adopt German citizenship. During
156 See: Hailbronner, K. Citizenship and nationhood in Germany. In: Brubaker, R. (ed). Immigration and 
the politics of citizenship in Europe and North America, op. cit., p. 76 and: 2. Einbiirgerungen. In: Bericht 
der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung fur die Belange der Ausldnder iiber die Lage der Ausldnder in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. op. cit., p. 22.
157 For speeches in the Bundestag by Kerstin Miiller, Joschka Fischer, Schmalz-Jacobsen and Dr. Herta 
Daubler-Gmelin see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/18. op. cit., pp. 1224-1225, 1230-1232.
158 This revised version of the earlier 1995 Kinderstaatszugehorigkeit granted 'foreign children bom in 
Germany a guarantee of naturalisation between the ages of 18 and 27', conditional on 'good conduct' and 
the relinquishment of former nationality. Cited from: Green, S. Citizenship policy in Germany: The case 
of ethnicity over residence. In: Hansen, R. and Weil, P. (eds). op. cit., p. 42.
159 Cited from: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, op. cit., p. 155. See 
also: Lemke, C. Crossing borders and building barriers: migration, citizenship and state building in 
Germany. In: Klausen, J. and Tilly, L. A. (eds). op. cit., pp. 91-92.
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various political debates, for example, CSU politicians made this point abundantly 
clear. Dual nationality was perceived by the sister party of the CDU, the CSU, as 
working against integration and keeping alive, in the words of the former Bavarian state 
secretary Hermann Regensburger: 'An undesirable insurance mentality."60 From the 
viewpoint of conservatives, the assumption was that anyone with dual nationality had 
divided loyalties. As the former CSU Bavarian Minister of the Interior, Dr. Giinther 
Beckstein, stated: 'No-one can dance at two weddings." 61 Former CDU Minister of the 
Interior, Manfred Kanther, also stated in the Bundestag that dual nationality created a 
conflict of interests, and similar comments were made earlier by the then CDU 
Chairman Alfred Dregger. 162 Even those committed in Germany to granting full political 
rights to immigrants hesitated in attributing unilaterally German citizenship to 
immigrants. This was evident from politicians both left and right of the mainstream by 
their use of the expressions Zwangsgermanisierung and Eindeutschung (enforced 
Germanisation) to dispel any possible indictments of compulsive naturalisation. 163
In a Bundestag debate about extending dual nationality to the children of long-term 
resident foreign parents during 1997, summarising her contribution, Dr. Cornelie 
Sonntag-Wolgast (SPD) stated: 'No-one should be forced to become German. We do 
not want to force double nationality upon anyone - for better or for worse. It is 
necessary, however, to amend the principle of descent with the territorial one." 64 Earlier 
in 1982, CSU politician Carl-Dieter Spranger claimed in the Bundestag that: 'It should 
not be overlooked that there are large groups in Germany that have no wish to be 
Germanised."65 In 2004, the term was still being officially employed. During debates 
about the ethics of foreigner integration in Germany, Bavaria's former CSU Minister for 
Education and the Arts Monika Hohlmeier and the then Bavarian Prime Minister 
Edmund Stoiber criticised the inconsistencies of SPD policy. For example, Hohlmeier 
and Stoiber highlighted that in contrast to the past party line that rejected compulsive
160 Cited from: Hogwood, P. op. cit., p. 137.
161 For interview with Dr. Beckstein see: Jach, M. and Krumrey, H. op. cit., pp. 34-37.
162 For Bundestag speech by former CDU Federal Minister of the Interior Kanther in: Plenarprotokoll 
Deutscher Bundestag, 13/18. op. cit., pp. 1220-1224. For comments by CDU politician Dregger, see: 
Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 9/83. op. cit., pp. 4891-4895.
163 See: Baum, G. R. Aktuelle Probleme der Auslanderpolitik. Zeitschrift fur Ausldnderrecht und 
Auslanderpolitik, 1981 (1), pp. 7-12, cited from: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and 
Germany, op. cit., p. 177. See also: Kurthen, H. op. cit., p. 930. See also: Green, S. Citizenship policy in 
Germany: The case of ethnicity over residence. In: Hansen, R. and Weil, P. (eds). op. cit., p. 42.
164 See Bundestag speeches by Dr. Sonntag-Wolgast and Hesse's Staatsminister Gerhard Bokel in: 
Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/200. Stenographischer Bericht 200 Sitzung. Bonn, 30.10.97, pp. 
18080-18081, 18088-18089. 
165 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 9/83. op. cit., pp. 4912-4913.
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language competence as a Zwangsgermanisierung, former Minister of the Interior Otto 
Schily now demanded it as a requisite for integration and naturalisation for foreign 
nationals. During an interview with the German newspaper Welt am Sonntag in 2002, 
for instance, Schily declared: 'Anyone who wishes to settle here permanently must leam 
German."66
With a change of government in 1998, though, the first real signs of a re-orientation 
regarding the conceding of dual nationality to immigrants at official level appeared. 
Attempting to break with what Meinrad Belle of the CDU described in the Bundestag as 
a 'centuries-old tradition that defined German naturalisation according to bloodlines', a 
new coalition of Social Democrats and Greens entered office in September 1998 
determined to modernise Germany's citizenship law. 167 Announcing their proposal to 
comprehensively modify Germany's citizenship legislation, Dr. Michael Biirsch of the 
SPD proclaimed in the Bundestag: 'We Social Democrats have been fighting and 
waiting 86 long years for the extension of the principle of jus soli. n6* Responsible for 
the reform of the law on nationality, Otto Schily himself stated that Germany's new 
citizenship law represented a 'historical break from past traditions'. 169
In autumn 1998, Schily presented the German parliament with a draft bill intended to 
provide a 'litmus test' for the state of German society and its resolve to admit ethnic 
non-Germans as Germans via dual nationality. 170 Central to the provision of the SPD- 
Green proposal was that foreigners could keep their original citizenship when they 
became naturalised Germans. This was expected to encourage Turks to apply for 
citizenship because they could still retain the inheritance and property rights previously 
withheld by the Turkish authorities to Turks living in Germany. Formerly, Turks and 
other foreigners in Germany had to be released from their previous nationality before 
being naturalised as German. 171 Provided certain prerequisites are fulfilled, the 2000 
Law Reforming the Right of Citizenship now recognises children born in Germany to
166 See: Weckbach-Mara, F. ,,Rasterfahndung in ganz Europa ist unser Ziel." Welt am Sonntag, 21.07.02: 
53(29), p. 4. For CSU critiques of alleged SPD inconsistencies over a Zwangsgermanisierung see speech 
by Hohlmeier and Stoiber in: Plenarprotokoll 15/30. Bayerischer Landtag. 15 Wahlperiode, 30 Sitzung. 
Miinchen, 01.12.04, p. 1996.
167 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/18. op. cit., pp. 1224, 1231-1232, 1234. See 
also: Hogwood, P. op. cit., pp. 125-144 and: Citizenship reform law disputed, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
168 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/28. op. cit., pp. 2281-2282.
169 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/135. Stenographischer Bericht 135 Sitzung. 
Berlin, 28.11.00, pp. 13154-13155.
170 See: Cahn, C. Who is a German? SAIS Review of International Affairs, Winter-Spring 2000, p. 122.
171 See: Martin, P. German Green Cards: solution, stopgap or symbol? Migration News [Online]. 18.02.01 
[Accessed 02.08.02]. <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/cmpr/febO l/martin_feb01.html>
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foreign parents as German from birth. But between the ages of 18 and 23 years, children 
must decide whether they want to retain German nationality or the nationality of their 
parents. 172
Although dual nationality was still avoided in principle, in contrast to past legislation, 
previous nationality can be retained under certain conditions. Foreigners who have lived 
in Germany for more than 30 years are now able to naturalise and keep the passport 
issued by their country of origin. This last point applies to elderly persons and victims 
of political persecution. If release from the foreign nationality is legally impossible or 
would be politically, socially or economically detrimental, foreigners may retain their 
previous nationality. 173 Serving to highlight the distinction between popular and official 
national self-understanding, it was this last principle - that of the retention by foreigners 
of their former nationality - which provoked the most opposition.
Along with some of the public's rejection of the Spataussiedler, since reunification, 
those seeking to defend the ethno-cultural tradition of citizenship have become 
increasingly apparent. Further evidence of the contemporary relevance of Herder's 
notion of the Volk, or people, was the reaction from some quarters to SPD/Green 
proposals for extending dual nationality to long-term foreign residents based on a 
Verfassungspatriotismus or constitutional patriotism. Posing ideologically charged 
questions of what it means to belong to the nation-state, the fundamental ideological 
division between the Kulturnation and what Patricia Hogwood termed a 
Verfassungsnation underlined the competing idioms of German national identity. 174
Entering political discourse in the late 1970s, the term Verfassungspatriotismus was 
first employed by Dolf Sternberger and became central to the theme of national identity 
during the 1980s. During the 1970s, for example, West German left-liberal thinkers
172 In general, foreigners also have the right to become naturalised after eight years of law-abiding 
habitual residence instead of 15, as was previously the case. Adequate command of the German language, 
a basic awareness of German history and culture and a commitment to the basic tenets of the Constitution 
(Grundgesetz) are also requirements of citizenship. Cited from: Reform of the Law on Nationality. 
German Foreign Office [Online]. 2002 [Accessed 17.06.03]. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/ 
wilkommen/staatsangehoerigkeitsrecht/index_html> A draft of the SPD/Green proposed nationality 
reform was also outlined in a Federal law gazette dated 23.07.99. See: AusschluBgrunde. Artikel 2. 
Anderung des Auslandergesetzes. Gesetz zur Reform des Staatsangehorigkeitsrechts. Vom 15. Juli 1999. 
In: Bundesgesetzblatt 1999, Teill, N38. Bonn: Bundesanzeiger Verlag, 23.07.99, pp. 1620-1621.
173 This applied if release from the foreign nationality would bring economic disadvantages such as high 
release fees, degrading methods of release or problems with assets and property. Cited from: Reform of 
the Law on Nationality, op. cit. See also: Germany: option model approved. Migration News [Online]. 
Jun 1999: 6(6) [Accessed 12.07.02]. <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/jun_1999-llmn.html>
174 See: Hogwood, P. op. cit., pp. 125, 136-142.
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began advocating a German patriotism based explicitly on German liberal democratic 
traditions. Summarised by Habermas, national identity based on a 
Verfassungspatriotismus refers to a political culture in which liberal constitutional 
principles are able to take root - without requiring all citizens to share the same 
language, ethnic and cultural origins. 175 For the promoters of the Verfassungsnation 
stance upheld by the majority of the representatives of the left-wing parties, such as the 
SPD and the Greens, citizenship policy should contain the following criteria:
1. Immigrant and citizenship status ought to be re-defined in accordance with a 
more modern legislation. 176
2. Jus soli should take precedence over jus sanguinis. 177
3. Dual nationality should be extended to children born to foreigners in Germany 
and permitted to long-term foreign residents under certain conditions. 178
By contrast, an ethno-cultural self-understanding does not favour the naturalisation of 
millions of foreigners. Mario Rainer Lepsius and Douglas Klusmeyer, for instance, 
contrasted the differences between nations based on a Verfassungspatriotismus and an 
ethno-cultural community with respect to their bonds of allegiance, social composition 
and political development. According to Lepsius, ethnic unity provides the basis of 
legitimacy of statehood that becomes the fundamental criterion of membership in the 
state. Summarising Lepsius, Klusmeyer explained:
Ties of common ethnicity bind members of such a state more than their devotion 
to shared political principles. Indeed Volk [ethnic nations] can be indifferent to
175 See: Habermas, J. Faktizitdt und Geltung. Beitrdge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des 
democratischen Rechtsstaats. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992, pp. 632-661.
176 See: Hogwood, P. op. cit., pp. 136-142. For demands for a naturalisation process more in line with 
Germany's western neighbours, see speeches by Kerstin Miiller (Alliance 90/The Greens), Daubler- 
Gmelin (SPD) and Schily (SPD) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/18. op. cit., pp. 1224, 1231- 
1232, 1237-1238.
177 From 1995-1999 there were increasing calls by some members of the Bundestag for jus soli to replace 
the 'Abstammungsprinzip' (principle of blood descent) as a requirement for naturalisation. See comments 
by Joschka Fischer (Alliance 90/The Greens) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/18. op. cit., p. 
1226. See also Bundestag speeches by SPD politicians Dr. Sonntag-Wolgast and Sebastian Edathy in: 
Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/200. op. cit., pp. 18080-18082 and: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher 
Bundestag, 14/28. op. cit., pp. 2297-2300.
178 For general support of dual nationality from the left, see speeches by Dr. Biirsch (SPD), Jelpke (PDS), 
Christine Lambrecht (SPD) and Beck (Alliance 90/The Greens) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 
14/28. op. cit., pp. 2281-2283, 2295-2297, 2305-2309.
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the form of political constitution the state assumes and place their collective 
ethnic interests over and above respect for individual rights. 1179
One of the fundamental features of national identity is the idea of a patria or a 
community of laws. Concurrent with the sense of legal and political community is a 
sense of legal equality among the members of that community. Its full expression is in 
the various kinds of 'citizenship' that implies a minimum of reciprocal rights and 
obligations among members. 180 If citizenship is based on the Verfassungsnation 
construction, access to basic rights is available for all those who commit themselves to a 
particular cultural project. 181
In contrast to the Bundestag political elite, for the proponents of the Kulturnation 
position, the Verfassungspatriotismus idea of co-existing ethnic and cultural minorities 
and equal rights to naturalisation within a German society was unacceptable. This 
became particularly evident from the three main German extreme right-wing parties 
the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), the Republicans (REP) and German 
People's Union (DVU). 182 A REP Hessian bulletin of locally elected representatives 
noted:
So far jus sanguinis has ensured the character and identity of our people have 
been preserved - at least to some extent. By abandoning this principle, however, 
the federal government lays the foundation for the destruction of our country 
and people. 183
In sum, the more extreme variant of the ethno-cultural position as defined by the DVU, 
NPD and the REP parties can be summarised as follows:
1. Jus sanguinis should be preserved as the defining principle of German 
citizenship. 184
2. Foreigners are seen as a threat to the idea of the German Volk (nation) and, 
therefore, German identity. 185
179 Cited from: KJusmeyer, D. op. cit., pp. 1-20. John Hutchinson and A. D. Smith claimed the 'ethnic 
community possesses a permanent, physically bounded territory over and above its political 
organisations'. Cited from: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (eds). Ethnicity, op. cit., p. 6.
180 See: Smith, A. D. National identity, op. cit., pp. 10, 14.
181 See: Hogwood, P. op. cit., pp. 125, 135-142.
182 Headed by Dr. Rolf Schlierer the Republikaner are known in Germany as Die Reps. See: Roberts, I. 
op. cit., p. 149.
183 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999. Berlin/Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, Jun 2000, p. 40.
184 See: Wird Deutschland zweites Israel? Masseneinwanderung von Juden. National-Zeitung [Online]. 
02.04.04 (15) [Accessed 23.08.05]. <http://www.national-zeitung.de/Artikel_04/NZ15_2.html>
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3. Naturalisation should be restricted and dual nationality is unacceptable for 
foreigners. 186
It was the last principle outlined above that provoked the most vocal opposition by the 
DVU, NPD and the REP. Calling dual nationality 'an electoral betrayal', the REP 
initiated a nationwide signature campaign against Otto Schily's nationality reform. 187 
Along with the REP, the DVU and NPD were also actively engaged between 1999 and 
2000 in encouraging resistance to Schily's proposed extension of dual nationality. 
Under the slogan: 'No German passport for foreigners', the NPD held demonstrations in 
Magdeburg, Berlin-Mahrzahn and Cologne. 188 Responding to a DVU demonstration 
against dual nationality, SPD member of the Bundestag Christine Lambrecht maintained 
that the DVU's signature action campaign was tantamount to the incitement of racial 
hatred. 189
Whilst, perhaps, not sharing all the ideology of the REP, DVU or NPD, nevertheless, 
evidence indicated that the last principle of their agenda outlined above enjoyed 
considerable widespread public support. At the beginning of 1998 a petition was 
launched that, according to the former Prime Minister of Hesse, Hans Eichel (SPD), 
'mobilised opposition against the extension of dual nationality'. 190 Between January and 
April of 1999, Statewatch reported 4.5 million signatures were collected from Germans 
opposed to dual nationality - Der Spiegel reported ten million. 191 Indicative of the gulf 
between official and popular national identity at the time, some exit polls also revealed 
a vigorous opposition to the SPD/Green government's dual nationality proposal 
second only to worries about unemployment, which in 1999 was 10.7%, leaving 4.1 
million jobless. 192
185 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2003. Berlin/Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, Mai 2004, p. 76.
186 During their campaign against dual nationality in North Rhine-Westphalia, the NPD stated in the 
Deutsche Stimme (German Voice): 'Racial mixture is against nature and is Volkermord [genocide].' See: 
Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. Diisseldorf: Innenministerium des 
Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 28.02.01, pp. 47-48.
187 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2003. op. cit., pp. 77-78.
188 For NPD demonstrations against dual nationality, see: Niedersachsen Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999. 
Hannover: Niedersachsisches Innenministerium, 1999, p. 51 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999. 
Freistaat Thiiringen. Erfurt: Thiiringen Innenministerium, Apr 2000, p. 58.
189 See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/28. op. cit., pp. 2307-2308.
190 Cited from: Germany: dual nationality change. Migration News [Online]. Mar 1999: 6(3) [Accessed
26.07.02]. <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/mar_1999-10mn.html>
191 See: Citizenship reform law disputed, op. cit., pp. 2-3 and: Damstadt, T., Emke, C. and Mascolo, G.
op. cit., p. 22.
1 See: Germany: dual nationality change, op. cit.
64
According to a survey carried out for Der Spiegel by the official representative of 
GALLUP in Germany, TNS Emnid, 53% of the 1,000 Germans of voting age polled in 
January 1999 stated that they were against the introduction of dual citizenship. 71% of 
CDU voters were against it compared with 44% of SPD voters. 193 In a separate 
telephone poll in 1999 by Politbarometer for Germany's second public service 
television station, Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF), of 1,287 Germans questioned, 
67% of FDP voters and 82% of CDU/CSU voters rejected dual nationality. Overall, 
68% of voters from the main parties - the SPD, CDU/CSU, The Greens, the FDP and 
PDS - all objected to the possibility of dual nationality, with 27% in favour of it. 194 In 
the same year Forsa reported, on behalf of the German newspaper Die Woche, 
illustrated weekly Stern and television station RTL, that every second citizen (49%) of 
the 1,002 Germans surveyed opposed dual nationality. On the other hand, only 39% 
supported it. 195 Ignoring alleged popular resistance at the time, however, the ruling 
parties of the SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens pushed through legislation in May 1999 
de-emphasising the traditional principle of citizenship by descent with those of birth. 196
To summarise, the post-war circumstances of a divided Germany and expulsions of 
ethnic Germans seemed to legitimate rather than disgrace the ethno-cultural nuance of 
self-understanding and citizenship in the FRG. According to some German 
commentators, such as Silke Delfs and Volker Ronge, the German public and political 
elite often tended to interpret the decisions of ethnic Germans to emigrate as a response 
to political and social discrimination, and to the adherence to German nationhood. 197 
This was evident in the former special status granted to ethnic Germans, who were not 
officially regarded as immigrants, but as nationals returning to their ethnos (ethnic 
group), whereas labour migrants and asylum-seekers were perceived as temporary
193 The survey was undertaken from 05.01.99-06.01.99. See: ,,Sind Sie fur oder gegen die Einfuhrung der 
doppelten Staatsbiirgerschaft?" MiBtrauen gegen Unbekannt. TNS Emnid. In: Darnstadt, T., Emke, C. 
and Mascolo, G. op. cit., p. 23.
194 The telephone poll was undertaken from 22.02.99-25.02.99, see: Doppelte Staatsburgerschaft sollte 
kunftig moglich sein. Doppelte Staatsbiirgerschaft. 09.07.03 (342). In: Politbarometer 02/99. Monatliche 
reprdsentative Umfrage. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e. V., Mannheim. Universitat zu Koln: Zentralarchiv 
fur Empirische Sozialforschung, 1999, p. 4.
195 Forsa undertook the surveys from 08.01.99-11.01.99. See: Sollten eingeburgete Auslander ihre 
auslandische Staatsburgerschaft behalten diirfen oder sollten Auslander bei der Einbiirgerung als 
Deutsche ihre auslandische Staatsburgerschaft aufgeben miissen? In: Meinungen der Burger zur 
Doppelten Staatsburgerschaft. Forsa Bericht 3403/6433 Mii, 12.01.99, pp. 1,4, 7.
196 See: Germany: dual nationality change, op. cit. and: Germany: option model approved, op. cit.
197 See: Delfs, S. op. cit., pp. 3-11 and: Ronge, V. op. cit., pp. 16-28. See also: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. 
op. cit., pp. 27-38.
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aliens. 198 Indicative of an end to former official positive Spdtaussielder discrimination 
was the more rigorous citizenship application for ethnic Germans, which suggested y MS 
sanguinis no longer constituted such an indispensable element of national self- 
understanding - at least at official level. Responding to questions from the Banner 
General-Anzeiger during 2001 on the more stringent conditions of entry and 
naturalisation for Spdtaussiedler by way of language tests, official representative for 
Spdtaussiedler, Jochen Welt, asked: 'Why should it be different for family members of 
the SpdtaussiedlerT 199
Although the Bundestag political elite have dispensed with ethno-cultural inflections of 
national identity, both Spdtaussiedler and some sections of the public still seemed 
committed to jus sanguinis - either in its literal or its more radical form. This was 
evident from Spdtaussiedler claims to German citizenship based on either an inherited 
jus sanguinis, or through an apparent endorsement from a minority of a more racially 
determined variant of German nationality. Surveys by Allensbach, the Research 
Institute of Social Analysis in Leipzig and various articles suggested that for some, 
Germanness and naturalisation were conditional on being of German descent.
Further to this distinction between the Bundestag political elite and collective national 
self-understandings, were the anomalous status and an apparent rejection of the 
Russlanddeutsche within some areas of Brandenburg, North Rhine-Westphalia and 
Lower Saxony. Although government policy was no longer so conducive towards ethnic 
Germans abroad, at the same time, their integration was still actively being officially 
promoted at the time of writing, and they continue to arrive in significant, albeit 
reduced, numbers. Despite an annual immigration quota of 100,000 ethnic Germans 
since 2000, scheduled to fall to 50,000 from 2002, the SPD and Greens were still 
determined to foster their integration.200 For instance, from 1998-2002 the SPD/Green
198 See: Kurthen, H. op. cit., pp. 929, 934 and: Giesen, B. National identity and citizenship: the cases of 
Germany and France. In: Eder, K. and Giesen, B. (eds). op. cit., p. 46. See also: Brubaker, R. Citizenship 
and nationhood in France and Germany, op. cit., pp. 171-178 and: Bethlehem, S. Heimatvertreibung, 
DDR-Flucht, Gastarbeitungerzuwanderung, Wanderungsstrome und wanderungspolitik in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982, p. 160.
199 For questions put by Holger Mohle of the Banner General-Anzieger to Spdtaussiedler representative 
Jochen Welt, see: ,,Sprache ist der Schliissel zur Integration." op. cit.
200 See: Migrationsbericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung fur Migration, Fluchtlinge und 
Integration im Auftrag der Bundesregierung (Migrationsbericht 2003). op. cit., pp. 27-28. See also: 
Weckbach-Mara, F. op. cit., p. 4.
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government spent in excess of 26.907 million Euros on 1,300 social integration 
programmes for Spdtaussiedler.2M
In the past, the official line was that ethnic Germans would be 'easily absorbed into 
German society'. 202 Closer inspection of more recent developments and past evidence 
suggested otherwise. Official promotion of the integration of the Russlanddeutsche into 
the host society was neither welcome nor wanted from some in Germany. Prejudice 
encountered in their former homelands also extended to their new one. Representing an 
ambiguous and unhappy position regarding their identity, as long as they remained 
outside Germany, Spdtaussiedler were regarded as Germans. Yet, because they were 
perceived as German, or occasionally as fascists rather than Poles or Russians, they 
suffered discrimination in their host states. As soon as they arrived in Germany, their 
identity again became contentious. Although Spdtaussiedler still had a legal, albeit more 
restricted, entitlement to citizenship, once again they were widely held as foreigners - 
this time as 'Russians'. 203 In sum, they were Germans who were not German.
Discrepancies over national self-understanding were also apparent over the extension of 
dual nationality to non-German immigrants. In the past, Germany did not officially seek 
to increase the number of its citizens through naturalisation.204 In the larger German 
cities, only one in four inhabitants had a German passport, and in 1996 Germany 
granted citizenship to just over 4% of its foreign population.205 And, according to 
Kurthen, in 1995 the annual naturalisation ratio was about 3% of the 7 million 'resident 
aliens' in Germany. This was in comparison with 6% in the United States and 8% in the 
Netherlands.206 Yet, since 1998 developments suggested it would become easier for 
those foreigners living on German territory to acquire citizenship, while ethnic German 
immigration and citizenship applications have become progressively restricted.
201 For official promotion and funding of the integration of ethnic Germans see: Starkere Integration von 
Aussiedlera. op. cit. and: III. Integrationspolitik. In: 5. Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung fur 
Ausldnderfragen uber die Lage der Ausldnder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Berlin/Bonn: 
Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur Migration, Fliichtlinge und Integration, Aug 2002, p. 43.
202 Cited from: Richter, A. op. cit., p. 96. See also: Seifert, W. op. cit., p. 448.
203 Cited from: Stark, H. op. cit., p. 43. See also: Schmid, B. op. cit., pp. 43-44.
204 'The Federal Republic of Germany does not strive to increase the number of its citizens through 
naturalisation.' Cited from: 2. Allgemeine Grundsatze fur die Einburgerung. 2. 3. 
Einburgerungsrichtlinien. In: Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt. op. cit., p. 16.
205 For rates of foreigner naturalisation in Germany see: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. op. cit., p. 50 and: 
Green, S. Citizenship policy in Germany: The case of ethnicity over residence. In: Hansen, R. and Weil, 
P. (eds). op. cit., p. 35.
206 See: Kurthen, H. op. cit., p. 93.
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Conversely, ethnic Germans can no longer claim automatic citizenship in their host 
states and on the other, dual nationality is now extended to the children of non-German 
immigrants who may, subject to certain conditions, retain their previous nationality. 
Both, arguably, represented significant breaks from a citizenship based almost 
exclusively on blood descent, hi other words, a volkisch, or ethno-nationalist concept of 
citizenship, has lost ground to a civic-territorial one, mainly supported by liberal 
intellectuals, ecologists, social reformers, Social Democrats and the Greens. SPD and 
Green representatives of the Bundestag Dr. Herta Daubler-Gmelin (SPD), Michael 
Bursch (SPD), Kerstin Miiller, Joschka Fischer and Marieluise Beck (Alliance 90/The 
Greens) campaigned for years for the extension of full citizenship rights for Germany's 
long-term foreign residents.207
For prominent Greens and liberals, such as Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Thomas Schmid, 
only the concept of a civil society can be the foundation of a successful and harmonious 
society. Claiming that jus soli had a civil advantage over German citizenship 
determined by bloodlines (jus sanguinis), political scientists Cohn-Bendit and Schmid 
argued: 'Civil society does not seek the deliberate eradication of differences and conflict 
via homogenisation or exclusion, but outlines exactly what is permissible without 
disrupting social cohesion.' 208
For other Germans, citizenship based on a Verfassungspatriotismus remained a 
problematic and emotive issue, as the opposition generated in response to the former 
SPD/Green ruling coalition's attempts to modernise and normalise German citizenship 
law in accordance with the more Western civic-territorial concept testified. Although jus 
sanguinis has lost ground to jus soli, continued adherence from some to the racial and 
xenophobic legacy of jus sanguinis from extremist elements threatened internal discord 
and a progressive conception of national identity.
Looking at the broader picture, evidence to-date indicated that the 2000 Law Reforming 
the Right of Citizenship, designed to promote a more inclusive national identity, was
207 For their speeches supporting the liberalising of citizenship for foreigners, see: Plenarprotokoll 
Deutscher Bundestag, 13/18. op. cit., pp. 1224-1226, 1229-1232 and: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher 
Bundestag, 14/28. op. cit., pp. 2281-2282, 2297-2300, 2305-2307.
208 For the defence of jus soli and multiculturalism by liberal intellectuals Cohn-Bendit, Schmid and 
others, see: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., pp. 528-529 and: Lemke, C. Crossing borders and building barriers: 
migration, citizenship and state building in Germany. In: KJausen, J. and Tilly, L. A. (eds). op. cit., pp. 
91, 97-98. See also: Hoffmann, C. Immigration and nationhood in the Federal Republic of Germany. In: 
Brady, J. S., Crawford, B. and Wiliarty, S. E. (eds). op. cit., pp. 368-369.
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unpopular with some elements of the population. Hostility to left-liberal moves away 
from jus sanguinis towards a more inclusive citizenship via dual nationality, not only 
reflected the unresolved question of a collective national identity, but also the struggle 
to preserve an ethno-cultural inflection of national self-understanding. Arguably, the 
two particular competing idioms of national identity of an exclusive populist 
Kulturnation on the one hand, and the SPD/Greens' conception of the 
Verfassungsnation that championed an inclusive identity on the other, polarised 
citizenship and, consequently, national identity.209
In conclusion, whilst the Law Reforming the Right of Citizenship heralded a significant 
change in direction under the former SPD/Green ruling coalition, at the same time, 
evidence suggested some were reluctant to dispense with exclusive definitions of 
nationhood. Although it would be misleading to conclude attitudes have not changed 
since 1945, despite the political ruptures in German history and official amendments, 
the ethno-cultural inflection of citizenship in Germany revealed a remarkable 
continuity. 210
To some in Germany, bestowing dual nationality represented a breach of the volkisch, 
or ethno-national, principle whereby a German citizen was born, not made. This type of 
attitude reflected a kind of folk-genetics or primordialism, according to which 
Germanness was seen as something that could neither be acquired nor lost. In other 
words, nationality could not be a conscious choice of the non-ethnic German citizen.2 "
There are, of course, other aspects of German identity, such as the continuing literary 
legacy of, arguably, some of the greatest representatives of the German variant of the 
Aufkldrung (Enlightenment); Gottfried Ephraim Lessing, Friedrich Schiller and 
Wolfgang von Goethe. Rejecting all forms of intolerance and barriers to the intellectual 
development of mankind, Lessing dismissed patriotism since it could lead to forgetting
209 See: Hogwood, P. op. cit., pp. 125-144.
210 'Surviving three political ruptures, the Wilhelmine era, the post-war democratic reconstruction of the 
FRG and German reunification were prominent in this development', noted Lemke. See: Lemke, C. 
Crossing borders and building barriers: migration, citizenship and state building in Germany. In: Klausen, 
J. and Tilly, L. A. (eds). op. cit., pp. 88, 86.
211 Primordialists interpret ethnicity as a biological and psychological fact based on certain patterns of 
behaviour, thinking and language. See: Giesen, B. National identity and citizenship: the cases of Germany 
and France. In: Eder, K. and Giesen, B. (eds). op. cit., p. 43. For claims that Germans differentiated 
between races (based on Deutschstdmmigkeit of German stock) see: Forsythe, D. German identity and the 
problem of history. In: Tonkin, E., McDonald, M. and Chapman, M. (eds). op. cit., pp. 143-154 and: 
Kurthen, H. and Minkenberg, M. op. cit., p. 186.
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that one must be a citizen of the world. Schiller agreed: 'Serving no prince, I write as a 
citizen of the world having lost my fatherland to the whole world at an early age.' 212 
Although not advocating the relinquishing of national identity, others, such as the Berlin 
historian Heinrich August Winkler, welcomed the extension of dual nationality as a step 
in the right direction for non-ethnic German residents.213
Nevertheless, evidence suggested that Herder's definition of the Volk and national 
identity as an exclusive cultural, linguistic and ethnic unit lived on, reflected within 
some public attitudes to citizenship - despite official and other appeals for the contrary. 
Advocates of change, such as Green politician Marieluise Beck, admitted in the 
Bundestag that 'dual citizenship needed making more palatable to the population'. 214 
Former chairman of the CDU opposition Wolfgang Schauble also conceded that: 'In an 
era of closer European co-operation and globalisation, an exclusive 
Schicksalgemeinschaft [citizen community of common fate] is now no longer 
tenable.' 215
Although liberal and postnational conceptions of citizenship have become more widely 
supported than they were in the past, conceding dual nationality to aliens still remained 
a Pandora's box for some in Germany. 216 Since debates about citizenship reflect what it 
means to belong to the nation-state, membership of the nation-state is, arguably, 
primarily about national identity. Exacerbated since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 
apparent hostility to the Spdtaussiedler, along with some of the public's rejection of 
dual nationality for long-term immigrants, suggested there were clear disparities 
between popular and official conceptions of citizenship and, arguably, therefore, 
national identity.
212 For resume of the positive impact of the Au/kldrung, see: Craig, G. A. op. cit., pp. 28-30.
213 See: Damstadt, T., Emke, C. and Mascolo, G. op. cit., pp. 29-31.
214 For comments by Beck and support of dual nationality by Sebastian Edathy (SPD), Christine
Lambrecht (SPD) and Otto Schily, see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/28. op. cit., pp. 2297-
2300, 2305-2309 and: Darnstadt, T., Emke, C. and Mascolo, G. op. cit., pp. 23, 27.
215 Cited from: Andresen, K. and Hildebrandt, M. Korsett aus Kreuth. Der Spiegel, 11.01.99 (2), pp. 30-
31.
216 For claims of a more general support for liberal conceptions of citizenship than in the past, see:
Zimmer, M. From the national state to the rational state and back? An exercise in understanding politics
and identity in Germany in the twentieth century. German Politics, Dec 1999: 8(3), pp. 37-38 and:
Hoffmann, C. Immigration and nationhood in the Federal Republic of Germany. In: Brady, J. S.,
Crawford, B. and Wiliarty, S. E. (eds). op. cit., p. 373-374.
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Chapter 2 
Immigration
'Germany is not a land of immigration."
According to German Professor of Sociology Christian Joppke: 'Germany is the only 
country that has not become tired of repeating it is not an immigration land, elevating 
the no-immigration maxim to a first principle of public policy and national self- 
definition.' 2 In 1978, the Joint Commission of the Federal Government and States 
outlined the principles of (West) German policy towards immigrants and non-Germans. 
Some of the first of these guidelines included the statement: 'The Federal Republic of 
Germany is not an immigration country.' 3 In fact, with a few exceptions, such as the 
former liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) deputy Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, 
conservative Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union politicians of the 
1982-1998 CDU/CSU-FDP ruling coalition, including the then FDP Minister of the 
Interior Gerhart Baum, continued to reiterate this claim. For example, CSU member of 
the Bundestag, Carl-Dieter Spranger, maintained in 1982 that whilst Germany may be a 
land of immigration, it was not something that ought to be encouraged.4 At the time of 
writing, however, the Bundestag political elite from both left and right maintained that 
Germany was an open and friendly land of immigration.
Drawing on comparisons between official former and current stances on immigration, 
this chapter analyses how the Bundestag political elite defined themselves. Evidence 
suggested there were two different conceptions of national identity being contested. On 
the one hand, mainstream party leaders either promoted or claimed that Germany was 
an open land of immigration. France, the Netherlands and the United States in particular
1 Cited from: Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt. Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, 12.01.78 Z 3191 A. 
Ausgabe A. 29. Jahrgang (2), p. 16.
2 Cited from: Klusmeyer, D. Four dimensions of membership in Germany. SAIS Review of International 
Affairs, Winter-Spring 2000, p. 18. For similar contentions see: Staab, A. Xenophobia, ethnicity and 
national identity in Eastern Germany. German Politics, Aug 1998: 7(2), pp. 40-41 and: Hogwood, P. 
Citizenship controversies in Germany: the twin legacy of Volkisch nationalism and the 
Alleinvertretungsanspruch. German Politics, Dec 2000: 9(3), pp. 133-136.
3 Cited from: Kurthen, H. and Minkenberg, M. Germany in transition: immigration, racism and the 
extreme right. Nations and Nationalism, 1995: 1(2), pp. 176-177. See also: Gemeinsames 
Ministerialblatt. op. cit., p. 16.
4 For comments by Spranger, Baum and Schmalz-Jacobsea see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 
9/83. Stenographischer Bericht 83 Sitzung. Bonn, 04.02.82, pp. 4905, 4914 and: Plenarprotokoll 
Deutscher Bundestag, 13/18. Stenographischer Bericht 18 Sitzung. Bonn, 09.02.95, pp. 1225- 1229.
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were held up in the Bundestag as suitable models to justify continued immigration and 
integration. For example, in 2000 the then Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily (Social 
Democratic Party (SPD)), stated: 'Why shouldn't we have a close look at the U. S. 
system of green cards and whether it meets our needs?' 5 On the other hand, a populist 
stance resisted further immigration and perceived official efforts to encourage a more 
economically competitive and cosmopolitan society as a threat to German identity. This 
chapter suggests there have been revived fears of what Baum and others referred to as 
an Uberfremdungsangste (fear of being inundated with foreigners) and concomitant 
need for Germans to protect their identity.6 Both conceptions exposed unresolved 
tensions between official and populist perceptions of national self-understanding, 
raising further questions as to whether Germany had a comprehensive collective 
national identity. Examining some of the public and media's responses to the country's 
first comprehensive national immigration law, Green Cards and attendant Leitkultur 
(leading culture) disputes, this chapter highlights other disparities between official and 
popular conceptions of identity.
From Dual Nationality to Green Cards
In 2001, the 1998-2005 SPD/Green coalition government dispensed with former official 
claims that Germany was not an immigration country. 7 This former stance bore little 
relation to reality, however. Germany continued to accept, in varying degrees, 
foreigners under the terms of labour migrants, family reunion, ethnic Germans, asylum- 
seekers and refugees. 8 Consistent with former official self-definitions, Germany had no 
formally defined national immigration policy. Yet in 2000, Germany's then Minister of 
the Interior, Otto Schily (SPD), appointed a 21-member Immigration Commission to 
make recommendations on the shape of Germany's 'first regulated immigration law'. 9
5 Cited from: Germany: Green Cards, violence. Migration News [Online]. Sep 2000: 7(9) [Accessed 
14.06.02]. <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/sep_2000-10mn.html>
6 An 'Uberfremdungsangste', or fears of an excess of foreigners, has been employed both past and 
present by Bundestag politicians such as Baum (FDP) and the former Chairman of the CDU Party 
Wolfgang Schauble. See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 9/83. op. cit., pp. 4908-4909 and: 
Schauble, W. Der Platz in der Mitte. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 06.07.94, p. 29.
7 See: Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt. op. cit., p. 16.
8 See: Hailbronner, K. Was kann ein Einwanderungsgesetz bewirken? Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 
1997 (B46), pp. 39-46 and: Hogwood, P. op. cit., p. 143.
9 Cited from: Schaffer, A. Schily unveils new immigration legislation. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
[Online]. 03.08.01 [Accessed 19.05.03]. <http://www.faz-archiv.de>
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One of the Commission's proposals was that Germany dispensed with its tradition of 
refusing to acknowledge that the country was a land of immigration, by admitting 
20,000 new permanent residents annually. 10 Divided into three main sections of labour 
migration, protection of refugees and integration, six doors for the entry of labour 
market immigrants were recommended that included three doors for foreigners seeking 
admission based on their qualifications. One of the main goals of the new German 
immigration policy, the Commission concluded, was to attract highly qualified 
foreigners to Germany and to cushion the impact of alleged demographic changes in the 
country." Four doors were also recommended for immigration - each to have a quota for 
asylum-seekers, humanitarian immigration, ethnic Germans and economic 
immigration. 12
Official assurances to overhaul immigration policy provoked neo-Nazis to march down 
Berlin's main boulevard, the Unter den Linden, shouting: 'No sell-out of Germany' and 
'Germany for the Germans'. 13 According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), 
in response to the announcement of the Commission's recommendations of allowing 
20,000 new foreigners, headlines appeared in the right-wing publication of the German 
People's Union (DVU), the National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung (NZ), claiming 
that: 'German academics demand stop to immigration." 4 Press releases from the right- 
wing party of the Republicans (REP) also demanded a halt to immigration, one of which 
declared that Otto Schily's new immigration law threatened the internal security of the 
land by encouraging thousands of 'unwanted guests'. 15 According to the Brandenburg 
Ministry of the Interior, at a National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) 'Party Day', 
Chairman Udo Voigt described the immigration law as: 'One of the biggest mistakes 
and crimes of the German government.' 16 Yet, was it only right-wing extremists who 
opposed the bill as implied by the authorities?
10 For future recommended annual rates of foreigners see: Section 7.2. Creating regulated forms of 
permanent immigration. In: Structuring immigration. Fostering integration. Report by the Independent 
Commission on Migration to Germany. Berlin: Federal Ministry of the Interior, 04.07.01, pp. 85-86.
11 See: Section 7.6. Facilitating the international mobility of highly qualified persons. In: Structuring 
immigration. Fostering integration, op. cit., pp. 96-98.
12 See: Ibid., pp. 11-193 and: Germany: 50,000 immigrants? Migration News [Online]. Aug 2001: 8(8) 
[Accessed 02.08.02]. <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/aug_2001-08mn.html>
13 Cited from: Boyes, R. German Right plays xenophobia card. The Times, 06.11.00, p. 14.
14 Cited from: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002. Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innem, Sep 2003, p. 78.
15 Cited from: Republikaner: Schilys Zuwanderungsgesetzentwurf gefahrdet die innere Sicherheit in 
Deutschland. Pressemitteilungen. Die Republikaner [Online]. 06.11.01 (47) [Accessed 31.08.05]. 
<http://www.rep.de/index.aspx?ArticleID=Oafdddfb-8fOf-4d02-a932-8318bd4c78a2>
16 Cited from: Verfassungsschutzbericht Land Brandenburg 2002. 4.000 ed. Potsdam: Ministerium des 
Innern des Landes Brandenburg, Mai 2003, p. 113.
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In spite of the efforts of the former SPD/Green ruling coalition to permanently dispense 
with Germany's cultural nationalism of the past, there were some in Germany who 
clearly opposed this stance, rejecting immigration. Indicative of this apparent identity 
crisis were the comments by SPD politician Gunter WeiBgerber, German diplomat Hans 
von Stackelberg and various opinion polls. Speaking in the Bundestag, WeiBgerber 
stated: 'It remains to be hoped the Commission for Immigration's Report will pave the 
way for a solution that will find accord within the population."7 'What is becoming 
clear today is that our identity is still insecure', stated von Stackelberg. 18 Surveys by the 
Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research in 2002, for example, revealed some 
Germans opposed the immigration bill, doubting not only its quality, but also the 
manner in which it was passed. Between 25 May and 6 June 2002, when Allensbach 
asked 2,087 Germans aged 16 onwards their impression of the course of events, only 
16% expressed the conviction that the decision was inaugurated in accordance with 
federal regulations. But 39% maintained the law was not passed in accordance with 
official regulations. 19
Article 52 of the German constitution, or Basic Law, requires Germany's 16 Ldnder, or 
states, to cast a majority vote on important legislation.20 Germany's Bundestag narrowly 
accepted the proposed SPD/Greens' immigration law, sending it to the second chamber 
of German politics responsible for the approval of laws passed by the Bundestag, the 
Bundesrat (upper house of the German Parliament), for a 35-34 vote on 22 March 2002. 
In fact, the new immigration law was only approved with the signature of the former 
Federal President Johannes Rau in June 2002.21 17% of the 2,087 Germans surveyed in 
2002 were convinced that the new immigration law was a good one, whereas around
17 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/135. Stenographischer Bericht 135 Sitzung. 
Berlin, 28.11.00, p. 13149.
18 Cited from: Cohen, R. Is Germany on the road to diversity? The parties clash. The New York Times 
International, 04.12.00, p. 14.
19 See: Frage: "Kiirzlich ist ja das Zuwanderungsgesetz verabschiedet worden. Wie ist Ihr Eindruck: ist 
die Entscheidung ordnungsgemafi abgelaufen oder nicht?" Tabelle 1 Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
Bevolkerung ab 16 Jahre. Das neue Zuwanderungsgesetz - Zweifel an seiner Qualitat. Allensbacher 
Archiv, IfD-Umfrage 7020, March/April 2002. In: Das Zuwanderungsgesetz Der Bundesprasident hat ein 
Gesetz unterschrieben, an dessen Qualitat die Mehrheit zweifelt. Allensbacher Berichte. Institut fur 
Demoskopie Allensbach, 2002 (11), p. 2.
20 See: Germany: new immigration law. Migration News [Online]. Apr 2002: 9(4) [Accessed 05.07.02]. 
<http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/Archive_MN/apr_2002-08mn.html> and: Article 52. In: Basic Law for 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Text edition - Status: December 2000. Berlin: German Bundestag - 
Administration - Public Relations Section/Ebner Ulm, 2001, p. 35.
21 See: Rau signs controversial immigration law. German Embassy Washington, D. C. [Online]. Jun 2002 
[Accessed 07.09.05]. <http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_rau_immigration.htm>
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every second person (49%) expressed doubts about its quality.22 50% of the 2,087 
Germans surveyed later that year were generally against immigration, with 22% in 
support of it. 23 Others were also convinced that the majority of Germans were also 
opposed to immigration. 84% of the 2,087 respondents, for example, believed that the 
rest of Germany in general was totally against immigration, with 4% expressing the 
opposite view.24 There were also reports from German newspapers of a general public 
hostility to immigration. 25
Indicative of the Bundestag political elite's attempts to change the country's image as a 
non-immigration land were, arguably, the comments by CDU member of the Bundestag 
Rita Sussmuth. Within the Preface of the 2001 Report for Immigration heralding the 
introduction of the Green Card Programme, Sussmuth, Chairperson of the Independent 
Immigration Commission, drew attention to the benefits that more immigrants would 
bring into the country.26 In order to alleviate alleged labour shortages due partly to 
Germany's falling birth-rates, the then German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroder, 
responded by proposing what he referred to as the Green Card Programme, allowing 
non-European Union (EU) foreigners to work in Germany for five years.27 Since 
Germany was allegedly expecting 20% fewer skilled workers by 2010, in May 2000 the 
German government agreed to offer what Schroder and other officials referred to as 
'Green Cards' to 20,000 non-EU foreign computer specialists.28
22 See: Frage: "Das Gesetz selbst, ist das nach Ihrem Eindruck ein gutes Gesetz, oder haben Sie da 
Zweifel?" Tabelle 1 Bundesrepublik Deutschland Bevolkerung ab 16 Jahre. Das neue 
Zuwanderungsgesetz - Zweifel an seiner Qualitat. Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfrage 7020, March/April 
2002. In: Das Zuwanderungsgesetz Der Bundesprasident hat ein Gesetz unterschrieben, an dessen 
Qualitat die Mehreheit zweifelt. Allensbacher Berichte. op. cit., p. 2.
23 See: Frage: "Sind Sie alles in allem fur oder gegen Zuwanderung nach Deutschland?" Cited from: 
Tabelle 2 Bundesrepublik Deutschland Bevolkerung ab 16 Jahre. Jeder zweite ist generell gegen 
Zuwanderung nach Deutschland. Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfrage 7022, May/June 2002. In: Ibid., p. 3. 
For general summary of the surveys see: pp. 1-4.
24 See: Frage: "Jetzt einmal abgesehen von Ihrer eigenen Meinung: was glauben Sie, wie die meisten 
dariiber denken? - Sind die meisten Leute bei uns in Deutschland wohl eher fur oder gegen 
Zuwanderung?" Cited from: Tabelle 3 Bundesrepublik Deutschland Bevolkerung ab 16 Jahre. 
Zuwanderung nach Deutschland - Das Meinungsklima. Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfrage 7022, 
May/June 2002. In: Ibid., p. 4.
25 See: Scheidges, R. Die Burger misstrauen der Auslanderpolitik. Handelsblatt, 02.05.02 (084), p. 4. See 
also: Meyer-Timpe, U. Gebraucht, aber nicht geschatzt. Gastarbeiter. Die Zeit, 06.09.01 (37), p. 26.
26 See: Structuring immigration. Fostering integration, op. cit., pp. 1, 36-41, 63-64.
27 See: Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroder auf der Jahresversammlung 2000 des Verbandes der 
Deutschen Zeitungsverleger am 16. November 2000 in Berlin. Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 17.11.00 
(77-2), pp. 1-10.
28 See: Germany: asylum, Green Cards. Migration News [Online]. Feb 2001: 8(2) [Accessed 14.06.02]. 
<http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/ Archive_MN/feb_2001 -1 Omn.html>
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Schroder, Otto Schily and the former President of the Federation of German Employees, 
Dieter Hundt, argued that Germany needed additional immigrants simply to maintain its 
labour force. Immigration and the recruitment of foreign workers were officially 
justified because allegedly not enough children were being born in Germany and there 
were significant skill shortages in the workplace - especially within the IT industry.29 
Former Chairman of the CSU party, Edmund Stoiber, for instance, described 
Germany's falling birth-rate as a 'ticking time bomb for the social security system and 
our whole economy' - a view echoed by Bavaria's then Minister of the Interior Gunther 
Beckstein (CSU).30 There were also concerns that this 'demographic time-bomb' could 
mean Germany's generous welfare state and high pensions may no longer be 
sustainable. 'An aging and shrinking population needs goods and services and 
somebody has to provide them', argued Rainer Miinz of the Immigration Commission.31
According to the Report by the Independent Commission, Germany's birth-rate had 
been dropping steadily in Germany for the last 30 years. If women continued having the 
current number of children at the time of writing, without further immigration the 
population in Germany is expected to decline from 82 million to less than 60 million by 
2050. This would result in the number of employed persons falling from 41 million in 
2000 to 26 million, which will probably have undesirable effects on economic 
development, innovativeness and the labour market, predicted the Commission.32 
According to Migration News, German women averaged 1.35 children in 2001 - the 
lowest fertility rate in northern Europe. 33 In the former German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) the situation was even more pronounced. Rainer Munz and Ralf Ulrich reported 
that since 1990, eastern Germany experienced fundamental demographic change, with 
births and marriages falling by 65% in 1994. 34 As with the immigration bill, the Green 
Card proposal had many detractors - exposing, therefore, another key dissonance
29 See: Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroder auf der Jahresversammlung 2000 des Verbandes der 
Deutschen Zeitungsverleger am 16. November 2000 in Berlin, op. cit., pp. 6-9 and: Schily presents draft 
of an Immigration Act. Federal Ministry of the Interior [Online]. 03.08.01 [Accessed 02.06.03]. 
<http://www.bmi.bund.de/dokumente/Pressemitteilung/lx_59920.htm>
30 Cited from: Atkins, R. Germany ponders incentives to raise childbirth. The Financial Times, 02.01.01, 
p. 6 and: Klingst, M. ,,Schily liigt sich in die Tasche." Die Zeit [Online]. 2002 (28) [Accessed 17.06.03]. 
<http://www.zeit.de/archiv/2002/28/200228_beckstein.xml>
31 Cited from: Broomby, R. Germany's immigration revolution. BBC News [Online]. 04.07.01 [Accessed 
08.07.02]. <http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/1422007.stm> See also: Klingst, M. op. cit.
32 See: Structuring immigration. Fostering integration, op. cit., pp. 26-28, 31-33, 63-64.
33 See: Das ist eine Dauerbaustelle. Die Tageszeitung, 07.06.03, p. 3. For claims Germany has the lowest 
fertility rate in Europe, see: Germany: immigration, fertility. Migration News [Online]. May 2001: 8(5) 
[Accessed 26.07.02]. <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn.archive_mn/may_2001-08mn.html>
34 See: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. E. Depopulation after Unification? Population prospects for East 
Germany 1990-2010. Berlin: Humboldt University, 1994, p. 1.
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between popular and official idioms of national identity. Evidence suggested that some 
sections of the German media along with the public in general had difficulty agreeing 
with the commission's proposals.
Some, such as the unions, Der Spiegel and Edmund Stoiber, maintained the German 
government must do more to retrain German workers to fill vacant jobs rather than turn 
to immigration.35 Speaking in 2002, for example, the then CSU Chairman Edmund 
Stoiber claimed that in view of the 4.3 million unemployed in Germany, the majority of 
the German population had no sympathy for a law that would facilitate the immigration 
of qualified employees.36 Public concerns about unemployment cast one of the biggest 
shadows over the SPD/Green government's proposal to bring in foreign workers. 'Most 
opinion polls found that 55 to 65% of Germans opposed the Green Card Programme', 
because 'Germany should not increase immigration at a time of high unemployment', 
noted Migration News.31 At the end of 2002, for instance, the unemployment rate in the 
former East stood at 18% - about twice the rate in the west (9%). 38
In a survey undertaken on behalf of the German government's Press and Information 
Office by Forsa (The Society for Social Research and Statistical Analysis), the majority 
of those surveyed were against any further immigration because there were too many 
unemployed in Germany. Of the 1,007 citizens surveyed in 2001, 60% expressed the 
view that Germany was already over-stretched with current immigration. 59% thought 
that further immigration should be halted because there were too many unemployed.39 
Opponents of the proposal even included the former SPD Minister for Labour, Walter 
Riester, who stated: 'We cannot allow a general international opening of the job market. 
We have over four million unemployed people - amongst whom are very qualified 
people in the IT field.' 40 Although giving no indication as to why some Germans 
rejected the Green Card, official representative of GALLUP in Germany, TNS Emnid,
35 See: Burgdorff, S. et al. ,,Wettbewerb urn Kopfe." Einwanderung. Der Spiegel, 12.06.00 (24), p. 23 
and: Germany: 50,000 immigrants? op. cit.
36 See: Kappner, J. and Rubner, J. ,,Die Grenze ist erreicht." Sueddeutsche Zeitung [Online]. 28.02.02 
[Accessed 24.12.03]. <htrp://www.sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/artikel/l 15/8107/print.html>
37 Cited from: Germany: Green Cards. Migration News [Online]. Jun 2000: 7(6) [Accessed 03.12.02]. 
<http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn.archive_mn/Jun_2000-1 Omn.html>
38 Cited from: Germany in uproar over foreign workers. BBC News [Online]. 22.03.02 [Accessed 
12.07.02]. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/newsid_l886000/1886897.stm>
39 From 10.12.01-13.12.01 Forsa surveyed 1,007 citizens over the age of 14 by means of a random choice 
computer-assisted telephone poll. See: Weil es in Deutschland viele Arbeitslose gibt. Meinungen zur 
Einwanderung (Contra-Argumente). 4. Meinungen zur Zuwanderung. In: Meinungen zur Einwanderung. 
Forsa Bericht P121350a/10159 Sb/Na, 17.12.01, p. 9.
40 Cited from: Martin, P. German Green Cards: solution, stopgap or symbol? Migration News [Online]. 
18.02.01 [Accessed 18.07.05]. <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rs/printfriendly.php?id=38_0_3_0>
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found 50% of 1,000 Germans surveyed in June 2000 opposed the initiative; 45%, on the 
other hand, approved of the scheme. 41
In contrast to official efforts for a more open Germany, another concern were fears of 
cosmopolitanism and resentment of the outsider whose origins can be traced back to the 
Wars of Liberation against France. Irritated by an alleged indifference to a lack of 
collective German national identity and excessive foreign, (notably French) values, 
Johann Gottfried von Herder emphasised the significance of a cultural community 
(Volk). In the late 1700s, von Herder pleaded for Germans to defend their values against 
foreign corruption, exemplified by statements such as: 'Awake German nation! Do not 
let them ravish your palladium! Germans, speak German!' 42 Along the same lines, the 
political writer Ernst Moritz Amdt wrote in his dissertation entitled On the Hatred of 
Other Nations and the Use of Foreign Tongues (1813):
It will come as no great loss to us if the gaggle of French language tutors, dance- 
masters, Abbes, valets, cooks and quacks, together with their maids and 
governesses, who infest our daughter's chambers and brothels, prefer to shun in 
future these coarse Alemanic lands, rendered so dreadful and unbearable to 
them.43
Herder also suggested that each culture must be regarded as an organic whole in its own 
terms, which was to lead to a rejection of the Enlightenment, fostering in turn the 
intellectual, political and literal movement known as Romanticism.44 In Germany, as 
arguably nowhere else, romantic poets and thinkers influenced political and social 
thought.45 According to Hermann Kurthen and Hans Kohn, the ethno-cultural 
understanding of German nationhood was formed in the shadow of French occupation 
by the Romantic Movement, which supplied patterns of thought that helped consolidate 
the nation. 46 German romanticism began, but did not end in poetry: 'It was an
41 TNS Emnid surveyed 1,000 Germans by means of a CATI or computer-assisted telephone poll 
interview. See: Mehrheit fur Einwanderungsgesetz Green Card fur IT-Experten bleibt umstritten. Die 
aktuelle politische Stimmung in Deutschland. TNS Infratest Trendsetter. (Ein Informationsdienst zum 
Meinungsbild in Deutschland) [Online]. Jun 2000 [Accessed 12.09.05]. <http://www.tns-infratest.com/ 
03_presse/Trendsetters/2000_06.asp>
42 Cited from: Craig, G. A. The Germans. New York: Meridian, Penguin Group, 1991, p. 32.
43 Cited from: Schroder, K. Essay 1: Languages. Translated by D. Cannell. In: Shelley, M. and Winck, M. 
(eds). What is Europe? Aspects of European cultural diversity. London/New York: Routledge/Open 
University, 1995, p. 48.
44 See: Craig, G. A. op. cit., pp. 30-34, 190-212 and: Fulbrook, M. A concise history of Germany. Updated 
ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 94-95, 108-109.
45 See: Kohn, H. The mind of Germany: the education of a nation. London: Macmillan, 1965, pp. 49-50.
46 See: Kohn, H. op. cit., pp. 75-77 and: Kurthen, H. Germany at the crossroads: national identity and the 
challenges of immigration. International Migration Review, 1995: 29(4), p. 929.
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interpretation of life, nature, and history and this inward-looking philosophical character 
distinguished it from romanticism in other lands', explained Kohn. German Writer 
Friedrich Schlegel wrote in 1798: 'Alone is infinite.' 47
This Innerlichkeit (inwardness) fostered a general anxiety to the outsider and change, or 
Angst, that later developed into what Jan-Werner Miiller and Michael Mertes described 
as a 'cultural pessimism' - and ultimately into xenophobia.48 Aside from left-liberal 
promoters of cosmopolitanism and difference in Germany, such as the publicist Norbert 
Bolz and the SPD Mayor of Bremen Henning Scherf, indicative of a Romanticist Angst 
towards change was some public cynicism towards globalisation, manifest in speeches 
by the then Chancellor Schroder.49 hi the 2000 annual general meeting of the 
Association of German Newspaper Publishers in Berlin, Schroder emphasised that any 
form of isolation was wrong:
Former debates about immigration have traditionally provoked defensive 
responses. Immigration in Germany has to come to be understood as something 
that Germans put up with out of moral grounds and as is the case with the 
current opinion, not necessary. This attitude in view of globalisation is a 
mistake.50
Schroder also announced that despite the prevalent deep reservations concerning 
immigration in Germany, he wanted to go further with the process facilitated by the 
Green Card initiative, claiming that Germany needed immigration for the country to 
compete with America, Britain and France. 51 The then Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer's justification of the Green Card initiative and declarations from Otto Schily, 
such as 'We are an immigration land, and that is irreversible', appeared to find little 
public resonance, except, perhaps, with the opposition.52 Schily was keen to highlight
47 For comments by Hans Kohn and Friedrich Schlegel see: Kohn, H. op. cit., p. 49.
48 See: Mertes, M. Germany's social and political culture: change through consensus? Words and things. 
Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Social Sciences, Winter 1994: 123(1), pp. 9-11. 
See also: Miiller, J-W. Another country: German intellectuals, unification and national identity. New 
Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 3, 216.
49 See: Mohr, R. Operation Sauerbraten. Der Spiegel, 06.11.00 (45), p. 344 and: Lehmann, K. and Beyer, 
M. ,,Leitkultur" - Diskussion schlagt Wellen in Bremen. Die Welt [Online]. 06.11.00 [Accessed 
19.09.05]. <http://www.welt.de/data/2000/l 1/06/590715.html>
50 Cited from: Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroder auf der Jahresversarnmlung 2000 des 
Verbandes der Deutschen Zeitungsverleger am 16. November 2000 in Berlin, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
51 See: Chancellor advocates expansion of Green Card system. German Federal Government Press and 
Information Office [Online]. 02.02.01 [Accessed 10.06.03]. <http://www.bundesregierung.de/top/ 
dokumente/Artikel/lx_3091 l.htm>
52 Cited from: Arbeitsmarkt soil Zuwanderung regulieren. Rhein Zeitung [Online]. 03.08.01 [Accessed 
11.06.03]. <http://rhein-zeitung.de/on/01/08/03/topnews/zuwa.html> See also: Address by Joschka
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that most CDU/CSU members of the Bundestag had finally acknowledged that 
Germany was an immigration land. 'For years immigration was described by them as a 
terrible wave rolling towards us. Now immigration is seen as something positive by the 
opposition', noted the former Minister of the Interior in 2001." Along with Joschka 
Fischer and Chancellor Schroder, the then leaders of the CDU opposition Angela 
Merkel and Friedrich Merz also claimed that: 'Germany needs more not less 
immigration.' 54 Reflecting the goals of the SPD/Green coalition, head of the CDU/CSU 
faction and, from November 2005, Germany's first Bundeskanzlerin, Angela Merkel, 
stated: 'We are competing for the best minds in the world.' 55
In contrast to previous declarations, there were also admissions from other conservative 
leaders that Germany was an immigration land. Former CSU party chairman Edmund 
Stoiber also admitted in an interview with the Suddeutsche Zeitung newspaper, that 
Germany was 'an open immigration country', along with the CDU Hesse Prime 
Minister Roland Koch. 56 Defending his Green Card initiative, Chancellor Schroder also 
maintained people were beginning to understand that it was in their economic interest to 
have this type of internationalisation. 57 Joschka Fischer was more vociferous, declaring 
right-wing extremists resisting an, 'immigrant culture are still living in the nineteenth 
century, because the fact is we have to open up for economic reasons'. 58
Yet, there was some public and media scepticism concerning official claims of a general 
acceptance of the promotion of internationalisation. hi spite of warnings from economic 
experts of deficits in areas of the workforce, Dr. Renate Kocher of the Allensbach 
Institute claimed that the majority of Germans were convinced that an immigration law 
should not only control, but also reduce future numbers of immigrants. 59 According to
Fischer, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the opening of the Forum on the Future of Cultural 
Relations Policy. Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, 04.07.00, pp. 7-8.
53 Cited from: Schily, O. ,,Es gibt noch Stolpersteine." Interview mit Der Spiegel, 02.06.01. 
Bundesministerium des Innern [Online]. 02.06.01 [Accessed 11.06.03]. <http://www.bmi.bund.de/ 
dokumente/Rede/lx_43199.htm>
54 Cited from: Merz, F. Einwanderung und Identitat. Die Welt, 25.10.00, p. 3.
55 Averesch, S. and Kolhoff, W. ,,Vorrang fur die eigene Bevolkerung." Berliner Zeitung, 04.07.01, p. 5.
56 For these admissions see: Kappner, J. and Rubner, J. op. cit. and: Deupmann, U., Hildebrandt, T. and 
Mestmacher, C. Kulturkampf urns Vaterland. Der Spiegel, 06.11.00 (45), p. 27.
57 See speech by Schroder in: Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroder auf der Jahresversammlung 
2000 des Verbandes der Deutschen Zeitungsverleger am 16. November 2000 in Berlin, op. cit., pp. 8-9. 
58 Cited from: Germany: culture, immigration. Migration News [Online]. Dec 2000: 7(12) [Accessed 
12.03.02]. <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn.archive_mn/dec_2000-10mn.html>
59 See: Kocher, R. Parteiiibergreifender Konsens in der Einwanderungsfrage. Nur die Griinen stehen 
aufterhalb dieses Konsenses. Eine Dokumentation des Beitrags in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung 
Nr. 140 vom 20. Juni 2001. Institut fur Demoskopie Allensbach, IfD-Umfrage 7007, IfD-Bencht 6255/1, 
Jun2001,p. 2.
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an Allensbach poll taken in June 2001, 68% of 2,054 German respondents from the age 
of 16 believed the limits of immigration had been reached, with only 17% believing 
Germany could accept any more.60 When asked whether an immigration law should 
reduce, expand or retain the current level of immigration, 53% of 2,054 Germans polled 
in 2001 believed that it should be reduced. Only 9% thought it should be expanded. 61 A 
separate poll by Forsa revealed about a third (32%) of 1,006 Germans, surveyed 
between 29 and 30 June 2000, believed that Germany needed more immigrants, whereas 
a clear majority (63%) were opposed to increasing the numbers.62 In another poll by 
Forsa in 2002, 84% of 1,007 Germans agreed with the question: 'Should immigration to 
Germany be restricted?' Only 13% said that it should not.63
Earlier surveys seemed to indicate a consistency of opinion. In 1992, for instance, 
Allensbach reported that every third person (34%) of the 2,205 Germans surveyed was 
concerned about the number of foreigners in Germany.64 By 1998, a survey by Forsa 
indicated this opinion had doubled. Between 19 and 20 November 1998, Forsa, on 
behalf of Die Woche, carried out a survey about immigration. 1,008 Germans were 
polled on whether they considered there were too many immigrants in Germany. Only 
3% expressed the view that immigration should be unlimited. Overall, 73% thought that 
the immigration of foreigners - including asylum-seekers - should be reduced. In total, 
60% of the 1,008 Germans surveyed thought there were too many foreigners, with 28% 
voicing the opposite opinion, indicating an increase of anti-immigration sentiment in 
Germany.65
60 See: Frage: "Es wird zur Zeit viel iiber Zuwanderung nach Deutschland diskutiert. Was meinen Sie: 
Kann Deutschland mehr Auslander aumehen, oder ist die Grenze der Zuwanderung erreicht?" Nur fur die 
Mehrheit der Grunen-Anhanger kann Deutschland mehr Auslander aufhehmen. Tabelle A2. 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland Bevolkerung ab 16 Jahre. Mehrheit fur eine Verringerung des Zuzugs nach 
Deutschland. Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfrage 7007, Juni 2001. In: Ibid., p. 16.
61 See: Frage: "Was meinen Sie: Sollte ein Einwanderungsgesetz den Zuzug nach Deutschland verringern, 
ausweiten, oder auf dem jetztigen Stand halten?" Mehrheit fur eine Verringerung des Zuzugs nach 
Deutschland. Tabelle la. Bundesrepublik Deutschland Bevolkerung ab 16 Jahre. Allensbacher Archiv, 
IfD-Umfrage 7007, Juni 2001. In: Ibid., p. 11.
62 The survey by Forsa was undertaken on behalf of the German newspaper Die Woche. See: Es sind der 
Meinung, dass Deutschland mehr Einwanderung braucht? 1. Meinungen zur Einwanderung. In: 
Meinungen zur Einwanderung undzum Asyl. Forsa Bericht P020326/8229 Sb/Sc, 03.07.00, p. 1.
63 1,007 German citizens aged below 30, from 30-44, 45-59 and 60 and over were surveyed by a 
telephone poll on behalf of RTL Television from 28.02.02-01.03.02. For survey details see: Sollte die 
Zuwanderung nach Deutschland begrenzt werden? In: Meinungen zur Zuwanderung. Forsa Bericht 
P220409/10408 Gii, 02.03.02, p. 1.
64 During 18.01.92 and 29.01.92, 2,205 Germans from the age of 16 were surveyed on their opinions of 
the numbers of immigrants. Cited from: Multikulturelle Gesellschaft. Jeder zweite weifl nicht, was 
gemeint ist. Allensbacher Berichte. Institut fur Demoskopie Allensbach, 1992 (9), pp. 2, 6.
65 See: Begrenzung der Zuwanderung? and: Zu viele Zuwanderer? In: Zuwanderung. Forsa Bericht 
2903/6319 Mu, 23.11.98, pp. 2, 4. Age groups included those under 30, from 30-40, 45-59 and 60 years 
and over. See: Ibid., p. 2.
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This scepticism also extended to some sections of the media. According to Deutsche 
Welle and the Berliner Morgenpost, in light of the economic downturn within the 
German information and telecommunications industry, the need for foreign computer 
workers fell considerably, raising questions about the justification for the scheme.66 In 
2002, the Berliner Zeitung explained that The Federal Association of Information 
Technology, Telecommunications and New Media (BITKOM) reported a growth rate of 
only 1.7%, with a continued scaling-down of operations in the forthcoming year.67
So were there any other salient reasons why the Green Card was not the predicted 
success? Speaking at the 2000 annual general meeting of the Association of German 
Newspaper Publishers in Berlin, Chancellor Schroder declared that irrespective of the 
economic situation, more, not less, international exchanges were needed. Nevertheless, 
at the same time, Schroder admitted that at the heart of the Green Card debate was a fear 
of globalisation and with it, exchanges of people who looked different and had different 
cultures. 68
According to British historian Eric Hobsbawm: 'International population movements in 
combination with economic shifts fuel defensive reactions whether against real or 
imaginary threats - some of them not unconnected with the rise of local nationalism.' 
Summarising, Hobsbawm observed that: 'Some force, tendency, or enemy must be 
perceived as potentially or actually eroding, corroding, or endangering one's movement 
and what it holds dear.' 69 Frank Brunssen argued that Angst was a non-rational reaction 
from those who felt threatened and 'therefore develops into distrust and suspicion 
towards the source that generates the threat'. According to Brunssen, Angst 'may be 
people, objects, the past, present day events or anticipated future developments'. 70 One 
such manifestation was the revival of the nineteenth century fears of an Uberfremdung 
(swamping by foreigners). 71
66 See: Not all that's green glitters. Deutsche Welle [Online]. 07.04.04 [Accessed 12.09.05]. 
<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1164555,00.hrml> and: Puppe, A. Drastisch weniger Nutzer 
von Green Cards. Berliner Morgenpost, 13.02.05, p. 18. See also: Lutz, M. Green Card Enttauscht die 
Erwartungen. Die Welt, 07.12.04, p. 11.
67 See: Knuf, T. Nachfrage Greencards geht zuruck. Berliner Zeitung, 17.06 02, p. 33.
68 See speech by Schroder: Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroder auf der Jahresversammlung 2000 
des Verbandes der Deutschen Zeitungsverleger am 16. November 2000 in Berlin, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
69 Cited from: Hobsbawm, E. Ethnic nationalism in the late twentieth century. In: Hutchinson, J. and 
Smith, A. D. (eds). Ethnicity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 356.
70 Cited from: Brunssen, F. ,,Angst vor Deutschland" and German self-definition. Debatte, 1994 (1), pp.
53-54.
71 For these claims see: Ibid., pp. 49-63.
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An Estrangement from National Roots?72
By the 1960s, the ghosts of German nationalism in the guise of an Uberfremdung 
appeared to have vanished. According to Peter Alter, 'from 1950 political culture and 
mentality of the German people emerged purified from the excesses of nationalism'. 73 
Although some, during the 1970s, warned of an ostensible foreign takeover of 
Germany, according to Christhard Hoffmann: 'The goal guiding of public discussion 
was one of social stability - not ethnic homogeneity.' Hoffmann claimed there was no 
'national debate' about immigration when the economic downturn of the 1970s resulted 
in a cessation of guest workers. 74 On the other hand, Hermann Kurthen and Karen 
Schonwalder argued that by the late 1960s the xenophobic ghosts of the past had not 
completely disappeared. There was still a crude anti-Semitism and openly racist attacks 
on migrant workers in response 'to the health of the German Volk\ noted 
Schonwalder. 75
With their distinctive styles of appearance, different religious beliefs as well as their 
unique and resented economic role, Jews had long been targets for anti-Semitism in 
Germany. 76 The economic crash of 1873 also stimulated a revival of anti-Semitism. 
According to Mary Fulbrook and Daniel Goldhagen, for many years there had been a 
tradition of popular hostility to Jews, and denigration of inferior 'eastern' Jews in 
particular. Big German banks associated with Jews survived the crash of 1873 and 
German Jews in general were allegedly resented by small enterprises, along with the 
lower-middle classes that had suffered economically. 'In addition, anti-Semitism was 
given intellectual respectability by prominent academics such as the nationalist historian 
Professor von Treitschke', noted Fulbrook. 77
72 Cited from: Dirke, S. von, Multikulti: the German debate on multiculturalism. German Studies Review, 
1994: 17, p. 520.
73 Cited from: Alter, P. Nationalism and German politics after 1945. In: Breuilly, J. (ed). The state of 
Germany. The national idea in the making, unmaking and remaking of a modern nation-state. 
London/New York: Longman, 1993, pp. 154-155, 175.
74 For this claim see: Hoffinann, C. Immigration and nationhood in the Federal Republic of Germany. In: 
Brady, J. S., Crawford, B. and Wiliarty, S. E. (eds). The postwar transformation of Germany: democracy, 
prosperity, and nationhood. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002, p. 365.
75 Cited from: Schonwalder, K. Migration, refugees and ethnic plurality as issues of public and political 
debates in (West) Germany. In: Cesarani, D. and Fulbrook, M. (eds). Citizenship, nationality and 
migration in Europe. London/New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 164. See also: Kurthen, H. op. cit., p. 918.
76 See: Fulbrook, M. A concise history of Germany, op. cit., p. 89 and: Craig, G. A. op. cit., pp. 126-146.
77 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. A concise history of Germany, op. cit., p. 132. For Goldhagen's analysis, see: 
Nolan, M. The politics of memory in the Berlin Republic. Radical History Review, Fall 2001 (81), pp. 
116-117.
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Arguably, one method of determining which understanding of the nation shapes a 
country is by evaluating its policy on immigration and by assessing popular reactions to 
these amendments. Nationalist language and symbolism are, perhaps, broader than an 
ideological movement. For Anthony D. Smith, nationalist language and symbolism 
often connect an ideology with the 'mass sentiments' of wider segments of the 
designated population, notably through slogans, ideas, symbols and ceremonies. 
According to Smith:
Typical events that generate and respond to such nationalist discourse may be 
perceived threats to a sense of common ethnicity in the guise of an influx of 
immigrants. A rich inner or ethno-history may help to crystallise and perpetuate 
therefore ethnic identities and xenophobic reactions. 78
In the 1980s, articles began appearing implying the spectre of an Uberfremdung was 
back and with it marked decreases in tolerance towards immigrants, along with fears of 
a loss of identity. 79 Opening with a psychological stimulus to the apprehensions and 
resentment 'of the West German population over the increasing influx of foreigners', 
noted Sabine von Dirke; one of the first of these was the Heidelberg Manifesto.  
Initiated, drafted and signed by 15 university professors in 1981, the document 
highlighted alleged key distinctions between the foreign and indigenous population. 
Calling for the preservation of the German race, the signatories condemned the 
infiltration of the German people by full-scale immigration, concluding the latter would 
eventually lead to an ethnic catastrophe. 81
Another article by political scientist Robert Hepp maintained that western and, in 
particular, German political elites had become estranged from their national roots. This 
alleged disjuncture between official and popular ideology suggested another key fracture in 
German national identity. According to Hepp, official political doctrine contributed to a 
de-nationalisation of the German people that would eventually lead to 'the final solution of 
the German question' - a theme forming his book of the same name. Hepp predicted an
78 Cited from: Smith, A. D. National identity. London: Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 25-26, 73.
79 See: Schonwalder, K. Auf der Suche nach der deutschen Identitat. Bin Literaturbericht. Batter fur 
deutsche und Internationale Politik, 1985: 30, pp. 145-185 and: Seeger, W. Ausldnder-Integration ist 
Volkermord. Das Verbrechen an auslandischen Volksgruppen und am deutschen Volk. Miinchen: Carl- 
Bauer, 1981. See also: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., pp. 513-521 and: Brunssen, F. op. cit., 49-63.
80 Cited from: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., p. 519. See also: Schonwalder, K. Migration, refugees and ethnic 
plurality as issues of public and political debates in (West) Germany. In: Cesarani, D. and Fulbrook, M. 
(eds). op. cit., pp. 166-170.
81 For details of the Heidelberg Manifesto, see: Im Wortlaut: ,,Facette eines gottlichen Plans." Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 04.03.82, p. 10 and: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., pp. 518-519.
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ethno-morphosis or permeation of the host culture by the immigrant culture, which will 
'soon be completed in the collapse of the German hosts under the onslaught of foreign 
immigrants with higher fertility rates'. 82 Furthermore, claimed Hepp, continued 
immigration and a cosmopolitan society was not an indication or expression of 
tolerance, but rather a decadent society's resignation to the fact that the steadily 
increasing birth deficit of Germans made the immigration of foreigners necessary. 
Concomitant with Germany's declining fertility rate was the process of modernisation, 
with its passionate and unrelenting, but shallow, emphasis on the individual pursuit of 
happiness, argued Hepp. 83 During the 1990s, it was again argued by extremists and 
some of the German media that hostility to immigration was a legitimate and an 
understandable self-defence of a people or culture that saw its identity under threat. 
'Don't the Germans', Karen Schonwalder and others asked, 'have the right to protect 
their identity?' 84
Evidence suggested that new immigration legislation, in the form of the Green Card 
(2001) and Immigration Act (2002), appeared to have provoked a revival of fears of an 
Uberfremdung. K An alleged ethno-morphosis referred to by Hepp was also referred to 
by the NPD's organ, the Deutsche Stimme:
Established politicians demand, in all seriousness, that foreigners make up for 
the imbalance in our people's net reproduction rate and they [the politicians] 
agree to raise immigration quotas. Since, in their view, all people are equal, it 
makes absolutely no difference whether they attract black Africans, Chinese or 
Turks to immigrate. In view of our reality-based image of humanity, this attitude 
is completely absurd. 86
82 See: Hepp, R. Die Endlosung der deutschen Frage. Grundlinien einer politischen Demographic der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland mit einem Exkurs uber Demokratie und Identitdt. Veroffenlichtungen der 
Stiftung Kulturkreis 2000, 8. Tubingen/Zurich/Paris: Hohenrain, 1988. Cited from: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., 
pp. 520-521,534.
83 See: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., pp. 520, 534.
84 Cited from: Schonwalder, K. Migration, refugees and ethnic plurality as issues of public and political 
debates in (West) Germany. In: Cesarani, D. and Fulbrook, M. (eds). op. cit., p. 170. See also: Syberberg, 
H. J. Germany's heart: the modern taboo. What remains of the German essence? New Perspectives 
Quarterly [Online]. Winter 1993: 10(1) [Accessed 23.05.02]. <http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/ 
1993_winter/germanys_heart.html>
85 See: Schily presents draft of an Immigration Act. op. cit. and: Germany: Green Cards, violence, op. cit. 
See also: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002 Niedersachsen. Hannover: Niedersachsisches Ministerium fur 
Inneres und Sport, 2002, pp. 41-44, 52, 60-64.
86 Cited from: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2002. Berlin: Federal 
Ministry of the Interior, Sep 2003, p. 55.
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'How many Mohammeds, Mustafas and Alis will be born in Germany this year?' asked 
the Hessian journal of the REP. 87 In 2004, the party paper of the DVU also asked: 
'Should foreigners replace Germans?' 88 There were similar statements from other right- 
wing extremist organisations, such as the Frankfurt am Main-based Citizens Movement 
(FUL) and the Hamburg List to Stop Foreigners (HLA).89 Concerns were also voiced 
about the sharp decline in German birth-rates. 'The Germans are dying out', ran a 
number of headlines, accompanied by predictions that within 20 years the population of 
Germany would be in near terminal decline. 90
Germany's foreign population rose from four million in 1990 to just over seven million 
in 2000 - primarily due to family unification and births to foreigners in Germany.91 
Based on conclusions from the Federal Commission for Foreigner Issues in 1999, from 
1960 to 1998 the share of the foreign population in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) rose approximately from 1.2% to 9%.92 In December 1994, the Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung and the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies concluded that 
the German population then estimated at 81 million - would shrink and that the 
foreigners' share of the population (8%) would rise.93 A decrease in return migration, 
the continued flow of family members from Turkey and a high birth-rate, for instance, 
has, according to some German commentators, kept the population of Turks in 
Germany particularly high.94
In an interview with Die Welt, Chairman of the then CDU/CSU opposition, Friedrich 
Merz, claimed that the relations between Germans and foreigners in many areas were 
not a problem. However, Merz also admitted that where it was perceived that there were 
more foreigners than Germans, people had concerns about their identity.95 Some articles
87 Verfassungsschutzbericht 2003. Berlin/Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, Mai 2004, pp. 77-78.
88 Cited from: Wetzel, B. Sollen Auslander die Deutschen ersetzen? National-Zeitung [Online]. 13.02.04 
(8) [Accessed 01.09.05]. <http://www.dszverlag.de/Artikel_04/NZ08_2.html>
89 See: Rechtsextremismus in Stichworten. Ideologien -Organisationen -Aktivitdten. Freie und Hansestadt 
Hamburg. 4.000 ed. Hamburg: Behorde fur Inneres. Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Hamburg, Jun 
2001, pp. 23,54.
90 Cited from: Brunssen, F. op. cit., pp. 60-61. See also: Fuller, C. Die Deutschen sterben aus - und 
verbloden. Die Tageszeitung, 01.09.04 (7450), p. 18.
91 Cited from: Germany: asylum, Green Cards, op. cit. and: Merz, F. op. cit., p. 3.
92 See: Facts and figures of the situation of foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany. 18th ed. 
Berlin/Bonn: Federal Government's Commissioner for Foreigners' Issues, Jun 1999, p. 8.
93 See: Immigration and population change in Germany. Migration News [Online]. Jan 1995: 2(1) 
[Accessed 26.07.02]. <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn.archive_mn/jan_1995-14mn.html>
94 See: Birg, H. Auf der schiefen Bahn. Rheinischer Merkur, 31.07.03 (31), p. 4 and: Meyer-Timpe, U. 
op. cit., p. 26.
95 See: Merz, F. op. cit., p. 3.
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in the British press claimed that over half of the German public thought there were too 
many foreigners in Germany - so much so that the term Uberfremdung itself began to 
reappear in surveys and some of the German media.96
Indicative, to some extent, of this particular Angst and disjuncture between official and 
popular self-conceptions of national identity were, arguably, the results of the following 
surveys. Between 30 and 31 October 2000, Emnid surveyed 921 Germans on whether 
they had fears of being inundated by foreigners (Uberfremdung). 43% of CDU voters, 
23% of SPD voters and 100% of DVU and NPD supporters agreed with the statement 
put by Emnid that: 'I have fears of an Uberfremdung.' 91 In a 2001 Forsa survey on 
behalf of the Press and Information Office of the German government, the majority of 
the 1,007 surveyed were also against any further immigration because they believed 
Germany was already uberfordert (overburdened) with immigrants.98 A survey and 
conclusions by co-director of Allensbach, Kocher, also seemed to reflect Hepp's 
controversial reasoning. Of the 2,172 Germans asked in 2000, 68% expressed the view 
that the limits of immigration had been reached.99
Attempts from the SPD/Green coalition to modernise citizenship and dispense with 
cultural nationalism provoked a political polarisation of who could and could not be 
German. Representing a cultural war that went to the very heart of what it meant to be 
German, another was whether there should be a Leitkultur, or leading culture, for 
Germans and Germany's immigrants.
96 See: Germany in uproar over foreign workers, op. cit. and: Connolly, K. Immigration issue could be 
key to German election. The Guardian [Online]. 03.05.02 [Accessed 21.06.02]. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,708999,00.html> See also: Schauble, W. op. cit., 
p. 29 and: Mohr, R. op. cit., p. 344.
97 On average Emnid concluded that 32% of Germans had fears of an Uberfremdung. See: Tabelle 1: 
Aktuelle politische Einstellungen. In der letzten Zeit wurde viel iiber die Themen "Einwanderung" bzw. 
"Zuwanderung nach Deutschland" diskutiert. Dazu lese Ihnen jetzt einige gegensatzliche Aussagen vor 
und sagen mil bitte jeweils, ob Sie eher der ersten Aussagen oder eher der zweiten Aussage zustimmen. 
Aussage: Ich habe Angst vor Uberfremdung. In: Umfrage und Analyse. TNS Emnid, 2000 (11/12), p. 51.
98 From 10.12.01-13.12.01 Forsa surveyed 1,007 citizens over the age of 14 by means of a random choice 
computer-assisted telephone poll on their opinions on immigration. 60% expressed the view that 
Germany is already over-stretched with current immigration. See: Weil Deutschland bereits mil der 
Eingliederung der hier lebenden Auslander uberfordert ist. Meinungen zur Zuwanderung (Contra- 
Argumente). 4. Meinungen zur Zuwanderung. In: Meinungen zur Einwanderung. op. cit., p. 9.
99 See: Kocher, R. Die Bevolkerung fordert ein Einwanderungsgeset:. Leitlinien: quantitative und 
qualitative Steurung und Integration. Eine Dokumentation des Beitrags in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen 
Zeitung Nr. 296 vom 20. Dezember 2000. Institut fur Demoskopie Allensbach, IfD-Bericht 6207/1, Dez 
2000, p. 3 and: Frage: "Es wird zur Zeit viel uber Zuwanderung nach Deutschland diskutiert. Was meinen 
Sie: kann Deutschland mehr Auslander aufnehemn, oder ist die Grenze der Zuwanderung erreicht?" Die 
Grenze der Zuwanderung nach Deutschland ist fur die meisten erreicht. Tabelle A4. Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. Bevolkerung ab 16 Jahre. Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfrage 6099, November 2000. Die 
Bevolkerung fordert ein Einwandrungsgesetz. Leitlinien: quantitative und qualitative Steuerung und 
Integration. In: Ibid., p. 18.
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A leading culture?
When Chairman of the former CDU/CSU opposition faction, Friedrich Merz, demanded 
in the Bundestag that immigrants must conform to a Deutsche Leitkultur (guiding 
culture), the term triggered indignation as well as widespread sympathy. 100 Presenting 
different projections of collective identity, this issue of self-definition became an almost 
daily subject of discussions in mainstream national and regional German newspapers, 
right-wing radical publications and in the Bundestag. 101 It set the then Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer and other members of the Bundestag, such as Peter Struck (SPD) and 
Kerstin Miiller (Alliance 90/The Greens), against the CDU politicians Peter Hintze, 
Friedrich Merz and head of the CDU/CSU faction Angela Merkel. 102 In response to 
conservative pleas for a German Leitkultur as a suitable model for German national 
identity, both Chancellor Schroder and SPD member of the Bundestag Peter Struck 
dismissed it as 'half-baked', Schroder adding that Germany needed a more modern 
approach to its identity. 103 On the one hand, Kerstin Miiller and Joschka Fischer argued 
that such a concept was inflammatory and damaging to the concept of Europe. 104 On the 
other, Angela Merkel claimed the governing parties found the theme of the nation 
insecure and that the SPD and Greens, in particular, quite obviously 'have a disturbed 
relationship with the Fatherland'. 105
Perhaps more significant than party squabbles, the Leitkultur debate also exposed key 
differences between the Bundestag political elite, sections of the media and public, 
along with right-wing extremists. Although the political elite differed about the extent to 
which long-term foreign residents should adapt to a German 'guiding culture', key 
representatives from most of the mainstream German political parties agreed that 
immigrants could and should be integrated. 106
100 For Bundestag speech by Merz urging a Leitkultur, see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/135. 
op. cit., pp. 13031-13036. See also: Beste, R. et al. Absurdes Getose. Der Spiegel, 26.03.01 (13), p. 25.
101 See: Solms warnt CDU vor Begriff der ,,Leitkultur." Fuldaer Zeitung, 23.11.00, p. 9 and: Dahlmann, 
J. Leithammel allerorten. Die Zeit [Online]. 2000 (44) [Accessed 16.04.03]. <http://zeus.zeit.de/text/ 
archiv/2000/44/200044_printletter_1101.xml> See also: ,,Leitkultur fur Multikulti?" Deutsche Stimme, 
2000 (11), p. 1.
102 For these debates see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/135. op. cit., pp. 13046-13049.
103 For Bundestag speeches by Peter Struck and Schroder see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 
14/136. Stenographischer Bericht 136 Sitzung. Berlin, 29.11.00, pp. 13196, 13222-13223.
104 For speeches by Kerstin Miiller and Joschka Fischer, see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 
14/136. op. cit., pp. 13208-13209 and: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/135. op. cit., pp. 13036- 
13038.
105 Cited from: Nelles, R. Merkel: SPD hat gestortes Verhaltnis zum Vaterland. Die Welt, 02.11.00, p. 1.
106 For the promotion of the integration of foreigners by the CDU/CSU, along with key representatives 
from the SPD/Greens' Otto Schilly and Marieluise Beck, see: Arbeitsgrundlage fur die
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Evidence suggested that some of the German public and elements of the media were 
more sceptical. Further to the citizenship debate about the legal definition of foreigners 
was the one that emerged about their integration. The additional effect of Friedrich 
Merz's comments stimulated questions not only about what it means to be German a 
decade after reunification, but also whether or not foreigners, particularly the 2.2 
million Turks in Germany, could be integrated. 107 Merz claimed that as long as there 
were no clear definitions of a leading culture, neither immigration nor integration would 
be fully accepted. 'Immigration and integration can only be successful in the long term, 
if there is wide agreement within the population', noted the CDU opposition leader. 108
A resume of Germany's past encounter with immigration is, arguably, essential in order 
to fully comprehend the significance of both the proposed immigration law and 
significance of the Leitkultur debate.
During the early history of the FRG, the ethno-cultural grounding of German citizenship 
was embedded in the tradition of the jus sanguinis principle that, according to lost 
Halfmann, 'worked well for a nation-state without substantial immigration'. 109 Due to an 
otherwise readily accessible labour force drastically reduced by death in war and 
thousands of German prisoners of war, the immediate early post-war years saw deficits 
in the workforce. 110 This deficiency was initially compensated with the Vertriebene, or 
ethnic Germans, fleeing the Red Army at the end of the Second World War from the 
former Ostgebiete or eastern territories. Following the construction of the Berlin Wall in 
1961, this important source of labour became severely restricted, however. In response, 
the FRG increased its recruitment of so-called Gastarbeiter (guest-workers) from Italy, 
Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia, under the theory that they could be
Zuwanderungskommission der CDU Deutschlands. Berlin: Christlich-Demokratische Union, 06.11.00, 
pp. 1-5 and: Kappner, J. and Rubner, J. op. cit. See also: Burgdorff, S., Emcke, C. and Leinemann, J. 
,,Diskussion ohne Tabus." Der Spiegel, 12.06.00 (24), p. 28 and: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 
14/28. Stenographischer Bericht 28 Sitzung. Bonn, 19.03.99, pp. 2305-2309.
107 For the alleged problems of integrating Turks, see: Darnstadt, T., Emke, C. and Mascolo, G. Der 
Kampf um die Passe. Der Spiegel, 11.01.99 (2), pp. 25-32 and: Schonwalder, K. Migration, refugees and 
ethnic plurality as issues of public and political debates in (West) Germany. In: Cesarani, D. and 
Fulbrook, M. (eds). op. cit., pp. 166-167. See also: Rinaldi, A. No Turks please, we're German. New 
Statesman, 01.01.99, pp. 23-24.
108 Cited from: Merz, F. op. cit., p. 3.
109 Cited from: Halfmann, J. Two discourses of citizenship in Germany: the differences between public 
debate and administrative practice. In: Brady, J. S., Crawford, B. and Wiliarty, S. E. (eds). op. cit., p. 393.
110 See: Kremers, E. Die Nacht, in der Krefeld unterging. 22. Juni 1943. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Wartberg 
Verlag, 2003, p. 4 and: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 171.
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rotated in and out of the labour market as and when needed. 1 " Indispensable for any 
comprehensible understanding of why sections of the public and the far-right were 
reluctant to accept the fact that Germany had become an immigration land, was the 
official reasoning behind the policy of rotation.
Guest workers were recruited primarily to cushion fluctuations in the business cycle, 
without either having to be added as long-term residents or integrated within the 
population." 2 Yet, it was not until the late 1980s that officials began to accept that 
labour migration would lead to permanent settlement. 'Governments on both the left 
and right nurtured for decades the illusion that labour migrants were temporary workers 
who could be sent home when jobs became scarce', noted Kurthen. According to 
Kurthen and Brubaker, foreign workers were supposed to stay for between one and 
three years and then return home."3 A comparison with France is instructive. Whereas 
in Germany the employment of foreign workers was regarded as only a temporary 
measure, France planned on permanently integrating at least some of its migrants." 4 
Thus, official admissions that Germany was an immigration land and that foreigners 
were there to stay would have necessitated an officially endorsed integration 
programme for its foreign residents. Neither until 1998 was particularly forthcoming." 5 
Since the Bundestag political elite promoted open immigration, whilst some of the 
media and public sought to bring it to a halt, the issue of integration raised by the 
Leitkultur epitomised the fundamental ideological crisis within German national 
identity.
According to the Verfassungsnation, or understanding of national identity based on a 
constitutional patriotism, irrespective of ethnic or religious background, as a rule,
111 See: Seifert, W. Admission policy, patterns of migration and integration: the German and French case
compared. New Community, Oct 1997: 23(4), pp. 443-444 and: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. Germany and its
immigrants: a socio-demographic analysis. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Jan 1998: 24(1), pp.
33-35.
112 See: Miinz, R. and Ulrich, R. Germany and its immigrants: a socio-demographic analysis, op. cit., pp.
41-42 and: Brubaker, R. op. cit., pp. 171-178.
113 Cited from: Kurthen, H. op. cit., pp. 922-923 and: Brubaker, R. op. cit., pp. 171-172.
114 See: Seifert, W. op. cit., p. 446. See also: Favell, A. Philosophies of integration. Immigration and the 
idea of citizenship in France and Britain. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. 64.
115 For official admissions of this, see interview with Schily in: Burgdorff, S., Emcke, C. and Leinemann, 
J. op. cit., pp. 26-28 and: 1. Fur einen neuen integrationspolitischen Dialog. AnstoBe zum Thema 
Integraton III. In: Beck, M. 4. Bericht zur Lage der Ausldnder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
Berlin: Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur Migration, Fliichtlinge und Integration, Feb 2000, pp. 
226-227. See also: Brubaker, R. op. cit., pp. 176-177.
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everyone can become integrated into a nation's culture." 6 Indicative of this 
constitutional patriotism in action was, arguably, the Bundestag speech by Kerstin 
Muller (Alliance 90/The Greens): 'A Leitkultur is of no use for the integration of 
foreigners because culture is many-sided and is not that simple. People must be treated 
as individuals and not on their religion or descent." 17 Despite official justifications for 
continued immigration, evidence suggested the Bundestag political elite seemed to have 
failed to understand that the irrefutable fact of immigration settlement does not 
necessarily make the country, in the minds of many Germans, a country of immigration. 
An apparent anxiety that the former SPD/Green ruling coalition were ignoring popular 
sentiments that Germany should not be a land of immigration, also extended to 
differences between how mankind was perceived between the Bundestag elite and some 
elements of the German public. Evidence suggested there was some doubt as to the 
limits of assimilability for non-German ethnic groups - especially, but not exclusively 
Turks. 118
Useful sources when probing the nature of national identity are the speeches of 
nationalists and their pamphlets, programmes and other documents of ethno-nationalist 
organisations. As far as Reitemeyer Professor of Political Science Walker Connor was 
concerned, nationalist speeches have been dismissed far too readily as useless 
propaganda. Nevertheless, according to Connor: 'Nationalism is a mass phenomenon 
and the degree to which the leaders are true believers does not affect the impact of its 
reality.' So the issue was not the credibility of the propagandist, 'but the reactions they 
inculcate and mass instinct to which the propagandist appeals'."9
A. D. Smith argued that: 'The mingling of homogeneous cultures through immigration 
and guest workers can provoke strong ethno-nationalist reactions from indigenous 
peoples and cultures." 20 Because it is based upon the belief in a common ethnicity, the
116 See: Habermas, J. Faktizitat und Geltung. Beitrdge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des 
democratischen Rechtsstaats. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992, pp. 632-661 and: Takle, M. 
German policy on immigration and European integration: two challenges to the nation-state and the role 
of the political community in the democratic process. Paper prepared for presentation at ARENA-seminar, 
19.03.02, p. 7. See also: Hogwood, P. op. cit., pp. 125,136-142.
117 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., p. 13209.
118 See: Kurthen, H. and Minkenberg, M. op. cit., pp. 175-196 and: Schonwalder, K. Migration, refugees 
and ethnic plurality as issues of public and political debates in (West) Germany. In: Cesarani, D. and 
Fulbrook, M. (eds). op. cit., pp. 166-167. See also: Rinaldi, A. op. cit., pp. 23-24.
119 Cited from: Connor, W. Ethnonationalism: the quest for understanding. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994, pp. 76, 198. For similar line of argument see: Smith, A. D. Nations and 
nationalism in a global era. Oxford: Blackwell/Polity Press, 1995, pp. 1-7, 147-160.
120 Cited from: Smith, A. D. National identity, op. cit., p. 176.
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ethno-national bond ultimately bifurcates humanity into 'us' and 'them'. 121 Summarising 
ethnic identity, Smith and John Hutchinson interpreted ethnic identity as: 'The essence 
of an ethnic group' or 'the quality of belonging to an ethnic community or group. It is 
what you have if you belong to an ethnic group - generally in the context of opposition 
to other ethnic groups." 22 Indicative of this exclusive stance in Germany was the 
Heidelberg Manifesto. Published in several newspapers in 1981, its racist agenda caused 
particular concern in the Bundestag. 12 * 'Based on an alleged objective science including 
cybernetics, biology/genetics', the 15 signatories of the Heidelberg Manifesto 
concluded that certain different peoples were incompatible and mutually exclusive on 
the same territory. According to the Manifesto, large numbers of non-German 
immigrants of disparate culture, mentality and religion were beyond integration. 124
Other advocates of what Sabine von Dirke termed the 'biologist-nationalist stance', 
such as Wolfgang Seeger and Professor Erwin Paul, equated culture with nature by 
claiming that a people's culture is part of its genetic material. 125 Or, in other words, 
culture is biology. According to Seeger, children of interracial marriages inevitably have 
a disposition for being unprincipled, weak-willed and having unrestrained behaviour. 
They are, therefore, most likely to show criminal traits because of the incompatibility of 
the genetic material of their parent, argued Seeger. 126 This example illustrated not only 
the continuing influence and language of the Third Reich, but also its overtly racist 
ideology articulated via Seeger and others during the 1980s and beyond. What was 
particularly significant about the Heidelberg Manifesto was that its recommendations 
and philosophy not only continued to emerge within far-right publications, but had 
become manifest within the media and, to a lesser extent, the public.
In 2003, REP Party Chairman Dr. Rolf Schlierer agitated against the admission of 
Turkey into the EU, claiming Turkey's entrance would spell the end for any German
121 Cited from: Connor, W. op. cit., p. 207.
122 Cited from: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (eds). op. cit., p. 4.
123 For official concerns about the detrimental influence of the Heidelberg Manifesto, see comments by 
Baum (FDP) and DrelMer (SPD) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 9/83. op. cit., pp. 4908-4909.
124 See: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., pp. 519-520 and: Im Wortlaut: ,,Facette eines gottlichen Plans." op. cit., p. 
10 and: Hoffrnann, C. Immigration and nationhood in the Federal Republic of Germany. In: Brady, J. S., 
Crawford, B. and Wiliarty, S. E. (eds). op. cit., pp. 366-367.
125 Cited from: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., p. 518.
126 See: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., pp. 517-520 and: Seeger, W. op. cit., p. 12. See also: Paul, E. Das 
vereinigte Deutschland - europaische integrierte Nation oder diffuse "multikulturelle Gesellschaft"? 
ZeitschriftfurPolitik, 1992: 39, pp. 394-420.
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guiding culture, guiding or otherwise. 127 As far as the so-called German Liberal Party 
(DP) was concerned, any foreigners who did not want to adapt to a German Leitkultur 
had no right to stay in Germany, reported the Brandenburg authorities in their report on 
far-right German parties. 128 Explaining why the CDU did not represent a viable political 
alternative to the NPD, in July 2005 the Thuringian party candidate, Dr. Rita Hoffmann, 
vehemently criticised conservative party leaders Angela Merkel and Friedrich Merz for 
adopting a conciliatory approach to implementing a German leading culture. 129
Along with a radical stance to a guiding culture for foreigners, anti-integration positions 
also appeared in various far-right party papers and speeches. In the Niedersachsen 
Spiegel, the Lower Saxon authorities reported that local NPD party functionary, 
Michael Fiedler, justified rejection of the equality of foreigners 'on an explicit 
biological racism'. 130 For the Saxon branch of the REP, the belief that it is possible to 
integrate past and future immigrants was 'a mistake'. 131 According to the DVU, 'the 
integration of any more foreigners is simply not possible - particularly a group so 
ethnically erratic as the Jews'. 132
In response to Johannes Rau's 2000 Berlin Speech, urging Germans to accept that 
Germany should continue to receive more immigrants, some contested whether a 
German guiding culture should, could or must exist. 133 For Ronald Monch, Georg Paul 
Hefty and Josef Joffe, a leading culture was indispensable for German identity. Along 
similar lines, Bremen College Principal Monch stated in the newspaper Die Welt that 
the acceptance of a leading culture should be self-evident for anyone living in a 
country. 134 Writing in the weekly Die Zeit, Joffe defined German culture as metaphysics 
and Volkstum or national traditions - 'it is Goethe on the shelf and the lime tree above
127 Cited from: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004. Rheinland-Pfalz. Mainz: Rheinland-Pfalz Ministerium des 
Innern und fiir Sport, Apr 2005, p. 38.
128 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht Land Brandenburg 2003. Potsdam: Ministerium des Innern des Landes 
Brandenburg, Mai 2004, p. 132.
129 See: Warum die CDU ,,keine alternative" und die Linksparteien eine ,,Mogelpackung" ist. National- 
Zeitung [Online]. 29.07.05 (31) [Accessed 01.09.05]. <http://www.dsz-verlag.de/ 
Artikel_05.NZ3 l_3.html>
130 Cited from: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 Niedersachsen. Hannover: Niedersachsisches Ministerium 
fur Inneres und Sport, 2000, p. 49.
131 Cited from: Bevolkerungsentwicklung und Zuwanderung. Die Republikaner [Online] [Accessed 
07.09.05]. <http://www.rep-sachsen.de/Neue_Dateien/deutschland/001.html>
132 Cited from: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001. Freistaat Sachsen. Dresden: Staatsministerium des 
Innern, Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Sachsen, 31.12.01, p. 43.
133 See: Rau, J. "Without fear and without illusions: living together in Germany." Berlin Speech in the 
House of World Cultures on 12 th May 2000. Federal President [Online]. 12.05.00 [Accessed 02.06.03]. 
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134 See: Lehmann, K. and Beyer, M. op. cit.
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the bench 1 . 135 'In complete seriousness,' noted Reinhard Mohr and Georg Paul Hefty, 
'integration without a Leitkulktur is like going to bed without a bed." 36
These interpretations of Leitkultur elicited critical responses from some quarters, 
suggesting such explicit patterns of conformity to certain values were tantamount to an 
implicit exclusion of others. On 8 May 2002, in a speech commemorating the end of the 
Second World War, Chancellor Schroder stated that whenever one associated values as 
emanating from a certain area, the exclusion of others resulted. 137 Publicist Norbert Bolz 
and SPD Mayor of Bremen, Henning Scherf, argued that a guiding culture should be 
orientated less towards identity and more with the inclusion of others. Bolz believed a 
guiding culture should not represent identity, but tolerance: 'We have to learn these 
days to understand culture not as identity but as difference." 38 For Scherf, 'a word that 
leads people astray into a restrictive definition of Germanness contradicts the goal of 
Bremen as a city open to the world'. 139
Whilst those, such as Bolz, the Mayor of Bremen and the SPD/Green government, did 
their best to promote the integration of foreigners, at the same time, there seemed little 
public and media sympathy for ethnic diversity. Since 2000, the Federal Government's 
Commissioner for Foreigner Issues reported 3.5 million marks had been set aside for 
integration projects for foreigners in Germany. 140 Although torchlight demonstrations in 
Munich and Hamburg between 1992 and 1993 protested against violence towards 
foreigners, they did not lead to the formation of a civil rights movement in support of 
minority rights. 141 Expert in international law, Dieter Blumenwitz, recommended 
distinguishing between rights to 'native national groups' and those to 'immigrating 
aliens'. 142 Theo Sommer argued against granting formal minority status to Turks that 
could result in their 'eventual segregation when the task in hand should be their
135 Cited from: Joffe, J. Lust auf Leit. Die Zeit, 16.11.00 (47), p. 1.
136 Cited from: Mohr, R. op. cit., p. 342.
137 See: Nation, Patriotismus, Demokratische Kultur. Debatte mil Gerhard Schroder. News Archive. 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [Online]. 31.05.02 [Accessed 23.03.04]. 
<http://www.berlm.spd.de/servlet/PB/menu/1534815/1016827.html>
138 Cited from: Mohr, R. op. cit., p. 344.
139 Cited from: Lenmann, K. and Beyer, M. op. cit.
140 For details see: III. Integrationspolitik. In: 5. Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung fur 
Ausldnderfragen uber die Lage der Ausldnder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Berlin/Bonn: 
Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur Migration, Fluchtlinge und Integration, Aug 2002, p. 43.
141 See: Schonwalder, K. Migration, refugees and ethnic plurality as issues of public and political debates 
in (West) Germany. In: Cesarani, D. and Fulbrook, M. (eds). op. cit., p. 173.
142 Cited from: Schonwalder, K. Minority rights at home and abroad: the German debate. In: Hudson, R. 
and Reno, F. (eds). Politics of identity, migrants and minorities in multicultural states. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000, p. 127.
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integration and adherence to the central values of a German Leitkultur\ w On the other 
hand, German political scientist Claus Leggewie demanded that Turks living in 
Germany should be formally acknowledged as an ethnic minority and granted the same 
status of cultural autonomy that ethnic Germans in Poland allegedly have. 144 But what 
did some of the public think?
In 2001, 2,054 Germans were asked by Allensbach to what extent should foreigners 
give priority to German culture. 61% thought German culture should take precedence 
over foreign traditions, religion and language. When asked whether they opposed a 
German Leitkultur in a country where many foreigners lived, only 29% believed there 
should not be a guiding culture, but only diversity with equal rights. 145 Another poll by 
Emnid in 2000, found that 31% of 921 Germans surveyed believed that immigrants 
should be able to live amongst Germans as they would in their own homeland.' 46 
However, the SPD/Green government, at the time of writing, seemed determined to 
move away from the traditional ethno-cultural understanding of a guiding culture. In the 
Bundestag, Chancellor Schroder declared he did not want to rekindle a new Leitkultur 
debate because 'enough has already been said on the issue by my colleague Peter 
Struck'. 147
As the reactions to the immigration law and Green Cards suggested, the problem for the 
German government appeared to be public perceptions of a leading culture, which 
promoted a national heritage and traditions as the sole legitimate points of identity 
reference. Although Schroder claimed dual nationality law was facilitating the 
integration of foreigners, past surveys indicated otherwise. 148 Officially classified as 
'confidential', in a 2001 Allensbach survey undertaken for the German government
143 Cited from: Sommer, T. Der Kopf zahlt, nicht das Tuch. Die Zeit, 16.07.98, p. 3.
144 See: Leggewie, C. Das Ende der Geduld. Die Tageszeitung, 18.09.93, p. 10 and: Schonwalder, K. 
Minority rights at home and abroad: the German debate. In: Hudson, R. and Reno, F. (eds). op. cit., p. 
122.
145 See: Frage: "Es wird ja viel dariiber diskutiert, ob fur Auslander, die in Deutschland leben, die 
deutsche Kultur Leitkultur sein soil, das heifit, ob sie sich im Konfliktfall an der deutschen Kultur 
ausrichten sollen. Dariiber unterhalten sich hier zwei. Wer von beiden sagt eher das, was auch Sie 
denken?" See: Tabelle A7. Bundesrepublik Deutschland Bevolkerung ab 16 Jahre. Allensbacher Archiv, 
IfD-Umfrage 7007, Juni 2001. In: Kocher, R. Parteiubergreifender Konsens in der Einwanderungsfrage. 
Nur die Griinen stehen auSerhalb dieses Konsenses. Eine Dokumentation des Beitrags in der Frankfurter 
Allgemeinen ZeitungNr. 140 vom 20. Juni 2001. op. cit., p. 20.
146 See: Aussage 2. Zuwander sollen auch bei uns so legen konnen, wie sie es aus ihrer Heimat gewohnt 
sind. In: Umfrage und Analyse, op. cit., p. 51.
147 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., pp. 13196, 13209, 13223.
148 See: Germany: migrants, asylum. Migration News [Online]. Jan 2001: 8(1) [Accessed 05.07.02]. 
<http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/jan_2001-10mn.html>
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entitled Foreigners in Germany, respondents were asked the extent to which their 
opinion mirrored what one most often heard in Germany. 149 Responding to the statement 
that most foreigners wanted to keep themselves to themselves and had as little as 
possible to do with Germans, 54% of 2,000 Germans surveyed nationwide agreed with 
this statement, compared to 40% in 1997. 15°
A 1999 survey undertaken by Allensbach revealed 23% of 2,000 Germans surveyed 
nationwide believed that dual nationality would contribute to the integration of 
foreigners, whereas the majority - 64% - were convinced it would not. 151 In 2001, 68% 
of 2,000 Germans surveyed nationwide believed that Islam and its customs hindered the 
integration of Muslims into German society, reported the 1998-2002 Allensbach 
Yearbook of Public Opinion Surveys. 152
Evidence also suggested the general perception in some areas of Germany was that 
Turks were different in culture and religion and wanted to remain so, 'seeking 
neighbourhoods of their own', noted Hamburg's former Foreigner Representative 
Giinter Apel. 153 Consequently, Turkish ghettos formed and isolated themselves from 
German society, noted three editors ofDer Spiegel and Theo Sommer from Die Zeit. w 
Conversely, according to the 2000 Shell Study on Young People in Germany:
149 See: Scheidges, R. op. cit., p. 4.
150 See: Frage: ,,Hier auf dieser Liste steht verschiedenes, was man iiber Auslander horen kann. Was 
davon ist auch Ihre Meinung? Bei welchen Punkten wiirden Sie sagen, das sehe ich genauso?" Die 
meisten Auslander wollen unter sich bleiben und mil Deutschen so wenig so moglich zu tun haben. Cited 
from: Auslander in Deutschland. Dezember 2001. 4. Einwanderung und Auslander. Die Nation. In: 
Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, R. (eds). Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1998-2002 Band 11. 
Miinchen: K. G. Saur, Verlag fur Demoskopie Allensbach am Bodensee, 2002, p. 571. A cross-section of 
1,000 were questioned Germans from both the old and new Ldnder in December 2001 by means of a 
nationwide random sample survey.
151 See: Frage: "Glauben Sie, dafl die doppelte Staatsbiirgerschaft dazu beitragt, daB Auslander, die schon 
lange bei uns leben, besser in unsere Gesellschaft eingegliedert werden, oder glauben Sie das nicht?" 
Cited from: Doppelte Staatsbiirgerschaft. Januar 1999. 4. Einwanderung und Auslander. Die Nation. In: 
Ibid., p. 584. Age group of respondents were between 16-29, 30-44, 45-59 and 60. A 'statistical 
representative cross-section' of 1,000 Germans from both the old and new Ldnder were surveyed in 
January 1999 by means of a 'nationwide random sample survey.'
152 See: Frage: ,,Hier auf dieser Liste ist einmal einiges aufgeschrieben. In welchen dieser Bereiche sind 
die Moslems, die bei uns in Deutschland leben. Ihrer Meinung nach so anders gepragt, daB es ihre 
Integration, ihre Eingliederung in die deutsche Gesellschaft schwierig macht? Bitte nennen Sie mir 
einfach die entsprechenden Punkte." Im Glauben, in der Religion. Mentalitatsunterschiede. Dezember 
2001. 4. Einwanderung und Auslander. Die Nation. In: Ibid., p. 576. In December 2001 a 'statistical 
representative cross-section' of 1,000 Germans from the age of 16 years from both the old and new 
Ldnder were polled by means of a nationwide random sample survey.
153 For comments by Giinter Apel, see: Darnstadt, T., Emke, C. and Mascolo, G. op. cit., pp. 27-28.
154 See: Ibid, and: Sommer, T. op. cit., p. 3.
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'Germany's youth have little interest in other cultures and their knowledge of Turks is 
minimal." 55
'Social aloofness, racist, ethnic and religious prejudice as well as discrimination by the 
German population can all obstruct efforts for integration - even in cases where 
immigrants are highly motivated', claimed the 2001 Report by the Independent 
Commission on Migration. 156 Evidence from the media also implied the major problem 
seemed to be Germany's reputation as a country where foreigners were not always 
welcome. 157 An example of this discrimination in action was the case brought to Der 
Spiegel's attention by the IBM manager Erwin Staudt who wished to employ a top, 
unidentified British IT manager in Germany. Der Spiegel reported the latter's work visa 
was suspended by the local authorities whilst his case was assessed. Staudt had to 
inform his prospective employee that his application had been refused on the grounds 
'his wife was a coloured person'. 158 Indian Frankfurt-based business consultant Rajesh 
Agarwal confirmed his associates felt there was definitely a racism problem in the city 
towards foreign employees. 'There's is an assumption that even if you have a very good 
education, it still makes no difference', explained Agarwal. 159 During his visit to India in 
2000, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer noted that he was asked: 'How safe is Germany 
for people with dark skins?"60
For right-wing radicals it seemed what constituted indispensable differences between 
races also extended to some sections of the public. In contrast to the official line, 
evidence suggested there were clear distinctions to be made when assessing levels of 
acceptance (and arguably, therefore, assimilability) for different ethnic groups from a 
European sphere and those outside it. 161 In a 2001 Forsa survey undertaken for the Press
155 Based on in-depth polls of and interviews with 6,000 young Germans during 1998-1999, the study was 
compiled by Arthur Fischer head of Psydata in Frankfurt am Main. The majority of respondents were 
between the ages of 15-24, and a total of 4,546 young people were selected, with an additional random 
sample of 800. See: Thomas, V. Youth 2000. Shell study on young people in Germany. Inter Nationes 
[Online]. Mar 2000 [Accessed 06.06.03]. <http://www.internationes.de/d/presse/basis/e/bil8-2000-e-f- 
html>
156 Cited from: Structuring immigration. Fostering integration, op. cit., p. 236.
157 For these claims see: Burgdorff, S. et al. ,,Wettbewerb urn Kopfe." op. cit., pp. 23-24 and: Meyer- 
Timpe, U. op. cit., p. 26. See also: Puppe, A. op. cit., p. 18.
158 See: Burgdorff, S. et al. ,,Wettbewerb urn Kopfe." op. cit., pp. 23-24.
159 Cited from: Kettmann, S. Germany's nagging IT problem. Wired News [Online]. 11.04.01 [Accessed 
12.07.02]. <http://www.wired.eom/news/politics/0,1283,42801,00.html>
160 Cited from: Address by Joschka Fischer, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the opening of the 
Forum on the Future of Cultural Relations Policy, op. cit., p. 8.
161 For official promotion of equal rights by Alliance 90/The Greens politician Kerstin Miiller and 
Chancellor Schroder see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., pp. 13209, 13222-13223.
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and Information Office of the German government, 73% of 1,007 German citizens 
surveyed aged 14 onwards, admitted they had reservations, in particular, about 
immigration by citizens from Islamic states. By contrast, Germans were more positive 
regarding the immigration of western EU citizens - 31% professed concerns about their 
immigration to Germany. 162 Karen Schonwalder, Michael Minkenberg and Hermann 
Kurthen also maintained there were clear distinctions in the acceptance of different 
nationalities and there were similar reports in the German press. 163
Whilst discussing the European legacy of culture for German identity, former President 
of the Bundestag, Wolfgang Thierse (SPD), maintained the question remained whether 
or not a Turk with a German passport could actually become German. 'Is it sufficient 
that immigrants respect the law or conform to a LeiikulturT asked Thierse. 164 According 
to Rudiger Scheidges, Rainer Miinz and Professor Hans-Dieter Schwind, it was not. 
Munz, Scheidges and Schwind maintained that some of the German public still did not 
accept Turks, Bosnians and Albanians. 165 This was, arguably, another instance of a 
contemporary version of Herder's ethnic-orientated cultural community of the Volk 
(people) opposing the idea of co-existing ethnic and cultural minorities and equal rights 
for minorities. 166
Evidence suggested then, that these attitudes not only deterred high-skilled workers 
from abroad via the Green Card visa system, but also damaged the country's chances of 
attracting foreign investment. Speaking in the Berlin parliament in 2005 about foreign 
IT-specialists avoiding the capital due to alleged hostile attitudes to foreigners, Berlin 
Senator from the Party of Democratic Socialists (PDS), Giyasettin Sayan, declared: 'At 
the moment, Germany's image abroad is not a good one."67 Summarising official 
concerns about foreigners being accorded equal treatment, SPD politician Peter Struck 
declared: 'We do not want to damage the respect of Germany in the eyes of the
162 See: Biirgern aus islamischen Staaten and Burgern aus anderen EU-Staaten. Vorbehalte gegen die 
Zuwanderung spezifischer Auslandergruppen. 4. Meinungen zur Zuwanderung. In: Meinungen zur 
Einwanderung. op. cit., p. 11. The survey was undertaken by means of a random choice computer- 
assisted telephone poll from 10.12.01-13.12.01. For details see: Datengrundlage. In. Ibid., p. 3.
163 See: Schonwalder, K. Minority rights at home and abroad: the German debate. In: Hudson, R. and 
Reno, F. (eds). op. cit., pp. 116, 120-127. See also: Kurthen, H. and Minkenberg, M. op. cit., p. 186.
164 Cited from: Thierse, W. Von Schiller lernen: Deutschland als Kulturnation. Hamburger Abendblatt 
[Online]. 02.04.05 [Accessed 20.06.05]. <http://www.abendblatt.de/daten/2005/04/02/416590.html>
165 See: Miinz, R. Neo-Deutsche start Auslander. Die Welt, 14.11.98, p. 10 and: Scheidges, R. op. cit., p.
4. See also: Schwind, H. D. Sind wir ein Volk von Auslanderfeinden? Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
24.06.93, p. 8.
166 For Johann Gottfried von Herder's interpretation of the Volk see: Craig, G. A. op. cit., pp. 30-34, 190-
212 and: Fulbrook, M. A concise history of Germany, op. cit., p. 94.
167 Cited from: Puppe, A. op. cit., p. 18.
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world.' 168 Publicly, though, Otto Schily was more upbeat about the situation. 'In spite of 
all the problems of immigration and integration, the past ten years have been largely a 
success story', noted the then Minister of the Interior. 169
During a 2003 demonstration in Hanover against immigration, NPD Chairman Udo 
Voigt criticised the alleged failure of Chancellor Schroder and the former SPD/Green 
government to admit to their clear incapacity to solve the immigration problem in 
Germany. Similar demonstrations occurred in Osnabriick, Wilhelmshaven and again in 
Hanover during 2004. 170 Two surveys also seemed to reflect a lack of confidence in the 
SPD/Green government's handling of immigration. In 2001, when 1,007 Germans were 
asked by Forsa, on behalf of the Federal Press Office of the German government, 
whether mainstream parties could be trusted to deal with immigration, it emerged that 
only 25% of those surveyed believed any German mainstream political party was fit to 
do so. 171 A 2001 Allensbach survey reported similar findings. 22% of 2,000 Germans 
surveyed nationwide believed none of the mainstream political parties 'take the trouble 
to deal with the issue', with 57% agreeing with the statement that they avoided the issue 
as much as possible. 172 Capturing the alleged mood at the time, the newspaper 
Handelsblatt reported:
So the government have it in black and white the months long disputes about 
immigration have not only resulted in Germans dissatisfied with the 
government's competence in dealing with the issue, but has also revealed the 
public has become sceptical about the whole credibility of the equal co-existence 
of different cultures and ability to successfully integrate immigrants. 173
To summarise, evidence suggested that the notion of a homogenous ethno-cultural Volk 
based around the ethnos, or ethnic group, along with the presumption that Germany was
168 For speech by Struck see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., pp. 13194-13196.
169 Cited from: Bundesinnenminister Schily im ZEIT-Interview vom 25. April 2002. Bundesregierung 
[Online]. 25.04.02 [Accessed 11.06.03]. <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Reden-Interviews/Interviews- 
, 11637.77936/interview/Bundesinnenminister-Schily-im-.htm>
170 See: Nationale Opposition sticht ins multikulrurelle Wespennest Hannover. Nationaldemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands [Online]. 26.05.03 [Accessed 25.11.03]. <http://www.npd.de/npd_info/meldungen/ 
2003/m0503-6> For reports of NPD protests, see: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004 Niedersachsen. 
Hannover: Niedersachsisches Ministerium fur Inneres und Sport, Mai 2005, p. 53.
171 From 10.12.01-13.12.01, 1,007 Germans over the age of 14 were asked by means of a random choice 
computer-assisted telephone poll to what the extent they thought the mainstream were competent in 
dealing with immigration, see: Kompetenz der Parteien bei der Zuwanderung. 9. Meinungen zu Parteien 
und Politikern bei der Regelung der Zuwanderung. In: Meinungen zur Einwanderung. op. cit., p. 22.
172 Cited from: Frage: ,,Wie ist Ihr Eindruck: Bemuhen sich die Parteien, mit dem Thema Zuwanderung 
voranzukommen, oder driicken die sich um das Thema herum?" Keine Eile bei den Parteien. Juni 2001. 
Auslander in Deutschland. 4. Einwanderung und Auslander. Die Nation. In: Noelle-Neumann, E. and 
Kocher, R. (eds). op. cit., p. 579.
173 Cited from: Scheidges, R. op. cit., p. 4.
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a country of non-immigration remained official dogma. Yet, since the introduction of 
Germany's first national regulated immigration legislation, the Bundestag political elite 
maintained that Germany had become an open land of immigration. Rau claimed in 
2000 that: 'Germany is now one of the most open countries in the world. We have 
become more experienced, more rich in experience and more tolerant." 74
Right-wing extremists did not share either Rau's view or the beliefs of many from the 
Bundestag political elite that Germany was an immigration land. Arguing it was 
'absurd' that the German political elite wanted to continue immigration in the face of 
increasing unemployment, evidence suggested the views of the Republikaner and the 
NPD on the subject were not so different from those held by some of the public and the 
media. 175 Otto Schily's and Rita Sussmuth's claims that Germany was 'de facto an 
immigration land' seemed to contradict the views of some Germans and there was little 
sign that some had become more receptive to either immigration or the Green Card. 176 
Whilst Germany had officially recognised itself as a country of immigration, evidence 
suggested it has done so against the will of many in Germany. Surveys indicated that as 
far as some Germans were concerned, the new law had changed nothing regarding the 
so-called 'problem of immigration' and that in general, most claimed the media were 
opposed to the whole concept of immigration anyway. 177
At the time of writing, it seemed that the new legislation allowing 20,000 skilled non- 
EU workers into the country also found little accord with the population, exposing 
further dissonances between popular and official idioms of national identity. Responses 
to the Green Card were generally disappointing, both from prospective applicants and in 
the attitudes of Germans themselves. In the eastern state of Saxony, for example, the 
Leipziger Volkszeitung claimed that by 2000 no Green Cards had been accepted by 
foreign workers. 178
174 Cited from: Section IV. In: Rau, J. op. cit.
175 For claims continued immigration was 'ridiculous', see: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection 
of the Constitution 2002. op. cit., p. 55 and: Bevolkerungsentwicklung und Zuwanderung. op. cit.
176 For claim by Otto Schily that Germany has become de facto a country of immigration, see: Burgdorff, 
S., Emcke, C. and Leinemann, J. op. cit., pp. 25-28. See also introductory comments by Chairperson of 
the Immigration Committee and Sussmuth: Preface. In: Structuring immigration. Fostering integration, 
op. cit., p. 1.
177 For claims by the mainstream media of a general public hostility to the 'problem' of immigration see: 
Scheidges, R. op. cit., p. 4 and: Meyer-Timpe, U. op. cit., p. 26. See also: Burgdorff, S. et al. 
,,Wettbewerb um Kopfe." op. cit., pp. 23-24.
178 For these claims see: 71 Green Cards in Sachsen. Leipziger Volkszeitung, 08.11.00, p. 1.
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Despite appeals from former Chancellor Schroder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer 
for more internationalisation in order to justify the immigration law, Green Card 
Programme and concomitant immigration of foreign workers, their pleas appeared to 
have been rejected. A deep-seated Angst of change and the external seemed to have 
returned in the form of an Uberfremdung. Legislation introduced in 2000 and 2002 
sanctioning continued immigration in the form of the Green Cards and the country's 
first comprehensive immigration law provoked an Uberfremdungsangste, and 
concomitant loss of identity within the media and public. 179
Notwithstanding clear public opposition, the Bundestag political elite appeared resolved 
to adapt to global competition, arguing Germany needed immigration for demographic, 
economic and cultural reasons. Yet, it seemed clear from the Leitkultur debates that 
some Germans had problems not only accepting the consequences of immigration, such 
as globalisation, but also parity of different cultures.
Another consequence of the immigration law and Green Card was to raise questions 
about whether there should be a suitable German cultural model of integration, or 
Leitkultur, for both Germans and immigrants to adhere to, exposing a vacuum in 
national identity. Politicians Friedrich Merz (CDU) and Rainer Briiderle (FDP) accused 
the SPD of indifference to a German Leitkultur in the Bundestag, claiming the people 
were still seeking guidance on the theme. 180
On the one hand, the mainstream German political parties generally accepted integration 
was necessary for Germany's foreign population. On the other hand, however, surveys 
and various articles revealed clear distinctions were made between foreigners from a 
European sphere and those from outside it, to the point of an apparent scepticism about 
whether Turks, for instance, could be integrated. Non-Europeans, particularly Indians, 
accounted for the largest proportion of those issued the Green Card, followed by 
workers from Russia. 181 There was, therefore, an apparent rejection by some of an
179 Articles were still appearing on the theme in 2005, for example, See: Peter, J. Warnung vor 
zunehmender Uberfremdung. Die Welt, 11.06.05, p. 4 and: Immer mehr reden von "Uberfremdung." 
Berliner Zeitung, 14.07.05, p. 36. Concerns were also expressed from the Brandenburg branch of the SPD 
about the use of the term. See: SPD-Landtagsfraktion Brandenburg. Potsdam: Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands, 01.03.05, pp. 12, 20, 33.
180 For speeches in the Bundestag by Friedrich Merz and Rainer Bruderle, see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher
Bundestag, 14/135. op. cit., p. 13036 and: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., p.
13204.
181 See: Kettmann, S. op. cit. and: Puppe, A. op. cit., p. 18.
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identity based on equal rights and cultures for all, indicating further evidence of 
competing definitions of national identity. Rau's 2000 speech, arguably, summarised 
the mood in Germany at the time: 'Integration [...] needs acceptance on the part of the 
local population." 82
In conclusion, evidence suggested a direct line was being increasingly drawn between 
national identity and immigrants and that, at times, Germany was becoming a 
battleground in which two different conceptions of national identity were being fought. 
Increased immigration in the form of the Green Card exacerbated tensions between 
exclusive and inclusive notions of nationhood.
Promoting immigration, tolerance and the integration of foreigners into society, the 
Bundestag political elite along with left-liberals continued to defend a 
Verfassungspatriotismus. 1 ** Political scientist Claus Leggewie, for example, noted that 
many German economists and politicians valued immigrants highly because of their 
model behaviour in the market economy. Along similar lines, CDU representative 
Heiner GeiJMer argued that many immigrants were essentially the 'cream of the crop' of 
their home countries and thus a valuable contribution to German society. 184 Although a 
low birth-rate was, arguably, potentially damaging for the future of the FRG, in contrast 
to right-wing political scientists, such as Robert Hepp, perhaps immigration could be 
the solution for, and not the alleged death of, the German nation. 185
Removing narrow definitions of identity could make it easier for Germany to reap the 
economic benefits of immigration, instead of wasting intellectual energy in struggling to 
preserve an ethno-cultural national homogeneity or purity that probably never existed or 
never will exist. That said, developments suggested immigration remained largely an 
alien concept with opinion polls demonstrating it did not represent a viable solution in 
the eyes of many Germans. It was also evident that official efforts to encourage a more 
economically competitive and cosmopolitan society were perceived as a direct threat to 
an ethno-cultural definition of German identity. In short, an ethno-cultural
182 Cited from: Section III. In: Rau, J. op. cit.
183 See: Rede des saarlandischen Ministerprasidenten Peter Miiller bei der Zentralen Gedenkfeier des 
Volksbundes Deutsche Kriegsgraber e.V. zum Volkstrauertag 2003. Plenarsaal des deutschen 
Bundestages. Christlich-Demokratische Union (Saarland) [Online]. 16.11.03 [Accessed 26.02.04]. 
<http://www.cdu-saar.dc/content/pp./l 195.htm> and: Wehler, H-U. ,,Terrain der Konservativen." Stern 
[Online]. 2004 (5) [Accessed 03.05.05]. <http://www.stern.de/politiJi/deutschland/533322.html>
184 Cited from: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., p. 527.
185 For Hepp's contentions see: Ibid., pp. 518-521.
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understanding of Germanness continued to inform sections of the public and those who 
questioned the merits of immigration.
So how far was Germany in reality 'an open land of immigration', as claimed by 
leading figures from the Bundestag elite?186 Reflecting another key dissonance between 
an inclusive Verfassungspatriotismus and exclusive ethno-cultural definition of the 
nation, although Germany was officially represented as an open land of immigration, 
evidence suggested for some, it remained rather a reluctant one.
186 For these claims see: Section IV. In: Rau, J. op. cit. See also interview with Chairman of the CDU 
opposition faction Friedrich Merz in: Friedrich Merz: Einwanderung und Identitat. Beitrag vom 
Vorsitzenden der CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Friedrich Merz, in der Tageszeirung ,,Die Welt" vom 
25. Oktober 2000 zur Diskussion um die "freiheitliche deutsche Leitkultur." Christlich-Demokratische 
Union [Online]. 25.10.00 [Accessed 28.02.04]. <http://www.cdu.de/ueber-uns/buvo/merz/fm-welt- 
leitkultur.htm>
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Chapter 3.
Xenophobia and Right-Wing Violence in Germany
There was, arguably, hardly a subject that aroused more unease outside Germany than 
the reception of foreigners by some elements of the German public. 1 Commenting in 
1998 on xenophobia, spokesperson for the South African Embassy, Alan G. Moore, 
stated that the situation in Germany was 'very disturbing'. 2 Earlier, Poland's Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, criticised the xenophobic outbursts against 
foreigners. 3
Aware of these and other concerns, the German government attempted to ban the largest 
of the three main right-wing extremist parties in Germany, the National Democratic 
Party (NPD), noted The Observer."' Yet, despite claims by the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior to the contrary, this chapter suggests the real motives behind the attempted 
prohibition was not only the growing membership of the NPD and other right-wing 
organisations, but also the increasing sympathy amongst some sections of society for 
their xenophobic and anti-multicultural agenda.
According to Social Democratic Party (SPD) Minister for Culture and Media, Julian 
Nida-Riimelin, and other members of the Bundestag, such as Annelie Buntenbach and 
Kerstin Miiller of the Alliance 90/The Greens, Germany has, or should, become more of 
a multicultural society. 5 As well as advocating cultural diversity, former SPD German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder also defended political asylum on the grounds of human 
dignity, enshrined within Germany's Basic Law (Constitution).6 Despite these claims 
and similar appeals from mainstream party leaders to Germans to resist right-wing
1 See: Staunton, D. It's time to resist the neo-Nazi killer gangs, Germans are told. The Observer, 06.08.00, 
p. 19 and: Cohen, R. Most recent killing may push Germans to act on hate crime. New York Times. 
21.08.00. Rickross [Online]. [Accessed 01.11.05]. <http://www.rickross.com/reference/neonazis26.html>
2 Cited from: ..National befreite Zonen." Der Spiegel, 23.03.98 (13), p. 52.
3 See: Brinks, J. H. Children of the new fatherland: Germany's post-war right-wing politics. Translated 
by P. Vincent. London/New York: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000, p. 147.
4 See: Staunton, D. op. cit., p. 19.
5 See: Interview Staatsminister Julian Nida-Riimelin mil der Frankfurter Rundschau am 18. Januar 2002. 
Press-undInformationsmat der Bundesregierung. Bundeskanzler [Online]. 18.01.02 [Accessed 14.09.05]. 
<http://www.bundeskanzler.de/Navigation/aktuelles,did=15694.hrml> For comments by Buntenbach and 
Muller, see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/28. Stenographischer Bericht 28 Sitzung. Bonn, 
19.03.99, p. 2325 and: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. Stenographischer Bericht 136 
Sitzung. Berlin, 29.11.00, p. 13210. 
6 See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., p. 13222.
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extremism, evidence suggested attitudes had changed little since the first public 
participation in right-wing extremist attacks on asylum centres during 1991-1992.
Top SPD officials, such as the former Federal Minister of the Interior Otto Schily and 
former President of the Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse, maintained the problems of racist 
violence and xenophobia were centred almost entirely within the former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR). According to Anthony D. Smith and Mary Fulbrook, in 
order for a strong sense of national identity to develop, there has to be a significant 
identification and affinity with the values, interests and traditions of state elites. 7 In the 
light of a sense of official repression, hostile reactions to multiculturalism, asylum and a 
concomitant perception that the Bundestag political elite's values were not those of 
some of the German people, this chapter argues that xenophobia highlighted the 
continuing disparities between official and popular perceptions of German national 
identity in both parts of the country.
The Real Essence of the Bans
Although extreme right parties do not play a significant role within German 
parliamentary party politics, nevertheless, at the time of writing, there were various 
claims they had a considerable influence on both political discourse and public opinion, 
whose racist agenda all the mainstream parties attempted to restrain. 8 To-date, for 
example, mainstream parties have so far consistently rejected any coalition politics with 
the extreme right. 9 So why were the mainstream parties so determined to curb the 
influence of the extreme right if, in the words of former Federal President Johannes 
Rau, 'Germany is now one of the most colourful and open countries in the world. We 
have become more relaxed, more rich in experience and more tolerant'? 10 Did violent 
racist conceptions of German national character find resonance within German society?
7 See: Fulbrook, M. German national identity after the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, pp. 16- 
17, 155, 232-235 and: Smith, A. D. National identity. London: Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 14-17, 21, 25.
8 For appeals by all the mainstream parties to resist right-wing extremism, see comments by Bundestag 
members Klaus Heft (FDP) and Michael Luther (CDU) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/135. 
Stenographischer Bericht 135 Sitzung. Berlin, 28.11.00, pp. 13109, 13113. See also speeches by Peter 
Struck (SPD) and Kerstin Miiller (Alliance 90/The Greens) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 
14/136. op. cit., pp. 13194, 13209. See also: ,,National befreite Zonen." op. cit., pp. 52-81 and: Brinks, J. 
H. op. cit., pp. 26, 34-35, 131.
9 See: Backes, U. and Mudde, C. Germany: extremism without successful parties. Parliamentary Affairs, 
2000: 53, p. 462.
10 See: Section VI. In: Rau, J. "Without fear and without illusions: living together in Germany." Berlin 
speech in the House of World Cultures on 12lh May 2000. Federal President [Online]. 12.05.00 
[Accessed 02.06.03]. <http://www.bundespraesident.de/dokumente/Rede/ix. 11962.htm>
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On 30 March 2001, both the Bundestag and Bundesrat filed requests to the Federal 
Constitutional Court asking it to declare the right-wing extremist NPD as 
unconstitutional thus outlawing the party." Chancellor Schroder himself appealed to 
the Constitutional Court, asking it to ban the NPD. 12 As far as the Federal Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution (BfV) was concerned, of the three larger right-wing 
extremist parties, which included the German People's Union (DVU) and the 
Republicans (Republikaner (REP)), the NPD was the most radical, decisively rejecting 
parliamentary democracy. 13
Otto Schily and the authorities were keen to outlaw the NPD on account of its anti- 
democratic stance, but evidence suggested the main concern of the then SPD/Green 
government was the party's increasing influence over disaffected youth and growing 
membership of the party - despite federal claims to the contrary. 14 Evidence from 
regional security reports and elsewhere indicated the federal authorities had attempted 
to play-down the significance of the increasing influence of the NPD - particularly the 
latter 7 s claim that they were the true guardians of German national identity. 15
For the first time since 1996, in 2002 the BMI, or Federal Ministry of the Interior, 
claimed NPD membership had fallen. At the same time though, the authorities persisted 
with their attempts to have the party banned. 16 In the national elections on 22 September 
2001, the NPD gained 'a mere 0.4% of all votes, thus failing to reach the 0.5% level 
required by the Political Parties Act to qualify for public funding', explained the BMI. 17 
Nevertheless, no other party, except the Party of Democratic Socialists (PDS), had been 
so influential in the former GDR as the East German wing of the NPD, claimed Der 
Spiegel and social psychologist Harald Welzer. 18
" See: German Supreme Court discontinues proceedings on ban of NPD. (Press Release). German 
Federal Government Press and Information Office [Online]. 19.03.03 [Accessed 11.06.03]. 
<http://eng.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/ Artikel/ix_473207.htm?script=0>
12 See press release from the Federal Chancellor's office: NPD - Verbotsantrag. Bundeskanzler [Online]. 
26.10.00 [Accessed 14.11.03]. <http://www.bundeskanzler.de>
13 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002. Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern, Sep 2003, p. 54.
14 See: Schily: discontinuation of proceedings to ban NPD regrettable. Federal Ministry of the Interior 
[Online]. 19.03.03 [Accessed 14.11.03]. <http://www.eng.brni.bund.de/dokumente/Pressemitteilung/ 
ix_91789.htm>
15 See: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2002. Berlin: Federal Ministry 
of the Interior, Sep 2003, pp. 48-49, 54.
16 See: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2002. op. cit., pp. 59, 62.
17 Cited from: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2002. op. cit., p. 63.
18 See: ,,National befreite Zonen." op. cit., p. 65 and: Welzer, H. Was bleibt im Gedachtnis. Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 25.01.05, p. 23.
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Before the middle of the 1990s, the NPD was relatively insignificant in the East 
compared to the other far-right parties - the Republicans (REP) and the German 
People's Union (DVU). But since 1992, the Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringian authorities 
reported a more or less consistent rise in NPD membership. In 1996, for instance, 
membership of the NPD had reached 3,500, increasing steadily during the years 1997 to 
4,300 to reach 6,500 members by 2000. 19 In fact, the Saxon and Saarland officials feared 
that the right-wing extremists under the NPD could easily cross the required 5% clause 
hurdle (Fiinf-Prozent Klausel) in local elections. 20 One of the main cities of the former 
East where the NPD had more than half the numbers of local left-wing SPD members 
was Leipzig, explained Der Spiegel. 21
Implying the ruling political elite no longer represented the people and, therefore, 
German national identity, NPD Chairman Udo Voigt claimed: 'As the spearhead of 
national opposition, the NPD is to be banned because those in power are afraid that their 
own people will awake.' 22 Already represented in Bremerhaven and Brandenburg in 
2003, concerns were expressed by the Saxon Ministry of the Interior that the DVU 
could also acquire the 5% vote level required in local party elections.23 Who else apart 
from the NPD made similar claims that the Bundestag elite no longer represented 
German national identity?
In contrast to other right-wing extremist parties, such as the German Alternative (DA), 
the National Offensive (NO) and the Free German Workers Party (FAP), according to 
Der Spiegel: 'The NPD appeared to have struck the right tone in the East a note of 
xenophobia and populism.' 24 In the eastern state of Saxony, the NPD attracted more 
members in 1998 than the Alliance 90/The Greens, with NPD membership rising from
19 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999. Freistaat Thuringen. Erfurt: Thiiringen Innenministerium, Apr 
2000, p. 39 and: Sachsen-Anhalt Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000. Magdeburg: Ministerium des Innem 
Sachsen-Anhalt, Mai 2001, p. 46.
20 The Fiinf-Prozent Klausel or 5% clause hurdle only allows parties with a minimum 5% of the national 
vote to take seats in parliament. See: Roberts, I. German language, life and culture. London: Hodder 
Headline, 2000, p. 142. See also: ,,National befreite Zonen." op. cit., p. 65 and: Verfassungsschutz im 
Saarland. Kurziiberblick iiber die Beobachtungsbereiche des LfV Saarland im Jahr 2004. Saarland 
Ministerium fur Inneres, Familie, Frauen und Sport [Online]. [Accessed 06.10.05]. 
<http://www.innen.saarland.de/index_5515.htm>
21 See: ,,National befreite Zonen." op. cit., p. 60.
22 Cited from: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2002. op. cit., p. 58.
23 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2003. Freistaat Sachsen. Dresden: Staatsministerium des Innern, 
Landesamt fiir Verfassungsschutz Sachsen, 31.12.03, p. 45.
24 Cited from: ,,National befreite Zonen." op. cit., p. 65. See also: KaBner, F. Braune Nester. Die Welt, 
21.09.04, p. 3 and: Forster, A. Block der jungen Kameraden. Berliner Zeitung, 07.09.04, p. 2.
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350 in 1996 to over 1,000 by 1998. 25 In 2000, the Saxony-Anhalt authorities reported 
that 'membership of the NPD had increased six-fold in the area since 1996'. 26 Others 
indicated the same. Known for his research of the far right, political scientist Richard 
Stoss argued that election results in the former East could have happened anywhere in 
Germany and feared there was a real sense that 'the dam would burst'. 27 Whilst this 
prediction failed to materialise in the aforementioned manner, nevertheless, the NPD 
certainly extended their support and influence from the new eastern Ldnder (states) into 
the old western Ldnder.
There were reports, for example, of what journalist Carsten Holm described as 'a 
renewed subtle form of racism of the people' in the western state of Hesse. In 1989, 
6.4% voted for the NPD in the Hessian town of Ehringshausen. This had risen to 13.6% 
in 1993, 22.9% in 1997 and by 2001, almost one in every four were voting NPD in 
Ehringshausen.28 In neighbouring Leun and Wolfersheim, the Hessian authorities 
reported a similar story; the NPD attracted 21.5% of votes in Leun and 22.7% in 
Wolfersheim during the local Hessian elections of 1997.29 Three other regional state 
authorities also reported consistent increases in membership of the NPD from 1998 to 
2000. 30 Corroborating the claims of Der Spiegel, representative for Turks in the area, 
Oktay Divar, stated: 'There is a general fear amongst Turks of racism and of the NPD in 
Hesse.' 31 In fact, the Hessian Ministry of the Interior also reported the NPD were still 
continuing to attract support in the area during 2002. 32
When the various annual reports by individual Ldnder were examined, discrepancies 
also appeared between BMI claims and those of the local Land offices responsible for 
the protection of their particular states. Germany's equivalent of Britain's MIS, the BfV, 
reported on behalf of the Federal Ministry of the Interior that 'the overall membership
25 See: ..National befreite Zonen." op. cit., p. 60 and: Pfahl-Traughber, A. Die Entwicklung des 
Rechtsextremismus in Ost-und Westdeutschland. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 22.09.00 (B39), p. 6.
26 Cited from: Sachsen-Anhalt Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000. op. cit., p. 46.
27 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 35.
28 Cited from: Holm, C. Ein Dorf sieht braun. Rechtsextreme. Der Spiegel, 12.03.01 (11), pp. 76-77.
29 See: Verfassungsschutz in Hessen. Bericht 2001. Wiesbaden: Hessisches Ministerium des Innern und 
fur Sport, Aug 2002, pp. 64-65.
30 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 Bayern. Miinchen: Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, 
Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Bayern, Mar 2001, p. 25, and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 des 
Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. Dusseldorf: Innenministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 28.02.01, 
p. 45. See also: Bericht der Landsregierung Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000. Schleswig-Holsteinischer 
Landtag. 15. Wahlperiode. Drucksache 15/24. Marz 2001. Sperrfrist 29.03.01, p. 33.
31 Cited from: Holm, C. op. cit., p. 77.
32 See: Verfassungsschutz in Hessen. Bericht 2002. Wiesbaden: Hessisches Ministerium des Innern und 
fur Sport, Mai 2003, pp. 65-66.
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potential of right-wing extremists has decreased since 1995'. 33 Compared to regional 
estimates of German subcultural right-wing extremist groups, reports from the federal 
BfV and BMI appeared underestimates of sub-cultural neo-Nazi groups. Evidence 
suggested that the federal authorities were keen not only to prove that attitudes in 
Germany were becoming more receptive to immigrants, but also that they were in 
control of an increasingly deteriorating situation.
In 1998, the BMI reported 'only 80 neo-Nazi "Kameradschaften" in existence', with 
'only a few groups making sufficiently successful attempts to achieve public attention 
through demonstrations'. 34 Again, in 2002, the authorities claimed Kameradschaften, or 
what the BMI described as 'neo-Nazi comradeships', only had a negligible impact. 35 
Characterised by an openly aggressive ideology for a National Socialist system, racism 
and xenophobia, so-called 'comradeships' were clandestine groups in which neo-Nazis 
organised themselves, who, along with the NPD, sought to protect German national 
identity.36
Contradicting the BMI, four regional authorities reported increases in the membership 
of these comradeships. Since 1993 and 1996, the Mecklenburg-West Pomeranian and 
Saxony-Anhalt Ministries of the Interior reported increases in these types of neo-Nazi 
groups. 37 Along with the Hamburg Ministry of the Interior, the Lower Saxon authorities 
also reported increases in comradeships between 1997 and 1998. 38 Particularly active 
since 1998, organising various local events in the Bramfeld area of Hamburg, was the 
' Kameradenkreis\ or the neo-Nazi comradeship network, of Thomas Wulff. 39
Between January 2001 and December 2002, for instance, no fewer than 30 NPD 
demonstrations took place in the Saxon area alone, with an average attendance of over
33 Cited from: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000. Berlin/Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, Mai 2001, 
pp. 24-25. See also: Staunton, D. op. cit., p. 19.
34 Cited from: Verfassungsschutzbericht 1998. Koln: Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz, 1998, p. 31.
35 Cited from: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2002. op. cit., p. 40.
36 See: Niedersachsen Verfassungsschutzbericht 1998. Hannover: Niedersachsisches Innenministerium, 
1998, pp. 33-38.
37 See: Neonazistische Kameradschaften. Verfassungsschutz Mecklenburg-Vorpommern [Online]. 
[Accessed 05.02.04]. <http://www.verfassungsschutz-mv.de/pages/neonazi_l.htm> and: Sachs en-Anhalt 
Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001. Magdeburg: Ministerium des Innern Sachsen-Anhalt, Mai 2002, p. 18.
38 See: Niedersachsen Verfassungsschutzbericht 1998 op. cit., p. 35.
39 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000, Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg. 4.000 ed. Hamburg: Behorde fur 
Inneres, Landesamt flir Verfassungsschutz Hamburg, Mai 2001, pp. 29-30.
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600.40 Demonstrations were also organised by Udo Voigt in Hesse and Berlin. 41 Perhaps 
of greater significance was the good publicity that the NPD demonstrations attracted 
with their martial appearance. An indication of the NPD's relentless public activities 
was, arguably, the following claim by the Bavarian authorities. According to the 
Bavarian Ministry of the Interior, since Udo Voigt took over as Chairman of the party in 
1996, the NPD has staged almost 700 nationwide demonstrations and similar actions.42 
Aside from their openly racist activities, many right-wing extremists also displayed 
'well-adjusted behaviour', noted Jan Herman Brinks.43 This was one of the reasons why 
they were often able to count on sympathy from some of the public, while other sub- 
cultural groups were less able to do so. Evidence also suggested the NPD held attraction 
for a particular segment of German youth.
Numerous comradeships maintained a close contact with the NPD, as well as its youth 
organisation, the Young National Democrats (JN). In fact, the NPD was the only right- 
wing extremist party to have a youth organisation with a significant number of members 
in 2002,44 Evidence suggested that the NPD was not only sending out what Der Spiegel 
described as the 'right message' in the former GDR, but also in the older western 
Lander.*s It was, arguably, this last factor that the federal authorities feared most. It 
seemed the most likely reason why the federal authorities were so keen to outlaw the 
NPD was not so much their alleged falling membership, but the 'extensive reception' of 
their openly xenophobic agenda amongst some German youth in states such as Hesse 
and Saxony.46 Challenging the Bundestag political elite's claims as representatives of 
German national identity, another was the NPD's blatant rejection of an officially 
endorsed multiculruralism.47
40 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001. Freistaat Sachsen. Dresden: Staatsministerium des Innern, 
Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Sachsen, 31.12.01, pp. 126-138 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002. 
Freistaat Sachsen. Dresden: Staatsministerium des Innern, Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Sachsen, 
31.12.02, pp. 109-119.
41 See: Verfassungsschutz in Hessen. Bericht 2000. Wiesbaden: Hessisches Ministerium des Innern und 
fur Sport, 2001, p. 18 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 Bayern. op. cit., pp. 38-39.
42 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004 Bayern. Miinchen: Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, 
Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Bayem, Apr 2005, p. 36.
43 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 34.
44 See: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2002. op. cit., p. 65.
45 Cited from: ,,National befreite Zonen." op. cit., p. 65. See also: Holm, C. op. cit., pp. 76-77.
46 Cited from: ,,National befreite Zonen." op. cit., p. 65.
47 For claims of the political elite to be representatives of German identity, see comments by Gerhard 
Schroder, Friedrich Merz and Joschka Fischer in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., 
pp. 13196, 13222-13223 and: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/135. op. cit., pp. 13031-13038.
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Multicultural Germany?
'Together we want to build a cosmopolitan, tolerant and just Germany.'48
As noted in the previous chapter, reactions from some of the public to the immigration 
law, Green Card Programme and 'guiding culture' deliberations highlighted the 
resistance to the Bundestag political elite and, in particular, the SPD/Green attempts to 
foster a change in attitudes towards foreigners.49 In a further attempt to dispense with a 
cultural nationalism of the past, between 1998 and 2005, the then SPD/Green ruling 
coalition aimed at new horizons of inclusion by extending dual nationality to children 
bom in Germany of foreign parents and long-term foreign residents or victims of 
persecution. Another was the Bundestag elite's promotion of a multicultural society.
In a speech observing the tenth anniversary of German reunification on 3 October 2000, 
Chancellor Schroder stated: 'Together we want to build a cosmopolitan, tolerant and 
just Germany.' 50 With more than a hint of wishful thinking, perhaps, opposition 
Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) party leader at the 
time, Angela Merkel, maintained that German culture was not prescriptive and would 
probably not change anyway as a result of a growing cosmopolitanism." Yet, the 
extreme right did not share their optimism or the theme of their multicultural agenda.
Right-wing extremist parties, such as the REP, the DVU and NPD, all maintained that 
German national identity was threatened by multiculturalism. According to the Lower 
Saxon Ministry of the Interior, NPD Party Chairman Udo Voigt declared: 'We are 
Germans and proud of it. We unequivocally reject a multicultural society because we 
want Germany for the Germans.' 52 Critical of the alleged damaging effects of a 
multicultural state, an NPD press release demanded the preservation of German 
identity. 53 Holding immigrants responsible in general for Germany's political and social
48 Cited from: Schroder, G. Observing the 10lh anniversary of German unification on 3 rd October 2000. 
(Press Release no 1/00). German Federal Government Press and Information Office [Online]. 03.10.00 
[Accessed 11.06.03]. <http://eng.bundesregierung.de/top/dokumente/Pressemitteilung/ix_20330.htm>
49 See: Deupmann, U., Hildebrandt, T. and Mesrmacher, C. Kulturkampf ums Vaterland. Der Spiegel,
06.11.00 (45), p. 27; Joffe, J. Lust auf Leit. Die Zeit, 16.11.00 (47), p. 1.
50 Cited from: Schroder, G. Observing the 10lh anniversary of German unification on 3 rd October 2000.
op. cit.
5f See: Nelles, R. Merkel: SPD hat gestortes Verhaltnis zum Vaterland. Die Welt, 02.11.00, p. 1.
52 Cited from: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004 Niedersachsen. Hannover: Niedersachsisches Ministerium 
fur Inneres und Sport, Mai 2005, p. 48.
53 See NPD press release: Die Vielfalt der Kulturen erhalten! Uberfremdung und Einwanderung stoppen! 
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands [Online]. 23.05.05 [Accessed 31.08.05]. 
<http://www.npd.de/npd_info/flugblaetter/2002/heimat.html>
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problems, the 2002 party-programme of the REP argued that the experience to-date of 
every multicultural society was one of conflict. Outlining the party's guiding principles, 
the most important demand of the party was the safeguarding of German identity and 
opposition to a multicultural state. 54 And, according to the DVU's party periodical, the 
National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung (NZ): 'An Umvolkung into a multicultural 
society cannot happen quickly enough for either the SPD or Greens.' 55 In fact, similar 
fears of an Umvolkung, or replacement of the German population by 'alien' ethnic 
groups, were also invoked by the youth wing of the NPD - the JN, and the REP.56
Was it only far-right extremists, such as the REP, NPD and DVU, that said 'no to multi- 
culti', as claimed by the BMI?57 According to researcher of right-wing extremism in 
Germany, Wesley D. Chapin, the DVU achieved 6.2% of the vote in 1991 in the local 
state election in Bremen and 6.3% a year later in Schleswig-Holstein. Led by former 
Waffen SS member Franz Schonhuber, the REP achieved 10.9% in Baden-Wurttemberg 
in 1992 and 8.4% in Berlin in the same year. Together they received more than 2.5 
million votes.58
Aided by an anti-foreigner billboard and letter campaign, the DVU astonished the 
German political mainstream by taking 12.9% of the vote and 16 seats in the local state 
elections of Saxony-Anhalt in April 1998. Five seats were also won by the DVU that 
year in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, representing 5.3% of the local vote. 59 Posing as 
champions against an alleged 'Umvolkung'' of the German people, in 2002 the DVU 
won nine seats in Bremen and Bremerhaven. 60 During a similar election campaign in 
2004, the NPD acquired 4% of the vote in the Saarland district of Germany, gaining ten 
seats in the region and 17,590 votes, reported the Saarland Ministry of the Interior. 
Again, the party enjoyed similar success with its anti-multicultural mandate - this time
54 See: Verfassungsschutz in Hessen. Bericht 2002. op. cit., p. 61.
55 Cited from: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2002. op. cit., p. 67.
56 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002 Niedersachsen. Hannover: Niedersachsisches Ministerium fur 
Inneres und Sport, 2002, p. 52.
57 See: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2002. op. cit., pp. 54, 75 and: 
SPD-Landtagsfraktion Brandenburg. Potsdam: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, 01.03.05, p. 28.
58 See: Chapin, W. D. Explaining the electoral success of the New Right: the German case. West 
European Politics, Apr 1997: 20(2), p. 56 and: Brunssen, F.  Angst vor Deutschland" and German self- 
definition. Debatte, 1994 (1), p. 55.
59 See: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 35. See also: Staab, A. Xenophobia, ethnicity and national identity in
Eastern Germany. German Politics, Aug 1998: 7(2), p. 31 and: Backes, U. and Mudde, C. op. cit., pp.
458-459.
60 See: 2002 Verfassungsschutzbericht des Landes Bremen. Bremen: Der Senator fur Inneres, Kultur und
Sport, Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Mar 2003, pp. 21-24.
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winning 12 seats in Saxony.61 Thus, evidence suggested that the defence of German 
national identity against multiculturalism by parties, such as the NPD and DVU, offered 
clear electoral potential.
NPD party theorist Jiirgen Schwab declared: 'German citizens oppose multicultural 
propaganda in kindergartens and schools.'62 But, just how realistic was this claim 
compared to statements from mainstream party leaders at the time of writing, such as 
Chancellor Schroder and Angela Merkel, that Germany was becoming 'more 
cosmopolitan'?63 Whether Germany was, or should become, a multicultural society, 
arguably, warranted particular attention because the issue transcended party politics into 
the media and public discussion, questioning the validity of the Bundestag elite's 
representations of German national identity.
According to Andreas Staab and others, throughout its history Germany never really 
experienced a multicultural society and the short period of colonisation prior to World 
War One had hardly any cultural or social impact on the populace within the 
Wilhelminian Reich.64 Although Germans often had experience of foreign cultures 
through exposure in the workplace to guest workers during the 1960s and 1970s, at the 
same time, until the inauguration of the SPD/Green coalition government in September 
1988, most politicians never demanded that Germans had to accommodate 
multiculturalism.65 According to the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research, 
Sabine von Dirke and Christhard Hoffmann, it was only during the 1980s that a 
comprehensive discussion appeared as a result of public engagement with the theme 
from the two main German church denominations.66 It was the Catholic and Protestant 
churches, for example, that introduced the term 'multicultural society' in 1980, during 
the so-called Tag des ausldndischen Mitbiirgers (Day of the Foreign Fellow Citizen),
61 See: 2. Parteien. 2.1. NPD. In: Verfassungsschutz im Saarland. Kurzuberblick iiber die 
Beobachtungsbereiche des LfV Saarland im Jahr 2004. op. cit.
62 Cited from: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2002. op. cit., p. 54.
63 Cited from: Schroder, G. Observing the 10th anniversary of German unification on 3 rd October 2000. 
op. cit. See also comments by Angela Merkel in: Nelles, R. op. cit., p. 1.
64 See: Staab, A. op. cit., pp. 40-41 and: Kolinsky, E. Multiculturalism in the making? Non-Germans and 
civil society in the new Hinder. German Politics (Special Issue), 1998: 7(3), pp. 192-197. See also: Betz, 
H-G. Perplexed normalcy: German identity after Unification. In: Alter, R. and Monteath, P. (eds). 
Rewriting the German past: history and identity in the new Germany. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 
1997, pp. 46-47.
65 See: Hogwood, P. Citizenship controversies in Germany: the twin legacy of Volkisch nationalism and 
the Alleinvertretungsanspruch. German Politics, Dec 2000: 9(3), pp. 125-144.
66 See: Hoffmann, C. Immigration and nationhood in the Federal Republic of Germany. In: Brady, J. S., 
Crawford, B. and Wiliarty, S. E. (eds). The postwar transformation of Germany: democracy, prosperity, 
and nationhood. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002, pp. 368-369.
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'whose employment of the term was an attempted broadening of the public's view of 
this group', noted von Dirke.67 In a policy statement in 1973, the former SPD Chancellor 
Willy Brandt maintained that the point at which 'Germany's capacity to absorb 
migrants was exhausted should be given careful consideration'.68 Even as late as 1980, 
the former SPD Prime Minister of Hesse, Holger Borne, stated: 'There will be no more 
Turks coming to this state as long as I am in charge.' 69 Opposition to multiculturalism 
was also apparent within discussions for proposals for a minority rights clause within 
the Basic Law. In 1991 and 1994, for example, regional ministers, such as Baden- 
Wurttemberg's Permanent Secretary Dr. Lorenz Menz (CDU), Bavaria's Assistant 
Secretary Dr. Friedrich Giehl (CSU) and CDU member of the Bundestag Erika 
Steinbach, flatly rejected the possibility of a multicultural state-construct. 70
Nevertheless, since the replacement of the conservative-dominated 1982-1998 
CDU/CSU-FDP ruling coalition government, various members of the Bundestag have 
actively promoted multiculturalism. Referring to the political debates about 
multiculturalism, Alliance 90/Green politician Kerstin Miiller stated in 1999 that: 'The 
living together of Jews and Germans has deservedly become very topical.' 71 Annelie 
Buntenbach, of the Alliance 90/The Greens, argued that it was essential that Germany 
acknowledged it was a multicultural society.72
Since the recruitment of foreign workers for the Green Card and rise in xenophobia 
since reunification, official encouragement of multiculturalism in order to stem the 
former and facilitate the latter made the issue particularly pressing. Evidence suggested 
that the modest results of the REP, DVU and NPD succeeded in mobilising parts of the 
population holding extreme-right values. Exposing further gaps between official and 
popular conceptions of national identity, along with the dual nationality and
67 Cited from: Dirke, S. von, Multikulti: the German debate on multiculturalism. German Studies Review, 
1994: 17, p. 516. See also: Multikulturelle Gesellschaft. Jeder zweite weiB nicht, was gemeint ist. 
Allensbacher Berichte. Institut fur Demoskopie Allensbach, 1992 (9), p. 1.
68 Cited from: Section IX. In: Bulletin: Regierungserkldrung des Bundeskanzlers vor dem Deutschen 
Bundestag. Z 1988 B. Bonn: Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 19.01.73 (6) s. 45, p. 54.
69 Cited from: Green, S. Citizenship policy in Germany: The case of ethnicity over residence. In: Hansen, 
R. and Well, P. (eds). Towards a European nationality: citizenship, immigration and nationality law in 
theEU. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, pp. 42-43.
70 See: Tagesordung: 1. Schutz und Forderung von nationalen und kulturellen Minderheiten (Gruppe 
2/VII). In: Niederschrift iiber die 6. Sitzung des von der Kommission Verfassungsreform eingesetzten. 
Arbeitsausschusses 2. "Weitere Grundgesetzanderungen." Bundesrat Kommission Verfassungsreform - 
Geschaftsstelle. Stenographische Protokolle. Bonn, 11.12.91, pp. 100-103 and: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher 
Bundestag, 12/209. Stenographischer Bericht 209 Sitzung. Bonn, 04.02.94, pp. 18143-18144, 18146.
71 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., p. 13210.
72 See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/28. op. cit., p. 2325.
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immigration debates, two main responses to multiculturalism were also apparent. On the 
one hand, there was an enthusiastic embrace of cultural diversification by the ruling 
SPD/Green political elite. For the former President of the Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse, 
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and Commissioner for Foreigner Issues in Germany, 
Marieluise Beck, multiculturalism was the successful foundation of a tolerant society.
In a 1999 Bundestag debate about tolerance, Beck argued that in the end, 
multiculturalism brought with it colour and diversity, which were better than a narrow- 
mindedness.73 In 2001, Wolfgang Thierse praised the leader of the Central Council of 
Jews in Germany, Ignatz Bubis, for his active commitment to the promotion of 
understanding between different cultures and religions.74 Responding to the detractors of 
multiculturalism and idealists, at an Alliance 90/Green party conference, Joschka 
Fischer appealed for members to stand together for human rights and tolerance. 75
On the other hand, there was an equally emphatic populist rejection of cultural diversity 
by sections of the public and media, along with a few academics. As to the acceptance 
of a multicultural society, a 1992 survey by the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion 
Research reported 55%, or every second person, of 2,205 Germans surveyed did not 
even know what multiculturalism was, let alone accepted it. 76 According to another 
survey in 2000, multiculturalism hardly ranked as the norm, and neither did the 
toleration or understanding for the culture of others. Of the 2,172 Germans questioned, 
27% believed that multiculturalism represented German culture. 77 Another survey found 
much the same. Summarising the results of the Youth 2000: Shell Study on Young 
People in Germany, by Arthur Fischer of Psydata in Frankfurt am Main, Volker 
Thomas reported almost one-quarter of 5,346 Germans aged between 15 and 24 said
73 See speech by Marieluise Beck (Alliance 90/The Greens) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 
14/28. op. cit., pp. 2306-2307.
74 See press release: Bundestagsprasident Wolfgang Thierse dankt fur Ignatz-Bubis-Preis. 
Pressemitteilung. Bundestag [Online]. 16.01.01 [Accessed 21.03.03]. <http://www.bundestag.de/bic/ 
presse/2001 /pz_010116.html>
75 See: Rede Joschka Fischer auf der Landesdelegiertenkonferenz Bundnis 90/Die Griinen Nordrhein- 
Westfalen. Koln. Gruene-mg [Online]. 26.02.05-27.02.05 [Accessed 24.10.05]. <http://www.gruene- 
mg.de/881.0.html>
76 See: Frage: "Wenn jemand von multikultureller Gesellschaft spricht, wissen Sie dann, was damit 
gemeint ist, oder konnen Sie sich darunter nichts vorstellen?" Tabelle 1. Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
Bevolkerung ab 16 Jahre. Allensbacher Archiv, ifD-Umfrage 5060, Januar 1992. In: Multikulturelle 
Gesellschaft. Jeder zweite weifl nicht, was gemeint ist. Allensbacher Berichte. op. cit., pp. 3, 6.
77 See: Frage: "Was macht die deutsche Kultur aus?" Tabelle A 9. Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
Bevolkerung ab 16 Jahre. Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfrage 6099, November 2000. In: Kocher, R. Die 
Bevolkerung fordert ein Einwanderungsgesetz. Leitlinien: quantitative und qualitative Steurung und 
Integration. Eine Dokumentation des Beitrags in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung Nr. 296 vom 20. 
Dezember 2000. Institut fur Demoskopie Allensbach, IfD-Bericht 6207/1, Dez 2000, p. 23.
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they had 'nothing at all' to do with foreigners with almost half (46.9%) claiming 'very 
little'. 78
Significant elements of the German media also rejected multiculturalism. On a front 
cover issue of Der Spiegel entitled, Dangerously foreign. The failure of the 
multicultural society, young Muslim girls were depicted reading the Koran, while to 
their right, foreign youths were shown brandishing knives and other weapons. 79 
Deriding it as 'absurd', a 2001 edition of the Sachsen Stimme criticised the Saxon 
Council for their attempts to promote multiculturalism.80 And, according to Die Welt, it 
was a particularly Berliner phenomenon that many politicians played down local fears 
about multicultural schools. 81 Further to some of the media's hostility to the concept 
were, arguably, the headlines in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Berlin-based 
Die Tageszeitung that claimed multiculturalism was 'unreasonable' and 
'irresponsible'. 82
Whilst the SPD/Green government generally embraced the concept of the multicultural 
society and criticised the alleged 'boat-is-full mentality' of some Germans, many it 
seemed did not. 83 Some in Germany, such as Professor Erwin Paul and Karen 
Schonwalder, associated large-scale immigration of non-Europeans with Lebanisation 
and American-style slums and their associated social breakdown and conflicts, 
dangerous streets and political disintegration in Germany. Paul described ethnic 
plurality as: 'An arbitrary disintegrative blend.' 84
Many in Germany, according to Der Spiegel and Rudiger Scheidges, feared that the 
tensions and conflicts, especially in the larger cities, were getting worse. 85 When asked 
to respond to the claim that high numbers of foreigners in German schools brought
78 See: Thomas, V. Youth 2000. Shell study on young people in Germany. Inter Nationes [Online]. Mar 
2000 [Accessed 06.06.03]. <http://www.internationes.de/d/presse/basis/e/bil8-2000-e-f-html>
79 See: Auslander und Deutsche: Gefahrlich fremd. Das Scheitern der multikulturellen Gesellschaft. Der 
Spiegel, 14.04.97 (16). See also Zeitbomben in den Vorstadtden. Ibid., pp. 78-93.
80 Cited from: Absurd! Dresdner Verkehrsbetriebe auf Multi-Kulti-Welle! Sachsen Stimme, 2001 (2), p. 1.
81 See: Peter, J. Warming vor zunehmender Uberfremdung. Die Welt, 11.06.05, p. 4.
82 See: ,,Multikulti ist eine Zumutung." Aktuell Rhein-Main-Zeitung. Frankfurt. Faz-Net [Online]. 
24.06.05 [Accessed 06.10.05]. <http://www.faz.net> and: Feddersen, J. "Multikulti ist 
verantwortungslos." Die Tageszeitung, 28.02.05 (7602), p. 13.
83 See: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., p. 526. See also: Verfassungsschut: in Hessen. Bericht 2002, op. cit., p. 67.
84 Cited from: Schonwalder, K. Migration, refugees, and ethnic plurality as issues of public and political 
debates in (West) Germany. In: Cesarani, D. and Fulbrook, M. (eds). Citizenship, nationality and 
migration in Europe. London/New York: Routledge, 1996, pp. 170-171.
85 See: Heise, T. and Kruse, K. Abstieg zum Slum. Der Spiegel, 23.11.98 (48), pp. 26-27 and: Scheidges, 
R. Die Burger misstrauen der Auslanderpolitik. Handelsblatt, 02.05.02 (084), p. 4.
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many social problems, 63% of 2,000 Germans surveyed nationwide by Allensbach in 
2001 agreed with the aforementioned statement. Designated by the authorities as 
'confidential', 49% believed foreigners were involved with crime, with 52% associating 
them with drug dealing.86 In 2001, 2,000 Germans nationwide were asked whether they 
thought it was possible to live together peacefully with those having essentially 
different convictions and cultural values, or would this always lead to conflict. In 
response, 29% believed it was - 58% did not.87
In contrast to German nationalists, who perceive multiculturalism as a threat to German 
identity, advocates of multiculturalism legitimised their vision of Germany through a 
positive historical narrative, citing past successful examples of integration to Germany. 
'No statement in favour of the multicultural society passes up the opportunity to refer to 
Frederick the Great's generous immigration policy regarding the French Huguenots or 
Austrian Protestants', complained Sabine von Dirke. 88 The supporters of 
multiculturalism had often cited Polish miners who migrated to the Ruhr Valley and the 
seasonal workers in Prussia during the late nineteenth century, as successful models for 
integration of foreigners.89 Some West German intellectuals, such as Axel Schulte, 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Thomas Schmid and CDU politician Heiner GeiBler, have also 
argued, in the words of Hans-Georg Betz, that the 'majority make an effort to 
understand and tolerate alien cultures'. 90 Evidence suggested, however, that in contrast 
to the Bundestag political elite's generally positive attitude to cultural diversity, along 
with their belief that culture is not racially determined; multiculturalism was also alien 
to a populist ethnic nationalism advocating the preservation of the Volk. 9[
86 See: Frage: ,,Hier auf dieser Liste steht verschiedenes, was man fiber Auslander horen kann. Was davon 
ist auch Ihre Meinung? Bei welchen Punkten wiirden Sie sagen, das sehe ich genauso?" Der hohe 
Auslanderteil an den Schulen bringt grofle Probleme mil sich; Der Droghandel bei uns ist in der Hand von 
Auslandern; Auslander sind uberdurchschnittlich an Verbrechen beteiligt. Cited from: Auslander in 
Deutschland. Dezember 2001. 4. Einwanderung und Auslander. Die Nation. In: Noelle-Neumann, E. and 
Kocher, R. (eds). Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1998-2002 Band 11. Munchen: K. G. Saur, 
Verlag fur Demoskopie Allensbach am Bodensee, 2002, p. 571. (Method: random sample survey).
87 See: Frage: ,,Glauben Sie, dafi trotz der Unterschiede in den Uberzeugungen und kulturellen Werten 
auf Dauer ein friedliches Zusammenleben zwischen der westlichen Kultur und der arabisch-muslimischen 
Kultur moglich ist, oder werden diese Unterschiede auch in Zukunft immer wieder zu Konflikten 
fuhren?" Cited from: Zwei Kulturen. Exkurs: Der 11. September und die Folgen. Dezember 2001. In: 
Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, R. (eds). op. cit., p. 998.
88 Cited from: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., p. 525.
89 ,, .,Ibid.
90 See: Betz, H-G. Perplexed normalcy: German identity after Unification. In: Alter, R. and Monteath, P. 
(eds). op. cit., pp. 46, 61 and: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., pp. 526-527.
91 See: Betz, H-G. Perplexed normalcy: German identity after Unification. In: Alter, R. and Monteath, P. 
(eds). op. cit., pp. 46-47.
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What exactly is meant by the term 'ethnic nationalism' in the above context? Stefan 
Berger provided an insight into the term:
Ethnic nationalism rests on the assumption that people, like an individual, have 
certain hereditary characteristics, which separate one nation from another. In this 
sense ethnicity is indivisible from the concept of the nation: Nations are based 
on a consciousness of ethnic identity.92
With banners announcing 'Deportation instead of immigration! German children need 
the country', around 300 nationalists protested in the Lower Saxon capital of Hanover 
against multiculturalism and the 'gradual and officially sanctioned replacement of the 
German people'.93 Evidence suggested their radical incitement against foreigners was by 
no means the preserve of extremists. For example, in the Allensbach Yearbook for 
Public Opinion Research, a 2001 survey asked 2,000 Germans nationwide whether they 
believed the continued influx of immigrants would result in a loss of identity. 50% 
believed it would gradually do so, with 38% expressing the opposite view.94 Of 
particular concern for the German government were the results of the comprehensive 
1998 Forsa (Society for Social Research and Statistical Analysis) report on Youth in 
Germany. Reminiscent of the NPD slogan 'Deportation instead of immigration', Forsa 
reported that 68% of 1,001 14 to 25-year-olds were also of the opinion that immigrants 
should be deported. 95
Whilst the anti-foreigner position saw a multicultural society as a threat to identity, 
alternatively, an identity based on a constitutional patriotism perceived the Germans' 
lack of acceptance of ethnic diversity as the real danger.96 Wolfgang Thierse, in 
particular, stressed that in a society based on a Verfassungspatriotismus (constitutional 
patriotism), ethnicity should be secondary. Otherwise, there was the danger of a return 
to the calamitous mistakes of the past that the Jews, Germany's neighbours and
92 Cited from: Berger, S. The search for normality: national identity and historical consciousness in 
Germany since 1800. Providence/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997, p. 213.
93 Cited from: NPD press release: Nationale Opposition sticht ins multikulturelle Wespennest Hannover. 
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands [Online]. 26.05.03 [Accessed 25.11.03]. 
<http://www.npd.de/npd_info/meldungen/2003/m0503-6>
94 See: Frage: ,,Wenn immer mehr Einwander nach Deutschland kommen, gent dann das, was 
Deutschland war, allmahlich verloren, oder glauben Sie das nicht?" Cited from: Identitatsverlust? Juni 
2001. 4. Einwanderung und Auslander. Die Nation. In: Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, R. (eds). op. 
cit., pp. 576, E25-E30. Age groups in the random sample survey were from 16-59.
95 From 18.05.98-24.05.98, Forsa conducted the survey for the newspaper Die Woche, see: Einstellungen 
und Vorurteile. In: Jugend in Deutschland 1998. Einstellungen, Meinungen und Auffdlligkeiten fur 
Rechtsradikalismus: eine Trenduntersuchung. Forsa Bericht 2903/5799 Sn/Si, 27.05.98, p. 15.
96 See: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., pp. 523-530.
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Germany itself, paid dearly for. 97 Further indicative of the disparity between popular and 
official perceptions of the nation and its representation, was a sense of the suppression 
of ethnic nationalism by the German establishment.
Suppression, or a 'poisoning of the hearts and minds of the people'?98
In an interim report of the Federal Cabinet on 11 October 2000 about the question of a 
proposed NPD ban, Chancellor Schroder claimed the available material proved 
conclusively the party's links to the former Nazi Party.99 Obliging the former German 
Chancellor, the BfV provided the following report for the Ministry of the Interior: 'The 
close affinity of the National Socialist racially pure community to which the NPD 
aspires is clear in the NPD party organ, the Deutsche Stimme.' m Following the Federal 
Constitutional Court's decision to discontinue the proposed ban on the far-right NPD, 
Schroder declared the government, if needs be, would go it alone for a ban. Federal 
spokesperson for the German government, Uwe-Karsten Heye, noted it was necessary 
for the Bundestag, Bundesrat and the German government to approve any ban of a 
party. 101 In justifying Schroder's proposed ban of the NPD, the Berlin authorities 
equated the NPD demonstrations during 2000 and 2001 to the former SA and SS 
marches against the Weimar Republic of the 1920s. 102
According to Anthony D. Smith, ethnicity and the myths of common descent are 
fundamental features of national identity, in some cases perceived 'as extensions of 
genetic selection and inclusive fitness'. 103 'Its adherents and particularly National 
Socialists excluded other ethnic groups such as the Jews and Gypsies in order to ensure 
ethnic persistence', argued Smith and the German authorities. 104 Arguably, neo-Nazi 
ideology plays an important part in assessing German national identity and xenophobia,
97 See press release: Bundestagsprasident Wolfgang Thierse dankt fur Ignatz-Bubis-Preis. op. cit.
98 Cited from: Kerstin Mtiller in the Bundestag: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., p. 
13209.
99 See press release from the Federal Chancellor's office: NPD - Verbotsantrag. Bundeskanzler. op. cit.
100 Cited from: Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999. Berlin/Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, Jun 2000, 
pp. 58-59.
101 See press release from the Federal Chancellor's office: NPD - Verbotsantrag. Bundeskanzler. op. cit.
102 See: Berlin Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001. Berlin: Senatsverwaltung fur Inneres Berlin, Abteilung 
Verfassungsschutz, Apr 2002, pp. 32-39. For reports of Nazi invectives against the Weimar Republic, see: 
Lynch, M. Nazi Germany. London: Hodder Headline, 2004, pp. 7-13, 15-16, 114.
103 Cited from: Smith, A. D. op. cit., pp. 14, 20, 22.
104 Cited from: Ibid., pp. 25, 30, 40. For the exclusion of 'Jews and other foreigners' in accordance with 
the 25 Point Party-Programme of the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers Party) based on 
Hitler's publication Mein Kampf, see: Verfassungsschutzbericht Freistaat Thiiringen 2004. Erfurt: 
Thuringen Innenministerium, Aug 2005, pp. 39-40.
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since its ethnically coloured violence goes hand in hand with National Socialist ideals. 
Evidence suggested there was a clear resentment that the aforementioned views were 
being officially repressed, along with an obvious empathy by some for those advocating 
them.
'Hans Jiirgen Syberberg, filmmaker, essayist and consummate cultural critic is the man 
German politicians love to hate', noted New Perspectives Quarterly. One of his 
suggestions was that far-right attitudes - particularly of the young - were a product of a 
kind of post-war democratic repression of identity. Some in Germany have given the 
impression that they were more sympathetic to the perpetrators of violence than the 
victims. Attempting to explain the motivation behind the spate of right-wing violence 
against asylum-seekers between 1991 and 1992, Syberberg argued:
When you look into the face of the 19-year old that threw the firebomb in Molln 
you see he's really the victim of a certain situation. My point is that we should 
not be focusing on what propelled the firebomb but what propelled the man. 105
Author Martin Walser and PDS member of the Bundestag Gregor Gysi, argued that 'the 
rise of extremist right-wing groups was the outcome of all of us having neglected the 
national question'. 106 Gysi pointed out that many East Germans today 'must be 
Germans' because the national question was blocked out in the GDR.'07 Accounting or, 
perhaps, excusing the xenophobic violence in the state of Brandenburg, Director of the 
Institute for Families, Childhood and Youth Research at the University of Potsdam, 
Dietmar Sturzbecher, claimed that: 'The deficits in the background of the typical 
perpetrators of violence are emotional - they miss acceptance and an open ear for their 
problems." 08 'Do not exclude them,' implored the author Martin Walser - 'for they are 
our protesting children." 09 Following the leader of the NPD Udo Voigt's appearance on 
Germany's Channel II (ZDF) television station, as part of his 1998 election campaign, 
Hans Jiirgen Syberberg explained that 'official opinion held this man and his views
105 Cited from: Syberberg, H. J. Germany's heart: the modern taboo. What remains of the German 
essence? New Perspectives Quarterly [Online]. Winter 1993: 10(1) [Accessed 23.05.02]. 
<http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/! 993_winter/germanys_heart.html>
106 Cited from: Brunssen, F. op. cit., p. 61. See also: Walser, M. ,,Deutsche Sorgen." Der Spiegel, 
28.06.93 (26), p. 43.
107 Cited from: Brunssen, F. op. cit., p. 61. See also: Walser, M. op. cit., p. 43.
108 Cited from: Jugend in Brandenburg - Vorurteile und Fakten. In: Sturzbecher, D. Jugend und 
Kriminalitdt in Brandenburg. Eine Materialsammlung. 5.000 ed. Potsdam: Ministerium des Innem des 
Landes Brandenburg, Jan 1998, p. 19.
109 Cited from: Schonwalder, K. Migration, refugees, and ethnic plurality as issues of public and political 
debates in (West) Germany. In: Cesarani, D. and Fulbrook, M. (eds). op. cit., pp. 173, 178.
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should be silent on the basis that he spoke far too cleverly'. 110 Voigt explained to The 
Observer's Denis Staunton that:
If there are attacks on foreigners in Germany, that is of course a sorry tale but it 
is the responsibility of the established parties who continue to allow 
uncontrolled flows of foreigners who now have the Green Card while they are 
not in a position to guarantee the right of all Germans to work. They have to 
reckon with the fact that people will develop a will to resist at some stage. But 
that is a normal, popular reaction. We don't need to orchestrate that. 1 "
But, what did some of the public think? In September 1994, according to the Allensbach 
Yearbook for Public Opinion Research, only 1% of 2,000 Germans surveyed 
nationwide reproached the NPD and DVU as 'extremist'." 2 Forsa revealed in a survey 
of 1,100 Germans in 1995 that one in every ten young people (11%) held the view that 
right-wing extremist groups should be treated in the same manner as other political 
parties, whereas in 1998 it was every one in four, or 27% (the figure was 29% in the old 
Ldnder, whereas in the new Ldnder, it was 26%)."3 Similar results occurred two years 
later. In 2000, only 8% of 1,793 Germans surveyed nationwide by Forsa believed right- 
wing extremist groups and demonstrations should be banned." 4 Voigt and Syberberg 
also claimed Germany's political leaders tried to repress opinions with laws and 
decrees, but if people wanted a Hitler, one could not prevent them from having one. 115 
According to Syberberg, Hitler 'came out of the heart of the German people'." 6 On the 
other hand, Chancellor Schroder maintained that 'neo-Nazi propaganda and xenophobia 
constitute attacks on the central values of our society'." 7
So was there any evidence indicating that some wanted a new Hitler? In 1981, Martin 
Greiffenhagen claimed five million Germans wanted to have a Fuhrer (leader) again." 8
110 Cited from: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 1998. Berlin/Bonn: 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1998, p. 42. For Syberberg's comments see: Syberberg, H. J. op. cit.
111 Cited from: Staunton, D. op. cit., p. 19.
112 See: Frage: ,,Woran erkennt man eigentlich, ob eine Partei extremistisch ist, was wiirden Sie sagen?" 
Extreme Parteien. September 1994. Parteien. In: Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, R. (eds). Allensbacher 
Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1993-1997 Band 10. Munchen: K. G. Saur, Verlag fur Demoskopie Allensbach 
am Bodensee, 1997, pp. 881, E27-E32. Germans over 16 were surveyed in a random sample.
113 From 18.05.98-24.05.98, Forsa interviewed 1,001 Germans aged 14-25 on their attitudes towards 
foreigners and right-wing extremism for the newspaper Die Woche. For 1995 and 1998 survey results, 
see: 6. Meinungen zu rechtsradikalen Gruppen. In: Jugend in Deutschland 1998. op. cit., p. 7.
114 The Forsa survey (5-9/10/00) was undertaken for the German newspaper Die Woche. For results see: 
Was miisste zur Bekampfung des Rechtsextremismus mehr getan werden? In: Einstellungen und 
Meinungen zum Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland. Forsa Bericht PO20340/8576 Gu/Mo, 10.10.00, p. 3.
115 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000. op. cit., p. 60.
116 Cited from: Syberberg, H. J. op. cit.
117 See: Schroder, G. Observing the 10th anniversary of German unification on 3 rd October 2000. op. cit.
118 See: Knischewski, G. Post-war national identity in Germany. In: Jenkins, B. and Spyros, A. S. (eds).
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Eleven years later, Forsa reported that 41% of all members of right-wing parties 
believed the country needed a new type of "Fuhrer\ and one in five of the 1,005 
Germans surveyed, a strong leader again."9 In 2000, The Observer and Brinks also 
reported that 26% of Germans believed Germany needed a strong leader again. 120 
According to the head of the Hessian Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Lutz 
Irrgang: 'The apparent inclination of Ehringshausen's citizens to right-wing extremism 
has its origins in the recent past." 21 In 1933, for instance, almost 80% of the area's 
citizens voted for the Nazi Party (NSDAP). Interestingly, by comparison, almost one in 
every four citizens voted for the NPD in Ehringshausen in 2001. 122
More disturbing, perhaps, were the dismissive attitudes towards right-wing extremism 
uncovered by Allensbach. In September 1994, 2,000 Germans were questioned 
nationwide about what they perceived as particularly extremist characteristics and 
expressions associated with political parties. Only 4% associated National Socialist 
ideology and 2% violent incitement against foreigners with right-wing extremist 
parties. 123 Although another Hitler was evidently not imminent, the banning of groups 
and repression of the former dictator's ideology were unwelcome from certain quarters - 
raising questions as to the acceptance of the Bundestag political elite's national 
identity. 124
Some contributors to the theme of German national identity, such as Chancellor 
Schroder and leaders of the then CDU/CSU opposition faction, Friedrich Merz and 
Angela Merkel, maintained that an economic dimension was crucial to identity building 
in Germany. 'Germans increasingly identify themselves with the market economy', 
claimed Merz in an interview with Die Welt. n5 Schroder claimed that the majority of 
Germans realised it was in their own interest that the nation-state should lose its
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See: Die Ergebnisse: 1. Meinungen zur gegenwartigen politischen Situation. In: Die Deutschen 1992: 
Weder gewalttdtig noch ausldnderfeindlich. Forsa Bericht PO 929/2330 Gii, 20.09.92, pp. 1-2.
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significance to international exchanges and the world economy. 126 Since the 
Wirtschaftswunder, or economic miracle in Germany of the 1950s, capitalism was the 
major source of identification with the regime before reunification - west of the river 
Elbe at any rate. 127 Generally considered Germany's leading playwright and artistic 
director of the renowned Berliner Ensemble, Heiner Muller claimed, for example, that 
during the 1990s Germany had no national identity, apart from the former 
Deutschmark. m
Yet, there were various claims that what appealed to some German youth had little to do 
with money. Founded in 1994 as an extension of a Berlin reading group based on the 
far-right extremist weekly newspaper Junge Freiheit (Young Freedom), the Deutsches 
Kolleg (German College) was active in NPD circles, its chief task being training a 
'nationalist intelligentsia'. 129 In November 2002, the Deutsches Kolleg published a flyer 
on its web site appealing for the following:
Let us build a new order without party rule on the ruins of this corrupt and 
decaying system! Let us create a Volksgemeinschaft [an ethnically homogenous 
national community] in which the economy serves the people instead of the 
greed of those who control all the money! 130
Expressing concerns about a change of values amongst German youth, Hans Jiirgen 
Syberberg claimed: 'They have concerts that can't be advertised. They don't make 
money and don't spend any. They just gather, and the gatherings are getting larger and 
are part of a real underground." 31
Although the Nationalist Front (NF), the German Alternative (DA) and the FAP had all 
been banned by 1995, 'their prohibitions only produced temporary dislocations and a 
search for new organisational forms', noted anti-fascist investigative magazine
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<http://www.berlin.spd.de/servlet/PB/menu/1534815/1016827.html>
127 See: Fulbrook, M. A concise history of Germany. Updated ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991, p. 213 and: Brandt, P. German identity. Debatte, 1993 (2), pp. 30-31.
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Searchlight. 132 From the middle of the 1990s, for example, Searchlight and the Lower 
Saxon authorities reported that former FAP and NF leaders, such as Thomas Heise and 
Steffen Hupka, were already conducting intensive discussions with the NPD about 
granting membership to their former members. 133 In northern and western Germany, 
leading activists of the banned FAP and ANS/NA (National Socialist and National 
Activist Front) parties, Christian Worch and Thomas Wulff, were quick to set up 
'autonomous comradeships' as replacement organisations. 134 Indicative of these 
developments was the re-structuring of Hamburg's right-wing extremist organisation 
the National List (NL). Although banned in February 1995, during the following 
months the NL and their former Chairman, Thomas Wulff, assumed overall control of 
most autonomous neo-Nazi groups in northern Germany, reported Searchlight and the 
Schleswig-Holstein Ministry of the Interior. 135
Instead of well-organised action groups with formal membership and internal 
hierarchies, loosely organised comradeships appeared in Bremen, Schleswig-Holstein 
and Lower Saxony. 136 From the outside, these bodies appeared independent from one 
another and only organised at a regional level. However, on the inside they were 
hierarchically organised and linked nationwide, as the aforementioned reports from 
regional authorities testified. Having no statutes, no tendering of accounts and no formal 
addresses, 'comradeships' avoid detection and prosecution by dispensing with their 
former self-styled names such as the Kameradschaften Northeim, Oberhavel and 
Wittenberg.  Comradeships not only communicated and transferred collective identities 
via informal communication outlets, such as the Internet, but also employed it to convey 
their message to the public. 138
'Once a month, every night at 11 p.m. a voice proclaims where the next torchlight neo-
132 Cited from: Bans are not working. Searchlight [Online]. Nov 2000 (305) [Accessed 22.01.04]. 
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Nazi procession will take place. It was the voice of the head of the comradeship 
Beusselkiez Mike Penkert', noted Der Spiegel.  Despite repeated bans by the MABB 
(Berlin-Brandenburg Regional Supervisory Authority for Private Broadcasters), Radio 
Germania was continuing to broadcast in 2000 via Berlin's Open Public Broadcasting 
Channel (OKB) for an 'obviously growing audience', claimed Carolin Erncke.' 40 Since 
reunification, Emcke also claimed that the number of right-wing extremists in Berlin 
alone more than doubled by 2000. 141 In fact, the neighbouring Brandenburg authorities 
also reported increases in neo-Nazi membership from 1998 to 2000. In 1998, for 
instance, there were 550 militant right-wing extremists in Brandenburg, 580 in 1999 and 
600 in 2000. 142
Speaking in the Bundestag, Kerstin Muller of the Alliance 90/The Greens, declared:
Whilst it is disgusting that bellowing right-wing extremists thugs demonstrate 
outside the Brandenburg Gate [...] at the same time we must deal with the 
poisoning of hearts and minds of people if we want to effectively combat racism 
in the long term. 143
Consequently, a scheme offering neo-Nazis money, jobs and even new identities to 
persuade youths to leave violent far-right movements was set-up by the BfV. 
Nonetheless, one year after its implementation, the BBC and Leonie Redler of the 
journal Socialism Today branded it 'a failure'. 144 Although the German government 
pushed through a new 'solidarity pact' to improve infrastructure in the east, as in the old 
Lander, money alone was not solving the problem. 145 Despite attempts to draw German 
youth away from neo-Nazi circles in the form of financial incentives and re-training 
initiatives, by the end of April 2002 the authorities admitted that fewer than 40 of the 
country's estimated 33,000 neo-Nazis had signed up for the so-called Aussteiger (Exit)
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programme. 146 An official press release announced in 2001 that over the course of the 
next three years, 150 million marks would be allocated for the nationwide XENOS, or 
Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance - Against Extremism and Violence, programme 
to fight xenophobia. In 2001, for instance, the equivalent of 80 million marks alone 
were made available for the purpose. 147
Although the German authorities have banned no fewer than 23 right-wing extremist 
organisations since 1990, evidence suggested the consequence of these bans had been a 
restructuring of the scene that had simply gone underground, with a concomitant 
increase in membership. 148 Even before the Nationalist Front (NF) was outlawed at the 
end of 1992, 'replacement structures were set up for Germany's first self-styled 
"autonomous comradeships" that turned out later to be the foundation for the Free 
Nationalists', noted Searchlight. 149 When informed that the authorities were going to 
continue with their endeavours to get his party banned, NPD Chairman Voigt remained 
defiant: 'Besides, new organisations can always be created afterwards." 50 Developments 
seemed to bear Voigt out. According to Leonie Redler, since 1995 over 150 far-right 
comradeships had been established. 151 In 2004, the Lower Saxon authorities reported the 
number of these semi-autonomous groups had increased to 160 nationwide. 152
Along with Voigt and Syberberg, Mike Penkert also maintained that the repressive 
official anti-German authorities forced him to introduce a national message. Greeting 
fellow neo-Nazis over the air-waves, Penkert announced that Radio Germania was the 
station for the national interest, expressing his bewilderment at bans imposed whenever 
one spoke the truth about what most Germans thought of certain groups of foreigners. 153 
Arguably, fascists do not stop being fascists because the state bans their organisations. 
One reason, perhaps, why neo-Nazi organisations reformed so effectively was because 
it took two years before a ban could take effect. 154 Evidence appeared to suggest that the
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established mainstream parties had failed to represent and address the concerns of some 
German citizens about multicultural ism, foreigners and the safeguarding of German 
national identity.
'The Basic Law is an important expression of our values and part of German 
cultural identity, through which only the internal unity of our society is possible. »155
Referring to basic human rights as enshrined in the Basic Law, Chancellor Schroder 
affirmed in 2000 that there should be no presiding adjectives or distinctions for the term 
'mankind'. 156 In the same year, CDU/CSU opposition leader, Friedrich Merz, echoed the 
German Chancellor: 'Our culture belongs essentially to the constitutional traditions of 
the Basic Law, which is built upon the unconditional respect of the dignity of mankind, 
personal rights of individuals and their protection by the state." 57 As far as the BMI and 
BfV were concerned, the opinions espoused by the NPD and others like them violated 
the principles of human dignity and equality, as laid down in Articles 1 and 3 of the 
Basic Law. According to the BfV:
Right-wing extremist ideology is governed by the idea that ethnic affiliation 
with a nation or race determines the value of a human being. According to this 
right-wing extremist thinking, human and civil rights are subordinate to this 
criterion and right-wing extremists refuse to accept the universal principle of 
human equality as defined in Article 3 of the Basic Law. 158
Disparities between the Bundestag elite's principles of the German Constitution and 
right-wing radical perceptions of humanity became apparent within the NPD's Party 
Profil series. In their position paper, the NPD declared its allegiance to a 'reality-based 
image of humanity' as the basis for an ethnic national community, defined as a 
community of shared racial characteristics of the German Volk. }59 They also called for 
an authoritarian political system in which the state and the people - in their view an 
ethnically homogeneous group - should join together as a single unit within a
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127
supposedly natural order, in which only a Volksgenosse, or ethnic national comrade of 
German blood, can be accepted as a German citizen. 160
Clear ideological distinctions also became evident in the attitudes of the NPD to 
political asylum. National manager of the NPD, Frank Schwerdt, maintained that: 
'Every prevented residence for asylum-seekers is a victory for Germans." 61 Similarly, 
the Bremen and Bremerhaven branches of the DVU complained there were already 
millions of illegal asylum-seekers in Germany, whose allegedly non-political basis for 
asylum was 'madness'. 162 Following the dissolving of the far-right Bundnis Rechts fiir 
Lubeck (Alliance of the Right for Liibeck) in 1998, later that year a replacement 
organisation, the Bundnis Rechts (Alliance of the Right), appeared in the north German 
state of Schleswig-Holstein. 163 Suspected of orchestrating the firebombing of an asylum 
centre in the north German port of Lubeck, Bundnis Rechts have campaigned vigorously 
against asylum in Lubeck. In a press release by the Lubeck-based Bundnis Rechts, Ingo 
Stawitz complained that: 'The maintenance of millions of foreigners, whether they be 
asylum-seekers, refugees or former Soviet-Jews has cost the country billions of 
Euros." 64 Apart from right-wing extremists, were there any others in Germany who 
needed to be 'persuaded' to accept asylum-seekers? 165
Further indicative of the rift between the Bundestag political elite and their national 
roots, was an apparent public scepticism about the liberality of the asylum clause 
enshrined under Article 16a of the Basic Law. In the opinions of Christiane Lemke, Jan 
Herman Brinks and Hermann Kurthen, Article 16a, or Right of Asylum, became the 
most liberal law on asylum in Europe. 166 According to Brinks: 'German asylum was a 
very generous arrangement since whoever asked for it was granted it." 67 Article 16a
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read: 'Persons persecuted on political grounds shall have the right of asylum."68 In 
September 1991, however, Allensbach found that 69% of 1,000 Germans surveyed 
within the old Ldnder wanted a change to the right to claim asylum guaranteed by 
Article 16a, that would reduce the numbers permitted to enter the country. In the new 
Ldnder, the figure was 64% out of 1,000 Germans surveyed. Only 19% said they 
wanted no change to the law in the old Ldnder, in the new Ldnder the figure was 
21%. 169 In 1992, a ZDF-Politbarometer survey conducted by the Mannheim Research 
Institute found 75% of West Germans and 86% of East Germans did not accept claims 
that asylum-seekers flee their homelands on account of political persecution. In total, 
66% of 2,000 Germans surveyed nationwide thought that Article 16 should be 
amended. 170 Hans-Dieter Schwind and Manfred Kuechler also reported that 'most 
Germans' (two-thirds of West and over 80% of East Germans) did not believe asylum- 
seekers were fleeing from political persecution. 171
Coming into force on 24 May 1949, the Basic Law is the very basis of the German 
Constitution. This was the first time in German history that a 'democratic' constitution 
was to be law. 'Former parliaments had attempted to create a bill of fundamental laws 
and rights but these had always been little more than recommendations', noted 
Roberts. 172 It is worth noting, in the context of a deficient popular identification with the 
Bundestag political elite, that the Basic Law of 1949 was, and still has not been, put to 
the German people by way of a referendum. 'Since Germany was an occupied country 
without its own government, there could be no peace treaty', noted Fulbrook. 173 
According to researchers of politics of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Lewis 
J. Edinger and Gordon Craig noted:
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It was generally understood by the drafters of the Basic Law and was implicit in 
the governmental structure [...] that 'strong governmental leadership would 
need to ensure the smooth operation of the new system and to create political 
orientations that would give the regime legitimacy among the mass of the 
population'. 174
Summarising the intensions of the Basic Law, Matthias Zimmer wrote: 'The 
Constitution was deliberately drafted to form a "militant democracy", intended to have 
the means to defend itself against unconstitutional activities." 75 It seemed evident, 
therefore, that the Allies and those permitted to draw up the Basic Law mistrusted most 
Germans and were reluctant to give 'the people' too much of a voice after the war. But, 
not only were there allegedly large sections of the German population who did not feel 
bound to the pledges of asylum protection in the Basic Law, some have also questioned 
the validity of the Constitution itself. 176
Surveys suggested that the opinions of some of the German population were not being 
sufficiently represented by the political elite, manifest in the attitudes expressed towards 
the Basic Law. Questioning whether the Basic Law and constitutional patriotism could 
continue to serve as a suitable means for collective identification, Stefan Berger and 
Alexander Gauland have denounced the FRG's 'bloodless constitutional patriotism'. 177 
Along the same lines, Karlheinz WeiBmann and Rainer Zitelmann argued that whilst the 
German people had retained a national feeling of togetherness, decadent anti-German 
intellectuals developed 'artificial ideas', such as constitutional patriotism and 
multiculturalism. 178
In 1994, REP national deputy and erstwhile member of the Bundestag, Dr. Rudolf 
Krause, warned there was considerable public disaffection towards the basis of the 
German constitution. According to Krause, the German public often perceived
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mainstream politicians as self-serving and unresponsive to their concerns and, whilst 
interested in the electorate's votes, they remained oblivious to their demands. Quoting 
Article 146 of the Basic Law, Krause reminded fellow members of the Bundestag that: 
The Basic Law shall cease to be in force the day on which the German people in free 
elections adopt a new constitution. Many in Germany want such a referendum." 79 Polls 
taken in 1991 and 2001 appeared to vindicate his comments. Reminding Germans that 
'the Basic Law originated under the supervision of the Western Powers and which is 
now over 40 years old', Allensbach asked 1,000 Germans in November 1991 whether 
an entirely new Basic Law should be drawn-up. 58% of 500 Germans surveyed in the 
new Lander thought that Germany should create a new constitution. 180 66% of 500 
Germans surveyed in the old Lander believed that they should have more of a say in the 
drawing-up of new laws; in the new, the figure was 79% of 500 Germans surveyed. 181 
According to Forsa, in 2001 two-thirds (67%) of 1,003 Germans questioned over the 
age of 18 said they wanted a national referendum on the Basic Law. 27%, meanwhile, 
were against such a change. Apparently, those surveyed wanted a more populist 
approach than that of the SPD/Green ruling coalition. 182
Chancellor Schroder claimed that he could not imagine any German patriotism which 
did not love freedom and with it, the German constitution. 183 Friedrich Merz also 
claimed that the Basic Law was an important expression of German values and an 
integral part of German identity. 184 Some in Germany had very different views. At an 
NPD demonstration in Gottingen in 2002 with the slogan 'Achieving social and national 
justice', according to NPD legal representative Horst Mahler:
They are not our politicians they are traitors to our fatherland. This system is 
not a German system. It is a vassal government [...] Many Germans think we 
have a constitution meaning the Basic Law but this Basic Law is not a
l79 For speech by Krause see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 12/209. op. cit., pp. 18144-18145.
180 Germans aged 16 onwards were polled by means of a random sample survey. See: Frage: ,,Das 
Grundgesetz ist ja vor uber 40 Jahren unter Aussicht und Kontrolle der Westmachte entstanden. Deshalb 
meinen manche, wir Deutschen sollten uns ein neues Grundgesetz schaffen, das besser unseren 
Bediirfhissen und Interessen entspricht. Andere sagen dagegen, das bisherige Grundgesetz hat sich so 
bewahrt, dafi wir kein neues brauchen. Welcher Meinung sind Sie?" Cited from: Neues Grundgesetz? 
Gesellschaftsordnung - Wirtschaftsordnung. November 1991. In: Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, R. 
(eds). Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1984-1992 Band 9. op. cit., p. 564.
181 See: Grundgesetzanderungen. November 1991. Gesellschaftsordnung - Wirtschaftsordnung. In: Ibid., 
p. 567.
182 From 17.07.01-19.07.01, Forsa surveyed Germans above the age of 18 on behalf of the registered 
organisation Mehr Demokratie e.V. - Landesverband NRW. See: Meinungen der Deutschen zur 
Volksgesetzgebung auf Bundesebene. Forsa Bericht P1722/9635 Ap/Na, 30.07.01, p. 1.
183 Nation, Patriotismus, Demokratische Kultur. Debatte mit Gerhard Schroder. News Archive, op. cit.
184 See: Merz, F. op. cit., p. 3.
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constitution. It is a basic law dictated by the occupying powers the victors over 
Germany for the Federal Republic. The Federal Republic is not the German 
Reich and not Germany. 185
Hoping to weaken public trust in the value system anchored in the Basic Law, the REP 
and DVU have consistently attacked the democratic representatives of the state in 'a 
polemic and defamatory manner', explained the BMI. 'Stop the corruption tango' read 
one 2002 REP headline. 186 There was also some public indifference to the Basic Law. In 
March 1995, when asked by Allensbach to what degree did they think the founding of 
the Basic Law was an important event in Germany's history, fewer than half of the 600 
Germans polled (30%) considered it as significant. 187
According to a report by the Federal Government's Commissioner for Foreigner Issues, 
high percentages of migrants neither resulted in social flash points or high rates of 
criminal offences with a xenophobic motivation. 188 Yet, evidence suggested that for 
many in Germany, the driving forces behind xenophobia were economic and social 
fears compounded by asylum. Reservations of complete absorption within a borderless 
Europe have fuelled German fears of an alleged 'vast influx of immigrants seeking jobs 
in a country where over 9% of the population was already unemployed in 2000', noted 
the New York Times m Evidence suggested that, at the time of writing, mass 
unemployment, fears of socio-economic decline and a general insecurity were 
undermining the Bundestag political elite's post-national identity or constitutional 
patriotism. 190
Some, such as Manfred Kuechler, Christhard Hoffmann and Wemer Bergmann, argued 
that xenophobia was a product of resentment towards asylum-seekers based on socio-
185 Cited from: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2002. op. cit., p. 58.
186 Cited from: Ibid., p. 75. See also: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000. op. cit., pp. 83-84.
187 500 Germans from the western Lander and 100 from the old were surveyed by means of a telephone 
poll. See: Frage: ,,Es gibt Ereignisse, bei denen hat man des Gefuhl, dafi sie einen teifen Einschnitt fur die 
Gesellschaft bedeuten. Wenn Sie einmal an den Zeitraum seit dem 8. Mai 1945 denken, also an die 
letzten funfzig Jahre: Welche Ereignisse haben Sie personlich mil dem Gefuhl erlebt, dafi sie tiefe 
Einschnitte fur die Gesellschaft waren?" Schliisselereignisse. Nationalbewufistein-Geschichtsbewufistein 
Marz 1995. In: Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, R. (eds). Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1993- 
1997 Band 10. op. cit., p. 534.
188 See: Daten und Fakten zur Ausldndersituation. 20th ed. Berlin: Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur 
Auslanderfragen, Feb 2002, p. 12.
189 Cited from: Cohen, R. Call for 'Guiding Culture' rekindles political debate in Germany. The New York 
Times International, 05.11.00, p. 10.
190 See: Betz, H-G. Perplexed normalcy: German identity after Unification. In: Alter, R. and Monteath, P. 
(eds). op. cit., pp. 50-57 and: Kurthen, H. and Minkenberg, M. op. cit., pp. 175-196.
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economic factors. 191 Increased numbers of asylum-seekers during the 1980s, for 
example, brought social tensions that culminated in the first overt racist attacks against 
foreigners, claimed Thomas Ammer, Hoffmann and Bergmann. 192
Asylum applications, for instance, rose from 51,493 in 1979 to 107,818 in 1980. Data 
from the Federal Office for Refugees (BAFL) recorded 193,063 applications for asylum 
in 1990, 256,112 in 1991 and 438,191 in 1992. 193 Of these, 6,518 (4.4%) were approved 
in 1990 and 11,597 (6.9%) in 1991. 194 According to Panikos Panayi and Eva Kolinsky, 
during 1991 the high number of racist attacks carried out by extremists increased even 
further during the following year, from 1,483 in 1991 to 2,584 in 1992 - representing an 
increase of 74%. 195 In fact, there were almost 400 arson attacks on asylum centres 
during 1991; the following year the figure had risen to over 700. 196
So what was behind those incidents? Following reunification, some areas in Germany 
experienced high unemployment and faced an economic crisis. In February 1991, an 
Afghan refugee died of his injuries after a fascist raid on a refugee hostel in Leisnig, 
near Colditz in the former East. Later that year, skinheads in Dresden beat 28-year-old 
Angolan Jorge Gomondai to death. 197 50% of the population had lost their jobs by the 
end of 1992 following reunification in the eastern city of Rostock, noted Panayi. Heiner 
Muller claimed that the unemployment rate was more than 60% among young men in 
the city at the time. During the summer of 1992, violence broke out from local and 
travelling neo-Nazis against the asylum refuge in Rostock. In November 1992, three 
Turks were murdered in a firebomb attack in Molln, near Liibeck, within the state of 
Schleswig-Holstein. 198 Four years later in January 1996, an arson attack on an asylum
191 See: Kuechler, M. op. cit., pp. 47-48, 51-55.
192 See: Ammer, T. Prozesse gegen Skinheads in der DDK. Deutschland Archiv, 1988 (8), pp. 804-807 
and: Bergmann, W. Xenophobia and anti-Semitism after the Unification of Germany. Patterns of 
Prejudice, 1994 (28), p. 67. See also: Hoffmann, C. Immigration and nationhood in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. In: Brady, J. S., Crawford, B. and Wiliarty, S. E. (eds). op. cit., p. 366.
193 See: Migration und Asyl in Zahlen. 9th ed. Niirnberg: Bundesamt fur die Anerkennung auslandischer 
Fliichtlinge, Jul 2003, pp. 21-22.
194 Tabelle 9. Entscheidungen und Entscheidungesquoten seit 1990 in Jahreszeitraumen. In: Ibid., p. 51.
195 See: Panayi, P. Racial exclusionism in the new Germany. In: Larres, K. (ed). Germany since 
unification: the domestic and external consequences. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. 137, 
and: Kolinsky, E. op. cit., pp. 206-209. 
196 See: Rechtsextremistische Skinheads. NeonazistischeKameradschaften. Niedersachsen. op. cit., p. 8.
197 See: Atkinson, G. A decade of death. Graeme Atkinson on Nazi murders since unification. Searchlight 
[Online]. Nov 2000 (305) [Accessed 22.01.04]. <http://searchlightmagazine.com/stories/ 
germanyreport2000.htm>
198 For these claims see: Panayi, P. Racial exclusionism in the new Germany. In: Larres, K. (ed). op. cit., 
p. 137 and: Muller, H. op. cit., p. 16.
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refuge in Liibeck resulted in ten deaths and the serious injury of 35 asylum-seekers, 
reported local newspaper the Liibecker Nachrichten. 
Evaluating the reported economic problems of the city, the Liibecker Nachrichten made 
a clear correlation between xenophobia and unemployment. 'Since the middle of the 
1950s Liibeck has always been a problem area', noted the head of the city's 
employment exchange, Norbert Hahn. Claiming that during the 1950s the area was 
'already overrun with refugees', the Liibecker Nachrichten also reported that by 1996, 
unemployment in the economically depressed port of Schleswig-Holstein had reached 
13.4% - 'the country's highest'. 200 A similar firebomb attack to those in Molln and 
Liibeck occurred in May 1993 on a Turkish house in Solingen, near Cologne, resulting 
in the deaths of two women and three children.201 Contradicting official claims, Asher 
Reich and Frank Brunssen stressed that most attacks on asylum-seekers and their 
hostels occurred between 1991 and 1993: 'In 1992 Nazis killed more people than at the 
beginning of the 1930s', claimed Reich.202
Another development challenging the Commissioner for Foreigner Issues' claims that 
high numbers of asylum-seekers did not necessarily culminate in 'social flash points' 
were the claims that some local communities were being excessively overloaded with 
maintenance expenditure associated with asylum.203 In 1990, the former mayors of 
Stuttgart and Dortmund predicted animosity and resentment from local residents 
towards the housing of asylum-seekers. According to Eva Kolinsky, allocating public 
buildings like sports centres, community centres or school halls as temporary shelter for 
newcomers 'could inflict lasting damage on the life of communities and create 
potentially explosive social resentments'. 204 These fears were corroborated by the 
responses from residents in Hoyerswerda, Leipzig and Hanover.
199 See: Latzel, S. HafenstraBe: Kommt jetzt der dritte Prozess? Hansestadt Lubeck. Liibecker 
Nachrichten, 9/10.06.02, p. 16.
200 See: Nesemann, U. Im Schneckentempo durch das Jammertal. Liibecker Nachrichten, 20.03.96, p. 3.
201 For incidents in Rostock, Molln and Solingen see: Panayi, P. Racial exclusionism in the new 
Germany. In: Larres, K. (ed). op. cit., pp. 137-138 and: Brunssen, F. op. cit., p. 56.
202 Cited from: Reich, A. Nazismus ist nicht tot er schlaft nur. In: Bahmen, N. (ed). Deutsche Zustande. 
Dialog iiber ein gefdhrdetes Land. Hamburg: Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1993, pp. 56-57. Cited from: 
Brunssen, F. op. cit., p. 56.
203 For claims by the Representative for Foreigner Issues see: Raumliche Verteilung. In: Daten und 
Fakten zur Auslandersituation. op. cit., p. 12.
204 Cited from: Kolinsky, E. op. cit., p. 213.
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By the 1970s, the Saxon town of Hoyerswerda had become economically dependent on 
a nearby electro power plant and brown coal mines. Following reunification, 
unemployment in the city rose to 7%, thereby putting strains on social facilities by 
autumn 1991. 'After an increase in hostility between residents and 230 asylum-seekers 
during the summer, a full-scale riot broke out between 17 and 22 September involving 
hundreds of local residents and skinheads', noted Panayi.205 Along with Dortmund and 
Stuttgart, resistance from the local population, who were reluctant to accept refugees in 
their neighbourhood, also had to be taken into account during 1994, when finding 
asylum-seekers accommodation in the district around economically depressed 
Leipzig. 206 'Residents even paid skinheads to attack a home for political refugees that 
had recently been built at the end of their street', noted right-wing extremist researcher 
Wilhelm Heitmeyer.207 Although Heitmeyer failed to disclose the city where the alleged 
payment transpired, one source that did was the Lubecker Nachrichten. Suspected of the 
firebombing of an asylum hostel in Liibeck on 18 January 1996, in a written statement 
Maik 'W.' disclosed that he along with three fellow accomplices each received 5,000 
marks from an 'unknown source in advance for the attack'. 208 In Munich 1991, a 
Romanian asylum-seeker died of a broken skull sustained during a neo-Nazi attack, and 
in Hanover the following year, a refugee was so badly beaten by an extremist that he 
died from his injuries the following day. 209 With the reduction of asylum-seekers in 
Hanover, local newspaper the Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung claimed local protests 
in the city also decreased.210
Various surveys also appeared to support the theory that the xenophobia in Germany 
was aggravated by economic and social fears. In 1992, the Institute for Youth Research 
in Leipzig invited pupils between 14 and 15 years of age to give their opinions 
concerning violence against foreigners. 50% expressed that they felt economically and 
socially threatened by 'foreigners'. 2 " Wilhelm Heitmeyer undertook a similar
205 Cited from: Panayi, P. Racial exclusionism in the new Germany. In: Larres, K. (ed). op. cit., p. 136.
206 See: Kolinsky, E. op. cit., pp. 202-203.
207 Cited from: Heitmeyer, W. Hostility and violence towards foreigners in Germany. In: Bjorgo, T. and 
Witte, R. (eds). Racist violence in Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1993, p. 21.
208 Cited from: Frege, S. Maik W. gab Anschlag mehrmals zu Hafenstraflenband: Lubecker 
Staatsanwaltschaft teilte Einzelheiten zum Gestandnis des Grevesmuhleners mit. Lubecker Nachrichten, 
09.04.98, p. 4 and: Latzel, S. op. cit., p. 16.
209 See: Atkinson, G. op. cit.
210 See: Klein, M. Land will Fliichtlinge aus Containern holen. Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, 
24.08.95 (197), p. 4.
211 This survey generated a sample of 100 essays. See: Schubarth, W. and Stenke, D. Auslander -Bilder 
bei ostdeutschen Schulerinnen und Schiilern. Deutschland Archiv, 11.11.92, pp. 1247-1254. Cited from: 
Kolinsky, E. op. cit., p. 207.
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investigation between 1985 and 1990. Directed by Heitmeyer, the Bielefeld Study of 
Right-Wing Extremist Behaviour found a tendency of hostility towards foreigners that 
had been developing for many years as a result of the following process:
1. A fear of foreigners overshadowed by a competitive stance fuelled by economic 
considerations linked to a defensiveness expressed partly in political concepts 
such as ethno-pluralism and racism;
2. Hatred of foreigners is the next stage in which tolerance disappears completely. 
In its place, hostility arises that aims to introduce clarity by making fundamental 
distinctions between friends, the 'natives' and foreigners. 212
As with the Bielefeld Study, the Youth 2000 Shell Study on Young People also 
concluded xenophobia in Germany was fuelled by anxieties about future competition 
between Germans and foreigners - especially from asylum-seekers - who allegedly 'rob 
them of their jobs'.213
However, speaking in the Bundestag ex-Chancellor Schroder stated: 'On account of our 
self-respect, asylum should remain distinct from immigration.' 214 Evidence suggested 
Schroder's high-mindedness was not shared by some of his compatriots. According to a 
survey submitted for the German government in 1992, almost two-fifths of 2,000 
Germans questioned nationwide said they wanted to participate in a citizens' action 
group against a hostel for asylum-seekers scheduled for their community. Only 18% in 
the West and 14% in the former East declared their support for a counter-initiative to 
protect asylum hostels. 215 In 1992, a survey from Forsa found 51% of 1,005 Germans 
were also of the opinion that there were already too many asylum-seekers.216
Admittedly, those surveys were all undertaken in the 1990s. So have attitudes changed 
since 1990? Evidence suggested that xenophobic anti-asylum initiatives were still
212 The Bielefeld Study was based on qualitative interviews from 1985-1990 with 31 young men aged IT- 
21. See: Schonwalder, K. Right-wing extremism and racist violence in Germany. Review Article. West 
European Politics, Apr 1995: 18(2), pp. 450-451 and: Heitmeyer, W. Hostility and violence in Germany. 
Extract from the 1993 Bielefelder Study. In: Bjorgo, T. and Witte, R. (eds). op. cit., pp. 17-19.
213 See: Thomas, V. Youth 2000. Shell study on young people in Germany, op. cit.
214 See Bundestag speech by Schroder: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., p. 13222.
215 During October 1991 and September 1992, Germans aged 16 onwards were polled by means of a 
random sample survey. See: Frage: ,,Jetzt einmal abgesehen von Ihrer Meinung. Was glauben Sie, wie die 
meisten Leute in Deutschland denken: Haben die meisten Menschen in Deutschland Verstandnis fur 
diejenigen, die Anschlage auf Asylantenwohnheime veriiben, oder haben die meisten dafur gar kein 
Verstandnis?" Der Alarm iiber den Zustrom der Asylbewerber wachst. Bericht fur die Bundesregierung 
vom Oktober 1992 (Auszug). In: Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, R. (eds). Allensbacher Jahrbuch der 
Demoskopie 1984-1992 Band 9. op. cit., p. 541.
216 Forsa survey on behalf of Stern from 17.09.92-19.09.92, See: Einstellungen zur Zahl der Auslander in 
Deutschland. In: Die Deutschen 1992: Weder gewalttatig noch ausldnderfeindlich. op. cit., pp. 1, 7.
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attracting votes from some quarters. In the 2002 local elections, Chairman of the 
Bavarian NPD and advocate of the Nuremberg-based Burgerinitiative Auslanderstopp, 
or Citizen's Initiative to Stop Foreigners, Ralf Ollert, won a seat on the Nuremberg City 
Council with that very type of mandate.217 Holding the Interior Ministry in the city's 
coalition government, in 2002 Hamburg's populist Law and Order Initiative Party 
offered money to any African country prepared to accept 2,600 refugees, whose 
applications for asylum had been rejected. 218
When asked whether they would participate in initiatives to support places for asylum in 
November 2000, only 19% of 2,000 Germans surveyed nationwide confirmed they 
would participate in an anti-xenophobic initiative.219 In a survey undertaken by the 
Berlin-based Forsa in 2001 for the Press and Information Office of the German 
government, 60% of 1,007 German citizens expressed particular reservations about the 
influx of asylum-seekers and refugees from civil wars. 220 In 2002, the Hamburg 
authorities reported the number of nationwide right-wing extremist offences rose in 
comparison to the previous year, from 10,054 to 10,903.221 Thus, it would appear from 
developments to-date that, for some Germans, xenophobia arose as a result of asylum- 
seekers and socio-economic concerns, thus contradicting official claims.
Not all, of course, in Germany shared these views. Rejecting any amendment to the 
asylum clause Article 16a in the Basic Law, political scientist Jiirgen Habermas argued 
that the existence of a world-society imposed responsibilities on the wealthier nations 
for the poorer ones. Other proponents of multiculturalism, such as Gunter Hoffman and 
Werner Perger, also held Germany morally responsible for its resident immigrants.222 
There were candlelight demonstrations, with demands for a peaceful coexistence with
217 See: Bayern Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002. Miinchen: Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, 
Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Bayem, Mar 2003, p. 37.
218 See: Germany: new immigration law. Migration News [Online]. Apr 2002: 9(4) [Accessed 05.07.02]. 
<http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/Archive_MN/apr_2002-08mn.html>
219 See: Frage: ,,K6nnen Sie sich vorstellen, selbst bei einer solchen Initiative mitzumachen oder Ihre 
Unterschrift zu geben oder etwas zu spenden, oder ist das nichts fur Sie, halten Sie sich aus politischen 
Aktionen lieber raus?" Cited from: Initiativen gegen Fremdenfeindlichkeit. November 2000. 4. 
Einwanderung und Auslander. Die Nation. In: Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, R. (eds). Allensbacher 
Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1998-2002 Band 11. op. cit., p. 588. (Method: random sample survey).
220 From 10.12.01-13.12.01, Forsa surveyed Germans over the age of 14 by means of a random choice 
computer-assisted telephone poll. See: "Vorbehalte gegen die Zuwanderung spezifischer 
Auslandergruppen." In: Meinungen zur Einwanderung. Forsa Bericht P121350a/10159 Sb/Na, 17.12.01, 
pp. 11. For survey details see: Ibid., p. 3.
See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002, Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg. 4.000 ed. Hamburg: Behorde fur 
Inneres, Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Hamburg, Mai 2003, p. 148.
222 For support of ethnic diverstity in Germany, see: Habermas, J. Die Festung Europa und das neue 
Deutschland. Die Zeit, 28.05.93, p. 3 and: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., pp. 526-527, 535.
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foreigners, in Hamburg and Munich between 1992 and 1993.223 Nevertheless, in 
February 1999 an Algerian refugee was chased then pushed through the streets of the 
eastern town of Guben in Brandenburg by a right-wing youth gang. In order to escape 
his pursuers, Omar ben Noui jumped through a plate glass door, which caused him to 
bleed to death. 224 In August 2000, a 39-year-old Mozambican asylum-seeker was kicked 
to death in Dessau within the former GDR.225 Later that month, Indian Atiqur Rahman 
was beaten and had a dog set on him by Leipzig skinheads until managing to find 
sanctuary in a student hostel. Those incidents allegedly formed 'part of an endless 
catalogue of right-wing violence', whose focal point, argued the federal authorities, was 
clearly within the former GDR.226
»227
'The regional focus of violence is clearly eastern Germany.
Right-wing violence against foreigners in Germany increased considerably during 2000, 
representing a situation that was particularly dangerous for foreigners in the former 
GDR. That was the conclusion drawn by the then Federal Minister of the Interior Otto 
Schily, who declared in a press interview that: 'The regional focus of this violence is 
clearly eastern Germany.' 228 Former President Johannes Rau also maintained that 
although very few foreigners resided there, xenophobia was widespread in the east. 229 
But some in Germany questioned whether this constituted an accurate depiction of the 
state of affairs, raising further questions about the relevance of a collective national 
identity. For example, Pfahl-Traughber declared that: 'In no way is right-wing 
extremism merely an East German phenomenon.' 230
Dietmar Henning and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in particular, complained that 
statements issued by those such as Schily, portrayed a rather damning and unfair
223 See: Brunssen, F. op. cit., p. 62 and: Kuechler, M. op. cit., pp. 47-48.
224 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht Land Brandenburg1999. (Vorabdruck). op. cit., pp. 29-30.
225 For this claim see: Germany: Green Cards, violence. Migration News [Online]. Sep 2000: 7(9) 
[Accessed 14.06.02]. <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/sep_2000-10nm.html>
226 Cited from: Staunton, D. op. cit., p. 19.
227 Cited from a government press release: Schily: dramatic increase in right-wing extremism in Eastern 
Germany. (Press Release). German Federal Government Press and Information Office [Online]. 08.02.01 
[Accessed 11.06.03]. <http://eng.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix_31184.htm>
228 Cited from: Ibid.
229 For Rau's comments see: Section VI. In: Rau, J. op. cit.
230 Cited from: Pfahl-Traughber, A. op. cit., pp. 12-13.
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depiction of the situation in the former East. 231 Even the eastern state of Saxony- 
Anhalt's Minister of the Interior, Dr. Manfred Piichel, claimed that the number of 
violence prone neo-Nazis had decreased in the state during 2001. 232 Whilst numbers had 
increased nationwide, the Mecklenburg-West Pomeranian authorities maintained that 
neo-Nazi membership remained constant in the state during 2000 and 2001.233 In fact, 
Der Spiegel claimed the highest number of right-wing acts of violence in 2002 were 
actually committed in the western state of Lower Saxony.234
In order to help verify whether or not this really was an East German phenomenon, or 
merely a propaganda exercise designed by the federal authorities to de-emphasise the 
problem of ethnic-nationalism in the west, a differential examination may prove helpful. 
A report by the BMI, for instance, revealed that the eastern state of Thuringia accounted 
for the highest number of right-wing motivated extremist offences by the end of 2000. 235 
Although the figures given were per inhabitant in each state, arguably, the authorities' 
and various officials' assessment of right-wing violence was misleading (see Graph 1. 
p. 154). At first sight, the report gave the impression that the former GDR had the 
highest number of suspected or proven violent crimes overall. In terms of right-wing 
offences committed overall, however, the state with the highest number of recorded 
incidents in 2000 was actually the western state of North Rhine-Westphalia (see Graph 
2. p. 155).236
Since 1997, the federal authorities, along with various other officials, have portrayed the 
former GDR as the most violent-orientated area.237 Yet, if the annual reports for the 
protection of the constitution by the BMI are examined between 1997 and 2000, most 
right-wing violence took place not in the new Lander of eastern Germany, but in the 
western Lander. So, with the exceptions of the former eastern states of Saxony and 
Saxony-Anhalt in 1998, along with Berlin, the western Land of North Rhine-Westphalia 
actually accounted for the highest overall total of right-extremist offences between 1997
231 See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., p. 13234 and: Henning, D. Germany: 
violence against foreigners increases by 40 percent. World Socialist Web Site [Online]. 27.02.01 
[Accessed 21.06.02]. <http://www.wsws.org/articles/200l/feb2001/germ-f27_pm.shtml>
232 See: Vorwort. In: Sachsen-Anhalt Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001. op. cit.
233 See: Extremismusbericht 2001. Schwerin: Innenministerium Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 2001, p. 5.
234 See: Neumann, C., Robel, S. and Stark, H. ,,Ab in den Untergrund." Rechtsextreme. Der Spiegel, 
22.09.03 (39), p. 45.
235 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000. op. cit., pp. 36, 39.
236 See: Ibid., p. 35.
237 See: Schily: dramatic increase in right-wing extremism in Eastern Germany, op. cit. See also press 
release: Bundestagsprasident Wolfgang Thierse dankt fur Ignatz-Bubis-Preis. op. cit.
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and 2000 (see Graph 2. p. 155 and Graph 3. p. 156).238 Therefore, the highest level of 
xenophobia was, arguably, within the old Lander not the new - since the old Lander had 
the highest population concentration. In 2002, Germany had a population of 82 million 
people, with roughly 15 million residing in eastern Germany.2, 239
'Compared to western Germany, right-wing radicalism bears a more brutal visage in the 
east.' 240 That was the assessment of the situation in the former GDR by the then SPD 
President of the Federal Parliament, Wolfgang Thierse, in January 2001. In the 2000 
Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Brandenburg's CDU 
Minister of the Interior, Jorg Schonbohm, went even further, stating the increase in 
'physical assaults on foreigners had been committed with particular contempt for 
mankind'. 241 Nonetheless, there was also, arguably, an equally vicious catalogue of 
right-wing motivated incidents occurring in the western Lander.
In the northern state of Schleswig-Holstein, a Turkish mosque was firebombed in July 
2000.242 Later that year, right-wingers in Ludwigshafen in the Rhineland-Palatinate 
threw Molotov cocktails into a house for refugees.243 In Wolfenbiittel, near Brunswick, 
right-wing extremists in three waves of attacks threw 16 Molotov cocktails into the 
living quarters of a German-Turkish cultural club in November 2002. 244 There was also 
a host of similar incidents that the federal authorities failed to take into account in their 
assessment of xenophobia, preferring instead to focus on events in the former GDR. 245
Speaking in 1996, Brandenburg's Minister of the Interior, Alwin Ziel, also expressed 
particular concern about the 'incredibly blatant nature of right-wing acts of violence 5 . 
According to Ziel, for instance, 517 offences were recorded in Brandenburg by the end 
of 1996, whereas in 1995 the figure was 444. 246 More recently in 2000, the BMI also
238 For acts of violence with proven or suspected right-wing extremist background since 1997 both per 
inhabitant and per Land, (corroborating the claim that the western Lander had the highest right-wing 
offences in absolute terms), see Verfassungsschutzbericht 1998. Berlin/Bonn: Bundesministerium des 
Innern, 1998, pp. 21-25 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000. op. cit., pp. 35-36, 39.
239 See: Schulte-Peevers, A. et al. Lonely Planet Germany. 3 rd ed. Melbourne/Oakland/London/Paris: 
Lonely Planet Publications, 2002, p. 51.
240 Cited from press release: Bundestagsprasident Wolfgang Thierse dankt fur Ignatz-Bubis-Preis. op. cit.
241 Cited from: Taglich eine Straftat von Rechten in Brandenburg. Suddeutsche Zeitung, 28.04.01, p. 6.
242 See: Bundeskriminalamt wamt vor Eskalation rechtsextremer Gewalt. Berliner Zeitung, 24.07.00, p. 7.
243 See: Redler, L. op. cit.
244 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002, Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, op. cit., p. 149.
245 See: Atkinson, G. op. cit. and: Chronik rechtsextremer Gewalt seit der Wiedervereinigung. Eine 
Dokumentation von Jochen Arntz. Amnesty International in Munchen und Oberbayern [Online]. 
[Accessed 26.10.05]. <http://www.airmesty-muenchen.de/asyl/geschichte/asyl j;luonik90-93.htrnl>
246 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 164.
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claimed there was a readiness to use violence that was particularly apparent in the 
former GDR.247 For example, at Eberswalde in Brandenburg, near the Polish border, 
right-wing extremists assaulted two passers-by because they refused to return the Hitler 
salute.248 Evidence suggested, however, that this so-called 'blatant' xenophobia was by 
no means merely the preserve of the former GDR. 249
In the Bavarian town of Kolbermoor in 1999, a 35-year-old Mozambican was killed 
after a car-parking dispute.250 On 18 January 2002, in the residential area of Sulldorf in 
Hamburg, two young men were seen giving the Hitler salute. When challenged by three 
pedestrians to refrain from this behaviour, they were immediately set-upon one of 
them incurring serious head-wounds. On 3 August 2002, a man of Southern European 
appearance was told to 'get out' of Germany and was beaten to the ground, suffering 
fractured ribs. A passer-by who attempted to help was kicked away.251 It was significant 
that these incidents occurred in broad daylight within western states - not those of the 
new Lander.
Along with his allegations that xenophobia was particularly brutal in the east, Wolfgang 
Thierse maintained the skinhead scene was a reflection of the youth culture in the 
former GDR.252 Following Thierse, the BMI also claimed that the majority of skinheads 
were found in eastern Germany, with large groups operating in Thuringia, Saxony and 
Brandenburg.253 Indicative, however, of the extent of right-wing skinhead groups 
throughout Germany, were reports of increases in skinhead membership from 1998 to 
2000 in three of the old Lander.  Commenting on the neglected topic of female 
attitudes towards foreigners, Gertrud Siller argued that during the 1990s, women's 
opinions of asylum-seekers were marked by a similar degree of contempt and hostility 
to that expressed by males. 255 During 2001 and 2002, for example, female membership
247 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000. op. cit., pp. 24-25.
248 See: ,,National befreite Zonen." op. cit., p. 52. See also: Verfassungsschutzbericht Land Brandenburg 
1998. 7.500 ed. Potsdam: Ministerium des Innern des Landes Brandenburg, Jun 1999, pp. 19-20.
249 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 164.
250 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999 Bayern. Miinchen: Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, 
Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Bayern, Mar 2000, p. 3.
251 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002, Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, op. cit., p. 151.
252 See press release: Bundestagsprasident Wolfgang Thierse dankt fur Ignatz-Bubis-Preis. op. cit.
253 See: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 1999. Berlin/Bonn: Federal 
Ministry of the Interior, Jun 2000, p. 24.
254 For increases in membership of militant skinheads in three western Lander, see: Bericht der 
Landsregierung Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000. Schleswig-Holsteinischer Landtag, op. cit., p. 33 and: 
Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. op. cit., p. 19. See also: 
Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 Bayern. op. cit., p. 25.
255 See: Schonwalder, K. Right-wing extremism and racist violence in Germany, op. cit., p. 454.
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of right-wing comradeships was higher than that of skinhead groups in the western state 
of Lower Saxony. 256
Further indicative of the federal authorities' portrayal of xenophobia as a particularly 
eastern problem were, arguably, the following comments made by the Schily-appointed 
21-member Immigration Commission. According to the Immigration Commission, East 
Germans had a higher tendency towards xenophobia than West Germans. 257 Warning 
against tolerating a climate in which right-extremism could thrive, the authorities of the 
western state of North Rhine-Westphalia claimed xenophobic acts of violence were 
becoming increasingly 'socially acceptable' in the region.258
Copycat Offences?259
Reciprocal allegations between the media and Bundestag political elite about the 
coverage and exposure of xenophobia raised further questions about the relevance of a 
comprehensive, collective German national identity. Highlighting an apparent mutual 
animosity between the media and the authorities, newspapers, such as the Suddeutsche 
Zeitung, the Tagesspiegel, the Frankfurter Rundschau, and the news magazine Stern, all 
accused the German authorities of deliberately keeping silent or playing down right- 
wing acts of violence and offences.
In 1998, for example, Brandenburg's Ministry of the Interior instructed local police to 
keep silent about right-wing graffiti in former concentration camps, claimed the 
Suddeutsche Zeitung. According to the Suddeutsche Zeitung, the Potsdam Ministry of 
the Interior feared such news coverage would only incite copycat offences - a fear that 
was also shared by the BMI. 'In view of statements advocating the use of violence [...] 
groups could feel inclined to copycat attacks which meet with a keen response among 
the media', noted the BMI. 260 Instead of the official number of 36 xenophobic murders, 
as claimed by the federal authorities, according to the Tagesspiegel, there were 93
256 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002 Niedersachsen. op. cit., p. 15.
257 For claims by the Immigration Commission, see: Structuring immigration. Fostering integration. 
Report by the Independent Commission on Migration to Germany. Berlin: Federal Ministry of the 
Interior, 04.07.01, p. 240. 
258 Cited from: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. op. cit., pp. 9-10.
259 See: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 1999. op. cit., pp. 23-24.
260 See: Nazi-Schmierereien sollen verschwiegen werden. Suddeutsche Zeitung, 25.07.98, p. 7. For 
statement by the BMI see: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 1999. op. 
cit., pp. 23-24.
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deaths as a result of right-wing extremist violence since 1990. Other publications, such 
as the Frankfurter Rundschau and Stern, claimed the figure was more likely to have 
been between 97 and 99 deaths resulting from racist attacks.261 Whatever the precise 
figures, in a BMI press release Schily maintained that the figures were not half so bad as 
the media had portrayed: 'Our records show that from 1990 to July 2000 a total of 36 
people were killed as a result of acts of violence motivated by right-wing extremism.' 262
On the other hand, the federal authorities accused the media of exacerbating the 
situation by over-dramatising it. 'Nationalist liberated zones' was a term employed and 
abused too often by the media, judging by the response from representatives of the 
Bundestag and head of the employment agency for foreigners in East Germany Anetta 
Kahane. 'Nationalist liberated zones' was an expression used by right-wing extremists 
to refer to areas in which foreigners and minorities were subject to almost daily attack 
by neo-Nazis. German police often warned that they could not guarantee the safety of 
foreigners who strayed into them at night. 263 Long-standing expert of the neo-Nazi scene 
in the former GDR, Bernd Wagner, noted:
Increasingly small communes are being established. In Brandenburg or Saxony- 
Anhalt a group of about 30-40 people can completely dominate the local area. 
Such places include youth clubs, rail stations, petrol stations or market places 
that can provide a certain perceptible aura of intimidation.264
'Within these zones there is a total hegemony of right-wing groups, where anyone who 
looks different from Germans are thrown out', claimed Kahane. Kahane also maintained 
that East Germans were not interested in West German politics, or what the West 
German press reported, tending to isolate themselves from both. Conversely, it was 
different concerning foreigner politics. 'In this case, everything is absorbed and East 
Germans respond to this theme as if by remote control', claimed Kahane. Expressing 
particular concerns about the possible detrimental impact of Der Spiegel 's cover story:
261 For claims by the Tagesspiegel, Frankfurter Rundschau and Stern, see: Jansen, F. Seit der Einheit 93 
Tote. Tagesspiegel [Online]. 14.09.00 [Accessed 04.08.02]. <http://www.inidia.de/ 
tagesspiegel_02.htm> and: Bebenburg, P. von, 97 Todesopfer rechter Gewalt. Frankfurter Rundschau 
[Online]. 27.11.02 [Accessed 24.02.04]. <http://www.fraktuell.de/uebersicht/alle_dossiers/politik_inland/ 
was_tun_gegen_rechts/ ?cnt=23549> See also: 99 Tote in Deutschland durch rechtsextreme Gewalt. Stern 
[Online]722.04.03 [Accessed 01.06.03]. <http://www.stern.de/politik/mut/index.html?id=506930&eid 
=502536>
262 See: Schily: dramatic increase in right-wing extremism in Eastern Germany, op. cit.
263 For these claims see: Germany: asylum, Green Cards. Migration News [Online]. Feb 2001: 8(2) 
[Accessed 14.06.02]. <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/Archive_MN/feb_2001-10mn.html> and: 
Staunton, D. op. cit., p. 19.
264 Cited from: Pfahl-Traughber, A. op. cit., pp. 10-11.
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The failure of the multicultural society, Kahane complained that such national headlines 
'poured oil on the flames of the generally racist mood in the east that could prove 
disastrous for her work'.265 For seven years, Kahane and others have allegedly been 
trying to support the integration and local acceptance of foreigners within the former 
GDR. Summarising her main concerns, Kahane stated:
Journalists seem painfully unaware of the effects these kinds of comments could 
have in the east of the country. My main fear is that Bosnians and Vietnamese 
refugees - the two groups representing the most numbers of foreigners in the east 
- will be driven out.266
Allegations of media complicity in the incitement of right-wing violence were also 
made by the CDU Prime Minister of Hesse Roland Koch, Jorg-Uwe Hahn of the Free 
Democratic Party (FDP) and Cem Ozedemir (Alliance 90/The Greens). Koch alleged 
that the spate of right-wing violence was nothing to do with a general right-wing 
radicalism in society, but with irresponsible reports from the media. 267 According to 
Otto Schily, the term 'nationalist liberated zones was the most monstrous expression to 
be heard in 2000'.268
'A passing fancy'?269
In response to the spate of right-wing violence in the former GDR during 1999 and 
2000 recorded by the authorities, in 2000 Chancellor Schroder took a ten-day trip 
through East Germany urging 'civic courage against right-wing extremism'.270 SPD 
Prime Minister of Rhineland-Palatinate Kurt Beck, Chairman of the CSU Edmund 
Stoiber, and leader of the FDP Guido Westerwelle at the time of writing, also appealed 
for more civil courage from citizens.271 Summarising these requests, Volker Beck
265 Cited from: Kahane, A. and Prantl, H. ,,Wasser auf die Miihlen der volkischen Stimmung." 
Suddeutsche Zeitung, 15.04.97, p. 10. For cover story by Der Spiegel, see: Auslander und Deutsche: 
Gefahrlich fremd. Das Scheitern der multikulturellen Gesellschaft. op. cit. See also: Zeitbomben in den 
Vorstadtden. op. cit., pp. 78-93.
266 Cited from: Kahane, A. and Prantl, H. op. cit., p. 10.
267 See: Plenarprotokoll 15/59. Hessischer Landtag. 15 Wahlperiode, 59 Sitzung. Wiesbaden, 13.12.00, 
pp. 3987-3989. See also comments by Jorg-Uwe Hahn (FDP) and Armin Klein (CDU) in: Ibid., pp. 3991, 
4022. See also speech by Cem Ozdemir (Alliance 90/The Greens), in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher 
Bundestag, 14/135. op. cit., p. 13141.
268 Cited from: Schily: dramatic increase in right-wing extremism in Eastern Germany, op. cit.
269 Cited from: Neumann, C, Robel, S. and Stark, H. op. cit., p. 45.
270 Cited from: Germany: Green Cards, violence, op. cit.
271 See: Leersch, H-J. Zeichen setzen. Stoiber legt ,,Erfurter Memorandum" vor. Die Welt, 04.05.02, p. 3 
and: Stoiber-Kritik dominiert politischen Aschermittwoch. German News [Online]. 09.02.05 [Accessed 
26.10.05]. <http://www.germnews.de/archive/gn/2005/02/09.htmlSl> See also: Ambrosius, G. and Esser,
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(Alliance 90/The Greens) declared in the Bundestag that: 'We as a party call upon 
Germans to resist right-wing extremism.' 272 Despite similar appeals for 'resistance by 
the decent' from the Bundestag political elite in 2000 in response to right-wing 
extremism, in 2003, anti-Semitism researcher Wolfgang Benz maintained that 
Schroder's 2000 plea had changed nothing. 'It was a passing fancy that has since died 
out again', lamented Benz.273
According to Forsa, only 14% of 1,793 Germans surveyed nationwide in 2000 believed 
that there should be more done in schools to redress the problem of right-wing 
extremism. Only 5% of those questioned believed more civil courage was needed from 
citizens against right-wing radicalism.274 On 9 November 2000, a demonstration was 
scheduled against xenophobia. In a poll conducted by Emnid for Der Spiegel between 
31 October and 1 November 2000, out of 1,000 Germans surveyed, 68% said they 
would be abstaining, with only 5% confirming they would be participating. It is worth 
noting the following evidence in the context of claims by the former SPD/Green ruling 
Bundestag political elite that the heart of German xenophobia was located in the former 
GDR. 67% of Germans from the old Ldnder said they would not be taking part, whereas 
in the former East, 70% confirmed they would be joining the protest.275
Karen Schonwalder, Jan Herman Brinks and Bernd Wagner warned that many citizens 
thought along the lines that right-wingers simply put into practice. Brandenburg neo- 
Nazi expert Bernd Wagner claimed that the young right-wing extremist scene 
personified 'the will of the people which had the silent majority behind them'.276 But, 
how credible were these rather ominous claims?
According to Hajo Funke and Panikos Panayi, the violence against the asylum centre in 
Rostock during the summer of 1992 'involved both thousands of local residents and
S. Mainzer Appell. Rhein-Zeitung [Online]. 25.08.00 [Accessed 27.10.05]. <http://www.rhein-zeitung.de/ 
on/00/08/25/topnews/r_ausl_cont2.html>
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273 Cited from: Neumann, C., Robel, S. and Stark, H. op. cit., pp. 44-45.
274 For Forsa survey from 05.10.00-09.10.00 on behalf of the German newspaper Die Woche, see: Was 
miisste zur Bekampfung des Rechtsextremismus mehr getan werden? In: Einstellungen und Meinungen 
zum Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland. op. cit., p. 3.
275 Cited from: ,,Am 9. November sind Demonstrationen gegen Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Antisemitismus 
geplant. Was halten Sie davon?" In: Zu Hause bleiben gegen Rechts. Der Spiegel, 06.11.00 (45), p. 20.
276 Cited from: ,,National befreite Zonen." op. cit., p. 69. See also: Schonwalder, K. Right-wing 
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neo-Nazis', who had taken the trip expressly for the purpose. 277 Of Germany's 42,400 
far-right extremists registered by the BMI, Heinz Abosch and Frank Brunssen estimated 
that 200,000 Germans sympathised with their motives.278 Attacks on asylum hostels and 
their inhabitants in Hoyerswerda (1991) and Rostock (1992) went on for almost a week 
until, eventually, local police allegedly 'came to an arrangement with the right-wing 
assailants' reported Jochen Arntz of Amnesty International. 279 'Ordinary east Germans 
cheered first the attackers and then the police, who finally ended events by removing the 
asylum-seekers to a different locality', noted Eva Kolinsky. 280 Der Spiegel, Searchlight 
and Gerd Knischewski also reported that right-wing extremists were sometimes at 
liberty to terrorise their victims in Eberswalde (Brandenburg) and Magdeburg (Saxony- 
Anhalt), because citizens and local police just stood by - often with unconcealed 
support. 281
Wilhelm Heitmeyer and Manfred Kuechler also maintained that public sympathy for 
right-wing extreme acts of violence had increased between December 1991 and April 
1992 in both parts of Germany, 'because of the problem with asylum-seekers'.282 
Reviewing contributions to the 1993 volume Radical Right-Wing Violence in Unified 
Germany by Hans-Uwe Otto and Roland Merten, Schonwalder also reported how 
'remarkably similar racist violence and hostility towards foreigners was backed by 
widespread sympathy amongst the population in both parts of Germany'. 283 In 1992, 500 
Germans nationwide were asked whether they thought it was worthwhile protecting 
asylum hostels from attack. As with the 2000 Emnid survey undertaken for Der Spiegel, 
there was apparently scant difference in attitudes between respondents from the old and 
new Lander. In September 1992, only 18% of Germans in the west and 14% in the east 
said they would support action to protect a hostel from violence against asylum-
277 Cited from: Panayi, P. Racial exclusionism in the new Germany. In: Larres, K. (ed). op. cit., pp. 137, 
146-147.
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cit.
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seekers.284
Apart from the Bundestag political elite, however, others have also attempted to change 
attitudes and make a difference. In November 1997, German and Polish students created 
a chain of lights across the river Oder between the respective town halls of Frankfurt an 
der Oder to the Polish town of Slubice. Yet, according to foreign student representative 
Dietmar Martiny from Frankfurt on the Oder's Europa-University, there was an area in 
the city known locally as the 'Bermuda Triangle', in which foreigners simply vanish. 285 
Admittedly, there have been projects with varying successes to address the problem, 
such as the African cultural awareness clubs in the towns of Schwedt and Eberswalde 
near the Polish border. 'We have to overcome local fears', noted Holger Zschoge, a 
teacher who ran an employment centre for foreigners in Angermunde, Brandenburg. 
'Brave words', wrote Der Spiegel, because local intimidation, such as the throwing of 
stones against the windows of his residence, forced Zschoge to re-locate to a 'safer' 
location.286
Have attitudes to asylum and foreigners improved west of the river Oder?
Whilst there have been events promoting cultural diversity, such as the 1999 Berlin 
Love Parade and the 2000 Humanity and Tolerance festival, evidence revealed attacks 
on asylum centres have continued.287 Since 1999, there have been repeated attacks on 
asylum hostels throughout western Germany. In 1999, for instance, an asylum centre 
was attacked at Kutenholz-Aspe near Stade in north Germany by armed extremists.288 In 
Oberhausen in North Rhine-Westphalia, an asylum centre was firebombed in 2000. At 
Dinslaken railway station later that year, local skinheads who were encouraged by two 
accompanying females repeatedly kicked an asylum-seeker. 289
284 A 'representative cross-section' of 500 Germans from the age of 16 years were polled by means of a 
random sample survey. For survey details see: Frage: ,,In letzter Zeit has es ja verschiedene gewalrtatige 
Angriffe auf Ayslanten-Wohnheime gegeben. In manchen Gemeinde haben sich nun Burger 
zusammengetan, um diese Wohnheime vor weiteren Angriffen zu schiitzen. Finden Sie das gut, daB diese 
Leute die Wohnheime schiitzen wollen, oder finden Sie, dafl sich die Leute da zuriickhalten sollten?" 
Cited from: Der Alarm iiber den Zustrom der Ayslbewerber wachst. Bericht fur die Bundesregierung vom 
Oktober 1992 (Auszug). In: Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, R. (eds). Allensbacher Jahrbuch der 
Demoskopie 1984-1992 Band 9. op. cit., p. 542.
285 See: ,,National befreite Zonen." op. cit., p. 70.
286 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
287 For reports of love parades in Berlin, see: Neumann, C., Robel, S. and Stark, H. op. cit., p. 46 and: 
Beste, R. et al. Absurdes Getose. Der Spiegel, 26.03.01 (13), p. 25.
288 See: Niedersachsen Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999. op. cit., p. 30.
289 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. op. cit., pp. 87-88.
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Arson attacks also occurred on asylum hostels in the Bavarian towns of Dorfen, Grainet 
and Roth in 2000. 29° Attacks continued in the area the following year. In Aystetten, near 
Augsburg, a refugee centre was firebombed and in Cham three Kossovan-Albanian 
asylum-seekers were assaulted.291 In 2003, the windows of an asylum centre in the 
Baden-Wurttemberg city of Marbach-Rielingshausen were smashed and Molotov 
cocktails thrown inside. 'Stress with Turkish children at school' was the justification for 
the firebombing of a Turkish home in Rottenburg-Bad Niedemau, reported the Baden- 
Wurttemberg authorities.292 Contradicting federal claims, evidence suggested there was 
little difference between the old and new Ldnder in attitudes to xenophobia or asylum- 
seekers.
To summarise, on the one hand, the federal authorities claimed that NPD membership 
had fallen and, on the other, persisted with their attempts to ban the party on the 
grounds of their anti-constitutional stance and National Socialist message. There have 
been numerous warnings from various regional authorities and others of the growing 
popularity of the party - particularly amongst German youth.293 During 2001, for 
example, almost one in four Germans voted NPD in the Hessian town of 
Ehringshausen. 294
Evidence suggested that the federal authorities were keen not only to demonstrate their 
representation of German identity was widely accepted, but that they were also in 
control of an increasingly deteriorating situation. In 1998 and 2002, the federal 
authorities reported 'only 80 neo-Nazi comradeships' in existence, attracting little 
response. 295 Nevertheless, a number of regional authorities reported increases of these 
neo-Nazi groups, whose neo-Nazi message, according to Hans Jiirgen Syberberg, Der 
Spiegel, and the Berliner Zeitung, was 'warmly received'. 296
290 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 Bayern. op. cit., pp. 80-81.
291 See: Bayern Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001. op. cit., p. 85.
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It was, arguably, the challenge from NPD cells within comradeships to the Bundestag 
elite's role as representatives of German identity, and widespread response to the NPD's 
anti-multicultural agenda, that formed the real motivation behind the authorities' attempted 
prohibitions of the party. Promoting multiculturalism, however, formed part of the then 
ruling SPD/Green coalition's political agenda in Germany. Not surprisingly, the 
extreme right did not share their ideals.
Exposing further dissonances between official and popular perceptions of national 
identity, evidence also suggested that NPD and DVU claims that multiculturalism was a 
menace to German national identity also found accord within some sections of the 
media and population. Surveys and electoral gains by the NPD and DVU indicated that 
statements, such as 'Germany has or should become more of a multicultural society', 
from members of the Bundestag elite, were not particularly welcome from either some 
of the media or the public.
On the other hand, in response to criticism from opponents of multiculturalism, Claus 
Leggewie, Jurgen Habermas, Gunter Hoffman and Werner Perger, for example, have 
developed counterarguments in favour of multiculturalism. Promoting functionalist and 
ethical arguments, advocates of multiculturalism maintained that not only have 
immigrants contributed to the economic wealth of the country, but that the country had 
a certain moral responsibility for foreigners and refugees, owing to the Holocaust and 
the economic inequality in Europe. Since the West German government actively 
recruited the Gastarbeiter as cheap labour during the Wirtschaftswunder (Economic 
Miracle), and that they contributed to the economic wealth of the FRG, Jurgen 
Habermas, Gunter Hoffman and Wemer A. Perger held West Germany morally 
responsible for both its foreign residents and asylum-seekers. 297 Moreover, perhaps the 
issue should not be whether Germany is or is not multicultural, but how a more positive 
view of multiculturalism and harmonious coexistence be affectively promoted.
In contrast to the SPD/Green government's generally positive attitude to 
multiculturalism, evidence suggested that Germany was only a multicultural society in 
the very narrowest sense of the term. Some even expressed concerns of the merits and
297 For these and similar arguments by Leggewie, see: Dirke, S. von, op. cit., pp. 525-529, 535 and: 
Habermas, J. op. cit., p. 3. See also: Lemke, C. Crossing borders and building barriers: migration, 
citizenship and state building in Germany. In: Klausen, J. and Tilly, L. A. (eds). op. cit., pp. 95-98, 101.
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alleged dangers of a multicultural society. 298 Clearly, it was not just far-right extremists 
who rejected multiculturalism and perceived that German identity was threatened.
Further indicative of the disparity between popular and official perceptions of the 
nation, was a sense of repression of an ethnic nationalism by the German establishment. 
One survey found, for instance, that right-wing extremist parties should not be banned, 
and another, that some young Germans in particular were not so ready to condemn 
National Socialism.299 Despite numerous bans of right-wing extremist organisations 
since 1992, 160 replacement informal networks of like-minded individuals had been 
created throughout Germany by 2004. 30°
Symptomatic of the inconsistencies between official and popular perceptions of national 
identity, was an apparent scepticism from both right-wing extremists and sections of the 
public to asylum. Speaking in the Bundestag, ex-Chancellor Schroder maintained the 
right to political asylum should be upheld on account of German self-respect. 301 
Friedrich Merz, for example, claimed the Basic Law reflected German values and was 
an indispensable part of German identity. 302 Yet, clear discrepancies became particularly 
apparent between Schroder's defence of asylum and some public opposition to Article 
16a of the Basic Law, which granted political asylum based on persecution.
Not only did evidence suggest that some Germans opposed Article 16a, but in the 
context of identification with the Bundestag political elite, some commentators, along 
with some of the public, did not accept other elements of the Basic Law. Questioning 
the legitimacy of the German Constitution, during the NPD's 2002 national party 
convention in Lower Saxony, party Chairman Udo Voigt declared that the Federal 
Republic had been founded on 'Allied bayonets'. 303
298 See: Absurd! Dresdner Verkehrsbetriebe auf Multi-Kulti-Welle! op. cit., p. 1 and: Auslander und 
Deutsche: Gefahrlich fremd. Das Scheitern der multikulturellen Gesellschaft. op. cit. See also: Forster, A. 
Die NPD wirbt um linke Wahler. Berliner Zeitung, 27.06.05, p. 5.
299 See: Was miisste zur Bekampfung des Rechtsextremismus mehr getan werden? In: Einstellungen und 
Meinungen zum Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland. op. cit., p. 3 and: 6. Meinungen zu rechtsradikalen 
Gruppen. In: Jugend in Deutschland 1998. op. cit., p. 7.
300 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004 Niedersachsen. op. cit., p. 37.
301 See Bundestag speech by Schroder in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. op. cit., p. 
13222.
302 See: Merz, F. op. cit., p. 3.
303 Cited from: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2002. op. cit., p. 58.
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Various German academic contributors to the theme of national identity have also raised 
questions about whether a constitutional patriotism and, arguably, the Basic Law, were 
suitable means of collective identification. 304 Some surveys even revealed approval for 
an actual referendum on the Constitution. Perhaps the words of Brandenburg's former 
SPD Minister of the Interior, Alwin Ziel, explained why there has been no referendum 
on the Constitution in Germany: 'Just as citizens have to put their trust in the state, then 
so too must the state in turn trust its citizens.' 305
According to a report by the former Federal Government's Commissioner for Foreigner 
Issues, high numbers of asylum-seekers do not provoke ethnically motivated violence.306 
For some in Germany, however, asylum was the catalyst in racist attacks on asylum 
centres and on refugees themselves. Surveys indicated that xenophobia within elements 
of the public was provoked by high numbers of asylum-seekers.
Suggestive of the increasing gulf between popular and elite self-understanding, were the 
reciprocal antagonistic recriminations between the media and elite of how xenophobia 
was reported. Some in Germany disputed or resented the SPD/Green political elite's 
claim that xenophobia was a hallmark of the former GDR. Reports from the media and 
local authorities indicated right-wing extremists terrorised foreigners with equal 
brutality in the old Lander  Various newspapers also challenged official statistics, 
accusing the authorities of a deliberate reticence about the actual numbers of foreigners 
murdered by right-wing extremists. For their part, some Hessian politicians and the 
former Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily, reproached the media for aggravating the 
situation by exaggerating it.
Whatever significance the national media had in determining public opinion, despite 
claims to the contrary from the Bundestag elite, their concerns about the publicising of 
these incidents suggested racist attitudes were very much the same in both parts of 
Germany. Some political scientists even claimed that extremist violence particularly
304 Some of these contributors included Stefan Berger, Alexander Gauland, Karlheinz WeiBmann and 
Rainer Zitelmann. See: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 209, 214 and: Gauland, A. op. cit., p. 9.
305 Social Democrat Minister for Internal Affairs of Brandenburg from 1997-1999, Ziel introduced 
recommendations for the prevention of violence from local youth. See: Ziel, A. Prevention von 
Jugendkriminalitat Chance oder Dilemma? In: Jugend und Kriminalitdt in Brandenburg. Eine 
Materialsammlung. Potsdam: Ministerium des Innern des Landes Brandenburg,.Jan 1998, p. 8.
306 See: Raumliche Verteilung. In: Daten undFakten zur Ausldndersituation, op. cit., p. 12.
307 Areas where this was seemed particularly evident were Schleswig-Holstein, Nordrhein-Westfalen and 
Bavaria. See: Latzel, S. op. cit., p. 16 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 des Landes Nordrhein- 
Westfalen. op. cit., pp. 87-88. See also: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 Bayern. op. cit., pp. 80-81.
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that directed against asylum-seekers - enjoyed public backing. 308 Public hostility to 
multiculturalism and asylum, sympathy to racially motivated violence and even 
National Socialist ideals were not merely a phenomenon characterised by right-wing 
extremists in the former GDR.
In the context of official and popular identity and values, such as racial tolerance and 
what being German should actually mean, there were sometimes clear discrepancies. 
Friedrich Merz, Wolfgang Thierse, Chancellor Schroder and other members of the 
Bundestag all promoted tolerance and understanding as being central to German 
identity. Despite official calls for civil courage from the leaders of the mainstream 
German political parties against right-wing extremists, public indifference and the 
continuing rise of right-wing motivated violence - particularly against asylum-seekers - 
suggested nothing much had changed since 2000. Since 2000, for example, some of the 
media and three regional authorities continued to report attacks on asylum centres. 309
To conclude, although not everyone in Germany is xenophobic, evidence suggested 
reactions from the Bundestag political elite to extremist right-wing criminal actions 
have been considerably more positive than in the media or amongst certain sections of 
the population. Although the majority of Germans have not directly indulged in attacks 
themselves, at the same time, some in Germany did not condemn racially motivated 
attacks on foreigners either.
Reflecting more of an enlightened identity based on the land of Dichter und Denker 
(land of poets and thinkers), the candlelight demonstrations in Hamburg, Munich, and 
Frankfurt an der Oder could be interpreted as support for multiculturalism and 
cosmopolitan values.310 Yet, when the increase of clandestine right-wing extremist 
groups and the need for tolerance initiatives, along with some public sympathy to
308 For these claims see: Heitmeyer, W. Hostility and violence in Germany. Extract from the 1993 
Bielefelder Study. In: Bjorgo, T. and Witte, R. (eds). op. cit., pp. 19-20 and: Brunssen, F. op. cit., p. 56. 
See also: Schonwalder, K. Right-wing extremism and racist violence in Germany, op. cit., pp. 448-449 
and: ,,National befreite Zonen." op. cit., p. 53. See also: Kuechler, M. op. cit., pp. 53-63.
309 For official reports of attacks on asylum centres, see: Bayern Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001. op. cit., 
p. 85 and: Sachsen-Anhalt Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002 Magdeburg: Ministerium des Innern Sachsen- 
Anhalt, Mai 2003, p. 5. See also: Verfassungsschutzbericht Baden-Wurttemberg 2003. op. cit., pp. 145- 
146. For reports in the media see: Brandanschlag auf Asylbewerberheim. Berliner Zeitung, 22.11.01, p. 6 
and: Hohe Haftstrafen fur Brandanschalge. Badische Zeitung, 28.04.04, p. 16. See also: Maibaum, J. 
Anschlag auf Asyl-Heim. Neue Ruhr Zeitung (Essen), 16.03.05, p. 2.
310 According to John Ardagh, for instance, Germany likes to think of itself as the 'nation of poets and 
thinkers'. Ardagh, J. Germany and the Germans: After Unification. New Rev ed. London/New York: 
Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 298-307. See also: Fulbrook, M. A concise history of Germany, op. cit., p. 1.
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xenophobic-motivated acts of violence are all taken into account, sadly, the words of a 
former West German Chancellor seemed particularly appropriate. SPD Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt maintained that Germany brought in far too many foreigners as a result 
of idealistic thinking that resulted from the experience of the Third Reich. In Schmidt's 
opinion:
We have seven million foreigners in Germany today who are not integrated, do 
not want to be integrated and who are also not helped to integrate. Germans are 
unable and unwilling to assimilate all seven million because they are to a large 
extent xenophobic. 3 "
In the light of hostile reactions to foreigners, multiculturalism and asylum, evidence 
suggested that pockets of xenophobia highlighted the continuing disparities between 
official and popular perceptions of German national identity in both parts of the 
country.
311 Cited from: Helm, T. Germans will never welcome foreigners, says Schmidt. The Daily Telegraph 
[Online]. 29.03.02 [Accessed 27.06.02]. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2002/ 
03/29/wger29.xml>
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Graph 1. Acts of Violence with Proven or Suspected Right-Extremist Motivation 
Per 100,000 inhabitants, 1999 and 2000312
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312 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000. op. cit., p. 36.
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Graph 2. Acts of Violence with Proven or Suspected Right-Extremist Motivation
by£a/irf,1999and2000313
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Graph 3. Acts of Violence with Proven or Suspected Right-Extremist Motivation
by land, 1997 and 1998314
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Chapter 4.
Collective Guilt or 'Atonement' of Contempt? 1
In the previous chapter it was argued that reunification raised divisive questions about 
who may and may not be classed as German, contested both in the political and public 
arenas around citizenship and immigration. Evidence suggested the perceived failure to 
implement immigration goals and asylum encouraged xenophobia in both parts of 
Germany. Developments since reunification also suggested that not only were there 
widespread anxiety and resentment towards immigration and asylum, but also an 
increasing irritation with official demands for continued public atonement in respect of 
the Holocaust.
Immigration, xenophobia and asylum have all, arguably, had a direct impact on the 
legacy and collective memory of the Third Reich. It was the latter's nationalist excesses 
that led directly to the asylum provisions of the Basic Law of West Germany, 
formulated in May 1949. 2
Anthony D. Smith and Mary Fulbrook suggested that some of the most important 
preconditions for national identity include a sense of collective memory, common 
history and a shared legacy of the past. 3 Fulbrook, Karen E. Till and James Young also 
suggested 'sites of memory' might differ considerably from those intended by the state. 4 
Thus, one of the central arguments of this chapter is that what some have called the 
'foundational myth of post-war Germany' and so-called 'Holocaust identity' has been 
rejected. 5
1 See: Jesse, E. Vergangenheitsbewaltigung und politische Kultur. Politische Bildung, 1990: 23, pp. 53- 
54, 57. Cited from: Berger, S. The search for normality: national identity and historical consciousness in 
Germany since 1800. Providence/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997, pp. 179, 192.
2 For these claims see: Kurthen, H. Germany at the crossroads: national identity and the challenges of 
immigration. International Migration Review, 1995: 29(4), pp. 924-929 and: Lemke, C. Crossing borders 
and building barriers: migration, citizenship and state building in Germany. In: Klausen, J. and Tilly, L. 
A. (eds). From European integration in social and historical perspective 1850 to the present. 
Oxford/New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1997, pp. 93-98.
3 See: Fulbrook, M. German national identity after the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, pp. 16- 
19, 232-233 and: Smith, A. D. National identity. London: Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 14-17, 21, 25-26.
4 See also: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 16-19, 40, 63, 144. 155, 166-169, 235 and: Till, K. E. Staging the 
past: landscape designs, cultural identity and Erinnerungspolitik at Berlin's Neue Wache. Ecumene, 1999: 
6(3), pp. 254, 263-266.
5 See: Muller, J-W. Another country: German intellectuals, unification and national identity. New 
Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 246, 248, 252.
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Although historians ceased to engage in any constructive discussions following initial 
objections from left-liberal academics, nevertheless, the fallout of the Historians' 
Debate was considerable. In the wake of Ernst Nolte's 1986 essay Vergangenheit, die 
nicht vergehen will (The Past Which Will Not Disappear), for example, over 1,000 
articles appeared about the Historians' Debate in Germany.6 At the time, all the 
participating historians agreed that Germany's self-conceptualisation was at stake, noted 
Jan-Werner Miiller. 7 In the words of one of the main contributors to the theme, German 
philosopher and political commentator Jiirgen Habermas stated: 'It was a debate about 
Germany's self-understanding.' 8
Although those demanding a reappraisal of Germany's unique guilt were largely 
discredited and their views considered 'to some extent taboo', as maintained by 
Fulbrook and others, since reunification evidence suggests this aspect of German 
history is now being understood rather differently.9 Developments have indicated that a 
new post-national revisionist paradigm emerged, challenging the post-1945 official 
constructions of German identity. 10
Focussing on how German historians have contributed to nation-building both before 
and since 1990, throughout the chapter the changing role of the National Socialist past 
is reassessed. Evaluating the reappraised Holocaust, attendant crimes of the Wehrmacht 
and pre-1945 Sonderweg (special path) thesis, this chapter suggests both a public and 
increasingly intellectual disaffection with the Bundestag elite's portrayal of the National 
Socialist past and concomitant shame.
6 See: Kansteiner, W. Mandarins in the public sphere: Vergangenheitsbewdltigung and the paradigm of 
social history in the Federal Republic of Germany. German Politics and Society, Fall 1999: 17(52/3), p. 
98. See also: Ernst Nolle: 'Die Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will.' Eine Rede, die geschrieben, aber 
nicht gehalten werden konnte. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Deutsches Historisches Museum [Online]. 
06.06.86 [Accessed 11.06.04]. <http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumente/NeueHausforderungen_rede 
Nolle 1986/>
7 See: Muller, J-W. op. cit., p. 60.
8 Cited from: Wilds, K. Idenlily crealion and the culture of contrition: recasting  normality 7 in the Berlin 
Republic. German Politics, Apr 2000: 9(1), p. 84.
9 See: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 126, 175. For similar contentions see: Nolan, M. The politics of memory 
in the Berlin Republic. Radical History Review, Fall 2001 (81), pp. 113-132 and: Deutschland ist nicht 
mehr das Reich des Bosen. Welt am Sonntag, 11.01.04, p. 11.
10 See: Ml, J. The origins of the First World War. 2 nd ed. Harlow: Longman, 1992, p. 5.
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The Historians' Debate
Although developments were underway before reunification, new approaches to 
collective guilt, history and identity from some German historians since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall have become particularly evident. In the words of historian and political 
consultant to the former Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Michael Sturmer: 'The future is open 
once again. Nothing will be as was previously." 1 According to liberal historian Thomas 
Nipperdey, German historians have become the 'main speakers for the nation'. 12 Have 
any others laid similar claims in Germany, and if so, what are their implications for 
German identity?
Often exploiting their position of authority in Germany, 'historians have been defining 
and promoting national identity for at least the last two centuries', noted Stefan 
Berger. 13 J-W. Miiller even maintained their current role was almost unique:
Only in Germany does one find political scientists regularly publishing popular 
books on the state of the nation, often with pictures of themselves looking 
diffident and angst-ridden on the front or inside covers. Only in Germany would 
a random flicking through TV channels inevitably lead the viewer to one of the 
numerous 'talk shows' in which a small group of intellectuals earnestly debate 
political or philosophical topics on an almost daily basis. 14
Not only was the self-perception of German historians as 'promulgators of the national 
idea the result of their high social status', it was also due to the strength of historicism, 
argued Berger. 15 Their commitment to nation building, or what Eric Hobsbawm and 
Terence Ranger described as the invention of tradition, has had a long tradition in 
German historiography. 16
In the alleged absence of a politically united nation-state such as France, following 
defeat and occupation by the French between 1794 and 1813, tracing a unifying national
" Cited from: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 14, 18.
12 See: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 4, 16.
13 Cited from: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. ix, 1-11.
14 Cited from: Muller, J-W. op. cit., p. 14.
15 Since historicism held that any society could only be understood on the basis of its historical 
development, this meant historians held the automatic right to interpret the present, given that they 
supposedly held the key to Germany's past, noted Berger. Cited from: Berger, S. op. cit.. pp. 2-3.
16 See: Ibid., pp. 2-4 and: Alter, R. and Monteath, P. (eds). Rewriting the German past: history and 
identity in the new Germany. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997, pp. 9-11. For the invention of tradition 
in nation formation, particularly since 1871, see: Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. The invention of 
tradition. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 13-14, 264-265, 271-278.
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consciousness, or Volksgeist, became one of the central tasks of historians. 'Ethnicity 
and cultural identity constituted the very core of the "national spirit'", noted Berger. 17 
Early advocates of the national idea, such as Fichte and Herder, drew on the twin forces 
of culture and history in order to fashion the missing political nation, which has since, 
arguably, become part of the very essence of German national identity. 18
Faced with the scattered political map of the German states, German intellectuals 
promoted the idea that the German nation was created by culture and education based 
on the ethnic community, in contrast to the political idea of the nation epitomised by 
France. In the mid-nineteenth century, Theodor Mommsen argued that the idea of the 
nation was firmly linked not to political traditions, such as the French etat-nation 
(nation-state), but to the Volk (people) that allegedly embodied a unique identity. 
According to Stefan Berger, this special emphasis on history, culture and ethnicity 
characterising the German case was, by comparison to British and French 
historiography, much weaker. 19 Ludwig Dehio claimed that: 'Historiography has played 
a far greater role in the development of the immature nations of central Europe [...] than 
in the nation-building process of Western nations who by the eighteenth century had 
long reached national maturity.' 20 Summarising the past impact of historians and writers 
on Germany in the aftermath of the 1986 Historians' Debate, Lothar Gall at the German 
Historical Institute's 1991 Annual Conference stated: 'One thing seemed quite obvious 
and was accepted unquestioningly by large sections of the public: The Germans' view 
of their history was shaped by historians [...] and the nation's understanding of its 
history depended crucially on them.' 21
Although it was not solely university professors who wrote the nation's historical 
consciousness, what seemed incontrovertible was their increased presence within the 
media after the events of 1986. Along with historians, prominent participants in the 
debates on national identity have also been political scientists - often with a strong 
interest in contemporary history, such as Hans-Peter Schwarz, Eckhard Jesse, Kurt
17 Cited from: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 8-9.
18 See: Craig, G. A. The Germans. New York: Meridian, Penguin Group, 1991, p. 32 and: Fichte, J. G. 
Reden an die deutsche Nation. In: Fichte, I. H. (ed). Fichtes Werke. Berlin: Gruyter, 1971, pp. 359, 374.
19 Cited from: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 11, 24.
20 Ibid., p. 11.
21 Cited from: Gall, L. Confronting Clio: myth-makers and other historians (The 1991 Annual Lecture). 
London: The German Historical Institute, 1992, p. 6.
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Sontheimer and Konrad Low. 22 Evidence suggested there was an increasing tendency to 
recreate the nineteenth century role of history in order to dispense with collective guilt 
and re-constitute a German national identity.
Ostensibly provoked in June 1986 by historian Ernst Nolte's essay 'The Past Which 
Will Not Disappear', the so-called Historians' Debate questioned the singularity and, 
consequently, German collective guilt of the Holocaust and advocated its 'relativisation' 
through a comparison with other genocides. 23 In the aforementioned article, Nolte asked 
the central question: 'Was not the "class murder" of the Bolsheviks logically and 
factually prior to the race murder of the National Socialists?'24 Nolte's basic contention, 
argued Karl Wilds, was that 'the Holocaust was essentially a reaction to the Nazis' fear 
that the "Bolsheviks" would perpetrate a similar asiatische Tat [Asiatic action] against 
them given the opportunity'. 25
Klaus Hildebrand and Andreas Hillgruber also sought to reappraise certain elements of 
the National Socialist era.26 Hillgruber and Hildebrand asked, did Germany initiate as 
well as carry out genocide, or was it merely imitating Stalin 'out of fear of Asiatic 
hordes'?27 Such contentions did not go unchallenged. Provoking a storm of protest, 
Jurgen Habermas, Jurgen Kocka, Hans Mommsen and Hans-Ulrich Wehler all 
reproached Nolte for attempting to equate the mass murder of Jews by the Nazis with 
Stalin's Gulag forced-labour camps. 28 Although the debate ended in victory for those 
who insisted on the continuing relevance of a 'labour of remembrance' concerning the 
singularity of the Holocaust, evidence suggested it satisfied neither some academics nor 
some elements of the German public.29
Underlining key disparities between official and popular perceptions of contemporary 
German history, at issue were different implications of the past for the present. Whilst
22 For these claims see: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 2-3 and: Knischewski, G. Post-war national identity in 
Germany. In: Jenkins, B. and Spyros, A. S. (eds). Nation and identity in contemporary Europe. 
London/New York: Routledge, 1996, pp. 141-151. See also: Till, K. E. op. cit., pp. 267-268.
23 See: Muller, J-W. op. cit., p. 59.
24 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. Children of the new fatherland: Germany's post-war right-wing politics. 
Translated by P. Vincent. London/New York: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000, pp. 102-103. For article by 
Nolte see: Ernst Nolte: 'Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will.' op. cit.
25 Cited from: Wilds, K. op. cit., p. 84. See also: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 125-127.
26 See: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 125-126 and: Kansteiner, W. op. cit., pp. 94-98.
27 Cited from: Nolan, M. op. cit., p. 115. See also: Kansteiner, W. op. cit., p. 95.
28 See: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 125-126 and: Muller, J-W. op. cit., p. 59.
29 See: Knischewski, G. Post-war national identity in Germany. In: Jenkins, B. and Spyros, A. S. (eds). 
op. cit., pp. 142, 144-147 and: Nolan, M. op. cit, pp. 115-116.
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increasing numbers of academics saw the end of the division of Germany as a chance to 
escape from a so-called 'institutionalised collective guilt', the Bundestag elite 
maintained Germany should continue to bear historical responsibility.30 Former 
President of Germany Richard von Weizsacker and members of the Bundestag argued 
that the Third Reich and attendant Holocaust were 'without historical precedence' and a 
disgrace representing Germany's collective guilt. 31 In a Bundestag debate concerning a 
future memorial to the Holocaust in Berlin, politicians Rita Sussmuth of the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) party and Eckhardt Barthel of the German Social Democratic 
Party (SPD), claimed nobody disputed the singularity of the Holocaust. Members of the 
Bundestag Michael Roth (SPD), Anjte Vollmer (Alliance 90/The Greens) and former 
SPD Minister for Culture and Media, Michael Naumann, later added in the debate that 
the Holocaust carried a heavy burden of guilt for Germany.32
Despite Nolte having lost the first round of the debate among German academics, and 
with President Weizsacker, according to Brinks, coming out clearly in favour of the 
anti-Nolte camp, Nolte and others continued to refute the singularity of Nazi crimes.33 
Returning to his initial thesis that National Socialism and Communism were closely 
related after reunification, in his Nietzsche und Nietzscheanismus, Nolte 'interpreted 
Nietzsche's thoughts on his "party of life" as a kind of philosophical design for Nazi 
genocide'. 34 Nolte also claimed the nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche advocated world civil war in order to safeguard 'culture'. Brinks argued that 
Nietzsche was one of the main ideological contributors to the philosophical justification 
for the National Socialist programmes of the extermination of certain races. 35
Although Nolte accepted the ideological differences between Marx and Nietzsche, both 
were the 'most important ideologues' of what Brinks termed the 'European Civil War 
between 1917 and 1945'. 36 Further indicative of the resentment towards the Bundestag
30 For these claims see: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., p. 36 and: Knischewski, G. Post-war national identity in 
Germany. In: Jenkins, B. and Spyros, A. S. (eds). op. cit., pp. 139-148.
31 See: Streifzung durch die Geschichte. Weizsacker Rede zum 8. Mai 1985. Bundestag [Online]. 
08.05.85 [Accessed 01.12.05]. <http://www.bundestag.de/parlament/geschichte/parlhist/dokumente/ 
dok08.html>
32 For Bundestag speeches by Rita Sussmuth, Eckhardt Barthel, Michael Roth, Anjte Vollmer and 
Michael Naumann highlighting Germany's collective guilt, see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 
14/48. Stenographischer Bericht 48 Sitzung. Bonn, 25.06.99, pp. 4091-4116.
33 See: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., pp. 102-103 and: Nolan, M. op. cit., pp. 113-115.
34 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 104.
35 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 104. See also: Nolte, E. Nietzsche und der Nietzscheanismus. 
Frankfurt am Main/Berlin: Propylaen, 1990, pp. 80, 277.
36 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 104.
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elite's depiction of the National Socialist past, were a number of articles challenging the 
singularity and damning portrayals of the Hitler regime. Fulbrook argued that: 'The 
views given expression by Nolte, Hillgruber and Sturmer had long been prevalent 
among conservative circles, but had been to some extent taboo as far as public support 
by professional historians was concerned.' 37 According to Stefan Berger, since the 
appearance of Nietzsche und Nietzscheanismus in 1990, other academics have also taken 
up Ernst Nolte's ideas.38 Along with Nolte, right-wing historian Joachim Hoffmann 
argued that Hitler's invasion of Russia 'only just prevented Stalin's war of 
annihilation'. 39 In the historian Arnulf Baring's book What Now, Germany? (1991), 
German publisher Wolf Jobst Siedler described National Socialism as 'simply an 
authoritarian system' having an 'incredible criminal energy'.40 Dr. Christian Striefler 
reiterated Nolte's thesis that National Socialism's 'rational centre' was its anti- 
Bolshevism. According to Striefler, the real threat to the Weimar Republic was from the 
Communists - not the Nazis.41
There have also been suggestions from some German historians that the Third Reich 
possessed certain modernising elements. Nolte suggested that the killing methods 
employed by the Nazis during the Holocaust were 'humane' and ostensibly indicative of 
modernity, noted Stefan Berger and Michael Schneider.42 Following Nolte, in a best- 
selling biography German historian and publicist Rainer Zitelmann depicted Hitler as: 
'A conscious modernizer and revolutionary*, concluding that his ideas were 'coherent 
and modern'.43 Lower Saxon schoolteacher Karlheinz WeiBmann also claimed National 
Socialism brought about its own 'economic miracle', such as the development of 'a 
strong welfare state', noted Berger. 44 Bielefeld Lecturer Michael Prinz and political 
scientist Jurgen W. Falter also contended that the German National Socialist Workers'
37 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 126, 175.
38 See: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 125-131.
39 Cited from: Ibid., p. 137.
40 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 104. For the publication by Baring see: Baring, A., Rumberg, D. 
and Siedler, W. (eds). Deutschland. Was Nun? 2nd ed. Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1991.
41 See: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 125, 141.
42 See: Schneider, M. ,,Volkspddagogik" von rechts. Ernst Nolte, die Bemuhungen urn die 
,,Historisierung" des Nationalsozialismus urn die ,,selbstbewufite Nation. " Electronic Ed. Gesprachkreis 
Geschichte, Heft 11. Bonn: Forschungsinst. Der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Historisches 
Forschungszentrum, 1998, pp. 23, 28-36 and: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 129-130.
43 Cited from: Berger, S. op. cit., p. 127. See also: Schneider, M. op. cit., pp. 5-6, 31-32. For the best 
selling publication on Hitler by Rainer Zitelmann, see: Zitelmann, R. Hitler. Selbstverstdndnis eines 
Revolutiondrs. Hamburg/New York: Berg, 1987.
44 See: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 127-130, 141, 141.
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Party (NSDAP) was one, if not the first, modern 'populist party', going on to develop 
certain modern favourable social achievements, observed Michael Schneider.45
Evidence suggested some of the population also rejected the Bundestag elite's 
understanding and portrayal of Germany's most controversial aspect of its traumatic 
past. What Allensbach, Der Spiegel and Forsa (Society for Social Research and 
Statistical Analysis) uncovered, arguably, made disturbing reading for the various 
German governments. Since reunification, it seems some young Germans have become 
less critical in their assessment of National Socialism. On a scale of one to six, 2,000 
Germans nationwide were asked by the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion 
Research in February 1991, to what extent they agreed with certain aspects of 
Germany's past. Approximately half (3.3 on the scale) agreed with the statement that 
not everything about National Socialism was bad.46 According to Der Spiegel, in 1995 
41% of 1,500 Germans questioned between the ages of 18 and 65 agreed that National 
Socialism had its 'good and bad sides'. 47 Other surveys revealed much the same. 23% of 
1,101 Germans surveyed by Forsa in the new Ldnder during 1998 believed that 
National Socialism 'was not that bad' compared to 13% in the old.48 Of 1,106 Germans 
surveyed in 2001 by Forsa, 47% in the former East Germany and 35% of West Germans 
said they believed that 'National Socialism had its good points', reported the German 
news weekly Die Woche.49
Not all, of course, portrayed National Socialism in such a favourable light. Professor 
Heinrich August Winkler reproached both Nolte and Striefler 'for attributing rationality
45 For arguments by Michael Prinz and Jiirgen Falter see: Schneider, M. op. cit., pp. 28, 31-33.
46 See: Frage: ,,Auf diesen Karten stehen Aussagen und Meinungen iiber unsere Geschichte. Verteilen Sie 
diese Karten bitte auf diese Skala hier, je nachdem, wieweit sie diesen Aussagen und Meiningen 
zustimmen. 1 heiBt, Sie stimmen uberhaupt nicht zu, und 6 heiBt, Sie stimmen voll uind ganz zu. Je mehr 
Sie einer Aussage zustimmen, desto weiter legen Sie die Karte nach rechts, und je weniger Sie 
zustimmen, desto weiter legen Sie die nach links." Ich glaube, nicht alles am Nationalsozialismus war 
schlecht. Urteile iiber die deutsche Geschichte. GeschichtsbewuBstein-NationalbewuBstein. Februar 1991. 
In: Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, R. (eds). Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1984-1992 Band 
9. Munchen/New York/London/Paris: K. G. Saur, Verlag fur Demoskopie Allensbach am Bodensee, 
1993, pp. 366-377, E29-E31. Germans aged from 16 were polled by means of a random sample survey.
47 Emnid undertook the survey from 18.04.95-23.04.95 on behalf of Der Spiegel. See: ,,Der 
Nationalsozialismus hatte gute und schlechte Seiten." Gute und schlechte Seiten. Die Jungen denken 
anders. Umfrage iiber Einsichten und Ansichten der Deutschen zum Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Der 
Spiegel, 08.05.95 (19), pp. 76-77.
48 From 18.05.98-24.05.98, Forsa interviewed 1,101 Germans aged 14-25 on their attitudes towards right- 
wing radicalism for the newspaper Die Woche. See: 4. Zustimmung zu nationalsozialistischen Ideen. In: 
Jugend in Deutschland 1998. Einstellungen, Meinungen und Auffalligkeiten fur Rechtsradikalismus: eine 
Trenduntersuchung. Forsa Bericht 2903/5799 Sn/Si, 27.05.98, p. 5.
49 Germans aged 14-25 were surveyed by Forsa for Die Woche. See: Helm, T. Young Germans see 'good 
side' to Nazis. The Daily Telegraph [Online]. 08.02.01 (2085) [Accessed 21.06.02]. 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=news/2001/02/08/wnaz08.xml>
164
and historical legitimacy to Nazism'.50 Bochum Historian Hans Mommsen interpreted 
the National Socialist dictatorship as 'fake modernisation' concealing backward 
tendencies, and Hamburg Professor Peter Reichel claimed the regime was 'inimical to 
and incapable of modernisation'. 51 Some writers and academics, such as Klaus Rainer 
Rohl, Friedrich Lenger, Eckhard Jesse and Martin Walser, also adopted Nolte's thesis - 
arguably this time though - to exonerate Germans from past guilt.
A 'Moral club'?52
Another manifestation of the Historians' Debate was an apparent impatience from some 
quarters with an alleged 'institutionalised historical guilt'. 53 Heralded by the acceptance 
speech from the novelist Martin Walser of Germany's 1998 Peace Prize for Literature, 
it represented another key disparity between the mainstream German political elite and 
popular perceptions of the past and national identity.
Along with political scientists, prominent participants in the debates on national identity 
have also been journalists and writers, such as Martin Walser and Giinter Grass, who in 
the words of J-W. Miiller could 'best be described as Meinungsfuhrer [opinion 
leaders]'. 54 Emphasising the centrality of their role within historical writing, the media 
and for national identity, according to J-W. Miiller:
These Meinungsfuhrer self-consciously aim at influencing public discourse, 
staging their public interventions in what are usually called the 
Intelligenzblatter. They tend to set the terms of debates both in specialised 
journals such as Merkur and Kursbuch, popular dailies such as Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Suddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt as well as in more 
influential weeklies such as Der Spiegel, Stern and Focus. 55
'There is a peculiar German tradition of Publizistik (intellectual journalism), where 
public opinion often equalled published opinion in Germany', noted J-W. Muller - but
50 Cited from: Berger, S. op. cit., p. 126. See also: Winkler, H. A. ,,Appell an die Angst." Die Zeit, 
03.12.93, p. 24.
51 Cited from: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 132, 144.
52 See: Taberner, S. A manifesto for Germany's 'New Right'? Martin Walser, the past, transcendence, 
aesthetics, and ein Springender Brunnen. German Life and Letters, 01.01.00: 53, pp. 126-128.
53 See: Ibid, and: Muller, J-W. op. cit., pp. 244-250. See also: Fulbrook, M. op. cit, p. 36 and: Mohr, R. 
Total normal? Der Spiegel, 30.11.98 (49), p. 42.
54 Cited from: Muller, J-W. op. cit., p. 13.
55 Cited from: Ibid., pp. 13-14. See also: Ibid., pp. 8-10, 16-17, 244-265 and: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 2-3. 
See also: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., p. 222.
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not it seemed official. 56 Evidence indicated that there was a fundamental difference 
between official published opinion and public opinion.57
Indicative of the pattern of discussion first established in the Historians' Debate by 
Nolte and Hillgruber, Martin Walser and others not only demanded a re-assessment of 
the Holocaust's singularity, but also rejected demands for Germany's collective 
penance. 58 This next round went beyond the Historians' Debate because not only were 
previous representations of the Holocaust at issue, but also the role of morality and 
collective guilt in German memory. 59 Challenging official recommendations of how the 
Holocaust should be remembered, in his 1998 Frankfurt Paulskirche speech Walser 
attacked what he perceived as the 'instinationalisation of Holocaust remembrance as a 
moral club' as a means of'ensuring perpetual German shame'.60
Furthermore, Walser also claimed that: 'Auschwitz is not suited to be readily available 
as a means of intimidation or even moral obligation.' 61 Or, as J-W. Muller put it, 'real 
moral claims could only be negotiated between reader and author'. 62 Dismissing the role 
of ethics in contemporary interpretations of the past, along with Ernst Nolte, Manfred 
Kittel, Friedrich Lenger and others also argued that morality and politics should occupy 
little, if any, place within historical writing.63 Enrico Syring, for instance, argued that 
some historians in Germany now claim that the one-sided representations of Hitler 
should cease.64
However, statements from the Bundestag elite indicated that the Holocaust should very 
much remain part of German collective remembrance and national self-understanding. 
President of the FRG at the time, von Weizsacker, argued that in view of the magnitude 
of the crime, any reservations any had about the Holocaust paled into insignificance.65
56 Cited from: Muller, J-W. op. cit.. p. 14.
57 See: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 178, 192 and: Muller, J-W. op. cit., pp. 244-265. See also: Fulbrook, M. op. 
cit., 155, 166-167, 175, 203, 235.
58 See: Muller, J-W. op. cit., pp. 244-249 and: Kansteiner, W. op. cit., pp. 84-85, 96-99. See also: Mohr, 
R. op. cit., p. 42 and: Kellerhoff, S. F. Viele haben wenig, und wenige haben viel zu verantworten. Die 
Welt, 15.01.04, p. 27.
59 See: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 5-6 and: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 105.
60 Cited from: Taberner, S. op. cit., p. 126.
61 See: Walser, M. ,,Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede." Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
28.10.98. Cited from: Kansteiner, W. op. cit., p. 85.
62 Cited from: Muller, J-W. op. cit., p. 246.
63 Other German academics adopting this argument were Karlheinz Weifimann, Eckhard Jesse and Rainer 
Zitelmann, see: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 125-126, 130-131, 177-179.
64 Cited from: Schneider, M. op. cit., p. 19.
65 Cited from: Mohr, R. op. cit., p. 44.
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Speaking in the Bundestag during 1999 about a prospective Berlin Holocaust memorial, 
CDU representative Sylvia Bonitz asked rhetorically: 'Do we not need a memorial to 
express the shame and sadness within every individual in the country?' 66 Former 
President of the Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse and Berlin Senator Annette Fugmann- 
Heesing of the SPD agreed. 'A central Holocaust monument ought to reflect a message 
of our shame for future generations that is an important element of our dignity', stated 
Thierse. 67 According to Fugmann-Heesing: 'No memorial has hitherto sufficiently 
expressed our shame and dismay. By not accepting a memorial in Berlin would be 
tantamount to denying future generations a symbol of our grief and shame for the 
victims of the Holocaust.' 68
Further to official demands for continued public acceptance of Germany's collective 
shame, Michael Roth (SPD) declared: 'We want to make Germany's shame clear to 
future visitors.' 69 Former SPD Minister of Culture and Media Michael Naumann, 
politician Antje Vollmer (Alliance 90/The Greens) and other members of the Bundestag 
also maintained that the theme should constitute a future collective atonement of 
remembrance. 70
In addition to recommending that Auschwitz should be the 'subject of personal 
conscience not public ritual', according to Wulf Kansteiner and J-W. Muller, Martin 
Walser and his supporters also contended that there was 'no such thing as collective 
guilt'. 71 Along with the authorities' claims that those such as Walser attempted to foster 
'intellectual respectability' to views allegedly only held by right-wing extremists, 
former head of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Ignatz Bubis, criticised Walser 
as an 'intellectual arsonist'. 72 Others, such as the novelist and essayist Monika Maron, 
maintained that the writer had not committed any crime and Gunter Grass spoke out 
against any Holocaust museum. 73
66 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/48. op. cit., p. 4119.
67 Ibid., p. 4087. See also: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., p. 65.
68 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/48. op. cit., pp. 4104-4105.
69 See speech by Michael Roth see: Ibid., pp. 4097-4099.
70 For claims that the Holocaust should serve as an indispensable part of collective remembrance, see 
speeches by Michael Naumann and members of the Bundestag Antje Vollmer, Volker Beck (Alliance 
90/The Greens) and Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig (Free Democratic Party (FDP)) in: Ibid., pp. 4090-4091, 
4094-4095, 4100-4101,4111-4112.
71 Cited from: Muller, J-W. op. cit., pp. 246-249. See also: Kansteiner, W. op. cit., pp. 85-87.
72 Cited from: Muller, J-W. op. cit., p. 247.
73 See: Mohr, R. op. cit., p. 42 and: Kunstreich, T. Subjekt, Opfer, Pradikat. Konkret, 03.01.99: 99(1), pp. 
12-13.
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Consistent recriminations against the views articulated by Martin Walser also followed 
from the authorities. For example, in 1999 the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of the 
Interior labelled the journal Nation und Europa 'right-wing extremist' for re-printing an 
interview with Walser questioning German collective guilt in the news magazine 
Focus. 1* In 2003, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) reported that a member of 
the right-wing extremist Republican (REP) party's national executive appealed to 
Germans to 'resist their feelings of inherited guilt'. 75 National Democratic Party of 
Germany (NPD) legal representative, Horst Mahler, wrote: 'The German people have 
been subjugated long enough to an atonement complex via an Auschwitzkeule 
[Auschwitzclub].' 76
Indicative of a deeper disaffection with the Bundestag elite's portrayal of the National 
Socialist past than officially acknowledged, there was evidence that Walser's 
controversial appeals found accord not only amongst right-wing extremists, but also 
with a few academics and some of the public. Evidence suggested there was not only a 
growing resentment towards an alleged 'institutionalisation of collective guilt', but also 
to a so-called ' Gedachtnisarbeif, or labour of remembrance, raising further questions 
concerning the validity of a comprehensive national history and, therefore, identity. 77
A 'Labour of Remembrance', or 'is guilt out-of-date?' 78
According to Gerd Knischewski, Lutz Niethammer and Reinhard Mohr, after 1945 the 
prevailing paradigm was a Gedachtnisarbeit (labour of remembrance) for the victims of 
Germany's genocide that rejected German nationalism. 79 Konrad Jarausch, Hinrich 
Seeba and Daniel Conradt, for example, claimed: 'The post-war period functioned as a 
postscript, a historical space of prolonged penitence for previous transgressions.' 80 For
74 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999 des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. Diisseldorf: Innenministerium 
des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 29.02.00, pp. 98-99.
75 Cited from: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002. Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern, Sep 2003, p. 65.
76 See: Ibid., p. 87.
77 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., p. 36. Knischewski, G. Post-war national identity in Germany. In: 
Jenkins, B. and Spyros, A. S. (eds). op. cit., pp. 139-142.
78 Der Spiegel asked this question in their 1998 cover issue. See: 1st die Schuld verjahrt? Der neue 
Umgang mil der nazi-Vergangenheit. Der Spiegel, 30.11.98 (49). See also: Knischewski, G. Post-war 
national identity in Germany. In: Jenkins, B. and Spyros, A. S. (eds). op. cit., pp. 140-142.
79 See: Knischewski, G. Post-war national identity in Germany. In: Jenkins, B. and Spyros, A. S. (eds). 
op. cit., pp. 141-142 and: Niethammer, L. The German Sonderweg after Unification. In: Alter, R. and 
Monteath, P. (eds). op. cit., p. 136. See also: Mohr, R. op. cit., p. 42.
80 Cited from: Jarausch, K. H., Seeba, H. C. and Conradt, D. P. The presence of the past: culture, opinion 
and identity in Germany. In: Jarausch, K. H. (ed). After unity: reconfiguring German identities. 
Oxford/Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997, p. 26.
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Peter Alter and Mary Nolan, this marked the beginning of a change of national 
consciousness that laid the foundations for a post-national identity. 81 To what extent did 
an 'Erinnerungsarbeif, as Wolfgang Thierse and other members of the Bundestag, such 
as Michael Roth (SPD) and Volker Beck (Alliance 90/The Greens), described as 'a 
labour of remembrance', remain a prevailing paradigm, given the allegations by Ignatz 
Bubis and the authorities?82
Shortly after official reunification in November 1990, the historian Karl Heinz JanBen 
attacked what he perceived as efforts to absolve Germans of their historical guilt. 83 Kurt 
Sontheimer and Nicolas Berg also criticised 'the current tendency in historiography on 
National Socialism to revitalise and sanitise twentieth century German history'.84 
Indicative of this anti-penitential paradigm change were a number of articles 
challenging what political scientists Eckhard Jesse and Stefan Berger termed an 
'enforced and excessive atavistic notion of atonement in Germany as a substitute for a 
missing identity'. 85
In 1994, Klaus Rainer Rohl, Rainer Zitelmann and Karlheinz WeiBmann argued that as 
a result of the excessive attempts in dealing with National Socialism, an inherited guilt 
complex arose that ought to be dispelled. 86 Symptomatic of what Hans Jiirgen Syberberg 
and Martin Walser derided as 'institutionalised collective guilt', were allegations that 
Auschwitz had been deliberately abused in order to permanently dishonour the German 
people. 87 Suddeutsche Zeitung journalist Dirk Rumberg asked, 'how much longer will 
Auschwitz be used to blackmail us?' 88 Along the same lines, historian Hellmut Diwald 
complained that: 'Auschwitz was being abused with deliberately misleading and 
exaggerated statements in order to discredit a whole people.' 89
81 See: Alter, P. Nationalism and German politics after 1945. In: Breuilly, J. (ed). The state of Germany. 
The national idea in the making, unmaking and remaking of a modern nation-state. London/New York: 
Longman, 1993, pp. 154-156, 175. See also: Nolan, M. op cit., p. 116.
82 See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/48. op. cit., pp. 4087-4100.
83 See: JanBen, K-H. 'Von deutscher Schuld. Warum Deutschland den Schatten der Vergangenheit nicht 
entfliehenkann.'Di'eZert, 16.11.90(47), p. 48. See also: Berger, S. op. cit., p. 111.
84 Cited from: Berger, S. op. cit., p. 111. For allegations by Nicolas Berg, see: Berg, N. Eine deutsche 
Sehnsucht. Die Zeit, 06.11.03 (46), p. 38.
85 Cited from: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 179, 220-221, 252, 256.
86 See: Schneider, M. op. cit., pp. 42-43 and: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 125, 130-131, 177-197.
87 See: Syberberg, H. J. Germany's heart: the modern taboo. What remains of the German essence? New 
Perspectives Quarterly [Online]. Winter 1993: 10(1) [Accessed 23.05.02]. <http://www.digitalnpq.org/ 
archive/1993_winter/germanys_heart.html> and: Taberner, S. op. cit., pp. 126-141.
88 Cited from: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 178, 270.
89 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., pp. 108-109.
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These views provoked understandable admonitions from supporters of the Bundestag 
elite, who insisted on a continued penitence for the Holocaust. Professor Ulrich Raulff 
claimed that whilst suffering demonstrated that both Jews and Germans had a common 
memory, 'German shame ensured a perpetual distinction.'90 Questioning whether the 
significance of Martin Walser in the disputes about German guilt was merited, Professor 
Michael Wolffsohn described the author as an example of an 'extreme and overrated 
literary figure'. 91 Despite vilification by the authorities, at the time evidence indicated 
that Walser's views gained increasing respectability.92 Since Walser's 1998 Frankfurt 
Paulskirche speech, evidence suggested demands have been growing that after almost 
60 years Germans have borne the mantle of shame long enough. Indicative of these 
attitudes were a number of articles questioning German identity based around 
Auschwitz. Christian Jennerich, for instance, argued that a 'negative German identity 
based on a contrite recognition of the crimes of the Nazis is perverse'. 93 Social 
psychologist Harald Welzer also dismissed official notions that a national identity 
derived from German guilt and a criminal past can be successfully promoted and 
sustained amongst the people.94 One of Germany's most influential intellectuals, Karl 
Heinz Bohrer, also maintained that 'taking Auschwitz as a foundational basis of post- 
war German identity made a coherent national history and memory impossible'.95
For many years, Auschwitz served not only as an inescapable and unique symbol of the 
epitome of crime against humanity, but also as part of the history and very identity of 
Germany.96 Based on the 'genocide of the Jews', what some described as a 'Holocaust 
identity' was particularly encouraged and fostered by Germany's ruling political elites, 
alleged Jennerich, Josef Joffe and others.97 Justifying the location of a Holocaust 
memorial in Berlin, member of the Bundestag Volker Beck (Alliance 90/The Greens) 
declared: 'We have to show that it is not only a question of collective responsibility, but
90 Cited from: Miiller, J-W. op. cit., p. 248.
91 Cited from: Augstein, R. ,,Wirsind alle verletzbar." Der Spiegel, 30.11.98 (49), pp. 32-33.
92 For official critiques of Walser see: Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999 des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. 
op. cit., pp. 98-99 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002. op. cit., p. 65.
93 Cited from: Jennerich, C. Discomfort violence and guilt. Debatte, 2000: 8(1), pp. 65, 69.
94 See: Welzer, H. Was bleibt im Gedachtnis. Frankfurter Rundschau, 25.01.05, p. 23. See also: 
Syberberg, H. J. op. cit.
95 Cited from: Miiller, J-W. op. cit., p. 252.
96 For these allegations see: Berger, S. op. cit., p. 135 and: Mohr, R. op. cit., p. 42. See also: Staab, A. 
Xenophobia, ethnicity and national identity in Eastern Germany. German Politics, Aug 1998: 7(2), p. 40.
97 Cited from: Deutschland ist nicht mehr das Reich des Bosen. op. cit., p. 11. For allegations that the 
Bundestag political elite encouraged a 'Holocaust identity' see: Jennerich, C. op. cit., pp. 61, 67, 69 and: 
Muller, J-W. op. cit., pp. 246, 248. See also: Staab, A. op. cit., p. 40.
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also our national identity.' 98 'Preventing a repetition of the past is Germany's mission. 
Auschwitz must, therefore, remain part of German identity', stated Bundestag 
representative Christian Simmert of the Greens." 'German history between 1933 and 
1945 is an indispensable part of German identity. That is why we need a Holocaust 
memorial in Berlin', argued CDU politicians Ruprecht Polenz and Eckhart von Klaeden 
in the Bundestag}  'By creating a monument in Berlin for the victims of the 
Holocaust', its official advocates would in effect be 'commemorating the millions of 
victims and also itself as a lasting symbol for a better Germany', argued Josef Joffe. 101
Following the then CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit to Israel in 1984, his 
spokesperson, Peter Boenisch, stated: 'Germany must never be permitted to forget 
Auschwitz."02 More recently, CDU member of the Bundestag Norbert Lammert 
declared in 2002 that Germany bore a particular responsibility in remembering the 
Holocaust. 103 During his 1998 Frankfurt Paulskirche speech, Walser complained that a 
Berlin Holocaust memorial would be 'tantamount to creating an immense concrete 
nightmare'. 104 Maintaining there must be no public renunciation of collective 
remembrance, responding to Walser's 1998 Frankfurt Paulskirche speech, President of 
the FRG at the time, Roman Herzog, insisted that 'without Auschwitz no ethics are 
possible'. 105
Summarising the aftermath and implications of Walser's 1998 Frankfurt Paulskirche 
speech for German collective memory, Thomas Assheuer appears to have exposed 
another key dissonance between official and popular perceptions of the Holocaust. 
According to Assheuer, official and academic reactions to Walser's Paulskirche speech 
clearly demonstrated that national identity was being played out between a 
'bundesrepublikanische Schuldkultur' (official culture of shame) and discursive 
remembrance. 106 Or, in other words, collective memory and identity were being
98 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/48. op. cit., p. 4100.
99 Cited from: Ibid., pp. 4107-4108.
100 Cited from: 7&W., p. 4146.
101 Cited from: Kansteiner, W. op. cit., p. 85.
102 Cited from: Augstein, R. op. cit., p. 32. See also: Click, J. K. What does it mean to normalize the past? 
Official memory in German politics since 1989. Social Science History, Winter 1998: 22(4), pp. 553-554.
103 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/245. Stenographischer Bericht 245 Sitzung. 
Berlin, 27.06.02, p. 24760.
104 See: Mohr, R. op. cit., pp. 42-43.
105 Cited from: Ohland, A. Was heiflt normal nach Auschwitz? Sonntagsblatt [Online]. 27.11.98 (48) 
[Accessed 12.12.05]. <http://www.sonntagsblatt.de/artikel/1998/48/48-s.3.htm>
106 Cited from: Assheuer, T. Ein normaler Staat? Die Zeit [Online]. 1998 (47) [Accessed 20.12.05]. 
<http://zeus.zeit.de/text/archiv/1998/47/199847.normalitaet_.xml>
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contested between an official identity of atonement and revisionist anti-penitential 
identity.
With the gates of Auschwitz in the foreground, forming the basis of a series of articles, 
the 1998 front cover issue of the German news weekly Der Spiegel asked: 'Is 
Germany's guilt over?"07 There have also been allegations of a growing 
'Zerknirschungsmentalitaf, or a 'mentality of remorseful rumination', from what some 
political commentators described as 'the silent majority'. 108 Implying a former public 
reticence and acceptance of collective atonement, according to Michael Geyer: 'When 
Martin Walser expressed his unease about a culture of German contrition he publicly 
expressed a popular German sentiment that had only previously been heard privately." 09 
It was in this context that Rudolf Augstein, Reinhard Mohr and Die Welt claimed that 
Walser's 1998 Frankfurt Paulskirche speech broke a former taboo, openly challenging 
official demands for German collective atonement. 110 hi the aftermath of Walser's 
speech, the first real signs of open public hostility to official demands of collective 
responsibility and atonement became apparent." 1
Augstein, for example, interpreted Walser's reference to an earlier silent disregard of 
the persecution of the Jews as indicative of a blatant indifference 'now increasingly 
prevalent in Germany'. 112 According to J-W. Miiller: 'While everybody present at 
Walser's speech offered a rapturous standing ovation, Ignatz Bubis and his wife alone 
had remained seated and silent." 13 During his Frankfurt Paulskirche speech, Martin 
Walser also condemned those who had allegedly 'instrumentalised' the Holocaust in 
order to advance 'arbitrary political positions'." 4 There were others who also shared this 
view. 'It is correct', complained Reinhard Mohr in Der Spiegel, 'that Auschwitz has 
always been instrumentalised in order to justify every kind of moralistic nonsense such
107 See: 1st die Schuld verjahrt? Der neue Umgang mil der nazi-Vergangenheit. op. cit.
108 For claims of a Zerknirschungsmentalitat, see: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 179, 192 and: Schneider, M. op. 
cit., pp. 41,43. See also: Mohr, R. op. cit., p. 42 and: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 36, 235.
109 Cited from: Geyer, M. (ed). The power of intellectuals in contemporary Germany. Chicago/London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001, pp. 6-7.
110 See: Augstein, R. op. cit, p. 32 and: Mohr, R. op. cit., p. 42. See also: Das Tabu der Deutschen. Die 
Welt, 31.05.02, p. 3 and: Muller, J-W. op. cit., pp. 245-247, 249.
111 For demands for Germany's continued responsibility for the Holocaust, see speeches by Volker Beck 
(Alliance 90/The Greens), Rita Sussmuth (CDU), Christian Simmert (Alliance 90/The Greens) and Hike 
Leonhard (SPD), in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/48. op. cit., pp. 4100-4110.
112 Cited from: Augstein, R. op. cit., p. 32.
113 Cited from: Muller, J-W. op. cit., p. 247.
114 Cited from: Ibid., pp. 245-247.
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as the separation of Germany as a just punishment." 15 Whilst refraining from such 
inflammatory language, Matthais Zimmer also contended that the division of Germany 
was a punishment for the Holocaust." 6 Along with Mohr, however, historian Konrad 
Jarausch and journalists Ulrike Ackermann and Cora Stephan also criticised the endless 
polemic debates about the division of Germany serving as a 'punishment for Nazi 
crimes'." 7 Although Klaus von Dohanyi agreed with Walser that the Holocaust had 
been instrumentalised for political purposes, nevertheless, the former SPD Mayor of 
Hamburg 'reaffirmed a German "Holocaust identity" defined by [...] "this shameful 
time'"." 8 According to von Dohanyi: 'Nothing defines both at home and abroad German 
identity so profoundly as the legacy of the Holocaust." 19 Speaking shortly afterwards in 
the Bundestag about a permanent memorial to the Holocaust in Berlin, Free Democratic 
Party (FDP) representative Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig insisted that any future memorial to 
the victims of National Socialist genocide should 'keep alive a Holocaust conscience'. 120 
Contributions by other members of the Bundestag in the debate certainly indicated a 
consensus of opinion for the centrality of the Holocaust for collective 'self 
understanding'. Former President of the Bundestag, Wolfgang Thierse, stated: 'We are 
not building a Holocaust memorial for Jews - whether German or otherwise - but for 
our own self-understanding that accepts a perpetual reminder and admonitions of the 
unspeakable atrocities against humanity engraved within our conscience." 21
Yet, according to Mary Fulbrook, 'many young Germans are simply fed up with having 
the Holocaust rammed down their throats. They simply want to be allowed to be 
normal, unburdened by the immense legacies of the national past." 22 Surveys by 
Allensbach appeared to support the claims of Fulbrook, J-W. Miiller, Christian 
Jennerich and Martin Walser. Allensbach reported in 1991 that just over half of the 
2,000 Germans surveyed believed they should no longer be burdened with the National
115 Cited from: Mohr, R. op. cit., p. 42.
116 See: Zimmer, M. From the national state to the rational state and back? An exercise in understanding 
politics and identity in Germany in the twentieth century. German Politics, Dec 1999: 8(3), pp. 32-33.
117 Cited from Jarausch, K. H. (ed). op. cit, p. 8. See also: Stephan, C. Wo Unrecht zu Recht wird. Die 
Welt, 24.09.03, p. 9 and: Ackermann, U. "Wo wir uns finden." Eckhard Fuhrs Pladoyer fur die 
Vaterlandsliebe. Rezensiert von Ulrike Ackermann. Deutschland Radio [Online]. 27.05.05 [Accessed 
27.06.06]. <http://www.dradio.de/dkultur/sendungen/politischesbuch/380312/>
118 Cited from: Miiller, J-W. op. cit., p. 248.
119 See: Klaus von Dohnanyi. Eine Friedensrede. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10.11.98 (265), p. 33.
120 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/48. op. cit., pp. 4111-4112.
121 For speech by Thierse and similar comments by members of the Bundestag Hike Leonhard (SPD), 
Anjte Vollmer and Volker Beck (Alliance 90/The Greens) see: Ibid., pp. 4086-4110.
122 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., p. 235. See also: Schneider, M. op. cit., pp. 35,43,48.
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Socialist past. 123 In the same survey, Germans were also asked to what extent they 
agreed with certain statements concerning Germany's past. Over half believed that 
Germany's alleged war guilt has been exploited as a means of exerting pressure in order 
to obtain 'atonement and compensation'. 124 During a speech on Germany's equivalent to 
Britain's Remembrance Day, the CDU Prime Minister of the Saarland and Bundestag 
member, Peter Miiller, raised concerns about what he perceived as a marked 
indifference from both former and current generations when requested to acknowledge 
responsibility for past crimes. 125 Peter Miiller claimed that whilst discussing the 
Holocaust with both young and old, he heard statements such as: 'What has it [the 
Holocaust] got to do with me? I am not guilty. Those events had already happened by 
the time I was born." 26
According to Jan Herman Brinks and others, Hellmut Diwald's publications, such as 
Germany: United Fatherland, 'met a popular need to finally draw a line under the Third 
Reich'. 127 Commenting on the impact of Diwald on German national identity amongst 
the public, Mary Fulbrook maintained the historian's other major work, The History of 
the Germans, became a 'prominent blockbuster of German history'. 128 In the History of 
the Germans, Diwald argued that 'only 7,000 people had perished in the concentration 
camp of Bergen-Belsen of malnutrition and disease'. 129 Expressing concerns about 
young Germans who wanted a ' Schlufistrich\ or line drawn under the past, according to 
the periodical Konkret, 55% of Germans no longer wanted to hear about National 
Socialist crimes. 130
Mainstream politicians, nonetheless, rejected any kind of Schlufistrich, or permanent 
confining of Germany's shame and guilt to the past, and have continued to maintain that
123 See: 'Mil unserer nationalsozialistischen Vergangenheit sollten wir uns heute nicht mehr belasten.' 
Urteile iiber die deutsche Geschichte. GeschichtsbewuBstein-NationalbewuBstein. Februar 1991. In: 
Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, R. (eds). op. cit., pp. 366-377.
124 Cited from: 'Die Kriegsschuld der Deutschen dienst vielen im Ausland als Druckmittel, um an 
Wiedergutmachungszahlen hearnzukommen.' In: Ibid., p. 366.
125 See: Volkstrauertag. Bundesverwaltungsamt [Online]. 2005 [Accessed 03.04.05].
<http://www.bund.de/nn_58936/microsites/Protokoll/National-Gedenk-und-FeiertageA^olkstrauertag/
Volkstrauertag-Knoten.html_nnn=true>
126 See: Rede des saarlandischen Ministerprasidenten Peter Miiller bei der Zentralen Gedenkfeier des 
Volksbundes Deutsche Kriegsgraber e.V. zum Volkstrauertag 2003. Plenarsaal des deutschen 
Bundestages. Christlich-Demokratische Union (Saarland) [Online]. 16.11.03 [Accessed 26.02.04]. 
<http://www.cdu-saar.de/content/pp./l 195.htm>
127 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 108.
128 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., p. 122.
129 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 108.
130 See: Kunstreich, T. op. cit., pp. 12-13. For similar claims see: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 36, 235.
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coming to terms with the past was an ongoing process. Representing a central theme in 
the Reichstag, or home of the German parliament, in 2003 the former President 
Johannes Rau held a service in which CDU Saarland Prime Minister Peter Miiller gave 
a memorial speech. During the speech, Miiller referred to the Holocaust as the 'most 
terrible chapter of German history in which there can be no space for any 
Schlussstriche\ m In an earlier Bundestag debate, former SPD President of the 
Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse claimed unanimity of opinion on the theme. Speaking 
about the centrality of a Holocaust memorial in Berlin for collective remembrance, 
Thierse stated: 'There are those who would gladly draw a line under this the most 
dismal part of our history. I believe, however, we all refuse to do so with sincerity and 
urgency." 32
Some surveys appeared to corroborate the fears of Thierse. In February 1986, 
Allensbach surveyed 1,000 Germans from the old Ldnder on whether a line should 
finally be drawn under the National Socialist past. 66% of those surveyed thought it was 
time to do so; only 24% thought differently. 133 Other surveys also suggested Germany's 
past guilt should be forgotten. According to a 1992 survey by the official representative 
of GALLUP in Germany, TNS Emnid, 62% of those surveyed thought that less 
attention should be given to the persecution of the Jews. 134 hi a 2000 survey on 
nationalism and right-wing attitudes in Germany, Forsa claimed that 65% of 508 
Germans surveyed in the former GDR and 46% of 502 in the new Ldnder believed that 
it was time to draw a line under National Socialism. 135
Since the Historians' Debate, evidence suggested public attitudes from some quarters 
and the media appeared to bear little relation to the mainstream political elite's agenda 
of a collective atonement. Official pressure from the Bundestag for Germans to
131 Cited from: Rede des saarlandischen Ministerprasidenten Peter Miiller bei der Zentralen Gedenkfeier 
des Volksbundes Deutsche Kriegsgraber e.V. zum Volkstrauertag 2003. Plenarsaal des deutschen 
Bundestages. op. cit.
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133 See: Frage: ,,Kiirzlich sagte jemand: Heute, 40 Jahre nach Kriegsende, sollten wir nicht mehr so viel 
iiber die Nazi-Vergangenheit reden, sondern endlich einen SchluBstrich ziehen.' Wiirden Sie sagen, der 
hat recht oder nicht recht?" SchluBstrich?. GeschichtsbewuBstein-NationalbewuBstein. Februar 1986. In: 
Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, R. (eds). op. cit., pp. 381, E29-E31. Germans aged from 16 were polled 
by means of a random sample survey.
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H. op. cit., p. 98.
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acknowledge their collective guilt, on the one hand, and an apparent reluctance from 
them to do so, on the other, arguably served to highlight key dissonances between 
official and popular identity. This apparent reluctance invoked condemnation from the 
BMI and from other official representatives who have consistently sought to place it in 
the context of revisionism.
5136'Many have little but few have much to answer for.
Along with the highly publicised series of exchanges among scholars and publicists, 
fallout from the Historians' Debate also, perhaps, helps elucidate the acceptance of 
revisionist themes and, arguably, public and extremist defiance to official portrayals of 
national memory and identity. 137 Appraising revisionism, the BMI stated:
Revisionism is among the most important subjects of extreme right-wing 
agitation, whose aim is to morally exculpate the Hitler regime or even to defend 
it. This approach is taken not only by neo-Nazis but also by other right-wing 
extremists since they feel that the negative public image of the Third Reich 
brings their own basic political views into discredit. 138
One of the themes falling under the rubric of revisionism was the opposition to the 
travelling photo exhibitions entitled War of Annihilation: Crimes of the Wehrmacht, 
1941-1944. Indicative of a rethinking of the past and the politics of memory in 
Germany, along with the Historikerstreit, another controversy was the first Wehrmacht 
exhibition. Whereas the Historians' Debate of the late 1980s was primarily conducted 
and supported by the so-called ' Flakhelfergeneration'', or those born between 1927 and 
1930, the first anti-Wehrmacht exhibition controversy mainly involved the 1968ers, 
along with younger critics (and supporters) of their parents and grandparents. 139
Arguably, one reason why American historian Daniel Goldhagen's 1996 publication 
Hitler's Willing Executioners became a bestseller in Germany was some of the silences
136 Cited from: Kellerhoff, S. F. op. cit., p. 27.
137 See: Knischewski, G. Post-war national identity in Germany. In: Jenkins, B. and Spyros, A. S. (eds). 
op. cit., p. 141 and: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., p. 125. See also: Miiller, J-W. op. cit., p. 61.
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Federal Ministry of the Interior, May 2001, p. 94.
139 The Flakhelfergeneration were generally those teenagers drafted out of their schools near the end of 
the Second World War to operate anti-aircraft batteries. See: Miiller, J-W. op. cit., pp. 7-12. See also: 
Nolan, M. op. cit., p. 114 and: Fuchs, T. and Wittke, S. Zwischen Angst und Alltag. Bomben auf 
Hannover Sommer 1943. Das Buch zur Serie Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung. Gudensberg-Gleichen: 
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and evasions it addressed, not only those of the Hitler generation, but also those of the 
1968 generation. In short, Goldhagen put the collective responsibility of the National 
Socialist past back on the public and intellectual agenda. 1140
Although Goldhagen highlighted the alleged wide range of willing participants in the 
Holocaust, at the same time, he seemed to almost vindicate those who claimed that most 
Germans had made a clean break with the National Socialist past. 141 Focussing on an 
'intentionalism' that blamed Hitler and a small group of high-ranking Nazi officials for 
the Holocaust, arguably, Goldhagen enabled the 1968 and 1989 generations to distance 
themselves from the past by hinting that anti-Semitism had died in 1945. l42 Whilst the 
main leaders of Nazism and capitalism were singled out as the main perpetrators of the 
Holocaust, for example, at the same time, some members of the 1968 generation were, 
according to Mary Nolan, 'reluctant to confront the actions of their parents during the 
Hitler regime'. 143 For all the allegations and reprimands against those who had actively 
or passively facilitated the Holocaust, Goldhagen seemed to imply that the criminal 
actions of the SS and police battalions did not extend to the ordinary members of the 
Wehrmacht. 144
One particular '68er who was not prepared to accept the alleged widely held perception 
of the clean reputation of the Wehrmacht, was the former head of the Hamburg Institute 
for Social Research (HIS), Hannes Heer. 145 Documenting the questionable ways in 
which the German army conducted warfare in the Ukraine, Bellorussia and Serbia, it 
was in this refigured intellectual context that the first anti-Wehrmacht exhibition by 
Hannes Heer, Bernd Boll and Walter Manoscheck was produced. 146
140 For this claim see: Nolan, M. op. cit., p. 118. For similar claim that the 1950s generation failed to 
address the National Socialist past, see: Zimmer, M. op. cit., p. 29.
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Opening in Hamburg on 5 March 1995, the widely travelled exhibition began touring all 
the major cities in western Germany, as well as many smaller ones from 1996. By the 
end of 1999, the exhibition had visited 33 German cities. 147 Since 1996, the federal 
authorities have also accused the Wehrmacht of war crimes and labelled any attempts to 
defend the conduct of the German Army as 'revisionist'. 148 According to the BMI:
The NPD uses revisionist arguments in attempting to shift historical 
responsibility of the National Socialist period. The aim is to deny Hitler's 
regime responsibility for atrocities committed by the German armed forces of 
the Third Reich during the Second World War. 149
'Political agitation from the German People's Union (DVU) party press organ, the 
National-Zeitung [NZ], against the travelling exhibition concerning the Wehrmacht's 
involvement in war crimes should also be viewed in the context of revisionism', argued 
the BMI. 150
Indicative of the opposition to the exhibition were the numerous nationwide right-wing 
extremist demonstrations. As soon as the exhibition from the HIS began touring 
Germany in 1996 there was opposition to its allegations. Some of the first protest 
actions took place during June 1996 in the regional capital of Thuringia, Erfurt. 151 Along 
with Bonn, Hanover and Dresden in 1998, protests were also held during 1999 in Kiel, 
Hamburg and Osnabriick. 152 For instance, during a demonstration against the travelling 
exposition held in Osnabriick on 9 October 1999 by 250 members of the youth wing of 
the NPD, the Young National Democrats (JN), 'three cheers were given for the Waffen 
SS\ reported the Hamburg authorities. 153
Although between 800 and 1,000 people participated in a counter-demonstration in 
Osnabriick on the same date as the JN demonstration, most of the protestors were not
147 See press release by Dr. Regine Klose-Wolf of the Hamburg Institute for Social Research in: Klose- 
Wolf, R. Ausstellung Verbrechen der Wehrmacht schlieflt ihre Pforten. Presseinformation, Hamburg. 
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locals, but left-wing extremists from North Rhine-Westphalia. Further indicative of 
support for the HIS exhibition were the following reports. On 22 May 1999, for 
example, there was a counter-demonstration in Cologne by about 2,000 anti-fascists - 
'250 of whom were members of various autonomous groups', noted the North Rhine- 
Westphalian Ministry of the Interior. 154 Provoking strong condemnation from the Head 
of the Tubingen Military Information Centre (IMI), Tobias Pfluger, however, one of the 
exhibits was firebombed in Saarbrucken on 9 March 1999. 155 So why did the display 
incite such vehement protests by right-wing extremists?
Along with the Holocaust, extreme right-wing circles maintain the history of the Second 
World War has been misrepresented to the public. Describing the protests against the 
Wehrmacht exhibition as clear indications of the national will, the NPD claimed: 'Our 
grandfathers were no criminals and we are proud of them." 56 During a protest rally in 
Kassel in 1998, Chairman of the Baden-Wurttemberg branch of the REP, Christian Kas, 
criticised the travelling exhibition for its alleged 'distortion of reality and lies'. 157 
According to the BMI, the DVU also exploited the controversy of the travelling 
exhibition with numerous articles that 'abounded with false representations of the 
Wehrmacht's conduct'. 158
Interestingly, questions about the historical accuracy and legitimacy of the display also 
arose from other quarters. 'No political-historical discussion provoked such a strong 
reaction than that over the role of the Wehrmacht during the Second World War', 
claimed Die Welt. 159 At issue were the questions of an 'institutional and individual guilt 
within the Wehrmacht on the one hand, and the collective responsibility of the current 
generation's recognition of it on the other', noted Mary Nolan. This was particularly 
difficult to cope with, argued Nolan and historians Norbert Frei and Rolf-Dieter Miiller, 
because 'the myth of the Wehrmacht's innocence' was generally accepted amongst
154 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999 des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. op. cit., pp. 66, 125-126.
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some of the so-called 'Wehrmacht generation' that had rebuilt Germany. 160 Indicative of 
a collective selectivity of memory and hence, arguably, renunciation of guilt, according 
to J-W. Muller the 'Third Reich was consciously separated from the Holocaust as was 
the Wehrmacht from the SS'. 161
Others were also not so accommodating to the views of the BMI or the HIS concerning 
the history and reputation of the Wehrmacht. At the end of 1999, accusations began to 
appear claiming that some photos had been misidentified, prompted by evidence 
uncovered by the historians Bogdan Musial and Krisztian Ungvary from recently 
opened Polish and Ukrainian archives. 162 Historian R-D. Muller, of the Potsdam-based 
Military History Research Office (MGFA), explained that the Polish historian Musial 
had claimed that some photos of alleged victims of the Wehrmacht in Tarnapol and 
Zloczow in the Ukraine were not Jewish, but actually Ukrainian and Russian victims of 
the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). 163 Head of the Munich Institute 
of Contemporary History (IfZ), Horst Moller, noted that Musial had proved that at least 
nine photographs depicted crimes committed by the Soviets and another two-dozen of 
suspected Russian involvement. 164 Hungarian historian Ungvary even maintained that of 
the approximately 1,000 photos, only 10% actually depicted the Wehrmacht committing 
crimes, complained the historian Volker Ullrich. 165
According to the head of the exhibition, Hannes Heer, 60-80% of German soldiers 
serving on the Eastern Front were guilty of war crimes. 166 But R-D. Muller contested 
this particular portrayal of the past. When asked by Der Spiegel how many German 
soldiers were actively involved in war crimes, according to Muller, there was no 
definitive answer. Although Muller cited Italian sources that estimated from five to 100 
German soldiers were implicated in atrocities in Italy, at the same time, Muller claimed
160 Cited from: Nolan, M. op. cit., pp. 121-122, 128. See also interview with Potsdam historian Rolf- 
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180
'the percentage of alleged crimes by the Wehrmacht was even less on the Eastern 
Front'. 167
R-D. Muller also had particular problems with the assumptions of instigators of the 
Wehrmacht exhibition that the younger generation that had served in the Wehrmacht 
should bear collective responsibility. This was because 'the average age of those serving 
in the Wehrmacht was 20 or below by the end of hostilities', noted Muller.' 68 There 
were also recriminations from other German academics. Historian Dieter Schmidt- 
Neuhaus, for instance, not only disputed the authenticity of photographs from the 
exhibition, but also a document purporting to boast of recriminations by the Wehrmacht 
on Russian and Jewish partisans. 169 Berlin historian Jorg Friedrich accused exhibition 
organisers of 'over-emotionalising and bungling of the facts', claiming what advances 
of the subject there had been over the last four years had, during the last ten days, 
become an apology for historical research on the theme. 170 'An exhibition depicting 
events in such an implausible manner must be closed indefinitely', reasoned Frankfurt 
am Main historian Lothar Gall. 171
Nevertheless, Hannes Heer contested allegations that the exhibition had collected 
material based on preconceived opinions. Heer 'vehemently defended' the selection of 
photos and texts 'on the basis of the latest documentary evidence', noted Volker 
Ullrich. 172 Disputing Schmidt-Neuhaus, Walter Manoschek of the HIS argued that about 
80% of the photographs had never before been released and on those grounds alone 
reproaches against their presentation were 'nonsense'. 173 Against the run of opinion, 
claimed the Saarbriicker Zeitung, director of the Library for Contemporary History in 
Stuttgart, Gerhard Hirschfeld, defended the exhibition, arguing that 'such huge criticism 
was unwarranted'. 174 Representatives from the Tubingen Military Information Centre 
(IMI) also defended the claims of the HIS exhibition. 175
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Serving to underline the continuing divisions between official and popular history of the 
Wehrmacht, all three of the mainstream political factions, along with the Party of 
Democratic Socialists (PDS), expressed particular support for the exhibition. 176 An 
earlier statement in Munich by former CDU Minister of Defence, Volker Riihe, along 
with concerns about right-wing extremist incitement amongst some of the public against 
the exhibition, formed the basis of a debate by the CDU, SPD and the Alliance 90/The 
Greens in the Bundestag."'' 'As one of the leading organisations of the Third Reich, the 
Wehrmacht and parts of its soldiers were inextricably involved in war crimes', argued 
Riihe. 178 'By participating in the Wehrmacht,' reasoned Freimut Duve of the SPD, 
'every soldier was effectively sworn-in as a criminal." 79 Elaborating on his statement, 
Duve went on to argue that by taking a formal oath of allegiance to Hitler, this 
effectively made soldiers criminals.
Supporting the conclusions of the exhibition, Gerald Ha'fner (Alliance 90/The Greens) 
declared that the Wehrmacht undertook a war of annihilation and, as such, was 
responsible for the murder of millions of civilians. 'Whoever wants to suppress those 
facts is guilty of historical misrepresentation', contended Hafner. 180 'It is disturbing', 
agreed Otto Schily of the SPD, 'that there are those who attempt to expel the truth about 
the role of the Wehrmacht in historical consciousness." 81
Whilst the CDU welcomed any historical reappraisal of the history of the Second World 
War, at the same time, some members of the CDU refused to accept the Wehrmacht was 
a criminal organisation per se. 182 Daughter of a Wehrmacht officer and CDU member of 
the Bundestag, Erika Steinbach, reprimanded the exhibition for being 'one-sided, 
blinkered and offensive to those who are not able to defend themselves'. 183 Although 
some German soldiers were undoubtedly responsible for war crimes, speaking in the
176 For SPD, Alliance 90/The Greens and PDS support see: Ausstellung ,,Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen 
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Bundestag Alfred Dregger (CDU) said he would challenge anyone who attempted to 
depict the Wehrmacht as a criminal establishment. 184 It should be noted in the context of 
the thesis that the sister party of the CSU (Christian Social Union, Bavaria), the CDU, 
not only participated at the exhibition's official unveiling in Hamburg in 1995, but also 
condemned any form of 'right-wing excesses in connection with the exhibition'. 185 
Nevertheless, an official CDU/CSU circular did acknowledge that the Wehrmacht 
'actively participated in war crimes'. 186
Following street protests in Munich on 1 March 1997 against the HIS exhibition, R-D. 
Muller complained representatives of the Bundestag 'sanctified the exhibition'. 187 
Defending the exhibition, Heiner GeiBler (CDU), for example, maintained that the 
organisers had successfully demonstrated that 'false perceptions of humanity based on 
race lead to crimes against humanity. War crimes are war crimes. They were perfectly 
justified in highlighting this phenomenon." 88
In the wake of a 'wave of criticism' from historians and journalists, noted West German 
Radio (WDR), the exhibition was forced to close because according to Mary Nolan, the 
BMI and others: 'Confidence in its accuracy and intentions had been notably 
undermined." 89 Horst Moller, for instance, accused head of the exhibition Hannes Heer 
of a 'one-sided interpretation and political agitation*. 190 Owing to 'inaccuracies in the 
texts and photographic documentation, the organisers closed the exhibition in 
November 1999', reported the BMI. 191 Chairman of the HIS, Jan Philipp Reemtsma, 
complained: 'Never before in the Federal Republic of Germany has an exhibition been 
subject to such critical scrutiny as this one." 92
Summarising the alleged mood in some of the German press at the time, Mary Nolan 
declared: 'Tendentiousness, sloppiness and a naive reading of photographic evidence
184 For speech by Alfred Dregger see: Ibid., pp. 14711-14712.
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had produced an exhibit so hopelessly compromised that it was beyond repair." 93 
Despite continuing criticism and hostility to the exposition and reservations about 
historical correctness, the exhibit re-opened in 2001. Commenting in 1999 on the 
closure of the first exhibition, SPD Minister of Culture and Media, Michael Naumann, 
claimed that the exhibition was not a complete failure, lamenting that it merely 
demonstrated the old adage that history is always a process of reappraisal. 194
Since re-opening in 2001, the Wehrmacht exposition once again became the focal point 
of right-wing demonstrations throughout Germany. 195 Following the re-opening of the 
Wehrmacht exhibition in Berlin on 27 November 2001, the NPD held a demonstration 
on 1 December in the capital under the slogan: 'The conscience of the Wehrmacht was 
and remains clean!" 96 Another took place shortly afterwards in the eastern city of 
Nordhausen, Thuringia, on 8 December. 197 Similar demonstrations followed throughout 
2002 and 2003. Right-wing extremist protests were held in Bielefeld, Leipzig and 
Peenemunde, for example, under the slogans: 'Our grandfathers were no criminals', and 
calling on Germans to: 'Protect the honour of the Wehrmacht.' m
Conversely, there were also attempts to prevent these demonstrations. Attempting to 
stop 600 right-wing extremists from demonstrating on 2 March 2002, counter- 
demonstrations were held in Bielefeld by about 400 left-wing extremists. On 21 June 
2003, around 100 masked left-wing extremists also attacked 180 members of the NPD 
and its youth wing, the Young Nationalist Democrats (JN), with bottles and fireworks in 
Schwabish Hall. 199
However, official reports indicated that numbers of right-wing extremist demonstrators 
were hardly down between 2002 and 2003, compared to those of 1998 and 1999.
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During 2002 and 2003, for instance, the average number of right-wing extremists 
demonstrating against the HIS Wehrmacht exhibition in Bielefeld, Leipzig and Halle 
was one thousand - equalling or exceeding earlier protests in Bonn, Magdeburg and 
Hamburg. 200
Perhaps not surprisingly, representatives from the three main right-wing extremist 
groups unanimously condemned the re-opening of the exhibition in 2001. Chairman of 
the NPD, Udo Voigt, attacked the exhibition for being 'rabidly anti-German and a 
transformation of lies created by obvious communists', adding it was 'shameful that 
German soldiers should be portrayed in such light who supposedly contravened 
international law'.201 In another show of defiance to official representations of the 
Wehrmacht, party-periodical of the DVU, the National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen- 
Zeitung (NZ) stated: 'It is highly questionable that figures like Reemtsma drag the 
German Wehrmacht, which made such an enormous sacrifice, through the mud, whilst 
the unatoned atrocities by the Allies are covered over or even glorified.' 202
As far as the authorities were concerned, anyone in Germany sharing such opinions 
were 'extremist' and to be condemned. Summarising right-wing opposition to the re- 
opening of the exhibition, a press release by the REP demanded an end to the 
'defamation of the German army'.203 Of course, such views could simply be dismissed 
out of hand as overstated right-wing propaganda, or perhaps as pure nonsense, were it 
not for the fact that those ideas exerted a certain social influence. Commenting on the 
first anti-Wehrmacht exhibition, for example, the Thuringian authorities in 1999 
claimed that 'local right-wing extremists exploited the mood at the time in order to 
advance their revisionist theories'. 204 Hannes Heer himself also admitted in 2004 that 
although doubts about the singularity of the Holocaust and the idea that the Jews were
200 Protest rallies drew 1,700 demonstrators in Bielefeld, 1,100 in Leipzig and 800 in Halle. Anti- 
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the perpetrators rather than the victims, were largely discredited after the first 
Historians' Debate, 'those opinions are now becoming more prevalent'. 205
In 2000, Berthold Seewald asked in Die Welt: 'Can victims also become 
perpetrators?' 206 There have been claims the catalyst for the ensuing spiral of violence 
on the Eastern Front was the Jews. Counter-Revolutionary Elements are to be Shot. The 
Brutalisation of the German-Soviet War of Summer 1941 was the title of Bogdan 
Musial's book reappraising correlations between the Soviet and Nazi crimes in Eastern 
Europe. Reviewing the historian's book, Seewald explained Musial researched areas of 
eastern Poland vacated by the Soviets in 1941 where they were alleged to have 
murdered between 20-30,000 people during their retreat from the advancing German 
army. According to Musial, Soviet atrocities enabled National Socialist propaganda to 
generate sympathy and understanding amongst German troops of all ranks for the war 
of annihilation in the East. Musial argued that German crimes were not 'infrequently a 
direct reaction to Soviet measures'. 207
Serving as the alleged catalyst for the ensuing spiral of violence on the Eastern Front 
were the Jews. Depicted by both Imperial Russia and the National Socialists as residing 
in excessive communes, this kind of propaganda further encouraged an already deep- 
seated traditional anti-Semitism amongst Poles and Ukrainians, argued Musial. The 
image of the Jews as an unwanted race had previously led to numerous Pogroms in the 
East that was exploited by the German occupying forces as an excuse for representing 
them as 'collaborators of the enemy', noted Berthold Seewald.208 In other words, 'the 
Jews had been instrumental during the Russian Revolution and following persecutions 
of anti-Communists', noted J. Giintner. 209 In his 2000 publication, Musial also referred 
to the reports by the Wehrmacht recording complaints and a sense of outrage by the 
inhabitants of Lemberg to Soviet atrocities allegedly 'aided and abetted by the Jewish 
population'. 210 Despite criticising this reappraisal of atrocities on the Eastern Front by
205 Cited from: Kellerhoff, S. F. "Das Heer der later - desinfiziert." Die Welt [Online]. 16.03.04 
[Accessed 15.11.05]. <http://welt.de/data/2004/03/16/251723.html>
206 Cited from: Seewald, B. op. cit., p. 30.
207 Cited from: Ibid. For book details see: Musial, B. Konterrevolutiondre Elemente sind :u erschiefien. 
Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjestischen Krieges im Sommer 1941. Berlin/Miinchen: Propylaen, 
2000.
208 Cited from: Seewald, B. op. cit., p. 30.
209 Cited from: Giintner, J. Unity and suffering the truth: 'reconciliation' - Germany's new attitude to 
history. Translated by K. Gartshore. GI Dossiers. Goethe Institute [Online]. Jan 2004 [Accessed 
01.03.04]. <http://www.goethe.de/kug/dos/en74695.htm> See also: Seewald, B. op. cit., p. 30. 
210 Cited from: Seewald, B. op. cit., p. 30.
186
the Wehrmacht, at the same time, Seewald claimed the author's thesis was 'in step with 
current opinion'. 2"
Symptomatic of an approval of this kind of revisionism and estrangement with official 
memory, there have been insinuations of participation in demonstrations against the 
Wehrmacht exhibition from other sections of German society. Mary Fulbrook, 
exhibition organiser the HIS and the Schleswig-Holstein authorities implied that the 
'massive demonstrations in Munich 1 were not merely attended by neo-Nazis.212 Whilst 
the BMI reported that the 1999 street protests against the Wehrmacht presentations in 
Kiel and Hamburg were 'organised and undertaken predominantly by right-wing 
extremists', this and similar contentions indicated others apart from neo-Nazis clearly 
took issue with the claims of the Wehrmacht exhibition.213
On the other hand, historian Eve Rosenhaft and the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior 
reported there were also violent counter-demonstrations in support of the anti- 
Wehrmacht exhibition during 1997 and 2002. Attended by significant numbers of left- 
wing extremist elements, in Munich on 12 October 2002, about 3,000 people counter- 
demonstrated against 1,000 right-wing extremists protesting against the second anti- 
Wehrmacht exhibition in the city. In order for the NPD protest to continue, the local 
police were obliged to remove a blockade set up by counter-demonstrators.214
Yet, evidence suggested that the right-wing slogan: 'Our grandfathers were no 
murderers' became common practice. 215 Incitement from other quarters to defend the 
honour of the Wehrmacht was also a cause for concern aired by Bundestag politicians 
Gerald Hafner (Alliance 90/The Greens) and Walter Kolbow (SPD). Speaking in the 
Bundestag about the 'inflammatory headlines' in the CSU's newspaper, the 
Bayernkurier, Hafner declared:
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With its title page describing the exhibition as part of an orchestrated moralistic 
campaign of defamation against the German people, attempts by those such as 
the Bayernkurier to discredit Reemtsma rather than the killings of the Second 
World War are worse than any right-wing propaganda.216
Kolbow also expressed fears about the threat posed to the alleged 'political consensus' 
over the theme. According to Kolbow:
We cannot ignore the Bayernkurier and others like them who threaten the basic 
fundamental political consensus about the theme. [...] It is no longer about the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung, but the attacks on those who refuse to evade the darkest 
chapter of our history. 217
During an interview with Die Zeit in 1999, defending the exhibition, Hannes Heer stated 
that from the very start the intention was to make clear the criminality of the Wehrmacht 
as an institution. Heer went on to explain the exhibition also wanted to portray the 
complicity of individual members by means of a graphic interpretation of the mentality 
and motives behind the taking of the photographs. Although a few photographs revealed 
that some German soldiers did appear to distance themselves from the executions, 
according to the organisers, these were the exception. 'Most revealed a disturbing kind 
of glorification, pleasure and even pride in the mass graves indicative within the 
inscriptions and smiles on the pictures', claimed Heer and Reemtsma. 218 Historian R-D. 
Miiller dismissed the 'handful of field letters or pictures of smirking German soldiers as 
inconclusive evidence for justifying claims that the majority of the Wehrmacht were 
implicated in war crimes or were of a general barbaric mentality'. 219 According to 
German journalists Sven Kellerhoff and Klaus B. Harms, Heer and Reemtsma had 
completely underestimated the extent of public hostility to the photos. 220 There was 
'widespread sympathy [...] with the experiences of German soldiers on the Eastern 
Front', argued Fulbrook, Nolan and others. 221
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Further to this refusal to accept the Bundestag political elite's claims of past 
transgressions of the German army and official interpretations of the National 
Socialists, were academic and other reactions prior to, and following the re-opening of 
the second anti-Wehrmacht exhibition in November 2001.222 Claiming it was still 
'defamatory towards the Wehrmacht', political scientist and Chairman of the NPD, Udo 
Voigt, derided the exhibition for showing 'wide displays of unproductive unhistorical 
waffle'. 223 German historical revisionist Walter Post maintained that only 1.5% of all 
German soldiers were guilty of atrocities on the Eastern Front. 224 Apart from such 
apologists on the edge of the political spectrum, for many years the undisputed 
consensus amongst academics was the recognition of the Wehrmacht's responsibility as 
a criminal institution, noted Kellerhoff. 225 According to R-D. Miiller and Gerhard 
Hirschfeld, when the first exhibition was shown, there were fears that fierce criticism 
would embolden the extreme right.226 Nevertheless, evidence suggested a critical 
reappraisal of the second anti-Wehrmacht exhibition also extended beyond right-wing 
extremists.
Although the emphasis switched from visual to written evidence, West German Radio 
noted the organisers of the HIS continued to maintain the Wehrmacht played a decisive 
role in every aspect of crimes against Jews and Russian prisoners of war.227 Along with 
its introduction, a section within the modified 2001 exhibition claimed: 'As an 
institution, the Wehrmacht was extensively implicated in an unprecedented racial war of 
annihilation.' 228 Director of the Berlin Research Centre for Military History Karl-Heinz 
Schmick, historian Stefan Scheil and others disputed such sweeping generalisations as 
'unreasonable and wrong'.229 Responding to the re-opening of the exhibition in 2001, the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung released an article entitled: 'The German army were no 
murderers.'  According to Sven Kellerhoff: '19 million private soldiers continue to
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profess their innocence from both a criminal and moral capacity.' 231 So too did some of 
the public, maintained Allensbach, Bielefeld Professor of History Ute Frevert and the 
Lower Saxon Ministry of the Interior. In January 2001, the Allensbach Institute for 
Public Opinion Research asked 1,000 Germans nationwide if they believed that many 
German soldiers had committed war crimes. In response, 27% believed they had, with 
just over half (52%) declaring they had not. 232 Similarly in 2000, only 18% of 1,000 
Germans polled thought that National Socialist crimes and the attempted annihilation of 
the Jews 'distinguished German history from that of other countries'. 233
Running from November 2001 to March 2004, the second Wehrmacht exhibition was 
shown in 13 German towns and cities. Although there were reports suggesting Germans 
accepted the essence of the second re-worked Wehrmacht exhibition, there were still 
claims of public opposition to it. 234 Three cities where there was still public opposition 
to the re-appraised Wehrmacht exhibition were Bielefeld, Dortmund and Hamburg. 
'Confronting its visitors with crimes that many did not and do not accept', according to 
Frevert, the exposition continued to invoke criticism and hostility.235 In 2003, for 
example, the anti-lVehrmacht exhibition was attacked by butyric acid in Dortmund, 
reported the local police. 236
Not all, of course, were so dismissive of the reappraised exhibition. Journalists Johannes 
Klotz and Klaus Wiegrefe maintained that the new exhibition 'irrevocably destroyed the 
public myth of the clean Wehrmacht'. 231 Further indicative of public defiance to the 
contentions of the second exhibition was the following report by the Lower Saxon 
Ministry of the Interior. During the final week of the anti-Wehrmacht exhibition in 
Hamburg, according to the Lower Saxon authorities: 'On 31 January and 27 March
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232 See: Frage: ,,Wie denken Sie iiber die deutschen Soldaten im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Glauben Sie, daB 
viele deutsche Soldaten, die am Zweiten Weltkrieg teilgenommen haben, Verbrechen begangen haben, 
oder glauben Sie das nicht?" Kriegsverbrechen deutscher Soldaten. Januar 2001. Geschichte. Die Nation. 
In: Noelle-Neumann, E. and Kocher, R. (eds). Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1998-2002 Band 
11. Miinchen: K. G. Saur, Verlag fur Demoskopie Allensbach am Bodensee, 2002, p. 549. (method: 
random sample survey).
233 Cited from: Frage an Personen, die glauben, es gibt erwas Besonderes in der deutschen Geschichte: 
,,Was ist das Besondere an unserer Geschichte, was unterscheidet unsere Geschichte von der Geschichte 
anderer Lander?" Besonderes der deutschen Geschichte. Die Nation. Dezember 2000. In: Ibid., p. 542.
234 See: Klose-Wolf, R. op. cit., pp. 1-2.
235 Cited from: Frevert, U. The return of the victims in the land of the perpetrators. GI Dossiers. Goethe 
Institute [Online]. Oct 2003 [Accessed 03.03.04]. <http://www.goethe.de/kug/dos/en61787.htm>
236 See: Anschlag auf Wehrmachtsausstellung - Noch keine Hinweise auf later. Kolner Stadt Anzeiger 
[Online]. 14.10.03 [Accessed 01.12.05]. <http://www.ksta.de/artikel.jsp?=1066059317414>
237 See: Klotz, J. op. cit. See also: Wiegrefe, K. Abrechnung mil Hitlers Generalen. op. cit., p. 84.
190
2004, 1,200 people demonstrated against the second Wehrmacht exhibition in Hamburg 
- 400 of whom were neo-Nazis.' 238
In contrast to what the general public thought, admitted the exhibition organisers, before 
the opening of the first in 1995 the consensus amongst the academic community was 
that the Wehrmacht did not distance itself from the war of annihilation.239 Yet, some 
German historians, such as Christian Hartmann, maintained, at the time of writing, that 
the disputes about the numbers of individual German soldiers implicated in war crimes 
assumed 'paradigmatic proportions'.240 Indicative, perhaps, of the change in some 
academic attitudes and contested collective memory was what could be termed a 
differentiated categorisation of violence in Germany. According to Die Welt, Germany's 
only Chair expressly devoted to military history, Bernhard Kroener, demanded future 
research should focus on the correlation between the violence of the twentieth century 
and the Second World War.241
Although the actions on the Eastern Front were undoubtedly questionable by the moral 
standards of today, at the same time, Kellerhoff asked was it really appropriate to 
evaluate them by contemporary value judgements? 'Compared to the moral standards of 
today, during the excessively violent German society of the 1930s and 1940s people 
could have perceived violence and crimes against humanity rather differently 7 , 
suggested the journalist. 242
A further problem, contended Kellerhoff and the German historian Ulrich Herbert, was 
the actual motivation for the crimes on the Eastern Front. Analysing the extent to which 
events were determined or constrained by ideological or actual circumstances, Herbert 
emphasised the so-called 'putativ-defensive Situation'  According to Herbert, since it
238 Cited from: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004 Niedersachsen. Hannover: Niedersachsisches Ministerium 
fur Inneres und Sport, Mar 2004, p. 38.
239 See: Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944. Controversies about an exhibition. 
The Postwar period. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht [Online]. Nov 2001 [Accessed 22.11.05]. 
<http://www.verbrechen-der-wehrmacht.de/docs/e_ausstellung/p_nachkrieg.htm>
240 Cited from: Hartmann, C. Verbrecherischer Krieg- Verbrecherische Wehrmacht? Uberlegungen zur 
Struktur des deutschen Ostheers. Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, 2004: 52, pp. 1-5. See also: 
Kellerhoff, S. F. Viele haben wenig, und wenige haben viel zu verantworten. op. cit., p. 27.
241 The Chair was in Potsdam. See: Kellerhoff, S. F. Unklare Vorstellungen. Die Welt, 19.03.04, p. 27.
242 See: Ibid. Editor of the Darmstadter Echo, Klaus Honold, made similar allusions in reference to the 
experiences of the German civilian population both prior to and during the Second World War. See: 
Honold, K. Darmstadt im Feuersturm. Die Zerstorung am 11. September 1944. Gudensberg-Gleichen: 
Wartberg Verlag, 2004, pp. 9, 17-58, 67-68.
243 Cited from: Kellerhoff, S. F. Unklare Vorstellungen. op. cit., p. 27.
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was evident that Blitzkrieg tactics had failed against the Red Army, many Wehrmacht 
officers believed the only recourse left open to them was now unrestricted warfare. 244
Chairman of the HIS, Jan Philipp Reemtsma, continued to maintain that much of what 
the Wehrmacht did was 'legalised barbarity'. 245 Conversely, R-D. Miiller expressed 
'serious objections' to the exhibition for failing to put the partisan war on the Eastern 
Front in context. In the opinion of Muller, the exhibition should have differentiated 
between victims of the Holocaust and those of the partisan war. 'Over three quarters of 
the photos were of victims of a partisan war and therefore not victims of war crimes in 
the strictest sense of the term', argued the Potsdam historian.246 'Reprisals by the 
Wehrmacht against civilian unrest were therefore within the boundaries of warfare', 
reasoned R-D. Miiller. 247 Citing the examples of the Algerian War and Vietnam, 
according to R-D. Muller, the taking and even killing of hostages in order to suppress 
local resistance in occupied territories was nothing new or exceptional. 248
Yet, spokesperson and co-ordinator of the exhibition, Dr. Ulrike Jureit, argued that even 
if one were to make allowances by differentiating between the crimes, the essence of 
either exhibition changed nothing concerning the responsibility of those involved.249 
Representatives of the Bundestag, Otto Graf Lambsdorff (FDP) and Heiner GeiBler 
(CDU), agreed. 'Whatever their organisation,' argued Lambsdorff, 'many personnel did 
not shirk from their responsibility in carrying out the orders of the Nazi regime.' 250 
GeiBler also made a similar statement, announcing that: 'War crimes are war crimes, 
whether committed by the German soldiers, the SS or anyone else.' 251
Along with some elements of the public, Dieter Schmidt-Neuhaus and R-D. Muller 
deemed it necessary to differentiate between the Wehrmacht proper and the armed units 
of the SS. Referring to the Nuremberg Trials of 1948 absolving the Wehrmacht of 
collective guilt, Schmidt-Neuhaus and Muller emphasised that executed Poles, depicted 
in three of the four photos taken in Tarnopol, were actually murdered by the NKVD -
244 For claims by Herbert see: Ibid.
245 Cited from: Wiegrefe, K. Abrechnung mit Hitlers Generalen. op. cit., p. 84.
246 Cited from: Sporl, G. and Wiegrefe, K. op. cit., p. 60.
247 Ibid.
248 On the one hand, R-D. Muller conceded that partisans had the right to defend their homeland. On the 
other, the Wehrmacht had the right to defend itself - even though it was an occupying force, argued 
Muller. See: Ibid.
249 See: Ullrich, V. Es ist nie zu Ende. Die Zeit, 22.01.04 (5), p. 39.
250 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/163. op. cit., p. 14716.
251 Ibid., p. 14726.
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not the Wehrmacht.252 Even if elements of the Wehrmacht had played a decisive role in 
war crimes, argued historian Christian Hartmann, that, in itself, did not necessarily 
implicate every one of its former millions of members. 'It is certainly difficult to 
quantify the actual numbers involved', agreed Sven Kellerhoff. 'Furthermore, Hartmann 
presented a plausible defence of the Wehrmacht, based on statistics of those that 
actually could have been present in the areas in question when the alleged crimes took 
place', argued Kellerhoff.253
On the other hand, allegations have also been made that in some cases officers and 
individuals alike had the opportunity to extricate themselves from active involvement. 
Ulrike Jureit and West German Radio, for instance, warned against accepting the 
'general inference' that it was not possible to question or refuse orders. 254 By way of 
example, the 2001 exhibition cited the reactions by three German officers and two non- 
commissioned officers to the orders to shoot the Jewish inhabitants of the area west of 
Mogilev, Orsha and Vitebsk in Belorussia (White Russia). According to the 2001 
exhibition, lieutenant Hermann Kuhls obeyed without hesitation. Following initial 
reservations discussed with his sergeant Emil Zimber, captain Friedrich Noll 
commanded Zimber to undertake the executions, later explaining in court that: 'An 
order is an order.' In spite of pressure from a superior at the time, captain Josef Sibille 
refused. Sibille was not punished at the time for his insubordination and neither was 
corporal Wilhelm Magel for 'deliberately missing his target'. Whilst Magel was 
pardoned in May 1954, the Darmstadt State Court found Noll and Zimber guilty of 
manslaughter and sentenced them to four and three years in prison respectively. Kuhls 
did not survive the war. 255
252 See: Sporl, G. and Wiegrefe, K. op. cit., p. 62. For interview with Schmidt-Neuhaus in Die Welt see: 
Schmidt-Neuhaus, D. op. cit., p. 35.
253 Responding to the claims of the HIS that 60-80% of the Wehrmacht were implicated in war crimes, 
Hartmann claimed that the majority of soldiers on the Eastern Front were front-line troops, not reservists. 
'This was significant because [...] crimes had to have been undertaken predominantly by reservists - not 
front line troops.' Concluding, Hartmann maintained the responsibility lay with Generals and Staff 
Officers - not the mass of private soldiers or front line officers that made up the Wehrmacht. See: 
Hartmann, C. op. cit., pp. 1-35 and: Kellerhoff, S. F. Viele haben wenig, und wenige haben viel zu 
verantworten. op. cit., p. 27.
254 See: Wiegrefe, K. Abrechnung mit Hitlers Generalen. op. cit., p. 89 and: Reinhardt, N. op. cit.
255 For details of these events, testimonies and subsequent trial in 1954 of the two remaining defendants 
Karl Friedrich Noll and Emil Zimber see: Options for action. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht [Online]. Nov 
2001 [Accessed 22.11.05]. <http://www.verbrechen-der-wehrmacht.de/docs/e_ausstellung/ 
p_handlung.htm> and: Introduction. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht [Online]. 
Nov 2001 [Accessed 14.11.05]. <http://www.verbrechen-der-wehrmacht.de/docs/e_ausstellung/ 
p_ausstellung.htm>
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Exposing further divisions between official and popular perceptions of the Wehrmacht 
was the dispute between the authorities and citizens of the north German town of 
Buxtehude, situated west of Hamburg, concerning a commemorative plaque. 
Celebrating the surrender of the town and its barracks to the British in April 1945, in 
May 2003 a commemorative stone was set honouring the German officers whose 
actions prevented the bloodshed of German soldiers and civilians. 256 Survivors of the 
Second World War Hans-Georg Freudenthal, Richert Rischkau, Jiirgen Schwarz, Hans- 
Peter Berger and Bodo Klages had been waiting many years for a monument to the 
salvation of their 'fairy-tale town' of Buxtehude.257 According to the Stade branch of the 
Union of Anti-Fascists (VVN-BdA) and local newspaper the Buxtehuder Tageblatt, the 
initial inscription on the memorial stone read:
On the 22 April 1945 the barracks and town of Buxtehude were handed over 
peacefully to British troops. With great risk to their lives, rear admiral Siegfried 
Engel, captains Alexander Magnus, Hans Haverkamp and lieutenant Karl 
Halaski successfully prevented civilian casualties and the destruction of the town.258
Following Internet allegations from the Independent Perspective Communication web 
site (PUK) and Stade VVN-BdA that the officers were guilty of war crimes, however, 
two weeks after the official unveiling, the plaque was removed.259
During his capacity as Second Admiral of the North Sea between 1943 and 1945, rear 
admiral Siegfried Engel was alleged to have sentenced 54 German naval deserters to 
death. Another, sea captain Alexander Magnus, was accused of having procured 
transport for the deportation of Jews from Corfu and having been involved in the 
execution of ten hostages in Greece during 1944.260 'It was on those grounds that 
investigations were renewed', noted the Stade branch of the VVN-BdA. 'Should 
research reveal sufficient evidence for the allegations, then the stone must be removed',
256 See: Buxtehuder Politik zieht Schlussstrich. Tageblatt Online (Stader Buxtehuder Altlander) [Online]. 03.01.04 [Accessed 07.11.05]. <http://www.tageblatt.de/db/Druckvorschau.cfm?DID=141190>
257 Bin gewaltiger Findling fur den Friedensplatz. Wochenblatt neue Stader. VVN-BdA Kreisvereinigung 
Stade [Online]. 12.03.03 [Accessed 21.11.05]. <http://www.stade.wn-bda.de/bux04.htm>
258 See: Bin gewaltiger Findling fur den Friedensplatz. op. cit.
259 See: Wisser, K. Ehrentafel fur Offiziere abgebaut. Hamburger Abendblatt Harburg/Landkreise [Online]. 10.06.03 [Accessed 05.12.05]. <http://www.abendblatt.de/daten/2003/06/10/174497.html>
260 See: Ruprecht, U. NS-Admiral verhangte Todesurteile iiber Deserteure - und wird fur sein Fahenflucht 
geehrt. Puk.de Politik und Kultur (perspective unabhdngige kommunikation) [Online]. 15.07.00 [Accessed 01.12.05]. <http://www.puk.de/puk/print.php?sid=386> and: WN-BdA Vereinigung der 
Verfolgten des Naziregimes Bund der Antifaschisten. Neofaschismus-Kommission KUSTE [Online]. [Accessed 24.04.06]. <http://www.kueste.wn-bda.de/index.html7/Seiten/unterseiten2005/welskopf.html>
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announced the Head of the local SPD faction, Hans-Uwe Hansen.261 When the 
allegations of misconduct against the officers were first investigated in 2000, head of 
the town archives, Bernd Utermohlen, reported there was nothing against the four 
officers in question. Apparently upholding the reputation of the officers, Utermohlen 
stated: 'The town cannot act merely on the claims of a few newspaper articles.' 2'262
Under pressure from the local authorities, however, Utermohlen reluctantly resumed 
research on whether there was actually anything to incriminate the officers. Along with 
Buxtehude archives, Hans-Peter Berger also opposed calls for a critical reappraisal of 
the Wehrmacht. 'This commemoration is about former events in Buxtehude and not 
about a reappraisal of the Second World War. That belongs to other places', stated the 
head of Buxtehude's regional development agency.263
As far as the federal archives and the local mainstream parties in Buxtehude were 
concerned, this apparent acceptance of past events and commemoration of those 
involved was unacceptable. Commenting on developments in May 2003, local SPD 
representative Hans-Uwe Hansen declared: 'What I find particularly disturbing is that a 
memorial plaque bears the name of suspected war criminals.' 264 According to the 
Buxtehuder Tageblatt and the Stade VVN-BdA, local Chairman of the Alliance 90/The 
Greens, Joachim Buttler, was also 'on the same wavelength as Hansen'. Critical of any 
memorial to former combatants, Buttler argued that: 'Having a memorial stone for war 
criminals serves no purpose, irrespective of whether the officers were on the right side 
in the end or not.' 265 Head of the CDU Party Uwe Hampe was more cautious in passing 
judgement on the conduct of the officers: 'We only form our opinions in the context of 
a political party', stated Hampe.266 Disputing the initial findings of Buxtehude archives,
261 Cited from: Gedenkstein wird politisches Thema. Tageblatt Online (Stader Buxtehuder Altldnder) 
[Online]. 13.05.03 [Accessed 19.04.06]. <http://www.tageblatt.de/db/Druckvorschau.cfin?DID=65105>
262 See: Keine Ruhe auf dem Friedensplatz. Wochenblatt Neue Buxtehuder. WN-BdA Kreisvereinigung 
Stade [Online]. 21.05.03 [Accessed 21.11.05]. <http://www.stade.wn-bda.de/bux04.htm>
263 Cited from: Bin Gedenkstein fur Kriegsverbrecher? Wochenblatt Neue Buxtehuder. VVN-BdA 
Kreisvereinigung Stade [Online]. 14.05.03 [Accessed 21.11.05]. <http://www.stade.wn-bda.de/ 
bux04.htm> See also: Keine Ruhe auf dem Friedensplatz. op. cit. and: Gedenkstein in Buxtehude. VVN- 
BdA Kreisvereinigung Stade [Online]. [Accessed 22.12.05]. <http://www.stade.vvn-bda.de/bux01.htm>
264 Cited from: Gedenkstein wird politisches Thema. op. cit.
265 Cited from: Ibid. See also: Gedenkstein in Buxtehude. op. cit.
266 Cited from: Gedenkstein wird politisches Thema. op. cit. See also: Gedenkstein in Buxtehude. op. cit.
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'further examination had revealed that two of the four officers in question were guilty of 
war crimes', announced the Mayor of Buxtehude Jurgen Badur. 2. 267
In 2000, a branch of the federal archives was set up in Ludwigsburg for the express 
purpose of the elucidation, ease of access and permanent preservation of documents of 
the Landesjustizverwaltungen or Federal Central Administration Offices. Established in 
1958 under chief National Socialist prosecutor of the SS death squads, or 
Einsatzgruppen, Erwin Schule, the Zentralstelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen 
Ludwigsburg was responsible for the co-ordination of reports documenting allegations 
of National Socialist crimes from across Germany. 268
Concerning the allegations of involvement in war crimes against the Buxtehude 
officers, documents from the Landesjustizverwaltungen (Federal Central Administrative 
Offices) confirmed that sea commandant for West Greece, Alexander Magnus, had 
actively participated in the deportation of the Jewish population of Corfu in 1944.269 On 
receipt of this information, Mayor Jurgen Badur ordered the removal of all names from 
the plaque. 270 According to the Buxtehuder Tageblatt and the Stade VVN-BdA, even 
before the allegations were confirmed, chief representatives from three of the main local 
parties were demanding the removal of the plaque. Along with Hansen (SPD) and 
Buttler (Alliance 90/The Greens), on account of the questionable conduct of the 
officers, Chairman of the Buxtehude FDP, Rudolf Fischer, also insisted on the removal 
of the plaque 'as soon as possible'. 271 Although the town council agreed in essence to 
the retention of a memorial stone, 'A future plaque cannot bear the names of the officers 
involved in the capitulation of the town', noted Jurgen Badur. 'Drawing a line under the 
past', according to the Buxtehuder Tageblatt, the citizens of Buxtehude had refused to 
pay for any stone without an inscription.272
267 For press release by Mayor Jurgen Badur see: Zwei geehrte Offiziere an Verbrechen beteiligt. 
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Along with others in Germany, evidence suggested many in Buxtehude also rejected 
official allegations of the collective misconduct of the Wehrmacht  Evidence during 
2003 and 2004 indicated some in the town still wanted to honour those responsible for 
its peaceful capitulation. There were reports, for example, that Buxtehude was 'A haven 
for the extreme right', noted the Information Service Against Right-Wing Extremism 
(IDGR).274 In 1999, 2001 and 2004, the Lower Saxon and Hamburg authorities also 
identified the town of Buxtehude as a centre for right-wing extremists.275 According to 
the Lower Saxon authorities, for example, along with Verden in 1999, Buxtehude was a 
main focal point for the activities of the youth wing of the right-wing extremist National 
Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), the Young National Democrats (JN).276 Owing to 
disruption from both Hamburg and local neo-Nazis, in January 2004 the panel 
discussion: Neo-fascism - a danger for society had to be abandoned.277 Local resident 
Heiko Tornow stated: 'It is repulsive that people here want to honour those who have 
condemned people to death or been involved in the murder of hostages.' 278
Despite allegations of criminal behaviour by the Stade WN-BdA, Mayor of Buxtehude 
and local politicians against Engel, Magnus, Haverkamp and Halaski, according to the 
WN-BdA, Uwe Ruprecht and the Buxtehuder Tageblatt, the citizens of Buxtehude 
'hold the officers as heroes and want to remember them as such'. 279 There was still no 
proof of Engel's responsibility for the passing of the 54 death sentences or the 
involvement of the officers Haverkamp and Halaski in war crimes, maintained 
Buxtehude City Archives and two local newspapers. 280 Summarising the evidence to- 
date, Bernd Utermohlen contended that neither Engel nor Magnus could be charged 
with war crimes in the strictest sense of the word, since both operated 'within the code 
of established military practice'. 281
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A New SonderwegV2
To-date, evidence suggested that whilst popular opinion saw the end of the division of 
Germany as a chance to escape from historical responsibility, the Bundestag political 
elite continued to demand public penitence for the past. A reappraised Holocaust as a 
legitimate response to communism and growing academic indignation to reproaches 
against the Wehrmacht have been identified as two distinct moves away from official 
representations of the past. Another was the challenge to an alleged officially endorsed 
German self-hatred and attendant issue of what Die Welt termed a 'Deutungshoheif or 
sovereignty of interpretation.283 Underlining the discord between official and popular 
perceptions of history was the appearance of an anti-post-national Sonderweg or special 
consciousness. This highly self-conscious project of overcoming collective guilt and 
German 'self-flagellation' was not only 'highly instructive about the nature of the 
intellectual field in Germany', noted J-W. Muller and Jeffrey Olick, but also more 
broadly about German collective identity. 284 According to Mary Nolan, Stefan Berger 
and others, it also reflected the growing visibility of right-wing intellectuals and 
nationalist historiography of some of the younger generation.285
After 1945, most intellectuals and political elites in Germany rejected the old anti- 
Western and nationalist German Sonderweg concerning past German culture, politics 
and nationalism.286 During the 1960s, what Karl Wilds described as the critical historical 
school developed a post-1945 Sonderweg theory that interpreted Germany's special 
path to a capitalist nation state, per revolution from above, as a deviation from the 
French democratic model of 1789. Germany's rapid economic development was 
shadowed by its Prussian anti-democratic, pre-industrial elites holding a monopoly of 
political power.287 Whereas economic modernisation was accompanied by social and 
political progress in Britain and France, argued Peter Monteath and Reinhard Alter, in 
Germany the dominant Prussian landed aristocracy blocked any fundamental
282 See: Das Tabu der Deutschen. op. cit., p. 3. 
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democratic political change.288 Helmuth Plessner, for instance, contrasted the healthy 
democratic developments of the states of Western Europe with the 'pathological course 
of German history'.289 Summarised by Reinhard Kuhnl, Peter Monteath and Reinhard 
Alter, the pre-1945 Sonderweg could thus be described as the 'uniquely German path' 
to political and economic modernisation compared to the standard western development 
taken by Britain and France.290 Fearing a future united Germany would follow its 
Sonderweg again, the first West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, ensured the 
FRG remained firmly entrenched within the European Community. 2, 291
'Germany's desperate efforts to catch up for deficiencies in state building and national 
consciousness' had contributed to it being led down a special path culminating in the 
Third Reich, argued J-W. Muller.292 'A new, left-liberal version of the post-1945 
Sonderweg advocated that Germans had uniquely to be ashamed of their nation', noted 
Fulbrook.293 According to Ernst Nolte: 'For four and a half decades historians have been 
writing a history of self-humiliation in the interest of the victors in the Second World 
War.' 294 Along the same lines, Verena Ringler claimed that the former SPD/Green 
government was often accused of shaping national identity 'in the tradition of the 
critical literary and political left-wing movements of the 1960s around their hatred for 
Germany'.295 SPD party official Tilman Fichter admitted that 'by nurturing a post- 
national identity, during the 1970s, 1980s and reunification, SPD politicians developed 
a type of anti-nationalism that made the nation state the source of all evil in German 
history'. 296
Since reunification, however, increasing numbers of academics have not only criticised 
the negative fixation of collective guilt, but were also asking: 'Is it not time to put an 
end to the German self-hatred encouraged in the aftermath of 1945?'297 Rather than
288 See: Alter, R. and Monteath, P. (eds). op. cit., p. 13.
289 Cited from: Muller, J-W. op. cit., p. 38.
290 See: Kuhnl, R. The German Sonderweg reconsidered: continuities and discontinuities in modern 
German history. In: Alter, R. and Monteath, P. (eds). op. cit., p. 115. See also: Ibid., p. 13.
291 See: Gloannec, A-M. Le, On German identity. Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts 
and Social Sciences, Winter 1994: 123(1), p. 137 and: Craig, G. A. op. cit., pp. 44-48.
292 Cited from: Muller, J-W. op. cit., p. 38.
293 See: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 234-235.
294 See: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 136, 215, 227.
295 Ringler, V. A debate on German culture and identity. The Bologna Center Journal of International 
Affairs. The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies John Hopkins University [Online]. 
Spring 2001: 4(1) [Accessed 14.06.02]. <http://www.jhubc.it/bcjournaiyprint2001/2001ringler.cfm>
296 Cited from: Berger, S. Nationalism and the Left in Germany. New Left Review, 1994 (206), p. 57.
297 Cited from: Knischewski, G. Post-war national identity in Germany. In: Jenkins, B. and Spyros, A. S. 
(eds). op. cit., p. 147. For similar comments see: Schneider, M. op. cit., pp. 42-43.
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dismissing the pre-1945 Sonderweg as an irrational part of German consciousness, or 
even as a precondition of fascism, Karl Heinz Bohrer interpreted the Sonderweg as a 
'quintessentially modern and acceptable part of German identity'. 298 Highlighting the 
continuing tensions between official and popular self-understanding, indicative of what 
could be described as a revisionist, anti-post-national 1990 Sonderweg consciousness, 
were various appeals for an officially endorsed national 'self-flagellation' to cease.
'Whenever there are signs of the slightest public hostility to self-flagellation, there is a 
rush for places in the choir stalls of repentance by the political elite desirous to express 
their and everybody else's guilt', complained Gerhard Kopf. 299 Lienhard Schmidt argued 
that the continual search for Gutmenschen, or 'model Germans', resulted in a long 
silence about past German suffering that became a perennial requisite of German self- 
flagellation.300 And, according to the self-styled largest online community for the 
preservation of Germanic culture, race and spirituality, Skadi net: 'The self-flagellation 
and self-hatred depicted within the Wehrmacht exhibition was inculcated by the Left - 
aided and abetted by Gerhard Schroder.' 301
Some academics have described the FRG as 'aberrant, superimposed post-national 
Sonderweg', noted Knischewski. 302 Professor Imanuel Geiss claimed the pre-1945 
Sonderweg provided a 'dogma of a new orthodoxy' for the FRG which 'served the sole 
purpose of "morally stigmatising" German history' that has since 'been nothing but "an 
instrument of subtle self-accusation'". 303 Dismissing historical responsibility for the 
Second World War, historian Hellmut Diwald declared: 'Consciousness of guilt for the 
war is an example of a quite simply incomprehensible desire for self-recrimination. It is 
truly without equal in human history.' 304 'Abandoning the post-national Sonderweg and 
associated mentality would give future generations of Germans a consciously national 
education and thereby overcome the present German self-hatred', argued political
298 Cited from: Miiller, J. Karl Heinz Bohrer on German national identity: recovering Romanticism and 
aestheticizing the state. German Studies Review, 01.05.00: 23(2), pp. 297-316.
299 For reproaches by Kopf see: Kopf, G. In den Schuhen Fischers. Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 10.10.98, p. 3.
300 See: Schmidt, L. "Denk ich an Deutschland." Das Ostpreufienblatt/Preufiische Allgemeine 
Zeitung/Landsmannschaft Ostpreuflen e.V. [Online]. 18.01.03 [Accessed 01.02.06]. 
<http://www.webarchiv-server.de/pin/archiv03/0303ob43.htm>
301 For critique of the Lett and Gerhard Schroder in particular by Skadi net, see: Umerziehung gegluckt? 
Fast! Forum.skadi.net [Online]. 10.06.04 [Accessed 01.02.06]. <http://www.skadi.net/forum/ 
showthread.php?t=l 3247>
302 Cited from: Knischewski, G. Post-war national identity in Germany. In: Jenkins, B. and Spyros, A. S. 
(eds). op. cit., pp. 139, 141,147.
303 See: Berger, S. The search for normality, op. cit.. p. 118.
304 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., pp. 106-107.
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scientist Konrad Low. 305 Michael Prinz, for instance, insisted on a mission dispensing 
with what Karlheinz WeiBmann derided as a 'metaphysics of German guilt', in order to 
liberate the country from the alleged 'stranglehold of educational motives'. 306 Manfred 
Kittel, Rainer Zitelmann and Klaus Rainer Rohl also identified the roots of German 
self-hatred and 'national masochism', not only as a result of 'the brainwashing effect of 
German re-education policies', but also in the 'anti-fascist tradition of the left'. 307
Rejecting an alleged 'superimposed post-national Sonderweg\ other German 
intellectuals have also identified German self-hatred as a consequence of left-wing 
politics.308 Calling for an end to German self-hatred, Dr. Christa Hoffmann claimed left- 
liberal historians 'deliberately instrumentalised the Nazi past in an almost masochist 
way in order to stigmatise and ultimately silence their political enemies'. 309 On the other 
hand, Thomas Assheuer expressed concerns about attempts to dispense with Auschwitz 
as an alleged 'culture of guilt' and rejection of collective atonement. Referring to the 
'sweeping away of the ashes of the past', Assheuer reproached Walser for 'encouraging 
amongst German youth the phenomenon of national masochism'. 310
As well as contending the 'genocide of the Jews was exploited to justify every kind of 
moralistic nonsense', Reinhard Mohr also maintained the Holocaust was used to 
'vindicate self-hatred fostered by a left-wing racism, absorbing itself in anything 
foreign'. 3 " Reflecting this sense of growing hostility to demands for continued self- 
flagellation, blaming the Left for an alleged German self-hatred, Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger complained: 'That a self-selected minority of the just should desire for 
themselves another people may well express their educational arrogance.' 312
Further indicative of this concept were the comments by Professor Michal Bodemann. 
Bodemann claimed that instead of the crimes of the past that ought to be fostering a
305 Cited from: Berger, S. The search for normality, op. cit., p. 179
306 Cited from: Oswald, F. Integral and instrumental nationalism: national-conservative elite discourse: 
the "what's right?" debate of 1994. Debatte, 1995 (2), p. 34 and: Berger, S. The search for normality, op. 
cit., p. 129.
307 For allegations by Kittel, Zitelmann and Rohl see: Berger, S. The search for normality, op. cit., pp. 
177-179, 189-190, 200 and: Schneider, M. op. cit., pp. 42-43.
308 Cited from: Knischewski, G. Post-war national identity in Germany. In: Jenkins, B. and Spyros, A. S. 
(eds). op. cit., pp. 146-147. See also: Jennerich, C. op. cit., p. 61 and: Springate, C. Germany: this land is 
our land. New Statesman & Society, 19.05.95, pp. 24-25.
309 Cited from: Berger, S. The search for normality, op. cit., pp. 179, 192.
310 Cited from: Assheuer, T. op. cit.
311 Cited from: Mohr, R. op. cit., p. 42.
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sense of historical responsibility and guilt, it was the Jewish minority in Germany that 
were being held responsible for an unwanted self-flagellation.313 There have even been 
calls for an end to 'German self-mutilation', claimed Konrad Jarausch, Hinrich Seeba 
and Daniel Conradt. 314 Filmmaker, essayist and consummate cultural critic, Hans Jurgen 
Syberberg appeared to sum up this sense of frustration and hostility to German self- 
recrimination: 'Germany's self-flagellation just becomes a sordid form of big business. 
The German artist who touches Hitler in the appropriately chaste way immediately finds 
open doors. There is something sickening about this [...] that we have all had enough 
of.' 315
To summarise, after 1945, various political commentators claimed the prevailing 
academic paradigm was a 'labour of remembrance'. 316 Since reunification, however, 
new approaches to collective guilt, history and, arguably, identity have become 
increasingly evident. Symptomatic of this transformation in attitudes to the past was a 
sympathetic economic and psychoanalysis of the Third Reich - no longer portrayed as 
quite so uniquely evil. 317 Following Ernst Nolte, other German academics have also 
challenged the singularity of the Holocaust, comparing it to the murder of political 
prisoners in the Soviet labour camps or Gulags.
Whilst most mainstream historians generally rejected revisionist accounts of the past, 
since 1990 attempts to reinterpret National Socialism have been warmly received 
amongst some conservative academics. 318 For some in Germany, National Socialism and 
the genocide of the Jews were no longer the inevitable results of a Hitler or a pre- 
mediated Auschwitz, as was allegedly the case before the 1980s. 319 Academics and 
writers, such as Armin Mohler, Hagen Schulze and Karlheinz WeiBmann, contended 
that the origins of the failure of the Weimar Republic lay, primarily, in connection with
313 See: Zadek, P. et al. Umfrage zum Holocaust-Mahnmal und dem Vorschlag, den Potsdamer Platz 
umzubenennen. Die Zeit [Online]. 1998 (12) [Accessed 01.02.06]. <http://www.zeus.zeit.de/text/archiv/ 
1998/12/holocaust.txt.l 9980312.xml>
314 Cited from: Jarausch, K. H., Seeba, H. C. and Conradt, D. P. The presence of the past: culture, opinion 
and identity in Germany. In: Jarausch, K. H. (ed). After unity: reconfiguring German identities, op. cit., p. 
51.
315 Cited from: Syberberg, H. J. op. cit.
316 See: Knischewski, G. Post-war national identity in Germany. In: Jenkins, B. and Spyros, A. S. (eds). 
op. cit, pp. 130-142.
See: DeutschJand ist nicht mehr das Reich des Bosen. op. cit., p. 11.
318 See: Berger, S. The search for normality, op. cit., pp. 125-133, 141, 176-190 and: Knischewski, G. 
Post-war national identity in Germany. In: Jenkins, B. and Spyros, A. S. (eds). op. cit., pp. 141-142, 146- 
147. See also: Nolan, M. op. cit., pp. 113-124 and: Springate, C. op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
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The search for normality op. cit., pp. 111-116. See also: Layton, G. op. cit., pp. 208-209.
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the 1919 Treaty of Versailles that gave rise to Hitler, Auschwitz and the Second World 
War.320
Challenging official portrayals of the origins of the Second World War, Armin Mohler 
argued: The Third Reich was not the product of a "German character" - it was clearly 
the child of the Treaty of Versailles.' 321 Yet, statements from the Bundestag political 
elite were clear about who was responsible for the commencement of hostilities. Former 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder spoke in the Bundestag of the 'historical 
responsibility of the land that brought genocide and two world wars to the continent'. 322 
'We must not forget', declared the former President of the FRG Roman Herzog, 'that a 
German government initiated the last war.' 323
There were also reports of growing academic resentment towards what Mary Fulbrook 
and Stuart Taberner referred to as an alleged 'institutionalised historical shame'. 324 
Whilst some journalists, authors and historians adopted Nolte's thesis in order to 
exonerate Germans from past guilt, numerous Bundestag politicians and left-liberal 
academics continued to insist on a 'labour of remembrance' and collective 
responsibility. 325
Nonetheless, there was increasing resentment from some of the media that the memory 
of Auschwitz was being deliberately abused by the Bundestag elite and others for 
political purposes. Challenging the role of morality within official prescriptions of 
collective memory, Martin Walser and his supporters attacked those who 'wanted to use 
Auschwitz as a moral club'.326 Summing up various attitudes perceiving that the 
National Socialist past was being exploited by the Bundestag elite to ensure a sense of 
collective guilt, Enzensberger declared: 'A change of heart cannot be achieved via 
moral blackmail.' 327
320 See: Berger, S. The search for normality, op. cit., pp. 125-126, 136, 146. See also: Overy, R. and 
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A number of articles have also challenged what some German politicians referred to as 
a 'Holocaust identity'. Numerous members of the Bundestag insisted, perhaps not 
unreasonably, that Auschwitz should continue to remain an indispensable part of 
German collective remembrance and national self-understanding.
Underlining a key disparity between official and popular perceptions of national self- 
understanding, evidence suggested there was not only a growing academic resentment 
towards an alleged 'institutionalisation of collective guilt', but also a public one.328 
Denying the existence of collective guilt from some quarters was also indicative of 
attempts to 'normalise' the past.329
With the growing distance from Hitler's war and the addition to the population of 15 
million East Germans (formerly officially encouraged to believe that responsibility for 
National Socialism did not extend to them), public acceptance of demands by the 
Bundestag elite for continued public recognition of collective guilt have become less 
compelling. 330 When Martin Walser called for an end to collective guilt, for example, he 
claimed to represent the 'people'. Walser and his followers seemed to echo a popular 
chord when he declared that there was 'no such thing as collective guilt'. 331
Irrespective of whether writers, such as Walser, can legitimately claim any 
representation of the German people, indications from some of the public and the media 
suggested representatives of the Bundestag political elite clearly did not speak for 
everyone in Germany. Although contested by many in Germany, a re-writing of the past 
was evidently seen by some as a welcome opportunity to reconstitute German identity 
and dispense with collective guilt.
To conclude, what did these themes conducted by intellectuals, journalists and leading 
newspapers suggest about public perceptions of the National Socialist era, collective 
guilt and national identity? Developments indicated that a reinvigorated nationalist
328 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 36, 235.
329 See: Layton, G. op. cit., pp. 208-209 and: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 97, 121-127. See also: Schneider, 
M. op. cit., pp. 36, 43, 48.
330 For claims that East Germans were collectively innocent concerning the crimes of the National 
Socialists, see: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 20, 55-58 and Staab, A. op. cit., p. 40. For population statistics 
in the former GDR see: Facts about Germany - Population and People. In: Schulte-Peevers, A. et al. 
Lonely Planet Germany. 3 rd ed. Melbourne/Oakland/London/Paris: Lonely Planet Publications, 2002, p.
51.
331 For Walser's dismissal of collective guilt see: Cited from: Kansteiner, W. op. cit., pp. 85-87 and:
Muller, J-W. Another country, op. cit., pp. 17, 246-250. See also: Tabemer, S. op. cit., p. 126.
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paradigm has emerged from some academics, challenging the post-1945 official 
constructions of German memory. Disputing collective historical responsibility for the 
Holocaust, there is a danger that such revisionist interpretations of the past imperil the 
reputation of the current generation of Germans and disguise or, perhaps, even lends 
credibility to more right-wing representations of the past. Efforts to reappraise 
disturbing and important issues of the Second World War have not just arisen from a 
few revisionists, such as Ernst Nolte, Rainer Zitelmann, Klaus Rainer Rohl or Martin 
Walser, however. Although by no means reflective of German society as a whole, there 
was evidence of a growing impatience from some elements of the public with the 
historical shame and singularity of the Holocaust, perceived to have been fostered by 
the Bundestag elite. Opposing attempts to confine the Holocaust to the past, a left- 
liberal discourse, demanding a continuing critical engagement with the National 
Socialist past based upon a 'labour of remembrance', was also very much in evidence.332
Nevertheless, opposition to an official identity of atonement centred on, but not 
confined to, Auschwitz was no longer unquestionably accepted at the time of writing. 
Anthony D. Smith and Mary Fulbrook suggested that some of the most important 
preconditions for national identity include a sense of collective memory, common 
history and a shared legacy of the past. 333 Whilst not indicative of the majority of 
Germans, at the time of writing evidence indicated that, unfortunately, some in 
Germany would rather forget the Holocaust and official demands for collective 
responsibility for the past.
332 See: Kramer, J. Letter from Germany: the politics of memory. The New Yorker, 14.08.95, pp. 48-65 
and: Konrad, G. Die Freiheit des Erinnerns. Die Zeit, 22.12.98 (53), p. 38. See also: Berg, N. op. cit., p.
38.
333 See: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 16-19, 232-233 and: Smith, A. D. op. cit., pp. 14-17, 21, 25-26.
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Chapter 5.
Contested Memory - the 60th Anniversary of the Air War
According to Mary Fulbrook, Anthony D. Smith and Marita Sturken, collective memory 
is an accumulation of individual recollections forming perceptions of the past that 
'resonates with significant sections of the population and official historical narratives'. 1 
Indicative of a new historical paradigm change concerning how the Allied Air 
Campaign between 1943 and 1945 was remembered and represented, this chapter 
highlights another key dissonance between popular and official collective memory and, 
arguably, therefore, national identity. 2 Despite its dimension in local memory, in 
contrast to official statements, there have been numerous contentions that the horrors of 
the Air War remained largely unarticulated particularly at national level. 
Consequently, there have also been various claims of an attendant loss of history and 
identity. Reflecting key distinctions between an official and public culture of 
remembrance, or Erinnerungskultur, this chapter suggests there are increasing 
ambiguities about how the Air War is remembered, presented and interpreted.
'Images of the past are tied up with contemporary politics. This has been a perennial 
theme both of social memory studies generally and of discussions of the German 
situation', noted Jeffrey Olick. 3 'A strong interest in German history has resurfaced in 
close connection with the question of national identity', claimed Sabine von Dirke and 
others.4 This was particularly evident within numerous academic and newspaper articles 
appearing since 2002, criticising and commemorating the 1940-1945 Air War, or 
Bombenkrieg, against German towns and cities as it was frequently referred to in 
Germany. 5 Although the RAF (Royal Air Force) commenced the bombing of civilian 
residential districts in places such as Osnabriick and Mannheim in 1940, it was not until
1 Cited from: Till, K. E. Staging the past: landscape designs, cultural identity and Erinnerungspolitik at 
Berlin's Neue Wache. Ecumene, 1999: 6(3), p. 254. See also: Fulbrook, M. German national identity after 
the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, pp. 143, 145-146, 155, 166-169, 175, 177, 230 and: Smith, 
A. D. National identity. London: Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 14-17, 21, 25.
2 For these claims see: Schwilk, H. Die Wahrheit lasst sich nicht aufhalten. Welt am Sonntag 08.12.02, p. 
9 and: Klugermann, G. Feuersturm tiber Freiburg. 27. November 1944. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Wartberg 
Verlag, 2003, p. 3.
3 Cited from: Olick, J. K. What does it mean to normalize the past? Official memory in German politics 
since 1989. Social Science History. Winter 1998: 22(4), p. 549.
4 Cited from: Dirke, S. von, Multikulti: the German debate on multiculturalism. German Studies Review, 
1994: 17, p. 516.
5 For publications referring to the term see: Steinacker, O. Bombenkrieg tiber Dusseldorf- Das Buch :ur 
Serie der Westdeutsche Zeitung. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag, 2003 and: Keller, V. Mannheim 
im Bombenkrieg 1940-1945. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag, 2003. See also: Schwilk, H. op. 
cit., p. 9 and: Ullrich, V. Weltuntergang kann nicht schlimmer sein. Die Zeit, 28.11.02 (49), p. 47.
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January 1943 that the first American bombers appeared over Germany in support of the 
British.6
One of the main arguments running throughout this chapter is that a culture of 
remembrance has changed in significant ways since Berlin historian Jorg Friedrich's 
2002 publication, The Fire (Der Brand), suggesting there were clear dissonances 
between popular and the Bundestag elite's conceptions of remembrance.7 A central 
theme of this chapter is that the image of Germany as a nation of perpetrators had been 
superseded by one of victims. There were increasing calls, amongst the media and local 
historians, for the survivors of the Allied Air Campaign to be officially accepted as 
equal and collective victims of war. This development was further evidence not only of 
a contested memory, but was also another example of a popular rejection of German 
identity based on a constitutional patriotism and collective guilt. Thus, it suggests that 
the 'post-national paradigm' referred to by Bernd Weisbrod in 1996 has, since The Fire, 
become a discourse of victims concerning how the bombing of Germany's cities was 
collectively remembered. 8
According to Rudy Koshar and Mary Fulbrook, Germans often speak of a 'memory 
landscape' or an 'Erinnerungslandschaff. 'This may be physical or psychological, 
steeped in memories and images that may be intensely personal but also highly public in 
the sense that large numbers of individuals accept the collective meaning of certain 
buildings and spaces', noted Koshar. 9 In contrast to the official line, however, numerous 
articles and publications maintained the suffering of those killed in the Allied Air 
Campaign was largely ignored or dismissed from the standpoint of the victims in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
This chapter suggests that German popular collective memory, in relation to the 
Bundestag political elite's, had, in the words of Rudy Koshar and David Carr, 'gone 
astray' - thus raising further questions as to whether the Bundestag political elite
6 See: Keller, V. op. cit., p. 8 and: Rickling, M. Der Tag, an dem Osnabruck ging unterging. 13. 
September 1944. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Kulturgeschichtliches Museum Osnabruck (KGM)AVartberg 
Verlag, 2004, pp. 13, 19-20.
7 For publication by Friedrich see: Friedrich, J. Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940-1945. 
12th ed. Munchen: Propylaen, 2003.
8 See: Weisbrod, B. Discussion: national paradigm German unification and the national paradigm. 
German History, 1996: 14(2), pp. 197-198 and: Friedrich, J. op. cit.
9 Cited from: Koshar, R. From monuments to traces: artefacts of German memory, 1870-1990. 
Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2000, pp. 9-13. See also: Fulbrook, M. op. 
cit., pp. 25-47,231.
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represented a consistent national memory in Germany. 10 Since the appearance of 
Friedrich's The Fire, the Bundestag political elite's refusal to acknowledge the civilians 
lost during the Air War as national collective victims of war has been increasingly 
contested. As a result of the popular acclaim accorded to The Fire, there were increasing 
demands that Germany's victims of the Allied Air Campaign should constitute part of 
the nation's Erinnerungskultur. Emergent in popular scholarship and the media, were 
also ethical challenges to the German official line that the destruction of Germany's 
cities was justified on the grounds it successfully served to liberate the country from 
National Socialism. In some cases, these extended to demands for greater recognition of 
Allied accountability for the unleashing of firestorms against, primarily, innocent 
civilians.
Evaluating the central themes of a perceived loss of history, an alleged forbidden 
collective mourning and official justification for the Air War, this chapter highlights key 
disparities between public and official memory and hence, collective identity.
A loss of history?
1.4 million tons of bombs fell on more than 1,000 German towns and cities between 
1940 and 1945." Three and a half million homes were destroyed and, by the end of the 
war, seven and a half million people were homeless. 'Burnt to death, buried alive or 
suffocated', noted relatively recent publications from Solingen and Fulda Archives; the 
bombings claimed the lives of at least 500,000 civilians, along with the irretrievable loss 
of medieval architecture. 12 Journalists Oliver Reinhard and Jochen Wittmann noted that 
only during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) and the expulsions from the former 
German eastern territories were more lives lost. 13 Yet, according to German author 
Winfried Georg Sebald: 'It never really crossed the threshold of German national 
consciousness or played any appreciable part in the discussion of the internal
10 Cited from: Koshar, R. op. cit., p. 9.
" Cited from: Kucklick, C. Terror gegen den Terror? Verbrechen gegen die Deutschen? Geo Magazin 
[Online]. 02/03 [Accessed 03.03.04]. <http://www.geo.de/GEO/Kultur_gesellschaft/geschichte/ 
2003_01_GEO_Bombenkrieg/> See also: Sebald, W. G. On the natural history of destruction. Translated 
by A. Bell. London: Penguin Books, 2004, pp. 3-4.
12 See: Rogge, R. and Schulte, A. Solingen im Bombenhagel. 4. und 5. November 1944. Gudensberg- 
Gleichen: Stadtarchiv Solingen/Wartberg Verlag, 2003, pp. 3, 24-25 and: Sagan, G., Heiler, T. and Kann, 
B. Der Tod kam in der Mittagszeit. Fulda im Bombenkrieg 1944-1945. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Stadtarchiv 
Fulda/Wartberg Verlag, 2004, pp. 3-4, 23, 30, 51-55. See also: Sebald, W. G. op. cit., p. 3.
13 One in three of the population were killed in some areas in Germany during the Thirty Years' War. 
See: Reinhard, O. and Wittmann, J. Wer Wind sat, erntet Feuersturm. Sdchsische Zeitung, 26.11.02, p. 7.
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constitution of West Germany."4 Whilst the fates of Hamburg and Dresden, for 
instance, are deeply embedded in national memory, the dimension and effects of the Air 
War on the other 160 bombarded cities remained largely unknown throughout the rest 
of the country. 15
Although local books have been written about the Air War, the few authors who did 
address the theme in the FRG, such as Heinrich Boll and Hans Erich Nossack, were so 
preoccupied with their own particular experiences that they scarcely noticed the horrors 
pervading elsewhere. Written at the end of the 1940s, Boll's The Angel Was Silent 
describing events in Cologne was not published until 1992. According to Sebald: 
'Compilations such as Hans Brunswig's Firestorm over Hamburg [1978] seemed 
curiously untouched by the subject of their research, making no attempt to portray the 
self-anaesthesia emerging from the war of annihilation." 6 Along with Jorg Friedrich, 
commentators outside Germany have also made similar observations.
Citing Jeremy Noakes, in 2000 Neil Gregor wrote: 'There is still no major study of the 
effects of the Allied air raids on the German population." 7 There have been claims from 
British military historians Adrian Gregory, Mark Connelly and Daily Telegraph 
journalist Hannah Cleaver, for example, that British authors did not address the effects 
of the air raids on the German civilian population. 18 'Former editor of the Daily 
Telegraph Max Hastings, who did address the theme in his book, did not go into detail 
about what happened in Darmstadt, Paderborn or Pforzheim whose old town centres 
disappeared in firestorms', noted Jorg Friedrich. 19
Editors of the Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung (HAZ) Thorsten Fuchs and Stefan 
Wittke lamented that 'it is a pity this discussion has only really just begun in Hanover
14 Cited from: Sebald, W. G. op. cit., pp. 3-32.
15 For these claims see: Gleich bist du tot. Literarische Welt. Die Welt, 16.11.02, pp. 1-2 and: Friedrich, J. 
op. cit., pp. 118-119. See also: Bolsche, J. ,,So muss die Holle aussehen." Der Spiegel, 06.01.03 (2), pp. 
39-41 and: Aufenanger, P. Bin Mantel des Schweigens. Arte tv [Online]. [Accessed 13.07.05]. 
<http://www.arte-tv.com/de/geschichte-gesellschaft/dresden/779568.html>
16 Cited from: Sebald, W. G. op. cit., pp. 7-11, 24.
17 Cited from: Gregor, N. A Schicksalgemeinschaft? Allied bombing, civilian morale and social 
dissolution in Nuremberg, 1942-1945. The HistoricalJournal, 2000: 43(2), pp. 1051-1052.
18 See: Cleaver, H. 'It was a massacre. Look your past in the face.' The Daily Telegraph [Online]. 
21.11.02 [Accessed 28.02.04]. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=news/2002/l 1/21/ 
nchur21.xml> See also: Sontheimer, M. Schillerndes Ungeheuer. Der Spiegel, 02.12.02 (49), pp. 156-157 
and: Reinhard, O. and Wittmann, J. op. cit., p. 7. 
19 Cited from: Cleaver, H. op. cit. See also: Reinhard, O. and Wittmann, J. op. cit., p. 7.
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60 years later'. 20 In short, there were various claims that the bombings played no role in 
a national articulation of collective recollections. 21 But what was the official line?
On the 57th anniversary of the German surrender of 8 May 1945, former German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder invited the author Martin Walser to a discussion about the 
theme of Nation, Patriotism and Democratic Culture in the Willy Brandt House, Berlin. 
Whilst elaborating on the theme of the nation, Walser emphasised the importance of a 
"Geschichtsgefuhr, or sense of national belonging and history, which, according to the 
author, had both previously been found wanting. But Schroder cautioned against such 
sentiment, referring to what Germany's excesses for this had led to in the past. 22 Martin 
Walser maintained that for many years, Germany had been 'without history'. 23 
Nonetheless, in a Bundestag debate about whether or not the Air War should be 
officially incorporated within national memory, Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 
politician Gunter Baumann, along with Angelika Kruger-LeiBner (Social Democratic 
Party (SPD)), maintained that there had been no loss of history. 24 Evidence from various 
newspapers and city archives appeared to suggest otherwise. Walser's view and those of 
others like him are being increasingly echoed throughout Germany at the time of 
writing.
In 2003, editor of the Lehmstedt Verlag Publishing Company, Mark Lehmstedt, 
discovered a remarkable find in the Leipzig Museum for History. 'Literally stumbling 
over a chest of unpublished documents', Lehmstedt claimed that many private letters, 
diaries and accounts revealed a different aspect of the air raid of 4 December 1943, 
which hitherto, had remained remarkably 'underexposed'. 25 Another hitherto unknown 
aspect of the raid was the claim of Leipzig's General Inspector of the Fire Service. 
According to Lehmstedt, the Inspector reported that the intensity of the firestorm
20 Cited from: Fuchs, T. and Wittke, S. Zwischen Angst und Alltag. Bomben auf Hannover Sommer 1943. 
Das Buch zur Serie Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag, 2004, 
pp. 3-4.
See: Sagan, G., Heiler, T. and Kann, B. op. cit., pp. 3-4 and: Frevert, U. Geschichtsvergessenheit und 
Geschichtsversessenheit revisited. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 2003 (B40-41), pp. 6-13. See also: 
Sebald, W. G. op. cit., pp. 3-32.
22 See: Nation, Patriotismus, Demokratische Kultur. Wir in Deutschland. News Archive. (Press Release). 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [Online]. 08.05.02 [Accessed 23.02.04]. <http://archiv.spd.de/ 
servlet/PB/menu/1016079/index.html>
23 See: Muller, J-W. Another country: German intellectuals, unification and national identity. New 
Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 244-245.
24 See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., pp. 4105-4106, 4108-4109.
25 Cited from: Rosendahl, I. ,,Unser Haus stand inmitten eines Flammenmeeres." Leipziger Volkszeitung, 
21.10.03, p. 1. See also: Lehmstedt, M. (ed). Leipzig brennt. Der Untergang des alien Leipzig am 
4.12.1943 in Fotographien undBerichten. Leipzig: Lehmstedt Verlag, 2004, pp. 34-38.
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kindled by 12,550 phosphorous bombs and 281,035 incendiaries exceeded that of the 
Hamburg firestorm in July 1943.26 Other places where anxiety over the loss of material 
and consequently history became particularly apparent were Raunheim, Darmstadt and 
Freiburg.
Disputing the claims of Baumann and Kruger-LeiBner, the Riisselheimer Echo reported, 
for example, that the events of the Second World War had only just been appraised in 
Raunheim. With a special exhibition, the local historical association graphically 
depicted the events of 1944 for the first time in 2003. Chairman of Raunheim's local 
town association, Heinz Schneider, and associates arranged displays and pictures 
showing the results of the heaviest raid that occurred on 5 November 1944. Photographs 
depicted bombed-out houses in the town centre that to-date had never been seen in 
public. Particularly noteworthy were photographs taken from Allied aircraft recording 
the damage after the attack. It was previously believed in the town that Raunheim had 
been the secondary target of Allied bombers, forced to abandon their intended targets of 
neighbouring cities, such as Frankfurt am Main, because of heavy anti-aircraft fire.27 
'Admittedly, there are thousands of photographs available of the scene after Freiburg's 
worst air attack in November 1944 but almost no moving ones', maintained local 
filmmakers Dirk Michael Adam and Hans-Peter Hagmann. Requesting previously 
unseen material, Adam and Hagmann hoped that their 2004 film Bombs on Freiburg 
would 'fill in the missing gaps', reported the city's press and public relations 
department. 28
Along with the Bundestag political elite, there were others who were also not prepared 
to accept allegations of a lost past. Journalist Volker Ullrich, for instance, referred to the 
fresco by film-director and author Alexander Kluge and Walter Kempowski's collage of 
the destruction of Halberstadt and Dresden. 29 Along with Freiburg, there were also 
appeals in Darmstadt during 2004 for photographs of the evening of 11 September 1944
26 See: Lehmstedt, M. (ed). op. cit., pp. 263-267.
27 See: Bombenhagel auf Raunheim. Heimatverein: Sonderausstellung zeigt viele bislang 
unveroffentlichte Bilder aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Riisselheimer Echo, 05.04.03, p. 19. For reports of 
local heavy anti-aircraft fire by Frankfurt City Archives and local eyewitness Gustav Lerch, see: Hils- 
Brockhoff, E. and Picard, T. Frankfurt am Main im Bombenkrieg. Mdrz 1944. Gudensberg-Gleichen: 
Frankfurt am Main Institut fur Stadtgeschichte/Wartberg Verlag, 2004, pp. 29, 36-37.
28 Cited from: Filmemacher suchen Zeitzeugen zum 27. November 1944. Presse-und
Offentlichkeitsreferat Amtsblatt. Stadt Freiburg [Online]. 26.06.04. [Accessed 23.02.06].
<http://www.freiburg-online.de/l/100/10002/stadtnachrichten.php?showmode=print&news_id=
15313&rubrik_id=36> See also: Littmann, U. Bewegte und bewegende Bilder. Badische Zeitung,
19.11.02, p. 16.
29 See: Ullrich, V. op. cit., p. 47.
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on account of 'the lack of visual material', noted the editor of the Darmstadter Echo 
Klaus Honold.30 Yet, perhaps most thought-provoking of all, Head of Bochum City 
Archives, Ingrid Wolk, maintained that the 'true extent of the pain and sorrow of the 
survivors of Bochum has and perhaps never can be documented - graphically or 
otherwise'. 31
CDU member of the Bundestag, Gunter Baumann, dismissed allegations that those lost 
in the Air War had been forgotten from an official capacity. Speaking in the Bundestag, 
Bauman declared: 'Our own people have never been forgotten in our national memory. 
Whenever Germans look back on this particular time, the question always arises of how 
many of us remain.' 32
But the media and some historical institutes did not share Baumann's apparent 
indifference towards the significance attached to past testimonies concerning the Air 
War. Under the direction of publicist and television journalist Guido Knopp, the Eyes of 
History was a series of films to ensure memories of the twentieth century do not fade 
away and remain preserved for future generations. 'Those who experienced the highs 
and lows of the twentieth century are now over eighty years old. There is, therefore, 
precious little time remaining to ensure their recollections do not disappear', reflected 
Knopp.33 'This anniversary will be the last chance for us to discuss what happened with 
those who experienced the Air War first-hand', noted Dusseldorf eyewitness and author 
Dieter Forte. 34 There have also been numerous appeals from German newspapers as well 
as municipal archives for eyewitness testimonies.
At the end of May 1942, an unprecedented 1,000-bomber fleet was deployed against 
Cologne. To commemorate its 60th anniversary, local paper the Kolner Stadt Anzeiger 
asked for eyewitness accounts and photographs for a series of articles for May 2002. 35 
In 2003, Hanover newspapers Neue Presse and Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung
30 According to Klaus Honold, 'only one photograph has emerged of the raid of the 11.09.44 on 
Darmstadt.' Cited from: Honold, K. Von Mutti blieb ein Schliisselbund. Darmstadter Echo, 06.04.04, p. 
11. See also: Welsch, A. Noch heute Albtraume. Darmstadter Echo, 15.09.04, p. 11.
31 Cited from: Wiborni, M. Bochum im Bombenkrieg. 4. November 1944. Fine Dokumentation des 
Stadtarchivs Bochum. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag, 2004, pp. 4, 23, 37.
32 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., p. 4108.
33 Cited from: Schobel, S. Der Verein 'Die Augen der Geschichte.' Eine Initiative gegen das Vergessen. 
Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen [Online]. 18.12.01 [Accessed 02.03.04]. <http://www.zdf.de/ZDFde/inhalt/ 
31/0,1872,1017439,00.html>
34 Cited from: Gleich bist du tot. op. cit., pp. 1-2.
35 See: Schwering, M. Noch einmal sagan, wie es gewesen ist. Kolner Stadt Anzeiger [Online]. 30.05.02 
[Accessed 05.11.04]. http://www.ksta.de/artikel.jsp?id=1022755011290>
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(HAZ) asked witnesses to recount events and impressions for their book on the Air War 
between 26 July and 9 October 1943.36 Although reports already exist recounting the 
raid of 22 October 1943 on Kassel, the Hessian/Lower Saxon Daily (HNA) appealed for 
more testimonies in 2003 - all of which were donated later that year by the HNA to 
Kassel City Archives. 37 In response to appeals during 2004 for an exhibition on the 
theme, Dessau Archives received photographs and contributions from those who 
witnessed events. 'Many citizens from Dessau contributed reports and photographs 
which, otherwise, would never have found their way to us', explained head of Dessau 
City Archives, Dr. Frank Kreifller. According to KreiBler, more eyewitnesses from 
Dessau needed to come forward, since much remained unknown about the air raids on 
Dessau. 38
Further evidence of a sense of a national loss of memory and, arguably, national 
identity, were various suggestions that many survivors repressed their experiences of 
events. Dietrich Janfien of Emden's Bunker Museum claimed that the victims of East 
Friesa's regional capital neither talked about the 181 raids on the city amongst 
themselves, nor conveyed to future generations what they had experienced.39 Editors of 
the Westdeutsche Zeitung (WZ) Rene Schleucher and Marc Herriger, maintained that 
although the Air War had 'burned itself deeply within the memory of those who 
underwent it, at the same time, it was repressed for many years in Dusseldorf . 40
Head of Magdeburg's Museum of Historical Culture, Dr. Matthias Puhle, also reflected 
this sense of former suppression from survivors. Whilst Magdeburg was no stranger to 
air raids during the war, on the evening of 16 January 1945 its citizens were surprised 
by a second raid on the city by the RAF (Royal Air Force), following an earlier one that 
morning. Local eyewitness Helene Grenzendorfer, for example, recorded that there 
were 645 air raid alarms in the city. 41 At 11.00 p.m. the United States 8 th Air Force
36 For these appeals see: Sommer 1943. Zwischen Angst und Alltag. Erinnern Sie sich? Hannoversche 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 03.07.03 (152), p. 15 and: Krische, M. Thema des Tages. Als Hannover in Triimmer 
fiel. NeuePresse, 10.02.03 (34), p. 28.
37 See: Augenzeugenberichte der Luftangriffe auf Kassel. In: Frau Krenz (Kassel City Archives). Personal 
communication, 09.09.04 and: Klaube, F. R. (Kassel City Archives). Personal communication, 22.09.04.
38 Cited from: Gens, A. Erinnerung bleibt wach. Mitteldeutscher Zeitung [Online]. 05.03.04 [Accessed 
26.03.04]. <http://www.mz-web.de/artikel?id=1069248399650>
39 See: JanBen, D. 6. Sept. 1944. Emden geht unter. Zerstorung und Kriegsende 1944-1945. Gudensberg- 
Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag, 2004, pp. 3-4.
40 Cited from: Die Opfer waren damals so alt wie ihr. Bombenkrieg iiber Dusseldorf. Westdeutsche 
Zeitung [Online]. 2003 [Accessed 15.11.04]. <http://www.wz-newsline.de/sro.php?redid=59150>
41 For diary entry, see: Ballerstedt, M. and Buchholz, K. Es regnet Feuer! Die Magdeburger 
Schreckensnacht am 16. Januar 1945. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag, 2003, p. 36.
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attacked the industrial area to the north of the city. Although the second air attack lasted 
only 36 minutes, it was the worst to-date, leaving almost 95% of the city centre 
destroyed and 4,000 dead.42 Along with Dresden and Cologne, Magdeburg was amongst 
the most devastated of German cities. According to Puhle: 'Although this image of the 
horror of what happened that evening has formed itself strongly within the memory of 
the survivors, seldom do eyewitnesses mention the destruction of the evening of 16 
January 1945.' 43
Testimonies that have appeared since Friedrich's The Fire from Darmstadt, Dusseldorf, 
Hanover and elsewhere also appeared to corroborate earlier claims of the husband-and- 
wife writing team, Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, and Winfried Georg Sebald 
that there was a collective 'inability to mourn' and an inadequate 
Vergangenheitsbewdltigung concerning the suffering of the Germans. 44
According to Fulbrook, for example, there was a fairly widespread phenomenon in 
Germany that could be termed Vergangenheitsbewdltigung or a coping with the past. 
One aspect of it centred on seeking absolution from the crimes of the past. 45 Another 
involved dealing with the suffering of the German civilian population, in what Karen E. 
Till and the Mayor of Minden, Michael Buhre, described as 'a working through and 
confrontation with Germany's National Socialist past'. 46
Referring to this coping with the past, Germany's second public service television 
station, Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF), depicted photographs of disfigured 
corpses as a consequence of Dresden's most destructive air raid in February 1945. 
Breslau refugee Annemarie Reitzenstein, however, discovered new hope in a surviving 
flower she found amongst the devastation of the city, reported ZDF.47
42 See: Friedrich, J. op. cit., pp. 350-353 and: Puhle, M. 'Dann fdrbte sich der Himmel blutrot...' Die 
Zerstorung Magdeburgs am 16. Januar 1945. Ausstellung im Kulturhistorischen Museum Magdeburg 
vom 15. Januar 1995 bis 14. Mai 1995. Magdeburg: Grafisches Centrum Calbe, 1995, pp. 5, 38-74.
43 Cited from: Magdeburg, den 16. Januar 1945. ,,Dann farbte sich der Himmel blutrot..." Die Zerstorung 
Magdeburgs am 16. Januar 1945. Kulturhistorischer Museum Magdeburg [Online]. 1995 [Accessed 
04.03.04]. <http://www.khm-magdeburg.de/Blutrot/Januar.html>
44 See: Mitscherlich, A. and Mitscherlich, M. (eds). Die Unfdhigkeit zu trauern: Grundlagen kollektiven 
Verhaltens. Munich: Piper Verlag, 1967 and: Sebald, W. G. op. cit., pp. 3-32. See also: Steinacker, O. op. 
cit., pp. 41-46 and: Fuchs, T. and Wittke, S. op. cit., pp. 3-4, 12-13, 72-78.
45 See: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 147, 167.
46 Cited from: Till, K. E. op. cit., p. 265. See also: Langenkamper, J. Jedes Opfer stand vor seinem 
Scherbenhaufen. Mindener Tageblatt, 07.05.05 (105), p. 4.
47 See: "Wir haben uberlebt." Erinnerungen an Dresden 1945. Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen [Online]. 
06.02.05 [Accessed 23.03.06]. <http://www.zdf.de/ZDFde/inhalt/5/0,1872,2258565,OO.html> See also: 
,,Vortrag im Historischen Zentrum zum Thema Luftkrieg." Presse-und Informationsamt Rathaus, I,
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Nevertheless, others evidently found their Vergangenheitsbewaltigung more difficult. 
Ursula Hoppe explained in 2004: 'For many years I suppressed my experiences of 16 
January 1945 in Magdeburg and even today, I have still not fully come to terms with 
what happened.' 48 Arguably, neither did other eyewitnesses from Magdeburg and 
Darmstadt. 'For years, Annemarie Burchardt could not bear the smell of burning', noted 
Dr. Maren Ballerstedt and Konstanze Buchholz.49 Survivor from Darmstadt's heaviest 
attack on 11 September 1944, Edlind Grobe, stated in Honold's publication Darmstadt 
in a Firestorm (2004): 'Whenever I remember the past I am speechless in my grief, 
weep but then restrain myself once more.' 50
Statements since 2002 from the media, writers and amongst the population also 
suggested a loss of history not only arose from the results of trauma and repression, but 
also from something that is becoming increasingly articulated in Germany. Various 
articles have appeared in Germany suggesting that a suppression of mourning arose as a 
consequence of a widespread sense of collective guilt - promoted and fostered by past 
governments in West Germany. During November 1994, on the 50th anniversary of the 
firebombing of Heilbronn, local CDU politician Manfred Weinmann stated: 'An 
outpouring of local emotions concerning the anniversary of 4 December 1944 is not 
appropriate with either the occasion or for reconciliation.' 51 These claims were 
particularly significant because they suggested a rejection of an officially endorsed 
Verfassungspatriotismus, or constitutional identity, and further evidence of clear 
disparities between official and popular collective memory.
According to historians Peter Steinbach, Stefan Berger and Jan-Werner Miiller, a 
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung, or a coming to terms with the past, 'became part of the 
basic political consensus amongst the major parties in the FRG'. 52 Yet, some have 
pointed to the alleged excesses of an officially endorsed Vergangenheitsbewaltigung as 
being responsible for the construction of 'artificial' concepts, such as 'post-nationalism 7
Hagen. Historisches Centrum Hagen [Online]. 30.09.04 [Accessed 20.12.04]. <http://www.hagen.de/cgi-
local/dcforum/dcboard.cgi>
48 Cited from: Fallenstein, H. 'Verarbeiten kann ein Mensch das nie.' Magdeburger Volksstimme Zeitung,
17.01.04, p. 9.
49 Cited from: Ballerstedt, M. and Buchholz, K. op. cit., p. 41.
50 Cited from: Honold, K. Darmstadt im Feuersturm. Die Zerstorung am 11. September 1944. 
Gudensberg-Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag, 2004, p. 59.
51 Cited from: Frank, H-G. Wahrheit wird ausgespart bei Gedenkfeier far Bombenopfer. Siidwest Presse, 
24.11.94, p. 1. See also: Huber, J. A. Die Nacht, als Kassel unterging: 22. Oktober 1943. Gudensberg- 
Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag, 2003, pp. 3-4.
52 Cited from: Berger, S. The search for normality: national identity and historical consciousness in 
Germany since 1800. Providence/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997, p. 177.
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and 'constitutional patriotism', noted Stefan Berger and Jan-Werner Muller. 53 Jeffrey 
Click maintained, for instance, that for some, coping with the past represented 'a 
national self-flagellation deriving from the Left's critique of the Nazi past one that 
constrained Germany's ability to claim a proud identity'. 54 There have also been claims 
it prevented Germany from mourning the dead of the Air War.
Forbidden mourning?
Former lecturer and novelist Winfried Georg Sebald argued that not only did the 
internal and external destruction leave historical deficits in literature, but it also left a 
kind of taboo in its wake. This taboo was manifest in official requirements for silence 
on the theme, so as not to embarrass the occupying authorities (western Allies) or 
jeopardise funds needed for rebuilding Germany's shattered cities. 'There was a tacit 
agreement, equally binding on everyone, that the true state of material and moral ruin in 
which the country found itself was not to be described', noted Sebald. 55
Indicative of this perception of a taboo against an open collective grieving were, 
arguably, the following comments by Konrad Jarausch, Mary Fulbrook and Dietrich 
Janflen. According to Emden historian JanBen: 'The true extent of the moral, material 
and physical destruction was hushed up within an entire generation under a kind of 
taboo which often went unrecognised, even by witnesses themselves.' 56 'An emotional 
vacuum followed, leading to a mass withdrawal to the primary sphere, or privatisation', 
as Jarausch and others described it. 57 'There did not seem any way of framing mourning 
in an acceptable way in the past', noted Fulbrook. According to Fulbrook and others, 
German private memories, grief and mourning for German victims 'could not easily be 
integrated into the official story of ritual guilt since German grief and testimonies were 
considered inappropriate in the light of collective guilt.' 58 'As there did not seem to be 
any way of constructing post-World War Two German society which could include the
53 See: Berger, S. op. cit, pp. 136-138, 177-189, 254 and: Muller, J-W. op. cit., pp. 32-40.
54 Cited from: Click, J. K. op. cit., p. 549. According to Jan-Werner Muller, liberal intellectuals engaged 
in a kind of 'intellectual Vergangenheitsbewaltigung'' through writing a critical history that sought to 
explain the initial success of National Socialism. Cited from: Muller, J-W. op. cit., p. 36.
55 Cited from: Sebald, W. G. op. cit., p. 10.
56 Cited from: JanBen, D. op. cit., p. 4.
57 See: Jarausch, K. H., Seeba, H. C. and Conradt, D. P. The presence of the past: culture, opinion and 
identity in Germany. In: Jarausch, K. H. (ed). After unity: reconfiguring German identities. 
Oxford/Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997. pp. 38-39.
58 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 166-167. See also: Seewald, B. Deutschland entdeckt seine 
Leiden und die Trauer darum. Die Welt, 09.12.02, p. 27 and: Huber, J. A. op. cit., pp. 3-4.
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lost,' argued historian Elizabeth Domansky, 'the dead - forever tainted by the stain of 
National Socialism - had to be forgotten.' 59 Summarising the situation after 1945, 
former SPD Minister of Defence and member of the Bundestag, Hans Apel, recalled the 
prevailing attitude was that 'mistakes had been made and that these had to be paid for'.,' 60
One book in particular appears to have changed everything in Germany - Friedrich's 
2002 publication Der Brand (The Fire)," This publication seems to have had the most 
impact in Germany on the theme and was, according to the Mayor of Paderborn, 'the 
most comprehensive national portrayal of the Air War to-date'. 62 'For the first time in 
Germany, the Air War is now being comprehensively addressed by a German', declared 
the Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (MDR). 63
Until the appearance of The Fire, the Air War was taboo, claimed numerous other 
newspapers and periodicals. According to the Hagen Historical Centre and Malte 
ThieBen, since 2002 Friedrich was widely hailed as a 'taboo breaker' by many 
publishing houses and the media. 64 Broadcasting station the Hessischer Rundfunk and 
Geo magazine maintained that The Fire had broken the 'seal of silence' over a certain 
chapter in German history. 65 Writing for Die Welt, Berthold Seewald claimed that now it 
may be possible to mourn in Germany for a memory that was repressed 'because the 
moralistic Basic Law of Germany wanted to promote a sense of shame and guilt'. 66 
Markus Schwering of the Kolner Stadt Anzeiger expressed concerns that 2003 could be 
the last chance for witnesses to present their terrible experiences to the present and 
forthcoming generations - without censorship. Mariam Lau, Jochen Bolsche and others 
were more outspoken in their attacks. As far as Lau was concerned: 'The tabooing of
59 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 166-167.
60 Cited from: Bolsche, J. op. cit., p. 42. See also: Sebald, W. G. op. cit., pp. vii-x, 7-14.
61 See: Sontheimer, M. op. cit., p. 156 and: Schwilk, H. op. cit., p. 9.
62 Cited from: Diesmal die Opfer im Blick. Neue Westfalische Zeitung, 11.01.05, p. 3.
63 Cited from: ,,Der Brand" - Trauma und Tabu. Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk [Online]. 14.02.04 [Accessed 
18.02.04]. <http://www.mdr.de/kultur/literatur/444482.html>
64 See: Hagener Vortrage und Diskussionen Kulturwissenschaft - Museum - Geschichte. 14. Mai 2003 
Bombenkrieg und Erinnerung. Historisches Centrum Hagen [Online]. 14.05.03 19:00 [Accessed 
09.03.04]. <http://www.hco.hagen.de/veranstaltungen/bombenkrieg.shtml> and: ThieBen, M. Gedenken 
an Hamburgs ,,schrecklichste Stunden." Historicum. net, Themenportal Bombenkrieg, 09.03.05, pp. 1-2.
65 See: Der Feuersturm: Die Bombardierung Deutschlands im Zweiten Weltkrieg zwischen Tabu und 
Trauma. Hessischer Rundfunk [Online]. 13.04.03 22:45 [Accessed 29.02.04]. <http://static.hr- 
online.de/fs/kultur/reportage_friedrich.html> For claims by Geo see: ThieBen, M. op. cit., pp. 1-2.
66 Cited from: Seewald, B. op. cit., p. 27.
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this subject was an injustice that, in respect of the [SPD/Green] government's avowal of 
democracy, it can no longer maintain.' 67
In 2003, Bolsche asked: 'Will the nationwide chain of events surrounding the 60th 
anniversary finally remove one of the last remaining taboos of the past?' 68 Uwe 
Bahnsen, Klaus Rainer Rohl and Jorg Huber all seemed to think so. Commenting on 
those lost in firestorms during the worst air raids on Hamburg in 1943, Bahnsen 
maintained that this terrible theme was no longer taboo 'throughout the rest of 
Germany'. 69 Reuters and Hessian Broadcasting correspondent, Huber, also welcomed 
the alleged breaking of the taboo in Kassel that precluded the war-time generation from 
being accepted as collective victims and, arguably, the title of Rohl's 2002 book, The 
Forbidden Mourning: The End of German Taboos was self-explanatory. 70
The belief that a taboo had been broken also extended to some historical institutions. 
'For many years the Air War was taboo in Frankfurt. Our new book marking the 60th 
anniversary of the air raid in March 1944, however, seeks to redress this unbalance', 
declared Frankfurt am Main's Institute for History. 71 So too did Osnabriick's Museum 
of Cultural History (KGM) and the Braunschweiger Zeitung. In 2004, the KGM 
released its publication called: The Day Osnabruck Went Down 13 September 1944. 
Local historian Matthias Rickling noted that until 'very recently', portraying the grief of 
the German population was generally perceived as 'ein unausgesprochenes Verbot'. 12 In 
a special edition commemorating the most destructive raid on Brunswick on 14 October 
1944, discussing the sorrow of the local population, similarly the chief editor of the 
Braunschweiger Zeitung, Paul-Josef Raue, maintained that 'the question of whether the 
destruction of the city was justified was taboo for almost 60 years'. 73 Discussing past 
perceptions of the Air War with Geo historical magazine, sociologist and researcher of
67 Cited from: Lau, M. 'Der Brand' und das Zweistromland. Die Welt, 19.12.02, p. 7. See also: 
Schwering, M. op. cit.
68 Cited from: Bolsche, J. op. cit., p. 41.
69 Cited from: Bahnsen, U. Feuersturm. Die Welt, 24.07.03, p. 8.
70 See: Huber, J. A. op. cit., pp. 3-4. See also: Rohl, K. R. Verbotene Trauer: Ende der deutschen Tabus. 
Tubingen: Universitas Verlag, 2002, pp. 76, 219.
71 Cited from: Michels, C. ,,Alle Hauser, ohne Ausnahme, brennen." Frankfurter Rundschau, 03.03.04, p. 
37. See also: Hils-Brockhoff, E. and Picard, T. op. cit., pp. 3-5.
72 Cited from: Rickling, M. op. cit., p. 3.
73 Cited from: Raue, P-J. Editorial. Die Bomben-Nacht. Der Luftkrieg vor 60 Jahren. Braunschweiger 
Zeitung Spezial, 2004 (10), p. 3.
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violence, Professor Wolfgang Sofsky, also claimed that there had been a clear 'proviso 
of terms' of how the Allied Air Campaign was to be described - if at all. 74
Responding to these and similar allegations in the Bundestag, politicians Angelika 
Kriiger-LeiBner (SPD), Silke Stokar von Neuforn (Alliance 90/The Greens) and Gunter 
Baumann (CDU) denied that any kind of taboo had been imposed concerning 
remembering the Germans as victims.75 Along with Kruger-LeiBner and Baumann, 
others have also denied there was any kind of taboo regarding German collective 
memory. Reviewing the historical impact of Friedrich's 2002 publication The Fire, 
Malte ThieBen and Volker Ullrich doubted whether there has been any prohibition of 
the theme because of a number of articles dealing with the destruction of Hamburg and 
Dresden. In fact, ThieBen claimed Operation Gomorrah, or the series of air raids on 
Hamburg in 1943, has always been part of the city's identity.76
Historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Frank Teske of Mainz City Archives and newspaper 
editor Klaus Honold, also shared reservations of whether there had been a taboo. At the 
same time, however, Wehler and Teske maintained it was not until many years later that 
those involved were able or believed it appropriate to talk about it. 77 This was because 
there was simply no opportunity for Germans to claim that they were victims, argued 
military historian Dr. Sonke Neitzel, Klaus Honold and journalist Alexandra Welsch. 78 
Along with Mary Fulbrook, Elizabeth Domansky and SPD representative of the 
Bundestag, Hans Apel, there have been similar claims that adopting the mantle of 
victim that, arguably, follows the emotional necessity of those affected by such events, 
was simply not possible at the time. For one thing, most of the victims had supported the 
Nazi regime, noted journalists and authors Oliver Reinhard, Jochen Wittmann, Jorg 
Huber and Dieter Forte.79
74 Cited from: Sofsky, W. ,,Die Dinge beim Namen nennen." Verbrechen gegen die Deutschen? Geo 
Magazin [Online]. 2003 (2) [Accessed 07.01.05]. <http://www.geo.de/GEO/Kultur-gesellschaft/ 
geschichte/2003_01_interview_sofsky/?>
75 See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., pp. 4105-4108.
76 See: ThieBen, M. op. cit., pp. 1-16 and: Ullrich, V. op. cit., p. 47.
77 See: Teske, F., Dr. Personal communication, 26.04.04 and: ,,Vergleichen - nicht moralisieren." Der 
Spiegel, 06.01.03 (2), p. 51. See also: Honold, K. Darmstadt im Feuersturm. Die Zerstorung am 11. 
September 1944. op. cit., pp. 5-15.
78 See also: Honold, K. Darmstadt im Feuersturm. Die Zerstorung am 11. September 1944. op. cit., pp. 5-
15 and: Welsch, A. op. cit., p. 11. For claims by Neitzel see: Neitzel, S., Dr. Personal communication,
20.04.04.
79 Collective mourning was not possible because mourning for the victims of National Socialism took
precedence over a collective one, noted Huber and Dusseldorf eyewitness and author Dieter Forte. See:
Huber, J. A. op. cit., pp. 3-4 and: Gleich bist du tot. op. cit., pp. 1-2. See also: Reinhard, O. and
Wittmann, J. op. cit., p. 7.
219
Whatever the truth, official responses to these allegations appeared to highlight the 
ongoing reappraisal of National Socialist history, where evidence suggested popular 
memory contrasted sharply with an official one. Commenting on the public reactions to 
The Fire in the Bundestag, CDU representative Gunter Baumann stated: 'What has 
become increasingly amplified is the call amongst the German population for the 
survivors of the Allied Air War to be accepted as equal victims of war.' 80 Nevertheless, 
evidence suggested federal mainstream politicians have so far dismissed mitigating 
appeals for equal victim status by declaring that Germans, as collective victims of war, 
should be prevented from becoming a permanent part of a national policy of 
recollections. Maintaining that it was not appropriate for Germans to be mourned in a 
national context, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer argued:
German suffering has to be placed in a European context of suffering. It cannot 
be a national project. Otherwise, I suspect the real intention is the re-writing of 
history that reverses the roles of victim and perpetrator. In this sense we cannot 
talk about the Germans as victims.81
There was a similar response from SPD member of the Bundestag Kriiger-LeiBner. 
Responding in the Bundestag to Friedrich's The Fire and the media's appeals for parity 
of status for the bombing victims, Kriiger-LeiBner (SPD) declared:
It is particularly dangerous whenever attempts are made in historical discussions 
to reappraise National Socialism. This is because the question of national self- 
understanding of the Germans always arises, which carries with it the danger of 
a new nationalism and exploitation of the past by apologists. We must not, 
therefore, permit any form of comparison of victims or their reappraisal. 82
Developments suggested that the official stance was not in accordance with the media, 
some historical institutions or elements of the public. Corroborated by CDU member of 
the Bundestag Martin Hohmann, Ute Frevert and others, Friedrich has now, in the 
words of military historian Sonke Neitzel, 'burst the dam, fuelling a counter-discourse 
on Germans as victims'. 83 Speaking in the Bundestag, Hohmann admitted that for the
80 For speech by Baumann see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., p. 4108.
81 Cited from: ,,Was haben wir uns angetan?" - Interview mit BundesauBenminister Fischer iiber ein 
Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen und iiber das Geschichtsbild der Deutschen, Wochenschrift "Die Zeit" 
28.08.2003. Auswdrtiges Amt [Online]. 28.08.03 [Accessed 02.02.04]. <http://www.auswaertiges- 
amt.de/www/de/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=4793>
82 See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., pp. 4105-4106.
83 Cited from: Neitzel, S., Dr. Personal communication, 20.04.04. See also: Frevert, U. op. cit., pp. 9-10 
and: KJugermann, G. op. cit., p. 3. See also: Sontheimer, M. op. cit., p. 156 and: Klaue, M. Moral
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first time Friedrich brought into central focus the Air War from the perspective of the 
600,000 German civilians as victims.84 Not only were there increasing numbers of 
German articles and publications appearing on the role of Germans as victims, 
emboldened by the appearance of The Fire, many eyewitnesses have also spoken out for 
the first time.85
Funded by Darmstadt City Council, local film producers Christian and Jutta Gropper 
received 25,000 Euros for their documentary film about the destruction of Darmstadt 60 
years ago on 11 September 1944. Released in 2004, 'Brandmale [Brands of Fire] is also 
about the search for the rest of Darmstadt's history', explained the producers. 
Challenging the claims of Bundestag politicians Baumann and Kriiger-LeiBner, 
according to the Croppers, the film clearly revealed 'what could only be really 
understood by following generations after intensive reflection: the loss of the town'. 86 
Including previously unheard eyewitness accounts, Christian Gropper stated: 'As a 
consequence of Friedrich's book, this theme will now be more openly and honestly 
addressed.' 87 Following the Darmstadter Echo's appeal for testimonies for the film, 
over 80 witnesses volunteered for the production. 88 There was a similar response for the 
2004 publication Darmstadt in a Firestorm by the editor of the Darmstadter Echo, 
Klaus Honold. Over 100 testimonies were received by the Darmstadter Echo for the 
book - many of whom had never before spoken or written about their experiences. 89 
Amongst those that did were Erna Reitz-Spielmann, Ruth Gaulrapp and Hilde 
Carpentier.
In response to an appeal for eyewitness testimonies for Monoid's publication Darmstadt 
in a Firestorm, Reitz-Spielmann described the search for her missing parents shortly 
after the firestorm in Darmstadt on 11 September 1944: 'One of the bodies in the 
HugelstraBe lay burnt beyond recognition which could only be identified by the bunch
Bombing. Mil SchweiB, Blut und Tinte die kampft Deutschland dafur, als "Opfer des Bombenkrieges" 
anerkannt zu werden. Konkret, 2003 (1), pp. 44-45.
84 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit.. p. 4098.
85 For these claims see: ThieBen, M. op. cit., pp. 1-2 and: JanBen, D. op. cit., p. 4. See also: Baczyk, D. 
,,Damit die Welt wieder gerade geruckt werde." Darmstadter Echo, 18.09.04, p. 13.
86 Cited from: Gruner, P-H. ,,Seid ein bisschen ehrfurchtiger." Darmstadter Echo, 29.04.04, p. 11. See 
also: Honold, K. Die Brandnacht hat eine Vorgeschichte. Darmstadter Echo, 30.08.04, p. 11.
87 Cited from: Gruner, P-H. op. cit., p. 11.
88 See: Honold, K. Die Brandnacht hat eine Vorgeschichte. op. cit., p. 11 and: Brandmale. Ein Film van 
Jutta und Christian Gropper. Exklusiv herausgegeben van der Wissenschaftsstadt Darmstadt. Darmstadt: 
Gropperfilm, 2004. Videocassette.
89 See: Baczyk, D. op. cit., p. 13 and: Welsch, A. op. cit., p. 11. See also: Honold, K. Darmstadt im 
Feuersturm. Die Zerstorung am 11. September 1944. op. cit., pp. 10-15.
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of keys. Then I realised - they were those of my mother. There was no trace of my 
father.' 90
Further indicative of the breaking of a former repression and ongoing 
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in Darmstadt were the following statements by other 
survivors of 11 September 1944. 'Forty years ago I read an appeal for the publication 
Brandnacht [Night of Fire]. It was not possible at the time to write or talk about that 
evening. But I am glad I have now done so', wrote Ruth Gaulrapp. 'One heard the cries 
of the trapped and burning that could no longer be rescued. Those kind of memories 
remain with one for a lifetime', noted Hilde Carpentier. 91
During 2003, over 100 testimonies were also sent to Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung 
(HAZ) and the Westdeutsche Zeitung (WZ) newspapers in response to their post-2002 
publications on the Air War. Editor of HAZ, Thorsten Fuchs, claimed that the 
newspaper received almost 250 accounts. 'Many of these were children at the time and 
owing to social and professional pressure had until recently repressed their experiences', 
noted Fuchs.92
In 2003, WZ interviewed one of the 'very few who have addressed events in 
Dusseldorf." According to local survivor and author Dieter Forte, what actually 
happened in Dusseldorf remained largely unarticulated either historically or publicly. 
Those who had read his book, The Boy with the Bloody Shoes (1995), actually thought it 
was science fiction, noted Forte and WZ. 94 When WZ began its 2003 series of articles 
commemorating the Air War, WZ editors Rene Schleucher and Marc Herriger reported 
that over 100 people had submitted contributions for their new publication on the 
theme. 'Many in Dusseldorf had not previously spoken about their terrible experiences
90 See: Honold, K. Darmstadt im Feuersturm. Die Zerstorung am 11. September 1944. op. cit., p. 47.
91 Cited from: Ibid., pp. 10, 31. There were similar testimonies from Irmgard Krievens and Gunter 
Wiemer. See: Ibid., pp. 59-60. Brandnacht was by local journalist Klaus Schmidt. See: Schmidt, K. Die 
Brandnacht. Dokumente von der Zerstorung Darmstadts am 11. September 1944. Darmstadt: Reba- 
VerlagGmbH, 1964.
92 Cited from: Fuchs, T. and Wittke, S. op. cit.. pp. 3-4. See also: Fuchs, T. (Editor of HAZ). Personal 
communication, 07.04.04 and: Honold, K. Darmstadt im Feuersturm. Die Zerstorung am 11. September 
1944. op. cit., pp. 5-15.
93 Cited from: ,,Das Thema war uberfallig." Bombenkrieg iiber Dusseldorf. Westdeutsche Zeitung 
[Online]. 06.05.03 [Accessed 21.06.04]. <http://www.wz-newsline.de/sro.php?redid=59172> and: Gleich 
bist du tot. op. cit., pp. 1-2.
94 See: ,,Das Thema war uberfallig." Bombenkrieg iiber Dusseldorf. op. cit. For book by Dieter Forte see: 
Forte, D. DerJunge mil den blutigen Schuhen. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995.
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as victims', noted Schleucher and Herriger. 95 So how did, in the words of Fulbrook, the 
'kaleidoscope of personal memories' and private stories intersect and interact with 
official representations of the past?96
Rudy Koshar maintained that memory sometimes relies on stories told and retold, 
adapted and shaped in response to specific moments of opportunity or crisis. 97 What for 
some is significant is not so for others, and either view may have been deliberately 
erased, omitted or manifested in quite different forms. This is, of course, the unreliable 
side of remembrance. On the other hand, it is an important source of evidence.98 As 
Fulbrook argued, only those who lived through the experience in question will have 
authentic personal memories.99 Making allowances for experiences being relative to the 
individual concerned, and taking into account the difficulties of generalising from small 
samples, it is possible to glean certain insights as to how the raids were being perceived 
in Germany at the time.
Undergoing 125 raids, no other city was so visibly transformed during the Air War than 
Hanover, claimed Jorg Friedrich. 100 During July and August 2003, HAZ printed 
testimonies submitted on what life was like during the nights of bombing in Hanover 
during 1943. 101 Describing the evening of Hanover's worst attack on 9 October 1943, 
schoolboy Lothar Redlin recalled that due to smoke coming into the shelter from the 
firestorm the door had to be opened: 'We saw phosphorous flowing over the asphalt and 
a woman on fire running screaming through the street." 02 Eight-year-old Helga 
Reinhardt corroborated Redlin's account. On emerging from a cellar in Hanover after 
the same raid, Reinhardt claimed that neighbours and acquaintances rushed past her 
with burning phosphorous on the soles their shoes. 103
1,300 people were killed and 300,000 wounded in Diisseldorf on 12 June 1943. 
Recovering in a local hospital, Margot Schmidt described what she saw following the 
air raid:
95 See: Die Opfer waren damals so alt wie ihr. op. cit. For the Westdeutsche Zeitung 2003 publication on 
the theme see: Steinacker, O. op. cit.
96 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., p. 155.
97 See: Koshar, R. op. cit., p. 8.
98 For these claims see: Fuchs, T. and Wittke, S. op. cit., p. 3.
99 See: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 145-146.
100 See: Friedrich, J. op. cit., pp. 228-229.
101 For appeals by HAZ see: Sommer 1943. Zwischen Angst und Alltag. Erinnern Sie sich? op. cit., p. 15.
102 Cited from: Fuchs, T. and Wittke, S. op. cit., pp. 73-74.
103 For testimony by Reinhardt, see: Ibid.
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A young girl was brought in. She sat by the only means of running water 
available in order to have her head dressed. In her hand held closely under her 
chin was one of her eyes. Until now I have been unable to recount the horror of 
what I saw that evening. 104
Recalling the evening of 12 June 1943, during which he not only suffered serious 
injuries but also the loss of his mother, Heinz Lang reported that he wept on his first 
attempt to write down his remembrances. 105 Of all the numerous testimonies that have 
appeared since The Fire, perhaps that by Kassel eyewitness Otto Pfutzenreuter best 
summarised the ending of the former silence from survivors of the Air War: 'What 
never ceased to amaze me was that people accepted this misery and distress without 
complaining." 06
At odds then with official representations of the past, were the intense memories of the 
Air War from women and children as 'forbidden victims', noted Matthias Rickling, 
Dietrich JanBen, Jorg Huber and 'many in the media'. 107 Highlighting the growing 
disparities between official and public cultures of remembrance, evidence suggested 
that Friedrich was also a key factor in affecting the breaking of the past silence of many 
Air War survivors. 'At last,' declared Mariam Lau, 'the German civilian population will 
have their sufferings acknowledged as a result of the appearance of Friedrich's 
publication." 08 'It would appear that the generation that experienced wartime suffering 
at first hand is now to be paid its deserved respects', reflected Bernd Ulrich. 109 Not, 
however, from the ruling Bundestag political elite.
'Your memory and ours." 10
According to the Federal Administration Office: 'Commemorations serve to emphasise 
key events or profound experiences in the collective past that are significant for the
104 Cited from: Steinacker, O. op. cit., pp. 41-42. See also: Friedrich, J. op. cit., p. 255.
105 See: WZ-Bombenserie wird jetzt zum Buch. Bombenkrieg iiber Diisseldorf. Westdeutsche Zeitung 
[Online]. 2003 [Accessed 03.12.04]. <http://www.wz-newsline.de/sro.php?redid=59151>
106 Responding to the Hessische/Niedersachsische Allgemeine (HNA) for past testimonies from October 
1943 in 2003, many responses in the form of letters were passed on to Kassel City Archives. See: 
Erinnerungen an die Bombennacht am 22.10.1943. Otto Pfutzenreuter, Kassel, 29.08.03, p. 1. 
Augenzeugenberichte der Luftangriffe auf Kassel. In: Frau Krenz (Kassel City Archives). Personal 
communication, 09.09.04 and: Klaube, F-R. (Kassel City Archives). Personal communication, 22.09.04.
107 Cited from: Rickling, M. op. cit., pp. 3-4 and: JanBen, D. op. cit., pp. 3-4. See also: Huber, J. A. op. 
cit, pp. 3-4, 30-45. See also: Thielkn, M. op. cit., pp. 1-3 and: Schwilk, H. op. cit., p. 9.
108 Cited from: Lau, M. op. cit., p. 7.
109 See: Ulrich, B. Alle Deutschen werden Briider. Die Zeit, 30.10.03 (45), p. 46.
110 Cited from: Geyer, M. (ed). The power of intellectuals in contemporary Germany. Chicago/London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001, p. 9.
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present and worthy of remembrance."" Official reactions to appeals for a National Day 
of Remembrance for those lost in the Air War suggested they were unworthy of 
commemoration. This reluctance to grant national victim status for those lost in the 
Allied Air War reflected another disparity between official and popular national self- 
understanding.
Summer 2003 marked the 60th anniversary of the Allied Air War against Germany. 
Until April 2005, no fewer than 161 German towns and cities planned to remember it, 
claimed Der Spiegel. 112 In Kassel's town hall, for instance, a commemorative hour was 
held in October 2003. The people of the city, the local media and Jorg Friedrich 
attended." 3 Outside the remains of Hamburg's main church, the St. Nicolai-Kirche, a 
bronze statue by Edith Breckwoldt was set up, marking the 60th anniversary of 
Operation Gomorrah on the city, 'in remembrance of those lost in the unimaginable 
inferno', noted the CDU Mayor Ole von Beust."4 In September 2004, Darmstadt's 
Mayor Peter Benz unveiled a three metre high pillar, commemorating the casualties of 
the raid in September 1944." 5 Remembering the 17,000 killed on the evening of 
February 1945, a new stele was also established in Pforzheim on the occasion of the 60th 
anniversary of the Air War." 6 In fact, along with Pforzheim, three other German cities 
hold annual commemorative events attended by local dignitaries to remember the 
heaviest raids and loss of life." 7 In 1995, the Mayor of Magdeburg, Dr. Willi Polte, 
confirmed that: 'Every 16 January we honour the victims of the inferno with 
commemorations.'" 8 There are also annual remembrance initiatives in Heilbronn and 
Dresden to which several notables and foreign guests are usually invited." 9
Evidently, new monuments have been erected and numerous commemorative events 
held both past and present - but not at a national level. Responding to growing requests
'" Cited from: National Days of Remembrance and Public Holidays. Protocol Office. Federal 
Administration Office [Online]. 2003 [Accessed 10.02.04]. <http://www.bund.de>
112 See: Bolsche, J. op. cit., pp. 38-40.
113 See: Rede von Oberburgermeister Georg Lewandowski zum 60. Jahrestag der Bombennacht. Stadt 
Kassel [Online]. 22.10.03 [Accessed 05.03.04]. <http://www.stadt-kassel.de/aktuelles/ 
publikationen_reden/2003/2003-10-22-2.html>
114 Cited from: Die Narben der Vergangenheit. Die Welt, 21.07.03, p. 34.
115 See: Honold, K. Die Brandnacht hat eine Vorgeschichte. op. cit., p. 11.
116 See: Erinnern an Zerstorung der Stadt. Pforzheimer Zeitung, 02.02.05 (26), p. 22 and: Bombenhagel 
iiber Pforzheim. 23. Februar 1945. Pforzheimer Zeitung, 23.02.04 (44), p. 15.
117 Strohmayer, M. Umfangreiches Programm erinnert an den 23. Februar 1945. 09.02.05. 60. Jahrestag 
der Zerstorung Pforzheims. Pressemitteilung. Stadt Pforzheim, Hauptamt Pressereferent, pp. 1-3.
118 Cited from: Liebe Magdeburgerinnen und Magdeburger. In: Puhle, M. op. cit., pp. 4-5.
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for a National Day of Remembrance for the bombing victims, in the Bundestag, Silke 
Stokar von Neuforn (Alliance 90/The Greens) emphasised that the international element 
was of greater significance than national for remembering the dead of the Air War. 
Referring to the many events across the country, echoing Stokar von Neuforn, SPD 
member of the Bundestag Kruger-LeiBner argued that: 'An official National Day of 
Remembrance is therefore not necessary.' 120 Along with Kriiger-LeiBner, Free 
Democratic Party (FDP) representative of the Bundestag, Hans-Joachim Otto, also 
stated that Germany did not need any more memory initiatives, since it was not the duty 
of the German government to inaugurate a national memorial for Germany's dead. 121 
But some historians and the German media thought otherwise. Despite increasing calls 
in the media 'to permit those lost in the Air War justice, empathy, comprehensive 
recollection and recognition', noted Ute Frevert and others, evidence suggested the 
Bundestag political elite has so far proved unwilling to accede. 122
In 2003, on the 60th anniversary of the largest air raid on Kassel, HNA's chief editor and 
local author, Thomas Siemon, asked Jorg Friedrich what the relevance was of a national 
commemoration 60 years after the event. 'Dispensing with all pretences of a self- 
appointed prophet of the nation', noted Siemon, Friedrich claimed that: 'Germany's 
dead still do not have a name - or collective voice. What are they? Those lost in a total 
war or victims of a war crime?" 23 According to Friedrich, Kassel was amongst only six 
other German cities that lost more than 10,000 civilians in one air raid - the others 
being Hamburg, Darmstadt, Dresden, Pforzheim and Swinemiinde. 124 'Although the 
exact figure was never conclusively verified', noted Kassel City Archives, they 
estimated at least 10,000 deaths as a result of the air attack on 22 October 1943. 125
Evidence from other sources also suggested there was a growing need for a collective 
voice for the bombing victims in Germany. Head of Heilbronn's Municipal Archives,
120 See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., pp. 4103-4108.
121 Cited from: Ibid., pp. 4106-4107.
122 Cited from: Frevert, U. op. cit., pp. 9-13. See also: Thielkn, M. op. cit., pp. 1-2 and: Rickling, M. op. 
cit., p. 3.
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bombennacht> For 2003 publication on the Air War in Kassel by Siemon, see: Siemon, T. and Dettmar, 
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124 See: Ibid. See also: Friedrich, J. op. cit., pp. 115-116.
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Christhard Schrenk, stated in 1994: 'After 50 years it is time to lay the facts on the 
table, because Heilbronn's deliberate annihilation, along with the deaths of thousands of 
innocent people, have never been officially acknowledged." 26 During 1998 and 1999, 
local historian Margarete Dorr interviewed numerous female survivors from the raid on 
Heilbronn on 4 December 1944 for Heilbronn Municipal Archives and for her 
publication on women's wartime experiences. Dorr's three-volume work included the 
testimonies of over 500 German women surveyed between 1988 and 1996. 127 According 
to Dorr: 'The worst part of the testimonies from the women of the town remains to be 
told.' Referring to the 7,000 killed or missing in a single raid on Heilbronn on 4 
December 1944, along with Jorg Friedrich, Dorr stated in 1999 that: 'The dead have no
voice." 28
Since Heilbronn's main cemetery proved inadequate to hold all those killed as a result 
of the Air Raid of 4 December 1944, mass graves were dug, noted Heilbronn 
Archives. 129 This was a familiar pattern repeated in Hamburg, Magdeburg and 
Pforzheim. Between 24 July and 3 August 1943, Operation Gomorrah claimed over 
40,000 lives. In its aftermath, corpses were thrown into mass graves adjacent to the 
main cemetery at Ohlsdorf, noted Egbert Hoffmann and Jochen Bolsche. 130 Dr. Maren 
Ballerstedt and Konstanze Buchholz of Magdeburg City Archives explained how horses 
and carts brought the 2,000-2,500 bodies to the cemeteries after the 16 January air 
attack. 'As these proved too small, mass graves had to be dug', explained Ballerstedt 
and Buchholz. 131 In 2004, the Pforzheimer Zeitung published a letter from a young 
woman writing to her husband at the front, describing the scene after the air attack on 
Pforzheim on 23 February 1945. According to the Pforzheimer Zeitung: 'The dead had 
to be buried in a mass grave and everyone brought their dead or helped his or her 
neighbour up to the pit. We had forgotten what grieving really was." 32
126 Cited from: Frank, H-G. op. cit., p. 1.
127 See: Margarete Dorr im Gesprach mil Lerke von Saalfeld. Zeitgenossen. Siidwestrundfunk [Online]. 
19.12.04 14:05 [Accessed 30.03.05]. <http://www.swr.de/lsunterwegs/archive/2004/12/19/> For Dorr's 
publication, see: Dorr, M. "Wer die Zeit nicht miterlebt hat... " Frauenerfahrungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg 
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Nationalsozialismus und zum Krieg. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1998.
128 Cited from: Feinaugle, F. ,,Ich sail Frauen Ubermenschschliches leisten." Heilbronner Stimme, 
06.12.99, p. 19.
129 See: Haufig gestellte Fragen zur Stadtgeschichte. Stadt Heilbronn [Online]. 2004 [Accessed 23.08.04]. 
<http://www.stadtarchiv-heilbronn.de/de/faq/antwort2/cont4.htm>
130 See: Hoffmann, E. A. Als der Feuertod vom Himmel stiirtzte. Hamburg, Sommer 1943. Gudensberg- 
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What Friedrich and others appeared to be suggesting, was that there was no appropriate 
form of mourning, culture of remembrance and, ultimately, identity for those lost in the 
Air War. 133 Some Bundestag politicians have criticised this phenomenon as a misguided 
'Erinnerungskultur' or culture of remembrance. Highlighting the apparent dilemma of 
German commemoration, member of the Christian Social Union (CSU), Peter 
Gauweiler, asked in the Bundestag: 'How are we to integrate our nation with this 
ErinnerungskulturT w Gauweiler then went on to cite an extract from the Suddeutsche 
Zeitung that ran: 'There is no reason why the victims of the Allied bombing terror 
should not be remembered."35
This new Erinnerungskultur phenomenon also became particularly apparent in 
publications and statements from historical institutions in Paderborn, Solingen and 
Fulda. Along with Heilbronn in 1992, the city of Paderborn wanted to dedicate a book 
of remembrance to its dead in 2005. 136 According to the head of Paderborn City 
Archives, Rolf-Dietrich Miiller: 'Some of the dead of the city remain faceless and 
anonymous and we believe that should change." 37 Following the November raids in 
1944, the dead of Solingen were taken to the so-called 'body collection points' at the 
cemeteries of Grafrath, Hohscheid and Ohligs. 'In many cases, identification or normal 
burial was therefore not always possible', noted the head of Solingen Archives, Ralf 
Rogge, and local historian Armin Schulte. 138 Although plans were laid in Frankfurt am 
Main during 1946 for a memorial to those killed in the 1944 air raids, it was not until 
1978 that a commemorative plaque was finally realised in the city. 'This proved 
inadequate, however, owing to its poor location', complained the self-styled 'memory 
of Frankfurt' or the Frankfurt Institute of History. 139
According to a 2004 publication by Fulda Archives, both an official and public culture 
of remembrance of the Air War was 'swept under the carpet, along with the pain and 
sorrow of those who survived it. 60 years on there is now, however, an opportunity to
133 See: Siemon, T. Interview: Auf einer Stufe mil Dresden, op. cit.
134 See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit, p. 4103-4104.
135 Cited from: Ibid. Bundestag politicians Baumann (CDU), Kriiger-LeiBner (SPD) and Stokar von 
Neufom (Alliance 90/The Greens) all noted (with clear reservations) that Friedrich's The Fire encouraged 
the widespread perception that there should be no reason why those lost in the Air War should not be 
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136 See: Zweites Gedenkbuch? 11,299 Tote. Heilbronner Stimme, 04.12.92 (281), p. 23.
137 Cited from: Diesmal die Opfer im Blick. op. cit., p. 3.
138 Cited from: Rogge, R. and Schulte, A. op. cit., pp. 24, 54.
139 Cited from: Hils-Brockhoff, E. and Picard, T. op. cit., pp. 5, 59-60.
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remember those lost."40 Wolfgang Sofsky also maintained that the Air War was always 
an unpopular term, due to official assumptions that it was open to abuse. 141 In 2003, 
members of the Bundestag Angelika Kriiger-LeiBner (SPD), Hans-Joachim Otto (FDP) 
and Giinter Baumann (CDU) rejected such appeals for a specific National Day of 
Remembrance for the bombing victims. 'One must remember the Bombenkrieg has 
always been part of a memory culture', stated Kriiger-LeiBner. Baumann maintained 
that Germans 'always have been a part of our collective remembrance'. 142 When appeals 
for eyewitness testimonies, statements from various leaders of municipal archives and 
eyewitnesses themselves are considered, the claims of Baumann and other members of 
the Bundestag that fears over a loss of the past were unwarranted, appear rather 
questionable.
Although a collective silence has now been broken, evidence suggested there was not 
only a widespread perception of a broken history, but also an attendant desire to recover 
and convey past suffering particularly to the younger generation. Janflen claimed, for 
example, that his 2004 publication would be of 'particular interest to the young in 
Emden since schools never addressed the theme in the past'. 143 Referring to the 1945 
raid on Magdeburg, for instance, city tour-guide and survivor Christel Horning wrote 
that 'this terrible part of German history should never be forgotten or suppressed, either 
for German youth or for visitors to Germany'. 144 These concerns also extended to the 
North Rhine-Westphalian Minister for Schools Ute Schafer, Wiirzburg bookshop 
Schoningh and the Mayors of Paderborn and Pforzheim.
Promoting the past in Diisseldorf, local company Henkel, together with local newspaper 
the Westdeutsche Zeitung (WZ), arranged for ten free copies of their 2003 publication 
Air War over Diisseldorf to be issued to every secondary school in the city. WZ editors 
Rene Schleucher and Marc Herriger noted that Schafer welcomed the project: 'Concern 
about the past is not merely an end in itself. We have to convey this subject to our 
children in order that they can have a relationship with the reality of what happened',
140 Cited from: Sagan, G., Heiler, T. and Kann, B. op. cit., p. 3.
141 See: Sofsky, W. op. cit.
142 For official dismissals of a National Day of Remembrance for German civilians lost in the Air War, 
see Bundestag speeches by Kriiger-LeiBner (SPD), Baumann (CDU) and Stokar von Neuforn (Alliance 
90/The Greens) in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., pp. 4105-4108.
143 Cited from: Janflen, D. op. cit., pp. 3-4.
144 Cited from: Horning, C. Personal communication, 14.04.04. Although not claimimg to address any 
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stated Schafer. 145 Henkel spokesperson Michael-Rolf Fischer also noted: 'It is our duty 
to enable the young to discover this aspect of the past." 46 A similar initiative was 
sponsored in Wurzburg. 'Every school in Wurzburg is to receive free copies of the 2005 
booklet Chronicle of Wurzburg 1945, information folder and plan of the destruction of 
the city from the local bookshop Schoningh\ reported the Main Post. 1 * 1 Events 
commemorating the 60th anniversary of the heaviest air raids in 1945 on Paderborn were 
also addressed to the young of the city. 148 Introducing a 40-page commemorative 
booklet in 2005 on the destruction of Paderborn, Mayor Heinz Paus stated:
We must remember the grief of those who endured and suffered the near total 
destruction of our old city. We owe that to the memory of our lost citizens and 
as a legacy to forthcoming generations of the perversion of war. 149
150Mayor of Pforzheim Christel Augenstein expressed similar views.
Freiburg historian Horst Boog was particularly vociferous in his demands for bringing 
past testimonies alive to the young. Although critical of some of the technical aspects 
addressed by Friedrich, such as radar equipment, nevertheless, reviewing The Fire, 
Boog wrote: 'The terrible portrayal of the Allied bombing war against German cities 
should be hammered into the next generation." 51 Magdeburg tour guide Christel 
Horning also maintained that 'a more realistic portrayal of the past must be undertaken 
in order to fully comprehend the political facts and to find their identity in the land of 
their birth'. 152
Further indications of an apparent need for a more comprehensive engagement with the 
past were allegations of a lost identity as a result of the immense destruction. 
Commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Air War in Frankfurt am Main, the
145 For statement by Schafer and details of the publication by the WZ, see: Die Opfer waren damals so alt 
wie ihr. op. cit. and: Steinacker, O. op. cit.
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148 See: Diesmal die Opfer im Blick. op. cit., p. 3.
149 Cited from: Miiller, R-D., Runte, M. and Zelder, H. Erinnern und Gedenken. Die Zerstorung der Stadt 
vor 60Jahren. Burgermeister der Stadt Paderborn. Stadt Paderborn, Jan 2005, p. 1.
150 See: Ausfithrungen van Christel Augenstein, Oberbiirgermeisterin der Stadt Pforzheim, anldsslich der 
Gedenkfeier 23.02.2005, 16 Uhr, aufdem Hauptfriedhof. Stadt Pforzheim, Hauptamt Pressereferent, pp.
1-3.
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25.02.04]. <http://www.dsz-verIag.de/Artikel/NZ52/NZ52_4.html> See also: Boog, H. Deutschland im
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Frankfurt Institute for History released a publication supplemented by an exhibition in 
2004. Referring to the exhibition, Head of Frankfurt's Department of Culture, Bernhard 
Nordhoff, declared: 'Not only do we want to hold a memorial ceremony, but also ensure 
people know what happened." 53 According to the Head of the Frankfurt Institute for 
History, Evelyn Hils-Brockhoff, this was because 'events have only just become 
realistically portrayed'. 154 Lamenting the loss of Frankfurt's identity, introducing their 
2004 publication, editors Evelyn Hils-Brockhoff and Tobias Picard noted: 'Birthplace 
of Goethe and the intellectual domain of Schopenhauer, the destruction of the city in 
March 1944 robbed Frankfurt of its original identity." 55 'On account of war-damage 
sustained many beautiful old buildings in Krefeld had to be demolished. Many 
Krefelders still mourn for this loss of architecture', noted Elisabeth Kremers of Krefeld 
City Archives. 156
But not all had such regrets, or were so keen to remember past generations in Germany. 
During the 60l commemoration in Leipzig, demonstrators ran into the main function 
room of the town hall crying 'never again Germany', throwing out flyers with the 
headlines: 'German perpetrators are no victims." 57 In front of the British Embassy in 
Berlin, anti-fascists invited locals to a party under the caption: 'Thanks England. 
Whether New York, London or Paris, everyone loves Bomber Harris." 58
Many others, however, clearly mourned the loss of their city's respective history, 
architecture and identity. Dismissing reproaches of attempting to adopt a cult of victim, 
Dr. Antje Telgenbiischer argued: 'The dead of Paderborn have their place in the private 
history of every family, but, at the same time, their fate is also Paderbom's and thus part 
of the city's identity." 59 Proudly noting that even Berliners used to travel to Hamburg 
whenever they wanted fashionable or luxury goods, grieving the loss of its thousand-
153 Cited from: Michels, C. op. cit., p. 37. This exhibition was held in the Karmeliterkloster and ran from 
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year-old history, chief editor of the Hamburger Abendblatt newspaper, Egbert 
Hoffmann, wrote: 'The recording of the appalling disaster of the Hamburg firestorms is 
still outstanding both for posterity and the world." 60 'Following the November raids in 
1944, the distinct and uniqueness of Solingen's medieval past was irretrievably lost', 
noted Ralf Rogge and Armin Schulte. 161 Referring to the former city's once magnificent 
baroque town hall as the 'pride of Emden', Dietrich JanBen expressed clear frustration, 
sorrow and bewilderment over its substitute and the time taken for the 'grave events and 
destruction of the city to be appraised'. 162
Summarising official reactions to appeals for a National Day of Remembrance for 
victims of the Air War, Kriiger-LeiBner stated: 'Our collective memory must not 
become a national politics of remembrance." 63 Reluctance from the Bundestag elite to 
acknowledge the suffering of the war generation at national level not only seemed at 
odds with significant sections of the media and historical archives, but also with a 
general current 'Zeitgeist' or spirit of the times. 164 This raised further questions as to 
whether there is a consistent collective memory and, thereby, coherent national identity 
in Germany today.
Arguably, one way of ascertaining the mood at the time was by public reactions to 
eyewitness testimonies themselves. According to Fulbrook, 'our memories are not 
simply un-refracted reflections of the past, but are in part products of the present - 
prompted and limited by surviving evidence, records, the memories of others and 
current conversations'. 165 Recollections of eyewitnesses of events were not only 
indicative, to some extent, of a past phenomenon, but also reflective, perhaps, of a more 
recent one. How painful events are privately recalled, publicly discussed and politically 
memorialised, arguably, form integral elements in a sense of collective identity, noted 
Fulbrook. 166 That is what makes them both significant and a barometer of the spirit of 
the times. 'Literature, non-fiction works, films and local television, have all taken up
160 Cited from: Hoffmann, E. A. op. cit., pp. 2, 9, 21.
161 Cited from: Rogge, R. and Schulte, A. op. cit., pp. 3, 6, 55.
162 Cited from: JanJkn, D. op. cit., pp. 3-4, 6, 72-78.
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these new histories of victims and perpetrators which the German public have 
responded to with the high sales and audience figures', claimed Ute Frevert. 167
Since its publication in 2002, Friedrich's The Fire has consistently been a 'best seller'. 
Within a month of its publication, The Fire had sold more than 100,000 copies 'with a 
theme hitherto confined to local history publishing houses or railway-station 
bookstalls', noted Berthold Seewald. 168 At the end of 2002, for example, Heimo Schwilk 
claimed 50,000 copies had been sold, with a further 30,000 printed to meet the expected 
demand. 169 Nevertheless, it was not just The Fire that became a best seller. Along with 
the Braunschweiger Zeitung's 2004 special publication on the Air War, Pforzheim 
survivor and former lawyer Hannelore Schottgen's 2003 book was also a best seller. 170 
According to the Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, advertisements to its 2004 
publication on the Air War prompted continual enquiries from the newspaper's 
readership as to when the book would be available, stirring considerable local interest 
when finally released. 171
As far as films, radio and television broadcasts on the theme went, in April 2003, ZDF 
presented a 90-minute documentary. Not only was Jorg Friedrich's 'portrayal of the 
horror' of the Anglo-American air raids on major cities, such as Berlin and Cologne, 
depicted, but also the effects of the raids on smaller cities, such as Aachen, Mainz and 
Wiirzburg. 172 In 2003, Spiegel TV author Michael Kloft interviewed Friedrich and the 
British historian Richard Overy in a television documentary about the 1944 raid on 
Brunswick. 173
There have also been a number of films and broadcasts at local level. Radio broadcasts 
on the theme included transmissions in Bremen and Hildesheim. 174 In Hildesheim, for 
instance, the local station DLF Nachrichten held a radio discussion called
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Remembrances on the 23 March 1945 and Hildesheimer Identity.  New films and 
documentaries on Mannheim and Kassel also appeared in 2003, documenting the 
destruction of the respective cities. Radio and television presenter Eberhard ReuB of 
Southwest German Broadcasting (SWR), for example, produced a 45-minute 
documentary video entitled The Injured City, based on the recollections of female 
survivors in Mannheim and comments of local military historian Dieter Wolf.' 76 Thus, 
evidence suggested that Friedrich was a major catalyst in affecting a more sympathetic 
approach towards the suffering of the Air War generation.
Not all, however, were so ready to accept the war generation as equal victims in 
collective remembrance, or welcomed this new spirit of the times. Reviewing Volker 
Keller's Mannheim in the Bombing War, Jorg Arnold criticised the local historian for 
not sufficiently underlining that the suffering of the survivors was a direct consequence 
of Nazi racial policies. Instead, Keller focussed on the ongoing physical and 
psychological trauma of the survivors. 177 Although Mannheim only lost 2,171 of its 
residents during the entire war, owing to its relatively good system of air raid 
protection, the material destruction was extensive. Enduring many air raids, 31 of which 
were described by the Mannheim City Archives as 'heavy', in total, 49% of buildings in 
the city were lost. 178 Eyewitness testimonies suggested the physical and psychological 
damage was also considerable and ongoing. Eyewitnesses, such as Dorothea Path, 
claimed that men wept when they realised nothing could be done to help those buried in 
the rubble. Werner A. Wurm recalled that he and others threw themselves onto the floor 
with their mouths wide open, in order to prevent their lungs from bursting from the 
impact of a 'Luftmine' or 'blast bomb'. 179 Summarising these and other statements from 
Mannheim, Doris Perlstein maintained that the pain from the scars of those days has not 
ceased. 180
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Along with Jorg Arnold, Ralf Blank of the Hagen Historical Centre also expressed 
concerns about those adopting the same line of reasoning as Keller and Jorg Friedrich, 
dismissing claims that Friedrich was a credible model for research and future 
historians. 181 Following Friedrich's critical interpretation of events, however, a number 
of historians and historical archives in Germany released numerous publications on the 
Air War, arguably, indicating the growing extent of Friedrich's influence. 182 It seemed 
self-evident, therefore, that since the publication of Friedrich's book The Fire in 2002, 
there was a new interest if not distinct empathy with those bombed out of their homes.
183
'Liberation'?
As we saw in the last chapter, a minority of Germans are beginning to question Hitler's 
sole responsibility for instigating genocide during the Second World War. On the 
occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Allied Air Campaign against Germany's cities, 
evidence suggested that many in Germany had reservations as to whether the bombings 
really did contribute to liberation. According to Matthias Rickling, Oliver Volmerich 
and Hans-Willi Hermans, the Allied Air Campaign was always justified in Germany 
because it led to liberation from the Hitler regime. 184 During the 40th anniversary of the 
end of the Second World War, the former West German President, Richard von 
Weizsacker, referred to 8 May as a 'Day of Liberation 1 for everyone from National 
Socialism. 185 More recently, Silke Stokar von Neuforn of the Greens argued that the 
destruction of the last war was 'without question morally justified because it led to a 
liberation from Fascism'. 186
Responses to these claims indicated a very different interpretation of the bombing. 
Contradicting official claims, evidence suggested there was an increasing sense of doubt 
with official moral and strategic justification for the Allied Bombing Campaign. This
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questioning of the former generally accepted Allied strategy to dispense with the Hitler 
regime, suggested a further distancing from an official Verfassungspatriotismus 
identity, based largely on collective atonement. More significantly, it represented 
another indication of a key dissonance between official and popular perceptions of 
collective memory and consequently, identity.
According to the editor of Dortmund's largest daily newspaper, the Ruhr Nachrichten: 
'Whenever it is claimed the air raids liberated Germany from National Socialism, there 
is now a growing distance to the previous justifications of the destruction as an 
unavoidable consequence of the Air War.' 187 On the other hand, Volmerich refrained 
from questioning the moral or strategic issues of the bombing of civilians throughout his 
publication. 188 Conversely, in May 2003, local historians Hermann Glaser and Ingmar 
Reither gave a historical lecture in Nuremberg's Karl-Broger Centre - attended by both 
young and old. During the lecture, Jorg Friedrich claimed that the Allies 'carried out 
some of the raids in order to celebrate destruction for its own sake'. 189 For Matthias 
Rickling of the Osnabriick Museum of Cultural History (KGM), Osnabriick's past 
represented only too well this phenomenon of wanton destruction. 'One of the most 
devastated cities of the Air War', by 1945, 6,018 buildings had been totally destroyed, 
1,434 people killed and 87,780 made homeless, noted Friedrich and Rickling. 190 
Rickling also claimed that by the time of the final raid on 25 March 1945, there was: 
'Nothing left to defend, nothing more to fight against.' According to Rickling, 'by 1945 
there was scarcely any movement on the railway, which was the Allied justification for 
the raid and scarcely anything left of the oil or cable factories'. 191 Not one of the city's 
historical monuments was left unscathed. 192 On the other hand, local historian Wido 
Spratte maintained that the city was a legitimate target, since it constituted an important 
rail junction for the movement of troops between Hanover, Miinster, Bremen and the 
Netherlands. 193
187 Cited from: Volmerich, O. op. cit., p. 3.
188 See: Ibid.
189 Cited from: Kalb, R. ,,Die Bombenwerfer waren Bestien." Nurnberger Zeitung [Online]. 05.04.03 
[Accessed 03.03.04]. <http://www.nz-online.de/artikel.asp?art=77701&kat=l 1>
190 For these claims see: Friedrich, J. op. cit., p. 204 and: Rickling, M. op. cit., pp. 3, 50.
191 See: Rickling, M. op. cit., pp. 16-17, 36, 42-44. See also: Henrichvark, F. 800 Brande: Da gab es 
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Friedrich, J. op. cit., p. 204. See also: Rickling, M. op. cit., pp. 34-41, 44-48.
193 See: Wie zertretenes Kinderspielzug. Neue Osnabrucker Zeitung, 01.03.05, p. 15.
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Questioning the real motives of the raids after September 1944 on Fulda, Gunter Sagan, 
Thomas Heiler and Beate Kann protested: 'On 11 September 1944 the Air War reached 
its most appalling point, bringing in its wake death and destruction. Yet that was not 
enough - more attacks followed right up until March 1945." 94 Throughout the war, the 
regional capital of Rhineland-Palatinate, Mainz, suffered 33 air raids - the first of which 
was in 1942 and the most devastating on 27 February 1945. 195 'Admittedly, the air raids 
in 1942 were the only real effective counter-weapon to the successes of the German 
army', argued military historian Sonke Neitzel. Nonetheless, the significant difference 
between the earlier raids and that of 27 February 1945 was that by the beginning of 
1945 it was obvious the outcome of the war was in no doubt, argued Neitzel. A month 
after the February raid, Mainz was occupied by the Allies and so in that respect, argued 
Nietzel, military justification played no role. 'In 1945 the raid was not a contribution to 
victory but more a spiteful action on an historical city with a significant cathedral', 
contended Nietzel. 196
In February 1942, Britain resolved on breaking the morale of the civilian population by 
area bombing, 'yet by winter 1944 it was evident that this objective was not working 7 , 
noted Ralf Rogge and Armin Schulte. 197 In spite of the 1,000 raids on Germany, neither 
the German population nor war production 'broke', argued Matthias Rickling, Thorsten 
Fuchs and Stefan Wittke. 198 Whilst some accepted the inevitable defeat, others, 
according to Rogge and Schulte, developed a fanatical resistance. 'Right up until the 
end, there was a clear will to resist the intended objective of the raids', noted Rogge and 
Schulte'" Historians Rainer F. Schmidt and Hans Mommsen argued that area bombing 
of civilian districts which should have brought the Nazi dictatorship down was 
completely futile in this respect, and actually brought civilians inadvertently closer to 
the regime.200 'In spite of occasional protests and minor civil disobedience, a popular 
civilian uprising against the National Socialist authorities envisaged by the Allies never
194 Cited from: Sagan, G., Heiler, T. and Kann, B. op. cit., p. 58.
195 See: Teske, F. Die Zerstorung von Mainz im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Historicum [Online]. 08.05.04 
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Rogge and Schulte. Cited from: Rogge, R. and Schulte, A. op. cit., pp. 3, 54. See also: Connelly, M. op. 
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materialised', reflected Rogge and Schulte.201 In fact, right up until the final days of the 
war, local journalist Karl Kuhling and historian Matthias Rickling claimed the position 
of the NSDAP (National Socialist and German Workers' Party) remained virtually 
inviolable in Osnabruck.202 Former Head of Minden Archives, Dr. Hans Nordsiek, was 
more sceptical about the adverse effects of the Allied bombing. Indicating that National 
Socialist exploitation of the raids had its limits as an effective means of propaganda, 
Nordsiek and Hans-Jurgen Amtage explained that the Nazi authorities forbade 
newspaper reports about the air attack on 26 October 1944 on Minden. 203
For Hans Mommsen, Rainer F. Schmidt and Matthias Rickling, however, area bombing 
only served to play into the hands of National Socialist propaganda. Frequent references 
by the Third Reich's Minister for Propaganda, Josef Goebbels, to the air raids as 'terror 
attacks' was not without its effect, argued Mommsen, since they encouraged a 'lynch 
mob justice' mentality within the civilian population towards captured Allied pilots.204 
There were reports, for example, of attempted and actual assaults on downed aircrews in 
Solingen and Osnabriick.205
Along with Jorg Friedrich, according to Frank Stenglein, Jochen Bolsche and others, it 
was less the endeavours to shorten the war or rescue the innocent than a pure lust for 
destruction that was the real motivation behind area bombing.206 Summarising the fates 
of Bremen and Koblenz, journalist Georg Schmidt and historian Helmut Schnatz 
argued: 'Carpet-bombing neither shortened the war nor had any direct influence over its 
final outcome.' 207 'Only for the opponents of Hitler's regime and forced labourers did 
the raids really signify liberation', reflected Mannheim historian Dieter Wolf and 
Hamelin journalist Wolfhard TruchseB. 208 'We were delighted whenever the bombers 
came, because we believed their bombs brought the end of war nearer 7 , explained
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202 For these claims see: Rickling, M. op. cit., pp. 16-17, 42.
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205 See: Rogge, R. and Schulte, A. op. cit., p. 54 and: Rickling, M. op. cit., pp. 42-44.
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former Sachsenhausen concentration camp inmate Harry Dubinksy. German-born 
Jewish journalist and survivor of Operation Gomorrah, Ralph Giordano, stated: 'In 
spite of all that happened, the British bombers were my liberators. As far as my family 
and I were concerned, the bombers were our second threat - the first being the 
Gestapo.' 209
Evidence indicated that reactions to the claims of Richard von Weizsacker, Stokar von 
Neuforn and Gerhard Schroder not only underlined the disparate interpretations of the 
Air War as an act of liberation, but also reflected another instance of where alternative 
memories confronted one another. During an interview with the German weekly Die 
Zeit, Joschka Fischer reiterated the essence of von Weizsacker's speech, claiming that 
the collapse of National Socialism brought liberation especially for Germany.210 Apart 
from an obvious sense of relief to an end of the bombing, evidence indicated that other 
more pressing factors overshadowed any feelings of liberation. Testimonies from 
Cologne, Fulda, Magdeburg and Osnabruck suggested that some remembered 1945 not 
as liberation, but as hunger, privation, horror and the loss of loved ones as a result of 
bombing.
One of the main privations for the German population in Cologne, Diisseldorf and 
Osnabruck at the end of the Second World War was the lack of food and health care. 2 " 
As a consequence of the bombing, for instance, hospital beds in Cologne had been 
reduced from 7,264 in 1939 to 1,627 by 1945.212 Indicative of the situation in Cologne 
during October 1945 was the birth of Kla're Schumacher's son in a cellar of the ruins of 
a convent. 213
As well as experiencing hunger, Alfons Kliiber claimed that he witnessed dogs digging 
up the remains of the dead for food in Fulda in April 1945 and accounts from the same 
year in Magdeburg and Osnabruck could, arguably, be interpreted as equally 
appalling. 214 Anneliese Schultze described the scene two days after the raid on 
Magdeburg on 16 January 1945: 'Soldiers fetched steaming black bundles out of the
209 See: Schobel, S. Die Debatte urn den Bombenkrieg. Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen [Online]. 10.02.03 
[Accessed 19.11.04]. <http://www.zdf.de/ZDFde/inhalt/31/0,1872,2033343,OO.html>
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rubble the size of large loaves of bread with long poles and laid them out in rows. I 
asked one of them what they were. "People", replied one of the soldiers.' 215 An 
unidentified woman described the aftermath of the final and most destructive raid on 
Osnabriick on 25 March 1945 to the city's Museum of Cultural History (KGM):
When I came around after an explosion near the tunnel [...], I found myself 
several metres away from where I had originally taken shelter. I felt warm and 
soft bodies under me - the dead and dying. Tatters of flesh hung on my clothing 
and 1 heard the groans of the injured.216
It was also evident that searching for the missing and dealing with the dead in the 
aftermath of war featured more prominently for some than liberation. By 1 October 
1947, for example, local historian Hermann Poppe-Marquard reported that 2,242 former 
combatants from the city of Osnabriick were still missing.217 Frank Teske and Hans-Jorg 
Kuhne reported in 2005 that for weeks following the raids on Mainz and Paderborn in 
February and March 1945, the local inhabitants were pre-occupied with burying the 
dead.218 Mainz author Heinz Leiwig, along with eyewitness accounts from those cities 
corroborated their claims.219 Thus, according to Mary Fulbrook, it seemed evident that: 
'The most searing private memories of war for women, children and serving soldiers 
were lost relatives and comrades.' 220
Nevertheless, according to the federal German authorities: 'Through collective 
remembrance of specific historic experiences, the fundamental values upon which the 
system of government and constitutional order are based come alive.' 221 In his speech on 
the occasion of the 57th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, former 
Chancellor Schroder referred to the 'gratitude to the former Allies in giving Germans 
the opportunity to embrace democracy 1 . 222 Polls and other evidence indicated that there 
was a distinct unease with official claims that the bombing served to liberate the
215 Cited from: Ballerstedt, M. and Buchholz, K. op. cit., pp. 42-43.
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217 See: Poppe-Marquard, H. Osnabriick. Kleine Stadtchronik - wasjeder wissen muR. 4th ed. Osnabriick: 
Verlag A. Liesecke, 2002, pp. 195-196. For similar claims in Krefeld see: Kremers, E. op. cit., pp. 3-4.
218 See: Teske, F. op. cit. and: Kuhne, H-J. Der Tag, an dem Paderborn unterging. 27. Mdrz 1945. 
Gudensberg-Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag, 2005, p. 42.
219 For accounts by Ernst Montag (Paderborn) Klara Klein and Hildegaard Mumm (Mainz) see: Kuhne, 
H-J. op. cit., p. 34 and: Leiwig, H. Der Tag, als Mainz unterging. 27. Februar 1945. Das Buch :ur Serie 
der Allgemeinen Zeitung Main:. 2nd ed. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag, 2004, pp. 7, 39, 49, 53.
220 Cited from: Fulbrook, M. op. cit., pp. 166-167.
221 Cited from: National Days of Remembrance and Public Holidays, op. cit.
222 Nation, Patriotismus, Demokratische Kultur. Debatte mit Gerhard Schroder. News Archive, op. cit.
240
country. In March 1995, 600 Germans were surveyed by the Allensbach Institute for 
Public Opinion Research and asked what particular events they considered represented a 
deep significance for German society since 8 May 1945. Only 7% believed that 8 May 
1945 was important for Germany. 223 In May 1995, Allensbach asked 2,000 Germans 
nationwide whether they had personally participated in any of the celebrations marking 
the end of the Second World War. Apparently contradicting Schroder, only 3% of those 
surveyed claimed they had done so.224
Yet, perhaps the most significant survey questioning official claims was the following. 
In March 1995, 1,000 respondents nationwide were asked whenever they reflected over 
the past, what particular time of history represented in their opinion the happiest for 
Germany. Only 4% held that 'liberation from the Nazis and the end of the war' could be 
included as among the most joyful.225
In addition, various regional historical institutions and a number of Wartberg Verlag 
publications reflected the growing challenges to the official justification that the Allied 
Air Campaign, and attendant devastation of German cities, facilitated the liberation of 
the country. 226 At the time of writing, there were also increasing calls for official 
acknowledgement that 'suffering should be weighed against suffering and guilt against 
guilt', noted Frevert and others.227 Or as Matthais Rickling, Egbert Hoffmann, Ralf 
Rogge and Armin Schulte indicated, there should be less emphasis on German 
accountability and more on Allied responsibility. 228
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Punishment raids?229
Speaking at the 50th anniversary of the destruction of Dresden, in 1995 the then 
President Roman Herzog claimed a reappraisal of the theme was not productive and did 
not correspond to the thinking of Germans.230 Perhaps, but as we have seen with so 
many other aspects of this theme, opinions about the Air War have changed 
considerably since 1995. Along with victim status and destruction, questions were not 
raised over the ethics of the bombing of civilians in public because, according to the 
journalists Oliver Reinhard, Jochen Wittmann and Cora Stephan, political correctness 
forbade it. 231
Whether the Allied Air Campaign against Germany could be morally justified or not 
was never the subject of open public debate in Germany after 1945, contended Winfried 
Georg Sebald and Paul-Josef Raue. 232 'A defeated country that had murdered millions of 
Jews could hardly call on the victorious powers to answer for the destruction of German 
cities', reflected Sebald.233 Or, as Oliver Reinhard, Jochen Wittmann and Dieter Forte 
noted: 'Eclipsing all other considerations were the criminal dimensions of the Third 
Reich.' 234 Konrad Jarausch and David Conradt's analysis of the situation serves to 
illustrate the atmosphere after 1945: 'The post-war period functioned largely as an 
ahistorical space of prolonged penitence for previous transgressions.' 235 In sum, the 
prevailing feeling in postwar Germany and well into the 1980s was one of guilt that 
obstructed a serious historical reappraisal, noted Ingrid Wolk, Sonke Neitzel and 
Winfried Georg Sebald. 236
Since the appearance of Friedrich's The Fire, various publications and discussions have 
intensified concerning the credibility of the Air War against 'defenceless civilians', 
noted the Mayor of Frankfurt am Main Petra Roth and others.237 Prior to Friedrich, the
229 The term was used by Der Spiegel to describe the air attacks of 1945. See: Bolsche, J. op. cit., p. 46.
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'generally accepted justification for the Bombing Terror' was that without it, the war 
would have continued and claimed more lives, noted Oliver Reinhard, Jochen Wittmann 
and Hans Mommsen.238 In any case, argued Frank Stenglein and Dieter Forte, the Allied 
bombardment of Germany was considered as judgement for the support given by the 
German people for Hitler and National Socialist excesses.239 Whenever the sufferings of 
Germans themselves were raised, it was in the words of Fulbrook: 'Difficult for them to 
be respected as genuine without the retort that Germans had, after all, brought it upon 
themselves.' 240 Speaking in Dresden on the 50th anniversary of the city's destruction, 
President of the FRG at the time, Roman Herzog, declared: 'Those who were jubilant at 
the outbreak of war finished up in tears because they had not done enough to prevent the 
National Socialists from seizing power in 1933.' 241
Yet, evidence suggested that along with Jorg Friedrich, many others no longer accepted 
those historical representations. What has increasingly emerged, at the time of writing, 
from both historians and the media, was that the closer the end of the War came, the 
more questionable the strategic necessity and legitimacy of the Allied air attacks. Aside 
from the questionable destruction and doubts over it facilitating liberation, Jochen 
Bolsche, Friedrich and others suggested the Allied raids served at the end of the war as 
something, perhaps, rather more sinister - 'Strafaktionen' or punishment raids.242 This 
was, arguably, another indication of where a rewriting of the past has also been a matter 
of redefining German national identity.
Many used to believe in Germany, reflected Cora Stephan and Hamburg journalist 
Christoph Kucklick, that the Allied Bombing Campaign was merely directed towards 
military and industrial targets of Nazi Germany.243 Nonetheless, many in Germany have 
also since questioned this standpoint. For historians, such as Matthias Rickling, Helmut 
Schnatz and Frank KreiBler, the characteristic feature of area bombing was not the 
alleged industrial, communication or transportation, but the residential areas of towns
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and cities.244 Frank KreiBler of Dessau City Archives also raised questions over the 
alleged restriction of American strategy to 'purely industrial and communication 
objectives'. In the preface of his 2004 publication Dessau in Ruins, KreiBler claimed 
that of the 1.4 million sorties by the Allies, few differentiated between civilians, 
workers, military or industrial targets. 245 Questioning the merits and intention of the 
RAF's strategy, Dr. Helmut Schnatz claimed the ratio of incendiaries deposited on 
Koblenz on 6 November 1944 far outweighed conventional explosives: 153,848 
incendiaries to 143 high explosives. This ratio and the actual location of the target, 
according to Schnatz, betrayed the real intention of the attack, namely 'the incineration 
of residential quarters'. 246 Schnatz provided an aerial photograph from Flight Lieutenant 
Young taken from his Lancaster bomber, clearly indicating the area illuminated by 
flares dropped marking the target area was the inner city - not the alleged railway lines 
spanning the Pfaffendorfer bridge. 247 Along the same lines, Dietrich JanBen of the 
Bunker Museum emphasised that the explosives used to destroy Emden on 6 September 
1944 comprised predominantly of incendiaries 'dropped on the densely built-up areas of 
the old town'. 248
Although the attacks on Fulda were directed on militarily significant targets, at the same 
time, 'their effect on civilian areas was certainly taken into consideration', noted Sagan, 
Heiler and Kann. 249 In neighbouring Frankfurt am Main: '1,001 men, women and 
children lost their lives on the evening of 22 March 1944 in the city. This corresponded 
to 18% of Frankfurt's total casualty rate during the entire war 7 , explained the Frankfurt 
Historical Institute. 250
On the other hand, Gottingen historian Martin Heinzelmann argued that without the 
Allied Air Campaign, even more lives would almost certainly have been lost. 251 Yet, 
according to journalists Christoph Kucklick, Hans-Willi Hermans and others, what has
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become increasingly apparent in Germany was the question of whether the 
bombardment of German cities, resulting in thousands of deaths, was really necessary in 
order to remove Hitler.252 In contrast to official interpretations of the purpose of Allied 
air raids (which was to liberate Germany), 'from January to May 1945 Allied bombers 
with pure punishment actions killed on average more than 1,000 civilians per raid', 
noted Jochen Bolsche.253 Although there was nothing more to defend by 1945, the 
intention of the final raid of 25 March 1945 was to 'strategically purify Osnabriick', 
contended Matthias Rickling.254 Others have also sought to draw attention to the 
legitimacy of the casualties in the latter stages of the war.
Between January to the final capitulation in May 1945, Jorg Friedrich, MDR, Oliver 
Reinhard and Jochen Wittmann estimated that at least 130,000 died as a result of such 
air raids.255 According to Jorg Friedrich and Hans-Willi Hermans, the average casualty 
rate was 1,023.256 'From February to March 1945, long after the outcome of the war was 
self-evident, a whole row of German towns and cities were left in soot and ashes', noted 
Ralf Rogge and Armin Schulte. Almost three quarters of the entire bomb load of the 
War fell during this time.257 There have also been various claims that 'militarily 
insignificant and defenceless towns and cities', such as Mainz, Pforzheim and 
Wurzburg, were targeted in order to inflict the greatest possible terror and destruction.258
Questioning the real motive for the heaviest attack on Mainz, Frank Teske of the local 
archives reported that about 1,200 people died in this the final raid of the war on the 
city. According to Teske, the raid did not achieve its alleged military objective of 
destroying the local transport infrastructure. 259 In February 2005, Wolf Giinthner 
reported that Pforzheim was almost entirely obliterated in 17 minutes following the air 
raid on 23 February 1945, claiming 'at least 20,000 lives'. 260 Nevertheless, according to
252 See: Kucklick, C. op. cit. and: Hermans, H-W. op. cit., p. 49. See also: Flade, R. op. cit., p. A2 and: 
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Pforzheim historian Ursula Moessner-Heckner, by February 1945 Pforzheim no longer 
constituted any military or economic significance. 261 'It died needlessly and was 
destroyed simply because it had not yet been destroyed', noted Moessner-Heckner. 2. 262
Apart from the Third Reich's broadcasting service and press releases, before Friedrich 
only a few, such as GDR representative on the International Committee for the History 
of the Second World War, Olaf Groehler, and neo-Nazis openly challenged the conduct 
of the Air War. 263 Following Hildesheim's heaviest raid of the war on 23 March 1945 by 
the RAF, the headline of the local National Socialist newspaper, the Hildesheimer 
Zeitung, referred to the perpetrators of the destruction as: 'Sadistic barbarians whose 
hour of reckoning would soon be upon them.' 264 Official organ of the Nazi Party for the 
Gau Hessen-Nassau area, the Rhein-Mainische Zeitung's front-page headline after a 
particularly destructive air raid in March 1944 ran: 'Renewed Bombing Terror Tries to 
Break our Resistance.' 265
Neo-Nazis have also commemorated the Allied Bombing Campaign in the 
aforementioned manner, which, since 1996 the authorities have consistently 
condemned. 266 As for how right-wing extremists have described the Allied raids, along 
with the Saxon authorities two other local authorities recorded protests within their 
annual security reports. 267 Saxony-Anhalt's Minister of the Interior, Manfred Piichel, 
reported in 2000 that right-wing extremists from across the region laid wreaths at 
Magdeburg's main cemetery bearing the dedication: 'The NPD-KV Magdeburg 
remembers the Allied war crimes' and 'murder of the German people on 16 January 
1945'. 268 Marking the 60th anniversary of Operation Gomorrah in July 1943, the 
Hamburg authorities complained that local right-wing extremists and the National
261 Cited from: Top Secret: Churchill gesteht britische Terrorangriffe ein 23. Februar 1945. Pforzheimer 
Zeitung, 23.02.05 (44), pp. 22-23.
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Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) held a commemorative march through Hamburg's 
city centre in July 2003 under the tenor: '60th anniversary of the Bombing terror.' 269
In an interview with the German television station Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR), 
Potsdam historian Julius Schoeps claimed that in the past, the Air War was inseparable 
from Hitler's regime and its atrocities.270 CSU representative Peter Gauweiler stated in a 
Bundestag debate on a National Day of Remembrance for the bombing victims: 
'German collective guilt is inextricably and extensively embedded within German 
historical consciousness.' 271 Fear of being labelled a revisionist meant the conduct of the 
Air War generally went unchallenged, argued Oliver Reinhard, Jochen Wittman and 
Hans-Jorg Kuhne.272
But since 2002, questions and demands for Allied accountability - particularly within 
the German media - are becoming increasingly independent from Nazi atrocities and the 
extreme right, noted Julius Schoeps, Berthold Seewald, Hans-Jorg Kuhne and others.273 
According to Kuhne, critics of the theme attempted to expose paradoxes and 
inconsistencies concerning the claims that German suffering has not been sufficiently 
addressed in the past. 274 At the time of writing, however, evidence suggested there has 
been a perceptible turn of the tide in attitudes towards the examination of German 
suffering. Holger Dohmen of the Hamburger Abendblatt and Paderborn historian Dr. 
Antje Telgenbiischer maintained that describing or remembering the horrors of the Air 
War had nothing to do with either forgetting the crimes of the National Socialists or 
right-wing revisionism.275 'It is simply the issue of human sorrow', noted Sven 
Kellerhoff. 276 Although Thorsten Fuchs and Stefan Wittke maintained that German 
suffering should not take precedence over German crimes, nevertheless, they did
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suggest that, perhaps, it would have been more productive if an 'alternative narrative' 
concerning the Air War had been fostered. 277
During an interview with The Daily Telegraph, Jorg Friedrich contended that the Allied 
war leaders 'should be judged using the same moral standards as those that they had 
vanquished'.278 According to Die Welt, Rudolf Walther and Achim Reinhardt, many in 
Germany agreed.279 Cora Stephan writing in Die Welt, for example, argued: 'Whoever 
preaches the indivisibility of human rights must also record past misdemeanours on 
both sides.' 280 Rudolf Walther described the Air War as a 'barbaric strategy' that for 
Hamburg journalist Uwe Bahnsen and many others has led to 'irrefutable moral 
questions being thrown open over the Allies' excessive employment of firestorms'. 281
Klaus Honold described the dropping of 80 million incendiaries on German towns and 
cities as a 'perfidious military logic that served no strategic use whatsoever'. 282 As a 
result of thousands of incendiaries being dropped on Hamburg, Magdeburg and 
Frankfurt am Main, according to Jorg Friedrich and Dr. Sabine Hock, huge firestorms 
were unleashed. 283 Rushing through the streets at 15 metres per second, those who did 
not reach the cellars and air raid shelters in time were pulled into the firestorm, noted 
Maren Ballerstedt, Konstanze Buchholz and the Head of the Frankfurt Institute for 
History, Evelyn Hils-Brockhoff.284
Speaking in the Bundestag, SPD politician Angelika Kriiger-Leifiner maintained that the 
destruction of Dresden and Hamburg would never have occurred without Rotterdam or 
Coventry and, therefore, German suffering should be secondary to the sorrow of 
others.285 Yet, for Berthold Seewald, this division into 'good and bad victims' was 
'absurd' because innocent Germans suffered during the Air War irrespective of 
whether Hitler attacked Coventry in November 1940 or not. 286 Sven Kellerhoff claimed
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that scarcely anyone in Germany today would hold all Germans as collectively guilty - 
especially women and children. 287
Prior to the Queen's visit to Germany in 2004, according to The Times and The Daily 
Telegraph there was a 'pent-up demand for British repentance in the country'. 288 Further 
indicative of the demands for Allied accountability were the numerous articles and 
publications betraying a sense of anguish and injustice from those who had lived 
through the bombardments.289 Journalists Reinhard Kalb, Holger Heith and Wolfhard 
TruchseB noted that some survivors gave vent to their anguish over their personal loss 
in Bochum, Hamelin and Nuremberg - in some cases even accusing the Allied bombers 
of being 'murderers'. 290 This also became evident in the tone of a number of national 
and regional articles.
Commemorating 16 March 1945, Wiirzburg council official Wolfgang Jung declared: 
'About 5,000 people - 3,000 of whom were women and children - suffocated, burned to 
death or were killed by falling masonry.' 291 Area bombing claimed more than 600,000 
civilians - almost 80,000 of them children, noted Der Spiegel and Die Welt. 292 In fact, as 
the Liibecker Nachrichten, the Kolnische Rundschau, The Fire and other publications 
and articles on the 60th anniversary seemed particularly keen to emphasise, it was 
mainly women and children who were the main recipients of the bombing. 293
Before the advent of The Fire, most mainstream German historians went out of their 
way not to attract official allegations of revisionism, by avoiding suggestions that the 
Allies should be held just as accountable for their actions as the National Socialists.294 
Along with the media, during and since the 60th anniversary of the Air War, the 
suffering of the innocent was also raised by a number of historical institutions. This
287 See: Kellerhoff, S. F. op. cit., p. 27.
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development suggested not only another paradigm change in German collective 
memory, but also a further challenge to official conceptions of national identity.
'Apart from the theme being generally officially ignored, the fact that the victims of the 
Air War were primarily women, children and the elderly is all the more reason that it 
should be heightened within public conscience', noted Sagan, Heiler and Kann of Fulda 
Archives.295 Claiming that the victims of the raids on Solingen in November 1944 were 
predominantly women, according to Ralf Rogge and Armin Schulte: 'Mothers 
wandered around helplessly with their infants as the first bombs fell at midday.' 296 
Matthias Rickling of the Osnabriick Museum of Cultural History and Dr. Andreas Fahl 
of Hanover's Historical Museum, both criticised the 'indiscriminate manner' in which 
women and children were killed in raids on Osnabriick and Hanover.297
'Planquadrat Gustav Ulrich 5' was the German air-defence codename for impending 
attacks on Hanover during the war. Often listened to by Hanoverians, its messages 
could be detected by good transmitters broadcasted by the early-warning radio station 
code-named lPrimadonna\ 29S Commemorating the 60th anniversary of the raids on 
Hanover, the city's Historical Museum called their 'special 2003 exhibition' after it, 
reported local newspaper the Neue Presse. 299 During the evenings of 8-9 October 1943, 
the Allies dropped 3,000 conventional explosives and 258,000 incendiaries. As a result, 
1,245 Hanoverians died in the following firestorm.300 'Those who could, threw 
themselves into the local lake', noted a 15-year-old former anti-aircraft gunner.301
Questioning the moral aspects of the strategy, exhibition curator Dr. Andreas Fahl 
stated: 'The terror of the raids did not differentiate between Nazis, opponents of Hitler, 
women or children.' 302 In fact, Matthias Rickling, Frank KreiBler and Wolfgang Sofsky 
actually went as far as to suggest that the Allies could also be held accountable as
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'murderers and criminals'. 303 Other German historians, however, such as Hans-Ulrich 
Wehler and Ralf Blank, claimed that Jorg Friedrich and others in his wake overstated 
their case. Wehler challenged the terms Friedrich employed to describe the Air War - in 
particular his analogies to a war of annihilation against civilians. Wehler also 
maintained in an interview with Der Spiegel that the question should not be over Allied 
guilt, but what was actually strategically feasible at the time. Ralf Blank, meanwhile, 
argued Friedrich 'places too much graphical emphasis in his publications'. 3„» 304
Hans Mommsen, Lothar Kettenacker and Sonke Neitzel, on the other hand, were more 
sympathetic to FriedricrTs depictions of German suffering, along with the historian's 
insinuations of Allied accountability. 305 Deputy Head of the German Historical Institute, 
Lothar Kettenacker, claimed the Allied Bombing Campaign on civilian targets was 
neither militarily necessary nor morally legitimate. 306 'Although Hitler initiated the 
brutalisation of warfare, equally the British also developed weapons specifically to be 
directed against civilians', stressed Hans Mommsen. Whilst also referring to the Allied 
casualties, at the same time, Mommsen claimed that by way of comparison the figures 
almost 'fade into total insignificance when compared to German casualties - most of 
whom were women and children'. 307
For Sonke Neitzel, the last raid on Mainz in February 1945 was an indefensible atrocity 
that nothing could justify. 308 In contrast to the official line, with the exception of 
Elizabeth Kremers of Krefeld City Archives, none of the other six Wartberg Verlag 
publications by various archives or historians on the theme attempted to justify the 
aerial bombing of civilians. 309 Numerous publications encouraged by The Fire suggested 
a radical change in this particular perception of the National Socialist past.
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Despite increasing reappraisals of the Air War and how its 60th anniversary was 
remembered, mainstream politicians shared neither the media's nor numerous historical 
institutions' appeals for official recognition of Allied culpability. Discussing public 
reactions to The Fire in the Bundestag, SPD representative Angelika Kruger-Leifiner 
argued, for instance, that public remembrance of the Air War must not lead to a re- 
orientation of Germans as victims or reversed charges of culpability. 310 'Germans should 
bring neither accusations of guilt nor offset sorrow against sorrow, since it has to be 
made clear who the actual perpetrators and victims of the Air War were', argued 
members of the Bundestag Peter Gauweiler (CSU) and Hans-Joachim Otto (FDP). 3 " 
'Germans are in no position to make allegations of external responsibility anyway', 
declared Silke Stokar von Neufora of the Alliance 90/The Greens. Others have also 
stated there must be no reversals of indictment. Journalist Ralph Bollmann and 
Professor Ute Frevert accused Friedrich and those who took up his arguments of 
'lapsing into historical relativism'.312 Ulrich Rauff even reproached Friedrich for 'over- 
emotionalising the facts'. 313
But for some, Friedrich had not gone far enough. Although Friedrich had addressed the 
long overdue theme and broken the silence, Klaus Honold noted that the Berlin 
historian had not given adequate expression to the emotional effects of the bombing in 
Darmstadt. Commenting on Friedrich's The Fire, Honold noted: 'The sorrow and pain 
clearly remaining in the city is not visible in the material.' 314 Achim Podak of the 
television station Das Erste Online maintained that: 'After almost 60 years, it is high 
time to bring out into the open the pain and private memories hitherto repressed.' 315
There were even claims that the true extent of the horror remained largely unarticulated. 
In 2003, Anja Greulich and Jorg Milliner from ZDF television produced a film using 
previously un-released footage censored at the time by the authorities. Josef Goebbels, 
the Third Reich's Minister for Propaganda, prohibited the taking of any photographs of
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German victims by the German press. 316 According to the Berliner Morgenpost, their 
photographs revealed entire city centres ablaze, people wandering around after losing 
their homes or broken bodies lying in the streets. 'These are bad enough,' explained 
Greulich, 'but we still have not dealt with the worst yet.' 317 Indicative of this stance, 
newspaper editors, Egbert Hoffmann and Hans-Willi Hermans, declared in their 
publications on Hamburg (2003) and Cologne (2004) that the actual numbers of those 
lost and the misery of the survivors remains 'far too understated'. 318
There were also similar observations elsewhere in Germany. As part of the 60th 
anniversary commemorations, Friedrich was invited to give lectures on the Air War in 
Nuremberg, Bochum and Paderborn.319 According to Friedrich, during these lectures 
and discussions it became evident many had never read or been instructed about the Air 
War from their teachers. 'Whilst every 16-17-year-old knew all about Auschwitz, many 
were astounded on hearing what happened to the German civilian population.' 320 Similar 
claims were made in Minden and Wiirzburg. Referring to the 2005 photographic 
exhibition in Minden's museum documenting the city's destruction, Robert Kauffeld 
claimed that the younger generation scarcely believed what they saw.321 According to 
Wolf Rottenbauer, one of the many questions put by Wiirzburg schoolchildren to local 
eyewitness Jutta Nudling was: 'Why were the dead stacked-up in the cathedral?' 322
In conjunction with a public memorial service and reception in the city's main function 
chamber, the Kaisersaal, on 23 March 2004 the Mayor of Frankfurt am Main, Petra 
Roth, opened the Frankfurt Historical Institute's exhibition March 1944 - Frankfurt 
during the Air-War.  Assessing the mood in the city and, arguably, other places at the 
time, during the memorial service Roth stated: 'I have the impression from both young
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and old alike that many questions remain unanswered. That is why the theme has to 
continue.' 324
To summarise, for five years Germany's cities were under perpetual bombardment. In 
contrast to official claims, Winfried Georg Sebald, Dieter Forte, Jorg Friedrich along 
with many others have argued that the true extent of the destruction remained 
unarticulated at national level. Although German contributors to the theme, such as 
Hans Erich Nossack, Hans Brunswig, Heinrich Boll and Dieter Forte, depicted their 
experiences at a local level, until The Fire, there have been numerous claims that there 
was no comprehensive national account of the Air War in Germany. Responding to 
these allegations and public reactions to Friedrich's The Fire, members of the 
Bundestag Giinter Baumann (CDU) and Angelica Kriiger-LeiBner (SPD) maintained 
that there was no '' Geddchtnisverlusf or loss of history. 325 Evidence suggested that not 
only was there a sense of a loss of history and identity, but also that the trauma of the 
Air War was never properly dealt with in the national consciousness of Germany. 326
Numerous articles have also suggested that a loss of history not only arose from the 
results of trauma and shock, but from real or perceived official repression. Various 
journalists and local historians claimed, for example, that a general silence arose as a 
consequence of an officially endorsed collective guilt, resulting in a public suppression 
of what was actually thought and felt about the Air Campaign. In short, there was a 
widespread perception that an official 'taboo' prevented Germany from mourning its 
dead, coming to terms with its past and from claiming equal collective victim status for 
those lost during the Air War.
This sense of an insufficient ' Vergangenheitsbewdltigung 1', or coming to the terms with 
this aspect of the past, also extended to demands for a National Day of Remembrance 
for the victims of the Air War.327 There have been claims that the dead in Germany have 
'no voice' and, arguably, identity. Referring to the thousands lost in the air raid on 
Darmstadt on 11 September 1944, for instance, editor of the Darmsttidter Echo, Klaus
324 Cited from: Roth eroffhet ,,Marz 1944". op. cit., p. 34.
325 For responses by Bundestag representatives Baumann and Kriiger-LeiBner, see: Plenarprotokoll 
Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., pp. 4104-4106, 4108-4109.
326 Cities where this seemed particularly apparent were Darmstadt, Freiburg, Hanover and Frankfurt am 
Main. See: Gruner, P-H. op. cit., p. 11 and: Filmemacher suchen Zeitzeugen zum 27. November 1944. op. 
cit. See also: Fuchs, T. and Wittke, S. op. cit., pp. 3-4 and: Hils-Brockhoff, E. and Picard, T. op. cit., pp.
3-4.
327 For public demands for a National Day of Remembrance for the bombing victims, see: Plenarprotokoll
Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., pp. 4105-4108.
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Honold, declared in 2004 that: '10,000 dead cannot speak.' 328 Appeals for a collective 
voice and national place of mourning for the bombing victims have been, in the words 
of Ute Frevert: 'Justified by the argument that the suffering of the German civilian 
population has so far been neglected or completely ignored in how the consequences of 
National Socialism are remembered.' 329 Indicative of this sense of neglect were claims 
from Jorg Friedrich, local historians and the media, that current and future generations 
should be more aware of what happened. Introducing Frankfurt am Main's 2004 
exhibition on the Air War, arguably reflecting the fears of many in Germany, Head of 
the City Archives Evelyn Hils-Brockhoff stated: 'A state loses its identity if it is 
unaware of its past.' 330
Reluctance from the Bundestag political elite to introduce a National Day of 
Remembrance and thus grant collective victim status to those lost during the Air War 
represented another instance where alternative memories confronted one another. This 
became particularly apparent in the widespread public interest in various non-fiction 
works, films and broadcasts in which the Air War generation were increasingly 
portrayed as victims - not perpetrators - of war. Malte ThieBen even claimed that in the 
current culture of remembrance, Polish and British victims of German bombing were 
sometimes almost completely overlooked.331
Because there were widespread concerns that witnesses are dying out, evidence 
suggested their testimonies and new books on the theme were increasingly being 
requested and digested by many of the present generation. Yet, for some in Germany, 
such as Bundestag politicians Angelika Kriiger-Leifiner, Silke Stokar von Neuforn and 
Die Zeit journalist Bernd Ulrich, publications such as The Fire appeared to be 'selling 
rather too well'. 332
328 Cited from: Honold, K. Lieber kurz durch die Flammen! Darmstddter Echo, 21.08.04, p. 15. See also: 
Honold, K. Darmstadt im Feuersturm. Die Zerstorung am 11. September 1944. op. cit., pp. 5-15. For 
similar comments by Heilbronn historian Margarete Dorr and Jorg Friedrich, see: Feinaugle, F. op. cit., p. 
19 and: Siemon, T. Interview: Auf einer Stufe mit Dresden, op. cit.
329 Cited from: Frevert, U. op. cit., pp. 9-11.
330 Cited from: Mdrz 1944 - Frankfurt im Bombenkrieg. Vortrag von Frau Dr. Evelyn Brockhoff 
anldsslich der Ausstellungseroffnung am 23. Mdrz 2004 im Kaisersaal. Frankfurt am Main: Institut fur 
Stadtgeschichte, Karmeliterkloster, 23.03.04, p. 1.
331 See: Thieflen, M. op. cit., p. 16 and: Einleitung. Bombenkrieg. Historicum [Online]. 20.02.06 [Accessed 16.12.04]. <http://www.bombenkrieg.historicum.net/einleitung.html>
332 Cited from: Ulrich, B. op. cit., p. 46.
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Concerns expressed in the Bundestag about the apparent change in public attitudes 
suggested not only another paradigm change in German collective memory, but also a 
further challenge to official conceptions of national identity. 'It seems the past will not 
go away because what for a long time was never talked about is now being talked 
about', reflected Heimo Schwilk.333 So much so that Jorg Friedrich has been acclaimed 
by many as a 'taboo-breaker'. Evidence suggested, therefore, that Friedrich has been 
instrumental in affecting a new paradigm change concerning how those lost in the Air 
War are remembered.
Contradicting claims from the Bundestag political elite, evidence also suggested a 
change in a culture of remembrance extended to whether the Air War could be 
strategically or morally justified. This questioning of the official stance on the Air War 
and justification for the Allied strategy in ridding Germany of Hitler indicated a further 
rejection of German identity based on an alleged penitential 
'' Vergangenheitsbewaltigung' . 334 Increasingly questioned by German historians and the 
media, was the official line that the bombing raids contributed to or signified liberation 
from Nazi tyranny. In fact, evidence suggested that most survivors remembered 1945 as 
bereavement, burying the dead or just concerns with sheer survival. Summarising 
numerous archive and other publications on the Air War, Lothar Kettenacker concluded: 
'No serious German historian would attempt to justify area bombing of civilians either 
strategically or morally.' 335 Or in the words of Jorg Friedrich: 'It was excessive, wrong 
and never once achieved the alleged and hoped-for effect.' 336
Yet, despite growing pressure from many in the media and some historians, there was 
no official accord with charges of Allied culpability. Bundestag representatives from the 
mainstream political parties maintained that German suffering must not be equated with 
the suffering of Germany's victims. 'Germans are in no position to make allegations of 
external responsibility', declared Silke Stokar von Neuforn of the Alliance 90/The 
Greens.337 Although contending that the Allies should not be absolved from their share 
of responsibility for past events, at the same time, Klaus Honold repudiated Friedrich's
333 Cited from: Schwilk, H. op. cit., p. 9. See also: Rickling, M. op. cit., p. 3.
334 According to Stefan Berger, Berthold Seewald and Jorg Huber, an officially endorsed and excessively 
penitent 'Vergangenheitsbewaltigung' prevented Germany from mourning its dead or coming to terms 
with the past. See: Berger, S. op. cit., p. 254 and: Seewald, B. op. cit., p. 27. See also: Huber, J. A. op. 
cit., pp. 3-4. For similar claims see: Rohl, K. R. op. cit., pp. 76, 219.
335 Cited from: Kettenacker, L. op. cit. See also: Mommsen, H. op. cit., p. 16.
336 Cited from: Stenglein, F. op. cit., p. 4. See also: Friedrich, J. op. cit., pp. 339-342, 431-432.
337 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., pp. 4107-4108.
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argument that the raids in the latter stages of the war served as actions of retribution. 
'The question of whether or not the raid of 11 September was a war crime is pointless', 
contended Honold. 338
To conclude, in spite of Bundestag politicians' claims to the contrary, for some in 
Germany the Air War still has not found adequate expression and neither have its 
psychological effects diminished. Not only did evidence suggest that many were still 
coming to terms with the past, but despite numerous allegations of a breaking of past 
taboos, a historical void still needed to be filled in Berlin, Darmstadt and Frankfurt am 
Main, for example.
On the one hand, a loss of history and official prohibitions against remembering 
German civilians lost in the Air War could be disputed. In 1978, 1983 and 1995, for 
instance, local authors Hans Brunswig, Thomas Grabe and Dieter Forte provided 
accounts of the firestorms in Hamburg, Hanover, and Diisseldorf. 339 Although the theme 
was evidently addressed before the appearance of The Fire in the aforementioned cities, 
the essence of more recent publications and articles from these and other cities indicated 
that past events had not adequately been dealt with from the perspective of the Germans 
as victims.340
On the other hand, perhaps, the standpoint of the Germans as victims should not be the 
only perspective of the Air War. Together with the hundreds of civilians killed in the 
bombing of Rotterdam and Coventry in 1940, many forced foreign labourers also died 
during air raids in Bochum, Hamelin and Gottingen. According to the Head of Bochum 
City Archives Ingrid Wolk and Hamelin historian Bernhard Gelderblom, for example, 
foreign slave labourers were forbidden from using public air raid shelters. 341
338 Cited from: Honold, K. Darmstadt im Feuersturm. Die Zerstorung am 11. September 1944. op. cit., p.
14.
339 See Brunswig, H. Feuersturm iiber Hamburg - Die Luftangriffe auf Hamburg im 2. Weltkrieg und ihre
Folgen. 3 rd ed. Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1979. Extracts supplied by Hamburg City Archives:
Bickelmann, D., Dr. (Hamburg City Archives). Personal communication, 10.03.04. See also: Grabe, T.
(ed). Unter der Wolke des Todes leben... Hannover im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Hamburg: Ernst Kabel Verlag,
1983 and: Forte, D. op. cit.
340 For books and articles indicative of this phenomenon in Hamburg, Hanover and Dusseldorf, see: 
Hoffinann, E. A. op. cit., pp. 9-44 and: ,,Das Thema war iiberfallig." Bombenkrieg iiber Dusseldorf. op. 
cit. See also: Fuchs, T. and Wittke, S. op. cit., pp. 3-78 and: Valentin, G. Findling erinnert an Tragodie. 
Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, 17.11.05, p. 3.
341 See: Gelderblom, B. and TruchseB, W. F. op. cit., pp. 24-26, 41-42 and: Wiborni, M. op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
See also: Heinzelmann, M. op. cit., pp. 28-29, 51-52 and: Rogge, R. and Schulte, A. op. cit., pp. 25, 54.
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Along with demands for a national memorial to the victims of the Air War, there was an 
overriding sense of urgency from some survivors, the media and local historians to 
continue to convey the pain of a neglected past - especially to the young. 342 For the 
moment though, the Bundestag political elite continued to show a marked reluctance to 
collectively remember this particular aspect of the past.
Responding to the question put by The Times on how far collective grief should be 
permitted to shape a new German patriotism, former manager of an East German 
factory, Ernst Rietze, declared: 'We would just like the same right that other countries 
have to express our identity. Is that so bad?' 343 So how far should German suffering 
determine German memory and identity?
On the one hand, some may claim that digging up the past serves no positive purpose 
and alienates those who suffered at the hands of Adolf Hitler. Although, perhaps, no- 
one would dispute that the employment of firestorms was hideous, on the other, some 
may contend they needed to be, in order to rid Germany of a cruel dictator. Some may 
even argue that history is not a private living room of remembrance. But why try to hide 
the past? As the 60th anniversary of the Air War clearly indicated, it often re-appears in 
any case - especially when branded by horror, trauma and a sense of injustice. It was 
this combination, along with an overriding need to remember the Air War from the 
perspective of the Germans as victims, which distinguished a popular Erinnerungskultur 
and identity from that of the Bundestag political elite.
342 For these concerns by Minden and Harnlin historians Monika Schulte and Bernhard Gelderblom, see: 
Gelderblom, B. and TruchseB, W. F. op. cit., pp. 13-17 and: Zeitzeugen sollen Erinnerungen 
niederschreiben. Mindener Tageblatt, 14.05.05 (111), p. 9.
343 Cited from: Boyes, R. op. cit., pp. 48-49. 'A cross section of Germans were questioned by The Times 
at the Brandenburg Gate', noted Roger Boyes. See: Ibid.
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Chapter 6.
Contested Sites of Memory - Symbols for and against Expulsion.
Sites of memory selected by post-reunification elites as alleged 'icons of historical 
memory 1 can offer useful insights into understanding German historical memory and 
identity. 1 Serving as King Frederick-William III of Prussia's palace guard quarters 
between 1816 and 1818, the New Guardhouse in Berlin became the official national 
memorial to the fallen during the Weimar Republic and again during the Nazi regime. 
Established in what Karen E. Till described as the 'symbolic centre of the city', the New 
Guardhouse was also the descendant to the former East German monument to the 
Unknown Soldier from the Second World War.2 After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, a redesigned New Guardhouse was ceremoniously unveiled in November 1993. 
During the observance, the then German Chancellor Helmut Kohl gave a speech and 
laid a wreath at the New Guardhouse, which, according to officials, has since served as 
the new national memorial to Germany's fallen. 3
Arguably, cultural practices and rituals, such as the laying of wreaths at national 
memorials or festive parades that take place along a prescribed route, 'naturalise a 
collective identity', noted Robert Foster." For example, Till claimed that citizens 
physically enact what is 'normal, appropriate or possible for a group at a particular 
setting'. 5 Sites of memory might differ considerably from those intended by political 
elites, however. Challenging the alleged collective function of the New Guardhouse, 
proposals for a central memorial and National Day of Remembrance commemorating 
the flight and expulsions of ethnic Germans were compelling examples of where 
alternative 'landscapes of national memory' have been created.6
1 Cited from: Welsh, H., Pickel, A. and Rosenberg, D. East and West German identities. United and 
divided? In: Jarausch, K. H. (ed). After unity: reconfiguring German identities. Oxford/Providence: 
Berghahn Books, 1997, p. 123.
2 See: Till, K. E. Staging the past: landscape designs, cultural identity and Erinnerungspolitik at Berlin's 
Neue Wache. Ecumene, 1999: 6(3), pp. 252-262 and: Click, J. K. What does it mean to normalize the 
past? Official memory in German politics since 1989. Social Science History, Winter 1998: 22(4), p. 561.
3 See: Till, K. E. op. cit., pp. 253-262 and: Day of National Mourning. New Guardhouse, Berlin. Protocol 
Office. Federal Administration Office [Online]. 2005 [Accessed 03.04.05]. <http://www.bnii.bund.de>
4 Cited from: Till, K. E. op. cit., p. 254.
5 Ibid.
6 See: Koshar, R. From monuments to traces: artefacts of German memory, 1870-1990. Berkeley/Los 
Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2000, pp. 8-11 and: Fulbrook, M. German national 
identity after the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, pp. 16-47, 155-167.
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Although former German governments have not refused to acknowledge the suffering 
of ethnic Germans who fled or were expelled from East and Central Europe at the end 
of the Second World War, this chapter contends that key members of Germany's former 
Social Democratic Party (SPD)/Green ruling political elite had rejected them as national 
and collective victims of war.
Another apparent inconsistency in commemorating Germany's dead, along with 
acceptable collective images of the past, was how former Group Captain Werner 
Molders was remembered. 7 Other alternative landscapes of memory were the 
Hermannsdenkmal (monument to Hermann) and the Varus-Schlacht (Varus Battle), 
celebrating the preclusion of foreign influence from Germany, along with the 
misappropriation of ancient Germanic symbols by right-wing extremist heathen groups. 8 
Analysing the legacy of the Hermann monument and the battle it commemorates for 
German national identity, this chapter also suggests an official distancing from 
Germany's ethnic origins and ancient symbols, highlighting further contradictions 
between popular and official national self-understanding.
Reflecting on the way the past has become an integral part of a symbolic politics of the 
present, issues of representation have also assumed a new importance in the politics of 
memory and identity. 9 This chapter suggests, therefore, that the alleged roles of the New 
Guardhouse (Neue Wache) and Day of National Mourning as central symbols of 
collective memory and mourning are increasingly being brought into question. 10
A Centre against Expulsion. 'The expellees that were not expellees.'"
In 2003, the Federation of Expellees (BdV) wanted to establish a permanent exhibition 
and memorial as a suitable place of remembrance for millions of ethnic Germans who 
fled or were expelled from East and Central Europe at the end of the Second World
7 See: speech by PDS member of the Bundestag Gerhard Zwerenz in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher 
Bundestag, 13/231. Stenographischer Bericht 231 Sitzung. Bonn, 24.04.98, p. 21237.
8 See: Schulz, M. Che Guevara im Nebelland. Archaologie. Der Spiegel, 08.03.04 (11), pp. 152-158 and: 
Abteilung Verfassungsschutz - Publikationen. Symbole und Kennzeichen des Rechtsextremismus. Info 1. 
Berlin: Berlin Senatsverwalrung fur Inneres, Jul 2001, pp. 11-12.
9 See: Gauland, A. Die Demokratie braucht Symbole. Die Welt, 08.08.00, p. 9 and: Dahrendorf, R. 
Germans lack the key to their identity. In: James, H. and Stone, M. (eds). When the wall came down: 
reactions to German unification. New York/London: Routledge, 1992, pp. 230-232.
10 See: National Days of Remembrance and Public Holidays. Protocol Office. Federal Administration 
Office [Online]. 2003 [Accessed 10.02.04]. <http://www.bund.de>
" Cited from: Jaenecke, H. Der Wahn der reinen Nation. Flucht und Vertreibung. 60 Jahre danach: ein 
neuer Blick auf das Drama im Osten. Geo Magazin, Nov 2004 (11), pp. 128-135.
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War. 12 As part of the post-war settlement of Europe between 1945 and 1947, almost 12 
million German refugees (Fluchtlinge) and expellees (Vertriebene) were 're-settled' 
amongst four zones of occupation. Forced to leave East and West Prussia, Hungary, 
Poland and the Sudetenland, their former homelands have since become part of the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Russia and the Baltic states. 13
At the 1945 Potsdam Conference between 17 July and 2 August 1945, the main Allied 
Powers convened to clarify and implement agreements reached at Yalta in February that 
year. It was agreed that Germany would be denazified and divided into four occupation 
zones, administered by Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Germany's institutions, economy, borders and populations were also to be reorganised. 14
To mark their plight, the BdV planned a £69 million Centre against Expulsion 
containing a permanent exhibition, library artefacts and a possible statue. 15 Along with 
the bombing victims, according to the Sachsische Zeitung and Jorg Friedrich, the 
expulsions of ethnic Germans from the former German territories in the east was 
Germany's biggest catastrophe since the Thirty Years' War of 1618-1648. 16 Since the 
generation which experienced the expulsions as victims is dwindling, not only were 
their fears that their past would pass away undocumented, but there have also been 
allegations of official indifference and even malevolence from some quarters. 'One of 
the biggest tragedies of the twentieth century could fall into oblivion', declared East 
Friesan authors Dr. Heiner Schroder, Petra Herterich and Lubeck historian Karen 
Meyer-Rebentisch. 17
Along with representatives of the two million-strong BdV, some sections of the German 
media, for example, claimed that the suffering of Germans driven out of former German
12 See: Falkner, M. Vertriebene wollen Bunker kaufen. Die Welt, 18.08.03, p. 4 and: "Vertreibungs- 
Zentrum nicht in Berlin." Wiesbadener Kurier 15.08.03, p. 11.
13 Cited from: Meyer-Rebentisch K. Angekommen. 60 Jahre Fluchtlinge und Vertriebene in Lubeck. 
Lubeck: Hansestadt Lubeck, Bereich Kunst und Kultur. Kulturforum Burgkloster, 2005, pp. 8-16.
14 See: Fulbrook, M. A concise history of Germany. Updated ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991, pp. 204-206 and: Hirsch, H. Flucht und Vertreibung. Kollektive Erinnerung im Wandel. Aus Politik
und Zeitgeschichte, 2003 (B40-41), pp. 16-19.
15 See: Paterson, T. Anger over tribute to Germany's 'war victims' The Daily Telegraph [Online].
31.08.03 [Accessed 22.01.04]. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/08/31/
wgerm31 .xml&ssheet=/news/2003/08/3 l/ixword.html>
16 See: Reinhard, O. and Wittmann, J. Wer Wind sat, erntet Feuersturm. Sachsische Zeitung, 26.11.02, p.
7 and: Friedrich, J. Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940-1945. 12th ed. Miinchen: Propylaen,
2003, frontispiece.
17 Cited from: Herterich, P. and Schroder, H. Vertrieben nach Ostfriesland. Leer: Ostfriesen Zeitung,
ZGO Zeitungsgruppe, 2005, pp. 7-8. See also: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 3-5.
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territory in Poland, the former Czechoslovakia and East Prussia by the Red Army has so 
far generally been ignored. 18 'Therefore, the day of our founding (5 August) should 
constitute a National Day of Remembrance for the victims of the Expulsions', declared 
the President of the BdV Erika Steinbach. 19 There were also demands for a National 
Day of Commemoration from the East Prussian and Silesian Welfare and Cultural 
Associations for ethnic Germans. 20 Concerning the fate of her members, speaking on the 
Day of Homeland in September 2001, Steinbach and others claimed that the eviction of 
millions of ethnic Germans from Central, East and Southeast Europe 'left almost no 
trace in official consciousness'. 21 Daughter of a former German army officer, Erika 
Steinbach also complained that: 'Over almost three decades ethnic Germans were 
confronted with political malice, arrogance or heartless disinterest.' 22
Responding to public appeals for official recognition of victim status, SPD 
representative Angelika Kruger-LeiBner declared in the Bundestag that: 'Germany has 
always remembered the German expellees in our collective memory.' 23 Interestingly, 
comments by the former SPD Minister of the Interior Otto Schily appeared to contradict 
Kriiger-LeiBner. During her speech on the Day of Homeland in 2001, Erika Steinbach 
thanked Schily for his past support for the BdV. Speaking in the Berliner Dom on 29 
May 1999, for instance, Schily claimed: 'For years, the political left in Germany 
virtually ignored the crimes against the expellees.' 24
Other evidence suggested responses from SPD/Green politicians, concerning how the 
expulsions were remembered, also appeared to have exposed key dissonances within 
German collective memory. Referring to the number of representatives from France, 
Croatia, Lithuania, Hungary and the Slovak Republic at the Day of Homeland, 
Steinbach highlighted that their presence indicated the significance attached to the issue
18 See: Noack, H-J. Die Deutschen als Opfer. Der Spiegel, 25.03.02 (13), pp. 36-39 and: Bauschke, C. Gerechtigkeit fur die Vertriebenen. Leitartikel. Welt am Sonntag, 08.08.04, p. 11.
19 Cited from: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort ,,Im Zentrum Vertreibung achten." BdV Landesverband 
Baden-Wurttemberg [Online]. 01.09.01 [Accessed 16.06.05]. <http://www.bdv-bw.de/tdh2001/ 
redesteinbach.htm>
20 Stoldt, H-U. ,,Schlimmes Trauma." Der Spiegel, 08.04.02 (15), pp. 70-74 and: Schlesische 
Nachrichten. Zeitungfiir Schlesien. LandsmannschaftSchlesien-Nieder-undOberschlesien. 15.01.05 (2),
p. 3.
Cited from: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort ,,Im Zentrum - Vertreibung achten." op. cit. See also: Graw, 
A. Deutsche als Opfer von Krieg und Gewalt. Die Welt, 05.02.02, p. 3.
22 Cited from: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort ,,Im Zentrum - Vertreibung achten." op. cit.
23 See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. Stenographischer Bericht 48 Sitzung. Berlin, 
05.06.03, pp. 4105-4106.
24 Cited from: Graw, A. op. cit., p. 3. For speech by Steinbach and Schily's speech in the Berliner Dom, 
see: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort ,,Im Zentrum - Vertreibung achten." op. cit.
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in which the fate of millions remained hidden under an alleged 'veil of silence'.25 
Implying current generations of Germans have not been adequately informed over 
Germany's past trauma, spokesperson for the Federation of Expellees, Walter 
Stratmann, declared: 'We want to show that the German people - especially women and 
children - also suffered terribly as a result of being expelled.' 26
'Shot, hung, raped, frozen or starved to death' - almost two million Germans died 
during the expulsions, noted Petra Herterich, Dr. Heiner Schroder, Karen Meyer- 
Rebentisch and others.27 Underlining an apparent 'need to bring the theme closer to the 
young', noted Hessian expellee representative Rudolf Friedrich, Meyer-Rebentisch and 
Kristina Stau maintained they were no longer prepared to accept the neglect and 
suppression of this particular aspect of Germany's past. 28 Wittenberg historian Christel 
Panzig and journalist Helga Hirsch also declared that there must finally be an end to a 
repression of German history. 29 Suggesting further evidence of a divided memory and 
national self-understanding were the numerous allegations of official taboos concerning 
the theme.
Reporting about the former 'shame and embarrassed silence of around a million women 
abused and expelled from former German territories', the fate of German expellees was 
'until very recently taboo', maintained the women's branch of the BdV, Meyer- 
Rebentisch and Berlin historian Ute Schmidt.30 There were various claims, for example, 
of official taboos in former East Germany (GDR) about the questioning or the open 
discussion of the suffering of German women as a result of the behaviour of the alleged 
Soviet 'liberators'. 31 Interestingly, Christian Social Union (CSU) politician Peter
25 Cited from: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort ,,Im Zentrum - Vertreibung achten." op. cit.
26 For statement by Stratmann, see: Paterson, T. op. cit.
27 Cited from: Herterich, P. and Schroder, H. op. cit., p. 9. See also: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 13- 
16, 41 and: Darnstadt, T. and Wiegrefe, K. ,,Vater, erschiefi mich!" Vertreibung (I). Spiegel-Serie uber 
Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten. Der Spiegel, 25.03.02 (13), pp. 40-60.
28 See: Minister eroffhet Vertriebenen-Ausstellung im Hessenpark. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
Rhein-Zeitung [Online]. 18.05.03 [Accessed 20.06.05]. <http://www.faz.net> and: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. 
op. cit., pp. 4-5, 106.
29 See: Nitz, C. Stimmen zu Flucht und Vertreibung. Mitteldeutsche Zeitung, 16.02.04, p. 21. See also: 
Ackermann, U. Helga Hirsch. Schweres Gepack. Flucht und Vertreibung als Lebensthema. Deutschland 
Radio Berlin [Online]. 25.02.05 (Broadcast 20.06.05, 12:56) [Accessed 20.06.05]. 
<http ://www.dradio. de/dlr/sendungen/politischesbuch/3 5 05 54>
30 See: Saenger, I. Vor 60 Jahren 1945 - Ein Jahr des Krieges, des Chaos und der Hofmung. 
Tagungsbericht der Tagung des Frauenverbandes im BdV e.V. Vom 14.-16.10.2005 in Kassel- 
Wilhelmshohe, pp. 1-2 and: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., p. 5. See also: Bunge, I. Schlage und Tritte zur 
Bewusstlosigkeit. Markische Oderzeitung, Lokalausgabe Spree Journal, 26.04.05, p. 15.
31 See: Deventer, K. and Schmitz-Giimbel, E. Vergewaltigt und verstummt. Frauen als Kriegsbeute (Teil 
2). Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen [Online]. 01.02.05 [Accessed 23.06.05]. <http://www.zdf.de/ZDFde/
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Gauweiler noted in the Bundestag that Giinter Grass's 2002 publication Im Krebsgang 
(Crabwalk), focussing on the Pokriefke family of West Prussian refugees aboard the 
Wilhelm Gustloff, was widely held by the German public as a 'taboo-breaker 7 . 32
On 30 January 1945, hospital ship the Wilhelm Gustloff embarked from the port of 
Gotenhafen (now Gydnia in Poland) near Danzig (now Gdansk, Poland), carrying 
around 1,000 wounded German soldiers and at least 5,000 refugees - mostly women 
and children - noted Gttnter Grass.33 Sunk by a Soviet submarine, according to Grass 
only 1,230 people were saved. This event constituted the deadliest maritime disaster of 
all time and was 'taboo' in the former GDR, noted Die Welt and the publishers of 
Crabwalk, Faber and Faber. 34
Although Hans-Ulrich Wehler disputed that the theme of expulsion was a 'taboo', 
nevertheless, the Bielefeld historian conceded there were certainly deep inhibitions 
about discussing what happened in 1944 and 1945.35 Consequently, 'thousands of 
Germans still live as homeland expellees with a broken biography and missing identity', 
claimed Erika Steinbach.36 There were similar contentions from Hamburg Geo 
magazine investigative journalist Heinrich Jaenecke, along with academics Manfred 
Wille and Karen Meyer-Rebentisch. Indicative of their broken story is the outstanding 
fate of 600,000 ethnic Germans from the 'Vertreibungsgebiete'. To this day, 
photographs of the missing still hang on the walls of the homes of expellee families, 
noted Jaenecke and Meyer-Rebentisch.37
As a result of missing, psychologically or physically impaired fathers and mothers 
traumatised by rape, many war generation children also have an identity crisis, noted 
psychiatrists Hartmut Radebold and Elmar Brahler. 38 Areas whose female inhabitants in 
particular endured mass rape, for example, were Demmin, Saxony and Berlin. 'There
inhalt/30/0,1872,2257406,00.html> and: Nitz, C. op. cit., p. 21. See also: Hirsch, H. op. cit., pp. 14-20 
and: Surminski, A. Das Trauma einer Generation. Flucht und Vertreibung. 60 Jahre danach: ein neuer 
Blick auf das Drama im Osten. Geo Magazin, Nov 2004 (11), pp. 112-114.
32 See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., p. 4104.
33 See: Grass, G. Crabwalk. Translated by K. Winston. London: Faber and Faber, 2004, pp. 18, 63, 107- 
119, 133-134 and: Der Beste Grass seit Jahren. Die Novelle "Im Krebsgang": Eine notwendige 
Erinnerung an das Schicksal der Vertriebenen. Die Welt, 05.02.02, p. 27.
34 See: Grass, G. op. cit., pp. 29, 50, 135-142, 161-162, rear cover.
35 See: ,,Die Debatte wirkt befreiend." Der Spiegel, 25.03.02 (13), p. 61.
36 Cited from: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort ,,Im Zentrum - Vertreibung achten." op. cit.
37 See: Jaenecke, H. op. cit., pp. 134-135 and: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 40-41.
38 See: ,,Kriegskinder." Trauma von Bomben und Tod qualt noch heute viele Menschen. Mitteldeutsche 
Zeitung, 30.04.05, p. 28.
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were between 300,000 and 400,000 cases in Berlin alone during 1945', claimed 
Bielefeld historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler. 39 During and following the advance of the Red 
Army, German historians Wehler and Hubertus Knabe estimated almost two million 
women and girls were raped by soldiers of the Red Army - thousands of whom were 
later deported to and died in Soviet forced labour camps.40
For instance, between 15,000 and 30,000 Germans died from hunger, disease, cold or 
abuse between 1945 and 1950 in Sachsenhausen, the former Nazi concentration camp.41 
Their treatment and subsequent deaths in other so-called ' Speziallager\ or special 
camps, such as Ketschendorf (Speziallager Nr. 5) in the former GDR, were, until 
reunification, 'taboo', claimed Berlin author Regina Scheer and former Ketschendorf 
detainee, Alfred Jank.42 As a result of their experiences, many have remained 
'permanently disturbed', noted Greifswald psychiatrist Philipp Kuwert and Berlin 
historian Ute Schmidt. 43 Accounts by survivors from the former Siberian labour camp 
Schadrinsk, along with the reports from abused females now resident in East Friesland 
and former East Berlin, confirmed the aforementioned claims of permanent 
psychological and physical distress. For many years, Erika Eden, Eva-Maria Stege and 
Hildegard Rauschenbach suffered severe back pains or depression as a result of their 
experiences in former East Prussia and East Brandenburg during 1945 and later within 
Schadrinsk.44
Citing from Giinter Grass's Crabwalk, CSU politician Peter Gauweiler admitted in the 
Bundestag that whilst the suffering of Germans remained largely forgotten, it was very 
much alive within the history of every German family.45 However, Erika Steinbach 
lamented:
39 Cited from: Ibid. See also: Zimmer, G. ,,Forum." ,JCriegsende in Demmin." Erinnerung fur die 
Zukunft. Norddeutscher Rundfunk 1 Radio MV, Broadcast 03.05.05 20:15 - 21:00. Cd-Rom.
40 For these claims see: ,,Kriegskinder." Trauma von Bomben und Tod qualt noch heute viele Menschen. 
op. cit., p. 28 and: Hoppe, B. Die Verbrechen der Roten Armee. Berliner Zeitung, 09.05.05, p. 26.
41 See: Brinks, J. H. Children of the new fatherland: Germany's post-war right-wing politics. Translated 
by P. Vincent. London/New York: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000, pp. 93-95.
42 See: Scheer, R. Der Umgang mil der Denkmdlern. Eine Recherche in Brandenburg. Potsdam: 
Brandenburgische Landeszentrale fur Politische Bildung. Ministerium fur Wissenschaft, Forschung und 
Kultur des Landes Brandenburg, 2003, pp. 59-60, 157-168 and: Bunge, I. op. cit., p. 15.
43 See: Rathke, M. Die verdrangende Generation. Frankfurter Rundschau, 02.05.05, p. 4 and: Deventer, 
K. and Schmitz-Giimbel, E. Vergewaltigt und verstummt. Frauen als Kriegsbeute (Teil 2). op. cit.
44 See: Kopcke, M. Verschleppt 1945 Deutsche Frauen in sowjetischen Arbeitslagern. Deutschland 
Radio Berlin [Online]. 07.01.05 [Accessed 30.06.05]. <http://www.dradio.de/d/r/sendungen/merkmal/ 
333041/> and: Herterich, P. and Schroder, H. op. cit., pp. 83-124.
45 See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., p. 4104.
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Nowhere in Germany is there a roof for an overall view of this tragedy, and 
nowhere for interested citizens to see for themselves the history and fate of these 
people. Knowledge of our own past is important for Germany's future. That will 
only be realised, however, if school lessons in every facet of the twentieth 
century are objectively reappraised. With this, of course, belongs the fate of the 
German expellees.46
Reflecting this sense of inadequate commemoration and articulation of past trauma was 
a survey carried out in November 2004 by the Hamburg magazine Geo. Asked whether 
the theme had been sufficiently dealt with in German schools and universities, of the 
1,471 Germans surveyed, 145 (10%) replied in the affirmative. 989 (68.3%) thought 
otherwise.47 'After decades of silence, many women are only just coming to terms with 
what happened to them', maintained Berlin historian Ute Schmidt, Munich Professor 
Michael Ermann and Greifswald University psychiatrist Philipp Kuwert.48 Further 
indicative, therefore, of the ongoing dissonances between officials, the media and 
historians over the alleged role of memorials, was whether German suffering should be 
placed within a national or European context.
Here, there, but nowhere yet...
Although Jiirgen Kocka suggested a bilateral rather than a national project, at the same 
time the Berlin historian favoured a German location for the centre. 'What speaks 
against Berlin? Nothing!' declared Munich historian Michael Wolffsohn. Wolffsohn 
went on to argue: 'Every decent human being has to approve of such a centre.' 49 
Frankfurt historian Lothar Gall reasoned that since the expulsions constituted a part of 
German history, such a project should be located in the political centre of the country. 
On the other hand, historians Fritz Klein (Berlin) was against Berlin and Karl Dietrich 
Bracher (Bonn) rejected any kind of centre at all. 50
46 Cited from: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort ,,Im Zentrum - Vertreibung achten." op. cit.
47 The survey included the following age groups: 151 (10.7%) younger than 20 years; 436 (30.9%) 
between 20-30; 373 (26.5%) between 31-40 and 449 (31.9%) over 40. See: Finden Sie, dass das Thema 
,,Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen" an Schulen und Universitaten ausreichend behandelt wird? In: 
Umfrage: Flucht und Vertreibung. Geo Magazin [Online]. 02.11.04 [Accessed 21.06.05]. 
<http://www.geo.de/urnfrage-vertreibung>
48 See: Rathke, M. op. cit., p. 4. For similar comments by Kuwert and Ute Schmidt see: Ibid, and: 
Deventer, K. and Schmitz-Giimbel, E. Vergewaltigt und verstummt. Frauen als Kriegsbeute (Teil 2). op.
cit.
49 Cited from: Historiker uneins uber den Ort des Gedenkens. Sachsische Zeitung [Online]. 23.09.03 
[Accessed 03 12.04]. <http://www.sz-online.de/nachrichten/>
50 Ibid.
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As far as federal officials were concerned, any German memorial against expulsion had 
to be in a European context. In the words of Germany's former Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer: 'It cannot be a national project.' 51 Along with Fischer and the then 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, according to the Berliner Morgenpost most 
SPD/Green politicians, at the time of writing, supported the 'Europeanisation' of the 
project. 'Any Centre against Expulsion must not be explicitly connected to the German 
expellees', declared Schroder. 52
Not only was there opposition from members of the 1998-2005 SPD/Green government 
against a national theme for a centre, but also to its proposed central location. During a 
summit with the then Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller, Schroder declared: 'A centre 
should not be constructed in Berlin.' 53 In an interview with journalists from Die Zeit, 
Joschka Fischer also spoke out against a centre for the German expellees in Berlin. 
'Such a project could only be conceivable in a European context', argued the former 
Foreign Minister.54 Opposition to Berlin also came from SPD representatives Lorenz 
Postler and Markus Meckel. SPD Deputy Mayor of Berlin's Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg 
district, Lorenz Postler, stated he would vote against Berlin - in spite of the considerable 
financial gain the project could bring to the city. 'So long as the debate has not been 
settled for a European location, I regard the national initiative as wrong', contended 
Postler.55 SPD member of the Bundestag Markus Meckel meanwhile suggested 
Wroclaw in Poland, whilst former SPD Minister of Culture Christina Weiss appealed 
for a European solution to the planned exhibition, Flight and Expulsion, to be set up in 
Bonn. 56
Along with Meckel, former presidents of the Bundestag, Wolfgang Thierse (SPD) and 
Rita Sussmuth (Christian Democratic Union (CDU)), also expressed concerns that a
51 Cited from:   Was haben wir uns angetan?" - Interview mil BundesauBenminister Fischer iiber ein 
Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen und iiber das Geschichtsbild der Deutschen, Wochenschrift ,,Die Zeit" 
28.08.2003. Auswdrtiges Amt [Online]. 28.08.03 [Accessed 02.02.04]. <http://www.auswaertiges- 
amt.de/www/de/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=4793>
52 Cited from: Facius, G. Schroder lehnt Zentrum fur Vertriebene in Berlin. Die Welt, 14.08.03, p. 4. For 
claims of the rejection of a national project by most SPD/Green politicians, see: Facius, G. Vertriebene 
wollen Zentrum in Berlin. Berliner Morgenpost, 16.07.03, p. 3.
53 Cited from: Boyes, R. Poles enraged by memorial to expelled Germans. The Times, 24.09.03, p. 14.
54 Cited from interview with former Foreign Minister Fischer: ,,Was haben wir uns angetan?" op. cit.
55 Cited from: Falkner, M. op. cit., p. 4.
56 See: Facius, G. Vertriebene wollen Zentrum in Berlin, op. cit., p. 3. For Weiss's comments see: Streit 
um Vertriebenen-Zentrum - Schily will mit alien sprechen. Bundesministerium des Innern [Online]. 
16.07.03 [Accessed 18.11.03]. <http://www.bmi.bund.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_92625.htm>
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national project would arouse the mistrust of Poland and the Czech Republic.57 Former 
Polish Foreign Ministers Wladyslaw Bartoszewski and Bronislaw Geremek, for 
instance, signed a joint appeal stating: 'Setting-up such a centre as a national German 
project creates mistrust among neighbours and cannot be in the interests of our 
countries.' 58 In Berlin, Poland's Ambassador Andrzej Byrt raised concerns expressed by 
the Polish media against the centre. 59 Czech officials also protested to Joschka Fischer, 
who was visiting Prague to discuss the Czech Republic's forthcoming European Union 
(EU) membership. According to The Daily Telegraph, 'hostile Czech journalists asked 
an embarrassed Fischer whether a memorial centre was intended as Germany's 
welcome to the EU new member states'. 60
But, Erika Steinbach dismissed her critics, arguing that Germany should be allowed to 
mourn the plight of its people. Steinbach also stressed the importance of a central 
location, because that would be the best method of representation, 'allowing Germans to 
mourn all those killed and dispossessed'. 61 Other representatives of the expellees also 
opposed a European dimension of the theme. Implying the official stance compromised 
not only national memory, but also national sovereignty and, arguably, therefore 
identity, Vice-Chairman of the BdV Peter Glotz argued: 'If one accepts the official line, 
it would be tantamount to admitting that the government in Berlin is not really a 
German government at all.' 62 Complaining external factors were taking precedence over 
domestic, Glotz suggested the SPD/Green government obviously thought avoiding 
external irritation was more important than commemorating Germany's expellees.63
Along with Erika Steinbach, the Organisation for a Centre against Expulsion also 
maintained that the problem of expulsion should not be reduced to German-Polish or 
German-Czech relations. According to the organisation: 'A centre's first responsibility
57 See: Facius, G. Vertriebene wollen Zentrum in Berlin, op. cit., p. 3 and: Falkner, M. op. cit., p. 4.
58 Cited from: Paterson, T. op. cit. See also: Burger, R. Gorlitzer Schlusselerlebnisse. Im Schlesischen 
Museum wird sehr behutsam an die Vertreibung erinnert. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 03.09.03 
(204), p. 3.
59 See: Gessler, P. and Lesser, G. Polen entsetz iiber Vertrieben-Gedenkfeier. Die Tageszeitung, 21.07.04 
(7414), p. 9.
60 Cited from: Paterson, T. op. cit.
61 Cited from: Boyes, R. op. cit., p. 14. See also: Erika Steinbach: Diskussion um Vertreibungen ein 
,,heilsamer Prozess." Deutschland Radio Berlin [Online]. 04.04.04 [Accessed 16.06.05]. 
<http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/idw-dlf7253542/>
62 Cited from: Bruckner, M. Wohin mil dem "Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen"? Deutsche Welle [Online]. 
03.09.03 [Accessed 22.12.04]. <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,95550l,00.html> 
63 Cited from: Ibid.
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is with the internal affairs and sympathy for the expellees.'64 Claiming popular support, 
Erika Steinbach declared: 'I feel it is a compliment that our work has inculcated such 
interest.' 65 'Levying a five Euro cent tax on each person to fund it, the centre had the 
backing of three Germans states and 400 towns and cities', noted The Daily Telegraph.66 
Although the BdV attracted financial donations from seven regions in the country, it has 
yet, at the time of writing, to receive any official funding. 67
Nevertheless, Erika Steinbach attracted broad support from the public, senior CDU 
politicians and prominent writers, reported The Times 6* In an interview with the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the former CDU Chairperson, Angela Merkel, claimed 
that most German states supported Steinbach.69 Further indicative of popular support for 
a centre was, arguably, the following claim by the Berliner Morgenpost and survey by 
Geo magazine. According to the Berliner Morgenpost, establishing a centre somewhere 
on the outskirts of the country would be suitable for nobody in the prevailing climate of 
opinion. 70 In a 2004 survey undertaken by Geo, for example, of 1,471 Germans 
surveyed, 19.9% (228) were against a memorial in the capital, whereas 64.6% (936) 
supported the proposal. 71 In an open show of defiance against the SPD/Green 
government, the BdV argued that Chancellor Schroder had no authority to try to stop 
it. 72 An insistence on a national role of a memorial for Germany's expellee victims 
seemed indicative of an emergent popular historicism, challenging the SPD/Greens' 
understanding of nationhood and their 'landscapes of memory'. 73
Children of guilt?
According to the Berliner Morgenpost, one of the reasons why most mainstream 
politicians rejected a national centre to the expellees were fears that a national focus
64 Cited from: "Vertreibungs-Zentrum nicht in Berlin." op. cit., p. II.
65 Cited from: Facius, G. Vertriebene wollen Zentrum in Berlin, op. cit., p. 3.
66 Cited from: Paterson, T. op. cit. and: Facius, G. Vertriebene wollen Zentrum in Berlin, op. cit., p. 3.
67 See: Bruckner, M. op. cit.
68 See: Boyes, R. op. cit., p. 14 and: Hall, A. Germans agonise over war memorial. The Times, 30.08.03, 
p. 18. See also: Facius, G. Vertriebene wollen Zentrum in Berlin, op. cit., p. 3.
69 See: Merkel fur Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen in Berlin. Interview mit Dr. Angela Merkel in der 
Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung vom 22.08.03. Informationsdienst fur Aussiedler und Vertriebene. (20). 
Berlin: CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, 23.09.03, pp. 1-2.
70 Cited from: Facius, G. Vertriebene wollen Zentrum in Berlin, op. cit., p. 3.
71 See: Was halten Sie von den Planen, in Berlin ein Mahnmal fiir die deutschen Kriegsfliichtlinge zu 
errichten? In: Umfrage: Flucht und Vertreibung. op. cit.
72 See: Paterson, T. op. cit.
73 See: Fulbrook, M. German national identity after the Holocaust, op. cit., pp. 16-47, 155-156.
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would threaten, in the words of Chancellor Schroder, 'a blurring of the actual historical 
causes of the expulsions'. 74 Joschka Fischer argued:
Whenever we are discussing the expellees, what must not be omitted is what 
occurred previously. By doing so, one equates historical guilt that results in a 
disastrous confrontation of a distorted perception of history that does not reflect 
reality. This reality being, that Germany's responsibility for beginning a war that 
resulted in the expulsions of its minorities.75
Although the then CDU Chairperson Angela Merkel supported a national Centre against 
Expulsion, at the same time, she also maintained along with other mainstream 
politicians that: 'We must recognise our guilt and responsibility concerning their 
causes.' 76 Whilst Joschka Fischer stated he understood the pain of the expellees, at the 
same time, he argued the expulsions must be put in the context of 'what we have done 
to ourselves and not about what others have done to us'. 77
Nonetheless, Erika Steinbach contended that: 'Millions of those expelled were children. 
How can they be held responsible for National Socialism?' 78 Further indicative of this 
emergent popular historicism were the demands from expellee representatives for an 
acknowledgement from the Polish and Czech governments of their states' respective 
responsibility for past injustices perpetrated against ethnic Germans. Speaking at the 
BdV's 2001 Day of Homeland, Erika Steinbach declared: 'It is also an appeal to our 
neighbours to acknowledge their responsibility for their countries' past actions.' 79
Challenging the ruling political elite's 'landscapes of memory', there were similar 
demands from other quarters. Following reunification, the then Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
declared the New Guardhouse as the new unified German national memorial for 
'victims of war and oppression'. 80 'In its new incarnation the monument included a pieta
74 See: Facius, G. Schroder lehnt Zentrum fur Vertriebene in Berlin, op. cit., p. 4.
75 See interview with former Foreign Minister Fischer in: ,,Was haben wir uns angetan?" op. cit.
76 Cited from: Merkel fur Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen in Berlin, op. cit., pp. 1-2. For similar comments 
by Sebastian Edathy (SPD), Hans-Joachim Otto (FDP) and Giinter Baumann (CDU) see: Plenarprotokoll 
Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., pp. 4099, 4106-4108.
77 Cited from interview with former Foreign Minister Fischer: ,,Was haben wir uns angetan?" op. cit.
78 Cited from: Paterson, T. op. cit. 'In reflection, it was amazing the extent of violence perpetrated against 
German civilians - most of whom were innocent women and children', noted Monika Franz. See: Franz, 
M. 60 Jahre nach Kriegsende: Flucht und Vertreibung als Gegenstand der Erinnerung in Deutschland. 
Bayerische Zeitschrift far Politik und Geschichte. [Online]. 2005 (2) [Accessed 21.06.06]. 
<hrtp://www.km.bayern.de/blz/eup/02_05/2.asp> For a similar line of argument see: Surminski, A. op. 
cit., pp. 112-114 and: Bunge, I. op. cit, p. 4.
79 Cited from: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort ,,Im Zentrum - Vertreibung achten." op. cit.
80 See: Day of National Mourning. New Guardhouse, Berlin, op. cit.
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by Ka'the Kollwitz and an inscription to all the victims of the Third Reich', noted 
Jeffrey Click. 81 Situated on a bronze plaque to the right of the entrance of the New 
Guardhouse, the inscription reads:
The New Guardhouse is the place of memory and remembrance of the victims of 
war and tyranny. We remember the innocent who lost their lives in war and as a 
result of war in their homeland, in captivity or through expulsion.82
Responding to the question put by Die Zeit of how the current official stance differs 
from that of Erika Steinbach's, Joschka Fischer maintained the current issue should not 
be about the expulsions, but about the process of German self-destruction. 'Past actions 
by Germans therefore rules out any claims that the Germans were victims', argued 
Fischer.83
Exposing further contradictions about how the German expellees were perceived in 
official and collective memory, BdV spokesperson Walter Stratmann stated: 'For 
decades displaced Germans have been brought up to think of themselves merely as 
perpetrators - not the victims - of Nazi war crimes.' 84 They were what historical 
investigative journalist Heinrich Jaenecke referred to as: 'The generation of 
perpetrators.' 85 Similar observations followed from Monika Kopcke, some historians 
and three female survivors of former Soviet labour camps. According to Former East 
Prussian survivor of the Siberian camp Schadrinsk, Hildegard Rauschenbach, for 
example: 'No-body was interested in what had happened. Past injustices were simply 
belittled or ignored.' 86 1999 Nobel Prize Winner for Literature Gunter Grass, along with 
historians Hubertus Knabe and Michael Kroner, were also concerned that the 'expulsion 
crimes' against German civilians had taken second place in German history. 87
A survey by Hamburg's Geo magazine and other evidence also reflected this reasoning. 
When asked to respond to the statement: 'Too little has been made of past injustices
81 Cited from: Click, J. K. op. cit., p. 561.
82 See: Neue Wache. Bundesregierung [Online]. 2004 [Accessed 09.03.04]. 
<http://www.bundesregierung.de/artikel-,413.89714/Neue-Wache.htm>
83 Cited from: ,,Was haben wir uns angetan?" op. cit.
84 Cited from: Paterson, T. op. cit.
85 See: Jaenecke, H. op. cit., pp. 133-134.
86 Cited from: Kopcke, M. op. cit. For similar views by Eva-Maria Stege and Christel Wolf, see: Ibid. 
and: Everwien, A. Zwangsarbeiterinnen in Sibirien - Deportiert und Vergessen. Kontraste 1. Rundfunk 
Berlin Brandenburg [Online]. 09.12.04 [Accessed 19.02.05]. <http://www.rbbonline.de/_/kontraste/ 
beitrag_druckenJ sp/key=rbb_beitrag_ 16105 3 3>
87 See:~Noack, H-J. op. cit., p. 37 and: Kroner, M. Deportation vor 60. Jahren war Kriegsverbrechen. 
Siebenburgische Zeitung [Online]. 12.01.05 [Accessed 13.06.05]. <http://www.siebenbuerger.de>
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such as the Air War and Expulsions', 822 of 1,471 Germans surveyed agreed. 88 
Attempting to answer the questions 'who am I and where am I from?' by German 
expellees, Helga Hirsch maintained that as long as the 'enforced repatriation of the 
expellees remains swept under the carpet, a reappraisal of past events cannot be 
concluded'.89
Although there is an official record of the crimes committed against the German 
expellees in the Federal Archives, they were not published until 1989 - and then only 
by the German Expellee Cultural Organisation, noted Hans Lemberg. According to 
Lemberg, 'the SPD government actively prevented the publication of the expulsion 
crimes against German civilians'.90 In the words of the Academic Director of the Berlin- 
Hohenschonhausen memorial to the victims of the Stasi (East German Secret Police), 
Hubertus Knabe: 'Communist atrocities against German civilians have so far been 
played-down in comparison to the crimes of National Socialism.' 91 Historian Hans- 
Ulrich Wehler and political scientist Michael Klundt, however, dismissed a 'like by 
like' comparison of crimes and the fates of German and Polish expellees.92
Nevertheless, there have been other allegations of atrocities against ethnic Germans. So 
where exactly did the alleged war crimes take place? According to historian K. Erik 
Franzen, writer Giinter Grass and the sole remaining survivor of Nemmersdorf, Gerda 
Meczulat, atrocities occurred in the former East Prussian and Pomeranian towns and 
villages of Nemmersdorf, GroBwaltersdorf, and Damerkow during 1944-1945, the first 
two having since become Russian and the last Polish. 93
Along with the supporters of the bombing victims, according to Hermann Kurthen:
88 Cited from: Es wird zu wenig iiber das Unrecht geredet, das Deutschen wahrend des Zweiten 
Weltkriegs widerfahren ist, zum Beispiel bei Bombardierung und Vertreibung. In: Umfrage: Flucht und 
Vertreibung. op. cit.
89 Cited from: Ackermann, U. op. cit. See also: Helga Hirsch. Schweres Gepack. Flucht und Vertreibung 
als Lebensthema. Perlentaucher [Online]. 2005 [Accessed 24.06.05]. <http://www.perlentaucher.de/buch/ 
19383.html>
90 See: Lemberg, H. Deutschland, die Nachbarlander und die Vertriebenen: Geschichte und 
Geschichtspolitik seit 1949. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte [Online]. 2004: 44 
[Accessed 24.06.05]. <http://library.fes.de/netzquelle/zwangsmigration/44hist.html>
91 Cited from: Oberschelp, M. Ganz ohne Ideologic geht es nicht. Frankfurter Rundschau, 04.05.05, p. 
30. See also: Hoppe, B. op. cit., p. 26.
92 See: Oberschelp, M. op. cit., p. 30 and: ,,Die Debatte wirkt befreiend." op. cit., pp. 61-64.
93 Stibbe, M. Women in the Third Reich. London: Arnold, 2003, pp. 165-166 and: Grass, G. op. cit., pp. 
29, 50, 63, 103-107. See also: Reuth, R. G. Nehmt die Frauen als Beute. Welt am Sonntag, 20.02.05, p. 
11. For eyewitness testimony of Gerda Mecuzulat, see: Damstadt, T. and Wiegrefe, K. op. cit., pp. 40-43.
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Sympathisers of the expellees now maintain that the country cannot continue to 
accept historical and moral responsibilities for victims of Nazi aggression on the 
one hand, whilst ignoring the plight of ethnic Germans who suffered as tokens 
of revenge against Nazi aggression on the other.94
What the representatives and sympathisers of the expellees appeared to highlight were 
double standards concerning the ethical duties advocated by the then Bundestag ruling 
elite. Or, as Radio Berlin Brandenburg, Karsten Deventer, Eva Schmitz-Gumbel and 
some expellees have indicated, the general official stance seemed to be that the legacy 
of Germany's past demanded an apparent selectivity of who warranted official 
sympathy, restitution and attentions.95
In September 2001, for example, Russian President Vladimir Putin and the then German 
Chancellor Schroder laid flowers in Berlin's Tiergarten to the memorial of 'Soviet- 
Liberators' killed in 1945 during the battle for Berlin.96 What was significant about this 
was that 'until today no top official of a united Germany has ever laid wreaths of 
flowers to the memorial of Soviet soldiers in the German capital', noted Russian news 
agency Pravda. According to Pravda, the sculpture ensemble in the Tiergarten was the 
first Soviet monument established in post-war Berlin. 97 As far as the right-wing 
organisation the Preufiische Treuhand (Prussian Claims Trust) and a Baden- 
Wiirttemberg branch of the BdV were concerned, this kind of 'selectivity of 
remembrance' by Schroder was tantamount to a 'betrayal'. 98 Although not expressing 
their resentment in such radical tones, the tone of various articles highlighting the need 
to remember the alleged 'neglected abuse of German women' and their enforced 
deportation, arguably, implied as much.99
94 Cited from: Kurthen, H. Germany at the crossroads: national identity and the challenges of 
immigration. International Migration Review, 1995: 29(4), p. 922.
95 See: Everwien, A. op. cit. and: Kopcke, M. op. cit. See also: Deventer, K. and Schmitz-Gumbel, E. 
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96 See: Vladimir Putin, Gerhard Schroder lay flowers at Soviet soldier-liberators' memorial. Pravda 
[Online] 25 0901 [Accessed 16.02.04]. <http://english.pravda.ru/diplomatic/200109/25/16177.html>
97 Ibid.
98 See: Hofrnann, G. Jetzt schreien wir wieder ,,Verrat." Die Zeit, 05.08.04 (33), p. 6 and: Kliem, E. R. 
,,Herzloser Umgang mil den eigenen Opfern." BdV Nachrichten. Mitteilungsblatt des Bundes der 
Vertriebenen. Vereinigte Landsmannschaften. Landesverband Baden-Wtirttemberg e. V. Stuttgart. 53. 
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99 Cited from: Angekommen in Bayern. Bayerischer Rundfunk [Online]. 22.02.05 [Accessed 25.04.05]. 
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Exposing further inconsistencies between the ruling Bundestag political elite and 
popular national memory, the then Federal Minister of the Interior's rejection of a 
National Day of Commemoration for the German expellees provoked further resentment 
to official 'landscapes of memory'. 100 Ignoring appeals for a National Day of 
Remembrance, on the 2005 Day of Homeland, Otto Schily suggested that a future 
Centre against Expulsion should be established in Breslau (now Wroclaw) in Poland.
Schily's proposal was met with 'whistles of derision from members of the BdV, 
reported various German regional newspapers. 101 'Instead of concentrating on the 
perception of Germans as victims,' Joschka Fischer argued, 'Steinbach should not 
forget the actual historical context of events or taking into consideration the fears and 
apprehensions of Germany's neighbours." 02 Rather than a German memorial for 
expulsion, the then Czech Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla also spoke out for a 
European centre focussing on the origins and consequences of the expulsions. 103 Yet, 
Steinbach claimed that the history of Czechoslovakia and Poland from 1918 was just as 
evil as National Socialism, as the 'huge discrimination experienced by Germans in those 
countries testified'. 104 'Following 1945, many women, children and elderly men were 
also victims of deportation, forced labour and expulsion - simply because they were 
German', noted Erika Steinbach. 105 Contradicting the general official line, at the time of 
writing, Vice-Chairman of the BdV Peter Glotz maintained that the centre would neither 
exclude the sorrows of others, nor place events out of their historical context. 106 Those 
few who did speak out on behalf of the expellees were labelled 'revisionists', noted 
Erika Steinbach, Christel Panzig, Regina Scheer and others. 107 Statements from the then 
ruling Bundestag political elite, at the time of writing, suggested they continued to be 
so.
100 See: Schily, O. Mitteilung der Bundesregierung zu der EntschlieBung des Bundesrates zur Erhebung 
des 5. August zum "Nationalen Gedenktag fur die Opfer von Vertreibung." Unterrichtung durch die 
Bundesregierung. In: Deutscher Bundesrat, Drucksache 769/03. Berlin, 16.10.03, pp. 1-2.
101 See: Vertriebene sorgen fur neuen Streit. Lausitzer Rundschau, 08.08.05, p. 2 and: Mil Pfiffen und 
emporten Zwischenrufen. Nachrichten - Ticker. Politik. Liibecker Nachrichten, 7/8.08.05 (183), p. 4.
102 For interview with Fischer see: ,,Was haben wir uns angetan?" op. cit.
103 See: Merkel fur Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen in Berlin, op. cit., p. 4.
104 Cited from: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort ,,Im Zentrum - Vertreibung achten." op. cit.
105 Ibid. For similar claims see: Jaenecke, H. op. cit., pp. 134-135 and: Franz, M. op. cit. See also: 
Herterich, P. and Schroder, H. op. cit., pp. 7-8, 109-115, 146-151.
106 See: Bruckner, M. op. cit.
107 See: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort ,,Im Zentrum - Vertreibung achten." op. cit. and: Erika Steinbach: 
Diskussion urn Vertreibungen ein ,,heilsamer Prozess." op. cit. See also: Nitz, C. op. cit., p. 21 and: 
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Whilst right-wing extremist parties, such as the German People's Union (DVU) and the 
Republicans (REP), 'do not formally deny the crimes of the National Socialist regime, 
nevertheless, they do dispute their uniqueness', noted the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior (BMI). 108 According to the DVU:
At the end of World War Two, roughly 20 million Germans were expelled from 
their centuries-old homeland by the victors and those that saw themselves as 
such. It was the largest mass expulsion in the history of the world and the 
greatest crime against the German people. 109
For the Chairman of the REP Rolf Schlierer, there were enough memorial sites in 
Germany to recall and commemorate the victims of Nazi crimes - but there was no 
central memorial for the millions of victims of expulsion. Furthermore, anyone who 
emphasised the guilt of one's own people and, at the same time, 'swept the crimes 
committed against the German people under the carpet, produced the very opposite of 
reconciliation', argued Schlierer. 110 Along with the federal authorities, Joschka Fischer 
and Chancellor Schroder continued to maintain the expulsion theme was the preserve of 
right-wing extremists and revisionists. Although undoubtedly exploited by the extreme 
right, developments in 2004 and 2005 suggested that this was no longer the case, as the 
response from some of the media and historians to the theme testified. Nonetheless, 
according to Fischer, the debate about the role of the Germans as victims hid the danger 
of historical revisionism. Schroder also expressed similar concerns: 'No-one can deny 
that the theme is connected to fascism.""
Yet, evidence suggested that there was, in the words of the Bundestag representatives 
Martin Hohmann (CDU) and Peter Gauweiler (CSU), 'a new public perception of the 
expellees'." 2 For many years, claimed Erika Steinbach, Christel Panzig and Giinter 
Grass, neither the expellees nor the German public showed any interest in their history 
or their suffering." 3 Various publications and former expellees reported that German 
refugees (Fluchtlinge) from the Sudetenland, Silesia and East Prussia were certainly not
108 Cited from: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2002. Berlin: Federal 
Ministry of the Interior, Sep 2003, pp. 70-71.
109 Ibid.
110 Cited from: Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 1999. Berlin/Bonn: 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, Jun 2000, p. 42.
111 Cited from: "Vertreibungs-Zentrum nicht in Berlin." op. cit., p. 11. For comments by Fischer see: 
,,Was haben wir uns angetan?" op. cit.
112 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., pp. 4098, 4104.
113 For these claims see: Es gilt das gesprochene Wort ,,Im Zentrum - Vertreibung achten." op. cit. and: 
Nitz, C. op. cit., p. 21. See also: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 5, 17-26, 101.
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very welcome in the aftermath of the Second World War. This was especially the case 
in Schleswig-Holstein, where almost one third of the entire local population constituted 
expellees from East Prussia', noted Gunter Grass." 4 However, along with the Air War 
victims, evidence indicated that considerable public interest has also arisen about the 
personal experiences of the expellees. 'More and more people - particularly the young - 
now want to know about the expulsions', declared CDU politician Martin Hohmann in 
the Bundestag. 115 Even Joschka Fischer admitted: 'The whole network of journalists is 
full of it every day." 16 So what exhibitions and publications have appeared and what 
exactly was their essence?
In 2004, Wittenberg historian Christel Panzig's temporary exhibition and accompanying 
publication Flight, Expulsion and Integration appeared. Over 100 eyewitness accounts 
from former East Prussia, Pomerania, the Warthegau and the Neumark, now resident in 
the Wittenberg and Bitterfeld regions of Saxony-Anhalt, formed the basis of Panzig's 
exhibition and accompanying publication. Many of the eyewitnesses had never publicly 
expressed their experiences." 7 Contradicting the claims of Joschka Fischer and 
Chancellor Schroder, according to journalist Corinna Nitz, expellee (Vertriebene] and 
refugee (Fluchtlinge) testimonies for the Wittenberg exhibition were not prompted by 
revenge or political revisionism, but 'merely deep personal feelings of unjustified 
suffering and persecution that filled every account'." 8 For example, Frank 'B.' testified 
that an appeal from a former expellee to the local Mayor for compassion for her 
children was rejected, with the suggestion that they should all be 'thrown in the River 
Elbe'." 9 Another witness, Anneliese Stefaniak, claimed she was permanently 
psychologically traumatised by the terror of the expulsions from the Sudetenland.' 20
Commenting on the 2003 permanent exhibition Expellees in Hesse held in Neu- 
Anspach, Hesse, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung made similar claims to Panzig and
114 See: Mischer, O., Rademacher, C. and Schroder, J. "Das Thema war lange reif." Flucht und 
Vertreibung. 60 Jahre danach: ein neuer Blick auf das Drama im Osten. Geo Magazin, Nov 2004 (11), p. 
138. See also: Angekommen in Bayern. op. cit. and: Jaenecke, H. op. cit., p. 134. See also: Meyer- 
Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 3-5, 17-27.
115 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. op. cit., p. 4098.
116 Cited from: ,,Was haben wir uns angetan?" op. cit.
117 See: Nitz, C. op. cit., p. 21. For publication by Panzig see: Konigseder, A. and Panzig, C. (eds). Zweite 
Heimat. Flucht, Vertreibung und Integration Deutscher nach dem II. Weltkrieg in Sachsen-Anhalt. 
Lutherstadt Wittenberg: PFLUG e.V., 2004, pp. 5, 13-14, 31, 37, 46, 51-72. 
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Nitz, arguing that expulsion is an injustice - 'whomever it befalls'. 121 Advertising the 
temporary 2005 special exhibition Arrived - Refugees and Expellees in Liibeck, the 
city's web site declared: 'The exhibition offers the people of Liibeck a deeper insight 
into their origins and family histories." 22
Further symptomatic of this change in public sympathy for Germany's victims of war 
was, arguably, the reception of the novel by what some of the German media described 
as Germany's 'praeceptor Germaniae\ or teacher of Germany, Giinter Grass. 123 Since 
its first release in February 2002, the semi-fictional Crabwalk had already sold more 
than 300,000 copies, reported Der Spiegel, Central German Broadcasting and publishers 
Steidel Verlag. 124 Within a 2002 four-part special series about the expulsion of ethnic 
Germans, Der Spiegel claimed in its introductory headline to the series, along with Geo 
historical magazine, that 'an innocent generation is finally showing interest in the long 
forgotten topic'. 125 In a 2004 survey carried out by Geo, of 1,471 Germans surveyed, 
477 (32.6%) stated they were now more interested in the theme than hitherto, with 205 
(14.0%) expressing the opposite view. 126
This new empathy for the German victims of expulsion also became apparent in the 
following reviews of three other publications on the theme. During 2005, for instance, a 
series of articles on the experiences of German expellees near the end of the Second 
World War appeared in the Ostfriesen Zeitung. On account of considerable local 
interest, the newspaper decided to publish the four-week long series of articles in a 2005 
book called Expelled to Eastfriesland. 127 Sent to the Silesian village of Liibchen, 
northwest of Breslau (now in Poland), bombed-out Berlin photographer Hanns Tschira 
also recorded events in early January 1945, whose pictures were brought to the attention 
of Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF) employee Lucia Brauburger. 128
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122 Cited from: Angekommen - 60 Jahre Fliichtlinge und Vertriebene in Liibeck. Luebecknews.de 
[Online]. 24.05.05 [Accessed 21.06.06]. <http://www.luebecknews.de/content/view/169/2/>
123 See: Noack, H-J. op. cit., p. 37 and: Baron, U. Endlich! Der ewige Roman. Die Welt, 16.08.04, p. 22.
124 See: Giinter Grass: "Im Krebsgang." Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk [Online]. 06.03.03 [Accessed 
14.06.06]. <http://www.mdr.de/kultur/literatur/596907.html> and: Noack, H-J. op. cit., p. 37.
125 Cited from: Noack, H-J. op. cit., pp. 36-39. See also: Umfrage: Flucht und Vertreibung. op. cit.
126 See: In jiingster Zeit wird das Thema ,,Flucht und Vertreibung" verstarkt von den deutschen Medien 
aufgegriffen. Sind auch Sie an diesem Thema heute mehr interessiert als friiher? In: Umfrage: Flucht und 
Vertreibung. op. cit.
127 Cited from: Schroder, H. Vertrieben nach Ostfriesland. Das Buch zur erfolgreichen Serie der 
Ostfriesen Zeitung. Ostfriesen Zeitung [Online]. 11.05.05 [Accessed 09.05.05]. <http://www.ostfriesen- 
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Underlining the significance of photographic evidence, the Berliner Morgenpost 
maintained that photographs do not sensationalise reality as eyewitness testimonies can 
so often do. 'In that sense the volume Farewell from Lubchen will allow "undisguised 
views" of the hitherto unknown Lower-Silesian expulsions of early 1945', noted Sven 
Kellerhoff. 129 There was also a Centre against Expulsion in the form of a book, noted the 
Berliner Morgenpost. Reviewing the 2004 publication Flight and Expulsion and its 
significance for German memory, Kellerhoff reflected: 'Flight and Expulsion offers 
remembrance without endangering reproaches from either side. Although this may help 
to objectify events, the book is nevertheless no more than the victims of the victims 
deserve.' 130
Referring to the rape and murder of the 24 women and children of Nemmersdorf and 
other places in Eastern Europe, Jorg Echternkamp, Der Spiegel and East Prussian writer 
Arno Surminski made similar claims that the expulsion theme is now being treated with 
greater empathy by many in Germany. 131 Highlighting once again the dissonances 
between official and popular perceptions of symbols of memory and nationhood was, 
arguably, the case of the Director of the East Prussian Regional Museum, Ronny Kabus. 
In January 2005, for example, there were calls for the resignation of Kabus from former 
expellees, some of the townspeople of Liineburg and the East Prussian Welfare and 
Cultural Association on account of his alleged 'questionable commitment to the 
Museum's cause'. 132 Chairman and spokesperson of the Museum, Wilhelm von 
Gottberg, explained that for a number of years there were tensions between Liineburg, 
Kabus, and his colleagues at the Museum on account of the historian's 'disloyalty to the 
work of the organisation'. Historian Kabus also provoked protests from the townspeople 
for attempting to dispense with the Museum's 'image of expulsion'. Conversely, Kabus 
had the broad support of federal politicians, such as Christina Weiss (SPD) and Martin 
Hohmann (CDU). 133
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Together with the claims of a lack of official empathy for the expellees as national and 
collective victims, particularly from the political left in Germany, on the other hand 
there was also a discernible hostility towards the victims of past German crimes. 134 
Since 1993, victims of war and tyranny are remembered at the New Guardhouse each 
year on the Day of National Mourning. This is usually observed on the second Sunday 
before the first Sunday in Advent in a simple ceremony during which the Federal 
President and representatives of the Federation lay wreaths at the New Guardhouse. 135 In 
1957, the New Guardhouse was renovated as a memorial to victims of fascism. 136 At its 
dedication in Berlin on the Day of National Mourning in November 1993, German 
Chancellor at the time, Helmut Kohl, delivered the following statement: 'The New 
Guardhouse in Berlin will serve as the Central Memorial of the Federal Republic of 
Germany for remembrance and commemoration for the victims of war and dictatorial 
rule." 37
Collective meanings and memories represented by monuments and other physical sites 
are, according to sociologist Erving Goffmann, products of 'shared framing strategies 
and devices'. 'If deployed successfully,' noted Rudy Koshar and Goffmann, 'they are 
supposed to delimit the number of possible meanings and private interpretations and 
thus disperse the effect of competing or subversive meanings." 38 Yet, evidence 
suggested that the official 'framing objectives' of the New Guardhouse, namely the 
remembering of millions of Jews murdered because of their origin, were increasingly 
being rejected at the time of writing. 139
According to academics Helga Welsh, Andreas Pickel and Dorothy Rosenberg: 'In spite 
of official philo-Semitism, most Germans have shown relatively little interest in the 
principal targets of fascist persecution." 40 Historian Nicolas Berg lamented, for 
instance, that: 'Throughout the last 20 years the average German has regarded anti-
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279
Semitism with almost complete indifference." 41 There have been numerous reports, for 
example, of continuing acts of vandalism on Jewish memorials in both the old and new 
German Ldnder (states). More than 100 graves were desecrated at Europe's largest 
Jewish cemetery in Berlin during 1999.' 42 In 2002, a commemorative work of art known 
as The Mother was vandalised at the former concentration camp of Wobbelin, near 
Schwerin - the regional capital of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. The following year, 
gravestones in Jewish cemeteries at Locknitz, Teterow and Ueckermunde were also 
defaced and overthrown, reported the local authorities. 143 Between 2003 and 2004, two 
regional Ministries of the Interior also noted defamations of Jewish memorial sites in 
Brandenburg and the state of Rhineland-Palatinate. 144 Yet, perhaps the most acute 
resistance to official functions of commemoration was the foiled bomb attack in 2003 
planned by the right-wing extremist group Kameradscha.fi Siid - Aktionsburo 
Suddeutschland (AS). Their intention was to prevent the laying of a foundation stone in 
the grounds of the Jewish Cultural Centre at the St. Jakobs-Platz in Munich on 9 
November 2003, commemorating the anniversary of the 1938 ' ReichskristallnachfV 45 
Better known to history as the 'night of broken glass', during 9 November 1938 Jewish 
synagogues, homes and business premises were burned and looted 'in response to the 
assassination of Nazi diplomat Ernst von Rath', noted Giinter Grass. 146
According to the German authorities: 'Official days of remembrance are among the 
symbols through which a state publicly portrays itself, which say something about the 
state's perception of itself." 47 Along with the proposed memorial for German expellees 
and desecration of Jewish cemeteries, how war veterans are remembered also appeared 
to have exposed another alternative site of memory. This was, arguably, particularly 
significant for understanding the disparities emergent within German collective 
memory, because although contested, according to Norbert Frei and Mary Nolan, the
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collective innocence of the Wehrmacht was generally accepted by many throughout 
Germany. 148
On 15 November 2003, a funeral march was held to coincide with the Day of National 
Mourning at Germany's biggest war grave cemetery situated 40 kilometres southeast of 
Berlin. At the Waldfriedhof cemetery at Halbe, former German air force pilots Reinhold 
Leidenfrost and Knight's Cross holder Otto Riehs remembered their fallen comrades. 
During the ceremony, they and others criticised the then SPD/Green government's 
attempts to prevent such anniversaries taking place. 149 On the one hand, the federal body 
responsible for the maintenance of war cemeteries, The German War Graves 
Commission, claimed that people from all ages were welcome. Yet on the other, the 
Commission stated that it was not an organisation for veterans who allegedly, 'only 
concern themselves with remembrance'. 150 Professor Ute Frevert also remarked on this 
sense of exclusion and the apparent inconsistencies within collective memory. Frevert 
noted:
Wishing to block or suppress such recollections politically would not only be 
pointless, it would be counterproductive. A society whose self-awareness 
derives from the recognition of historical, current and future responsibility must 
also remember its own dead - particularly when they have paid with their lives 
for crimes committed in the name of the German people, the entire people. 151
Besides members of the German army and other military personnel, also caught up in 
the last major defensive action of the German army, known as the Halbe Kesselschlacht 
of 1945, were Ukrainian slave labourers and German refugees fleeing the advancing 
Red Army. As well as the 20,000 German soldiers and hundreds of civilian casualties, 
more than 4,500 German civilians from the former Soviet internment camp of 
Ketschendorf are also buried at the Waldfriedhof cemetery. 152 Almost 12,000 people
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were unable to be identified and were buried in mass graves. According to Scheer and 
Broszinsky, for example, bodies were still being recovered and reburied from an 
opencast mine in the area at the time of writing. 153
Along with these and other 'innocent victims of war', there was also a sense that official 
framing strategies of remembrance discouraged a fitting remembrance for 'one of the 
best German pilots of the Second World War', noted various German newspapers. 154
No more the hero?
Within their handbook, the German War Graves Commission stated that the New 
Guardhouse 'contributes to the identity of our people'. 155 Yet, perhaps one of the most 
transparent contradictions to-date between official and popular 'landscapes of memory' 
were the emotive reactions inspired as a result of official endeavours to dispense with a 
certain Second World War fighter ace as an historical role model. Evidence suggested, 
for instance, that the Bundestag political elite seemed unable to provide an acceptable 
commemorative link from the past to the present. This applied not only to rear admiral 
Siegfried Engel, sea captain Alexander Magnus and the Wehrmacht, but also to former 
fighter pilot group captain Wemer Molders. According to Die Welt and the CSU Mayor 
of Neuburg, Bernhard Gmehling, it was a debate about tradition, identity and 
leadership. 156 How Molders was remembered appeared, therefore, to raise further 
questions as to whether the Bundestag political elite's depiction of national symbols and 
claims by the German War Graves Commission were as comprehensive and extensive 
as the authorities claimed they were.
Editor of the Markische Allgemeine Zeitung, Alexander Gauland, claimed that Germany 
has reached a degree of abstraction in which it becomes increasingly difficult to find
Halbe.htm>
153 See: Scheer, R. op. cit., p. 15 and: Broszinsky, K. Die Spuren des Leids in den Waldem um Halbe. Die 
Welt, 23.10.03, p. 37.
154 See: Leersch, H-J. Widerstand gegen von Struck verlangte Umbenennung des Geschwaders Molders. 
Die Welt, 26.02.05, p. 4 and: Spater Streit um Hitlers Teufelspilot: Namensarger Offiziere wehren sich 
gegen Umbenennung von ,,Werner Molders" Kasernen. Berliner Kurier, 24.03.05, p. 3.
155 See: Marcuse, H. The national memorial to the victims of war and tyranny: from conflict to consensus. 
Paper presented at the German Studies Association Conference, 25th September 1997, Washington D. C. 
Panel: Symbols and Silences of National Memory: Commemorations of the Nazi Era in Berlin. 
Department of History, University of California, Santa Barbara [Online]. 25.09.97 [Accessed 03.05.05]. 
<http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/neuwach.htm>
156 See: Stiirmer, M. Popstar der Nazi-Propaganda. Die Welt, 31.03.05, p. 3 and: Gmehling, B. Statement 
zur geplanten Namensanderung des Jagdgeschwaders 74 ,,M61ders." Presseinformation der Stadt 
Neuburg an der Donau, 28.01.05, p. 1.
282
acceptable collective images. 157 For example, former Director of the German Historical 
Museum, Christoph Stolzl, admitted that: 'The reunification of the Germans has so far 
lacked an image replacing all words." 58 'What was needed was a feeling of community 
and common identity', noted Professor Wolf Gruner of Rostock University. 159 Or in the 
words of Professor Ralf Dahrendorf: 'Germans lack the key to their national identity." 60 
Evidence suggested this was particularly apparent concerning the commemoration of 
'war hero' Werner Molders. 161
Under pressure from the left, in January 2005 Germany's Defence Minister Peter Struck 
(SPD) extended a law first proposed by the Party of Democratic Socialists (PDS) in 
1997 to include Werner Molders. In 1997, various members of the SPD and the 
Alliance 90/The Greens factions resolved to prevent the honouring of German 
volunteers who had served in the Condor Legion during the Spanish Civil War of 1936- 
1939, complained Carl-H. Pierk and the Berliner Kurier. 162 In Bundestag circulars from 
1997 and 1998, politicians from the Alliance 90/The Greens and the SPD factions 
demanded that it should no longer be possible to name federal barracks after former 
members of the Condor Legion. Notable politicians, for example, included Joschka 
Fischer and Kerstin Muller of the Alliance 90/The Greens, along with Dr. Peter Struck 
of the SPD. 163
Speaking in the Bundestag in 1998 on behalf of several party members, PDS politician 
Gerhard Zwerenz argued: 'Any future motion should also include Molders, since the 
pilot flew for General Franco during the conflict." 64 Despite the SPD/Green 
government's earlier exoneration of Molders' conduct in 2000, four years later Struck 
relented to renewed demands from the PDS, noted Carl-H. Pierk and the Berliner
157 See: Gauland, A. op. cit., p. 9.
158 See: Berger, S. The search for normality: national identity and historical consciousness in Germany 
since 1800. Providence/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997, pp. 204-206.
159 Ibid., pp. 199-200.
160 Cited from: Dahrendorf, R. Germans lack the key to their identity. In: James, H. and Stone, M. (eds). 
op. cit., pp. 230-232.
161 For claims that Molders was a popular hero in Germany, see speech by PDS member of the Bundestag 
Gerhard Zwerenz in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/231. op. cit., p. 21237 and: Boyes, R. 
German veterans on the warpath over law disowning Nazi pilot ace. The Times, 23.03.05, p. 34.
162 Cited from: Spater Streit um Hitlers Teufelspilot. op. cit., p. 3. See also: Pierk, C-H. Bin Name im 
Visier. Die Tagespost. Katholische Zeitungfur Politik, Gesellschaft und Kultur 26.02.05 (25), p. 2.
163 See: Antrag der Fraktion Biindnis 90/Die Griinen und der Fraktion der SPD. 60. Jahrestag der 
Bombardierung von Guernica/Gernika. Antrag. In: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/7509. Bonn, 
23.04.97, pp. 1-2 and: Andemngsantrag der Gruppe der PDS. 60. Jahrestag der Bombardierung von 
Guernica/Gernika. In: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/10494. Bonn, 23.04.98, p. 1. 
164 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/231. op. cit., p. 21237.
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Kurier. 165 'In accordance with legislation passed in 1998, any federal defence 
establishments named in honour of Werner Molders or anyone else who participated in 
Germany's Condor Legion will be re-named', explained the German Ministry of 
Defence in January 2005. l66
Indicative, however, of the perception from some that the Bundestag political elite 
seemed incapable of providing 'commemorative continuity and clarity' were the 
reactions to the German government's re-appraisal of their 2000 ruling. 167 A number of 
articles, for instance, expressed bewilderment and, arguably, resentment at the 
government's revocation of its former 2000 motion. 168 'Threatening to impair the 50th 
anniversary national celebrations in Berlin of the founding of the Federal Armed 
Forces', noted Die Welt, opposition to Struck's defamation of Molders' reputation 
seemed symptomatic of the populist resentment to official 'framing strategies of
commemoration'.' 69
Along with former Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, one of Germany's top fighter pilots 
Werner Molders was, until 2005, also officially considered a suitable role model for 
West German soldiers. 170 Admirers of Molders, such as the Berliner Kurier, Young 
Conservatives and the Chairman of the Molders Association, Helmut Ruppert, all 
considered the 'exceptional talent of the ace' as a 'timeless example of one's fulfilment 
of duty'. 171 As a 2000 Bundestag circular admitted, 30 barracks of the Bundeswehr 
(German Armed Forces) still bore the names of Wehrmacht officers and there were also 
establishments named after officers from the First World War. Despite calls from the 
PDS in 2000 for a reappraisal of their earlier decision, the SPD/Green government 
rejected a re-naming of any barracks in honour of Molders. This was due to a 'lack of 
evidence implicating the ace with either the bombing of the Basque city of Guernica or
165 See: Pierk, C-H. op. cit., p. 2. See also: Spater Streit urn Hitlers Teufelspilot. op. cit., p. 3.
166 Cited from: Umbenennung fur Verbande und Liegenschaften der Bundeswehr. (Press Release). 
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung [Online]. 28.01.05 [Accessed 03.05.05]. <http://wwww.bmvg.de>
167 Cited from: Gauland, A. op. cit., p. 9.
168 See: Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Heidi Lippmann und der 
Fraktion der PDS. Umbenennung von Bundeswehr-Kasernen. In: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 
14/3658. Berlin, 26.06.00, pp. 1-4.
169 Cited from: Flieger wollen weiter ,,M61ders" heiBen. Die Welt, 04.03.05, p. 2.
170 See: Boyes, R. German veterans on the warpath over law disowning Nazi pilot ace. op. cit., p. 34. See 
also speech by Gerhard Zwerenz in: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 13/231. op. cit., p. 21237.
171 See: Spater Streit um Hitlers Teufelspilot. op. cit., p. 3 and: Wiirdelos Spektakel. Junge-Konservative 
[Online]. [Accessed 10.04.06]. <http://www.junge-konservative.de/moelders.htm> See also: Ruppert, H. 
Unscharfe Kontraste. Staats-und Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft e. V. Hamburg [Online]. 01.04.04 
[Accessed 03.05.05]. <http://www.swg.de>
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the Nazi regime', noted a Bundestag circular signed by the German Ministry of 
Defence. 172
Expressing concerns that 74 Squadron had still not dispensed with Molders' name for 
the 60th anniversary of the Second World War in 2004, Norbert Lammert (CDU) and 
Gesine Lotzsch (PDS) asked fellow members in the Bundestag: 'Given that an air force 
Squadron still carries the name of Molders, will the government ensure that no units of 
the Bundeswehr continue to bear the name of former Wehrmacht officers involved in 
war crimes?" 73
Lotzsch maintained, for example, that Molders had been involved in the bombing of the 
Spanish village of Corbera d'Ebre during the Spanish Civil War. 174 According to a 
report published in April 2004, new evidence uncovered by the magazine Kontraste 
revealed that Molders had participated in the air raids on Corbera and in similar actions 
that had claimed many civilian casualties. 175 Accepting the charges, the then President of 
the Bundestag, Wolfgang Thierse, then passed on the report to the German Minister of 
Defence. Responding to the information, Struck's Secretary, Hans-Georg Wagner 
(SPD), declared: 'It appears there was a greater suggestion of Molders' involvement in 
the attacks on the Spanish population than previously realised." 76 Thus, in accordance 
with legislation passed in 1998, in January 2005 Molders' name was removed from the 
walls of 74 Squadron in Neuburg (Bavaria) along with a plaque at a German army 
barracks in Visselhovede (Lower Saxony). 177
Nonetheless, according to Die Welt, Kontraste and others, there was considerable 
opposition to the 2005 resolution and the claims upon which it was based. One of the 
main allegations by Kontraste was that Molders delighted in the destruction of war, the
172 See: Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die KJeine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Heidi Lippmann und der 
Fraktion der PDS. Umbenennung von Bundeswehr-Kasernen. In: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 
14/3658. op. cit., pp. 1-4.
173 Cited from: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/113. Stenographischer Bericht 113 Sitzung. 
Berlin, 06.06.04, pp. 10280-10281.
174 For these allegations see: Ibid.
175 See: Jahn, R. and Walter, C. Falsche Vorbilder - Die Bundeswehr ehrt Wehrmacht-Oberst Molders. 
Kontraste 1. Rundfunk Berlin Brandenburg [Online]. 01.04.04 [Accessed 12.04.06]. <http://www.rbb- 
online.de/_/kontraste/beitrag_druckenJsp/ key=rbb_beitrag_l 137815.html>
176 See: Erdriickende Beweise - Warum das Verteidigungsministerium nach einem Kontraste-Beitrag das 
"Jagdgeschwader 74 Molders" umbenennt. Kontraste \.RundfunkBerlin Brandenburg [Online]. 10.02.05 
[Accessed 12.04.06]. <http://www.rbbonline.de/_/kontraste/beitrag_druckenJsp/ 
key=rbb_beitrag_2026654.html> See also: Leersch, H-J. op. cit., p. 4.
177 See: Umbenennung fur Verbande und Liegenschaften der Bundeswehr. op. cit.
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campaigns he participated in and that he was a National Socialist. 178 Whilst the national 
daily Die Welt acknowledged there were still unknown facts remaining, according to the 
Neuburg branch of the CSU, there was still no proof of Molders' involvement in any 
questionable activities. Molders did not even arrive in Spain until after the 
bombardment of Guernica, noted Die Welt and the Berliner Kurier."9
Although serving in the Condor Legion and later campaigns in the Second World War, 
Molders was never a member of the National Socialist Party, maintained Helmut 
Ruppert and the Mayor of Neuburg Bernhard Gmehling. 180 Accredited with 'more 
aircraft shot down than the Red Baron Manfred von Richthofen', noted the Berliner 
Kurier, leading authority on Molders, Kurt Braatz, also pointed out that Molders 
received some of Germany's highest military decorations. 181 By 1941, Molders was the 
most decorated member of the Wehrmacht, reported Braatz. 182
Seeking then to 'restore the honour of Molders', noted The Times, 218 former and 
current officers signed an open letter to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Die 
Welt, along with a protest resolution contesting Struck's ruling. 183 Former divisional 
commander of 74 Squadron, Giinter Raulf, described the proposed re-naming as 'totally 
unjustified' and retired admiral Giinter Fromm expressed annoyance over the 'new 
tradition being prepared for our forces'. 184 'Although the honourable conduct of most 
members of the Wehrmacht was shamefully exploited by the Nazis, nevertheless, a re- 
naming would have detrimental effects on the morale of 74 Squadron', argued the head 
of the administrative district of Neuburg-Schrobenhausen, Richard KeBler. Commenting 
on his numerous visits to the squadron, according to KeBler a sense of tradition and 
Molders' name were 'indispensable elements of the squadron's and town's identity'. 185
178 See: Walter, C. Falsche Vorbilder - Die Bundeswehr und der Wehrmacht-Oberst Molders. Kontraste 
1. Rundfunk Berlin Brandenburg [Online]. 22.04.04 [Accessed 12.04.06]. <http://www.rbb- 
online.de/_/kontraste/beitrag_druckenJsp/key=rbb_beitrag_1143019>
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[Accessed 24.04.06]. <http://www.csu.de/aku/tp_ag_content>
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181 Cited from: Spater Streit um Hitlers Teufelspilot. op. cit., p. 3. See also: Pierk, C-H. op. cit., p. 2.
182 See: Pierk, C-H. op. cit., p. 2. See also: Stunner, M. op. cit., p. 3.
183 Cited from: Boyes, R. German veterans on the warpath over law disowning Nazi pilot ace. op. cit., p. 
34. See also: Wiirdelos Spektakel. op. cit. and: Leersch, H-J. op. cit., p. 4.
184 See: Flieger wollen weiter ,,M61ders" heiBen. op. cit., p. 2.
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Summarising complaints from both former and current officers to Bundeswehr 
representative Willfried Penner, Die Welt remarked: This action by Struck is 
unprecedented in the last 50 years of the history of the German Armed Forces." 86
How Werner Molders was remembered in 2004 and 2005 by Kontraste and the ruling 
Bundestag political elite, also provoked anger and resentment from some of the German 
public, claimed CSU member of the Bundestag Horst Seehofer, Kontraste and others. 187 
Following their television documentary on 1 April 2004, Kontraste claimed to have 
received hundreds of letters from viewers 'incensed at our interpretation of Molders as a 
Nazi', reported Kontraste editor Caroline Walter. 188 Nonetheless, Kontraste's 
representation of Molders was supported by defence spokespersons for the SPD and 
Green parties, such as Winfried Nachtwei (Alliance 90/The Greens), Rainer Arnold 
(SPD) and Wolfgang Thierse (SPD). 189 The Hamburg-based journal SWG (Society for 
State and Economic Policy) also claimed to have received many letters complaining 
against Kontraste's vilification of Molders' reputation. 190 Contending to enjoy the 'full 
support of the citizens of Neuburg', Richard KeBler declared: 'I reject categorically a re- 
naming of 74 Squadron." 91 Speaking on behalf of Neuburg, the city's Mayor, Bernhard 
Gmehling, also maintained that changing the name of 74 Squadron was: 'Totally 
unnecessary and unwarranted." 92 Despite these appeals and protests, however, Rainer 
Kumpel from the Ministry of Defence confirmed that: 'The government's decision 
stands." 93
In the light of relatively recent evidence, it seemed reasonable to ask whether the New 
Guardhouse actually fulfilled official requirements of providing a comprehensive site of 
collective remembrance. Taken as a whole, evidence suggested official claims that the 
New Guardhouse served as 'The Central Memorial of the Federal Republic of 
Germany' was rather questionable. 194 It was also debatable when statements from the
186 Cited from: Leersch, H-J. op. cit., p. 4.
187 For claims by Seehofer see: Ibid. See also: Sturmer, M. op. cit., p. 3 and: Wurdelos Spektakel. op. cit. 
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188 Cited from: Walter, C. op. cit.
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190 See: Ruppert, H. op. cit.
191 Cited from: KeBler, R. op. cit.
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Ministry of Defence in: Umbenennung fur Verbande und Liegenschaften der Bundeswehr. op. cit.
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SPD/Green government concerning German national identity were compared with the 
apparent growing public interest in the ethnic origins of the Germans.
»195
'Pure and distinct - unlike any other nation. 
The Varus-Schlacht - location Kalkriese.
Anthony D. Smith and John Hutchinson suggested that some of the key elements of 
national identity are myths of common ancestry. Best known for his articles on various 
aspects of ethnicity and nationalism, Reitemeyer Professor of Political Science, Walker 
Connor, also argued: 'A nation is a group of people characterized by a myth of common 
descent."96 More than a half-century ago, French Sociologist Maurice Halbwachs noted 
the centrality of monuments in the formation of collective memory. 197 In his alleged 
popular work The History of German National Literature ( 1844), theologian August 
Vilmar also highlighted the origins of ethnic Germans and national development, 
tracing the Germans' tribal identity back to Arminius. 198 Arminius, or 'Hermann the 
hero' as he is known in the vernacular, was the Germanic chieftain who successfully 
repulsed and then massacred three Roman legions. 199 Hermann, Chief of the Cherusci 
tribe, was the driving force of the rebellion of three other Teutonic tribes against the 
Romans. In the year AD 9, these tribes ambushed and annihilated the legions of the 
Roman governor and military commander Publius Quinctilius Varus.200
Completed in 1875, on 16 August of that year the monument was consecrated with 
'great pomp and national accord celebrating German unification in 1871 in the presence 
of the emperor Kaiser Wilhelm I', noted Ralf-Rainer Sass. 201 Commemorating the 
victory of Arminius, with a million visitors every year, the Hermannsdenkmal, or 
monument to Hermann, south of Detmold in the Teutoburg Forest, is one of the best- 
known memorials in Germany, claimed the Berliner Zeitung and the Lippe Regional
195 Cited from: Germania. In: Tacitus. The Agricola and the Germania. Translated by H. Mattingly 
(1948). Rev. ed. London: Penguin Classics, Penguin Books, 1970, p. 104.
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201 Cited from: Sass, R. R. Das Rdtsel der Varus-schlacht. Im Licht der neuen Ausgrabungen. 
Stuttgart/DusseldortfBerlin/Leipzig: Ernst Klett Schulbuchverlag, 1996, pp. xv-xvi.
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Association.202 Journalist Kai Schoneberg noted that since 1871 over 20 million people 
have visited the Hermannsdenhnal 203 Evidence suggested a revived interest and need to 
commemorate Germany's ethnic origins also extended to a museum about the site of the 
engagement that has important repercussions for German history and hence, arguably, 
German nationhood. It seemed the battle's legacy had once again become the focus of 
national consciousness and memory for some, disputing former Chancellor Schroder's 
dismissal of a unique, consanguineous German national identity. On the 57th anniversary 
of the German surrender on 8 May 1945, discussing the 'national question' and 
patriotism, Schroder declared: 'Nations are not, as one has long believed in Germany, 
partly or merely based on blood descent. They are communities of consent not 
descent.' 204 On the other hand, Rudy Koshar, Matthias Schulz, Ralf-Rainer Sass and 
others contended that Hermann became the embodiment of a pure, organic, barbarian 
identity, symbolising a patriotic defiance and need for protection against foreign 
intruders.205
So what was the catalyst for this revival of interest in the primordial origins of German 
nationhood? Since the discovery of 162 Roman coins and discarded military equipment 
at Kalkriese near Osnabriick in 1987, German archaeologists have been trying to 
determine where exactly the battle took place. Referred to as the Varus-Schlacht (Varus 
Battle) in Germany, the battle lasted for three days in which 20,000 Romans died.206 It 
was previously believed that the Varus-Schlacht occurred in the Teutoburg Forest near 
Detmold, yet for many years the actual location remained unconfirmed.207 Although the 
53.46 metres high monument was set up on a hilltop in the Teutoburg Forest, the battle 
is now said to have taken place not near Detmold, but at the foot of Kalkriese hill - just 
north of Osnabriick.208
202 See: Following the Teutons? In: The "Hermannsdenkmar (Arminius memorial), op. cit. See also: 
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With the opening of the new museum in Kalkriese in April 2002 confirming the 
location of the battle site, national and local interest in events of AD 9 intensified.209 
Between the villages of Schwagstorf and Bramsche in northwest Germany, the XVII, 
XVIII and XIX Roman Legions were annihilated and, according to Die Zeit and Die 
Welt, the new museum at Kalkriese celebrating these events was a 'sensation'.210 
Attracting the attentions of other national dailies and weeklies, such as the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung and Der Spiegel, along with various broadcasting stations, since the 
opening of the Kalkriese Archaeological Park in 2000, 1,200 publications have 
appeared on the Varus-Schlacht.2n
At the opening of the Kalkriese Museum in 2002, hundreds of guests were invited - 
including the German actor and television programme award-winner Matthias Habich, 
as well as various local archaeologists. There was even free transport provided for the 
venue.212 Interest in the Varus-Schlacht also extended beyond the opening of the 
Kalkriese Museum, the archaeological information centre and the local area. Mayors of 
neighbouring Wallenhorst and Hagen, Ulrich Belde and Dieter Eickholt, for instance, 
confirmed the success of an information and display stand on the Varus-Schlacht, which 
was held as part of the 2003 Lower Saxony Day exhibition in Berlin. 213 Celebrating the 
Varus-Schlacht, the travelling exhibition A Legend is Uncovered also proved successful 
in Dortmund, Wiesbaden and Bad Bentheim. 214 Attracting guests from all over 
Germany, during 2003 150,000 people attended the Varus-Schlacht museum at 
Kalkriese, noted Der Spiegel.  Summarising both local and national interest in the 
Varus-Schlacht, according to Managing Director of the Kalkriese Museum and Varus- 
Schlacht enterprise, Christian Jaletzke, since 2000 more than 500,000 people have 
visited the site of the battle. 216
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213 See: Riesenandrang in Berlin bei der  Varusschlacht." Osnabrucker Land. Neue Osnabrucker Zeitung, 
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Evidence also suggested some areas intended to permanently commemorate the Varus- 
Schlacht. Following their exhibitions on the theme in Werl, near Dortmund, both the 
Westphalian-Lippe Regional and Osnabriick Regional Varus Battle Associations 
announced plans for the 2000th anniversary of the Varus-Schlacht in 2009. 2 ' 7 Die Zeit 
reported that fireworks and even a ballet celebrated the success of the Kalkriese 
Museum at Easter 2004. 218 In April 2005, the exhibition Kalkriese - 15 Years of 
Archaeology opened with displays of both Roman and ancient German camps, theatre 
and music performances and gladiatorial combats. 'Many have already re-registered to 
participate in archaeological digs', explained the Head of Archaeology for the Varus- 
Schlacht in the Osnabriick region, Dr. Susanne Wilbers-Rost.219 During the course of 
2004 and 2005, a series of successful lectures by German historians and archaeologists 
were also held about the Varus-Schlacht and the significance of the finds.220 Media 
coverage of the site was particularly enthusiastic. Local newspaper the Neue 
Osnabrticker Zeitung, for example, described the new archaeological finds as a 'second 
Troy' and the Babelsberger Filmstudio reconstructed part of the battle site for the 
Kalkriese Museum, noted Die Zeit.221 Along with Radio Bremen, national broadcasting 
station ARD transmitted live from Kalkriese in 2004 and North German Broadcasting 
(NDR) devoted 12 programmes to the theme. 222
Evidence suggested, therefore, that German national identity manifested itself through 
reactions to symbols, such as popular heroes and museums. It was also discernible 
through the historical memories of certain events and their commemoration - 'shared 
amongst large numbers of people', noted Mary Fulbrook and A. D. Smith.223 'If nations 
are to endure, they must be founded upon the belief in the existence of ethnic cores', 
stated Smith. 'They must also have, or find, a living past into which successive 
generations are able to re-enter those legends and landscapes that locate the nation and
217 See: Feiern zur Varus-Schlacht werfen Schatten voraus. Die Welt, 24.09.02, p. 46.
218 Cited from: Frisch vom Markt. Die Zeit, 07.04.04 (16), p. 77.
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direct its future', argued Smith.224 Furthermore, contended Smith, 'National symbols 
embody its basic concepts, making them visible and distinct for every member, 
communicating the tenets of an abstract ideology in palpable, concrete terms that evoke 
instant emotional responses from all strata of the community.' 225 Media scientist 
Siegfried Quandt demanded, for example, that 'in a multi-media age, historical culture 
should also include an element of emotional culture'. 226 There were similar contentions 
from essayist Hans Jiirgen Syberberg. 227
As well as lamenting the loss of a sense of orientation, community and identity, German 
historians have also participated in discussions about the importance of national 
symbols for the development of a 'healthy patriotism', noted Stefan Berger. 228 Christian 
Meier and Peter Brandt argued that what was needed was a new patriotism. Meier 
stated: 'At stake is the constitution of a broad consensus which cannot be left to 
politicians alone.' 229 Yet, despite a revived nationalist self-awareness, the former 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder and his Minister for Culture, Christina Weiss, 
rejected anything that would consciously contribute to a re-nationalisation of historical 
consciousness.
5230
'We need no legends.
On 8 May 2002 in Berlin under the slogan 'Nation, Patriotism and Democratic Culture', 
Chancellor Schroder and Martin Walser participated in a discussion about what kind of 
patriotism was suitable for a future Germany. On the one hand, Walser stressed the 
importance of the emotional aspects of the nation as a feeling of history that could not 
be understood in a rational sense. Yet on the other, Schroder claimed: 'People need no 
monuments, museums or legends in order to commemorate or account for their
224 Cited from: Smith, A. D. The ethnic origins of nations, op. cit., p. 207.
225 Cited from: Smith, A. D. National identity, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
226 Cited from: Giintner, J. Unity and suffering the truth: 'reconciliation' - Germany's new attitude to 
history. Translated by K. Gartshore. GI Dossiers. Goethe Institute [Online]. Jan 2004 [Accessed 
01.03.04]. <http://www.goethe.de/kug/dos/en74695.htm>
227 See: Syberberg, H. J. Germany's heart: the modern taboo. New Perspectives Quarterly [Online]. 
Winter 1993: 10 (1) [Accessed 23.05.02]. <http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/1993_winter/ 
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228 See: Berger, S. op. cit., pp. 199-209, 223.
229 Cited from: Gloannec, A-M. Le, On German identity. Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of 
Arts and Social Sciences, Winter 1994: 123(1), p. 144. See also: Brandt, P. German identity. Translated 
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existence.' 231 At the opening of the temporary 2004 German Historical Museum's 
exhibition, Myths of Nations: Area of Memory, the then SPD Minister of Culture, 
Christina Weiss, also maintained: 'Nobody in Germany wants any more myths.' 232
Nonetheless, the Mayor of Jiilich Heinrich Stommel, Hans Jiirgen Syberberg and others 
appeared to contest the claims of Schroder and Weiss. On the 60th anniversary of the 
destruction of the ancient citadel of Jiilich by Allied bombers in 1944, Stommel stated: 
'Historical myths express the very essence of Mankind. They are comparable to religion 
in that they help to make sense of the world.' 233 'It does not matter whether or not an 
objective blood relationship exists. It is primarily the political community - no matter 
how artificially organised - that inspires the belief in common ethnicity', argued 
sociologist Max Weber.234 Or in the words of Walker Connor: 'What ultimately matters 
is not what is true, but what people believe to be true.' 235 As academic Peter 
Calvocoressi remarked: 'Myths can be as powerful as facts, particularly when allied 
with strong emotions.' 236 According to Stefan Berger, The myths of the nineteenth 
century still touch living roots amongst Germans which are only waiting to be 
revived.' 237 Further contrary to the stances of the SPD/Green ruling political elite, in 
1982 Giinter Grass claimed: 'We need a place where every German can look for his 
origins.' 238 Along the same lines, Hans Jiirgen Syberberg declared:
I think that there is an urge to retrieve what we have lost [...] our songs, our 
Teutonic fantasies. We must be allowed to long. We are afraid to sing our 
grandfather's songs; we are afraid to appreciate Wagner, even to mourn the theft 
of our myths and fairy tales from history. 239
Evidence suggested, however, that the waiting and fears of Christian Meier, Giinter 
Grass and Hans Jiirgen Syberberg were over.
231 Cited from: Ibid.
232 Cited from: ,,Mythen der Nationen." Mythen der Nationen. 1945 Arena der Erinnerungen. Deutsches Historisches Museum [Online]. 01.10.04 [Accessed 01.06.05]. <http://www.dhm.de/ausstellungen/ 
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233 Cited from: Gedenkfeier am 16. November 2004. Stadt Juelich [Online]. 22.11.04 [Accessed 
21.01.05]. <http://www.juelich.de/gedenktag>
234 Cited from: Weber, M. The origins of ethnic groups. In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (eds). 
Ethnicity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 35.
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Popular participation in what A. D. Smith referred to as the 'myths of ethnic election' 
ensured the survival of the belief in ethnic communities across the centuries - 'despite 
many changes in their social composition and cultural contents', argued Smith.240 Even 
if objective and factual evidence in common ethnicity is found wanting, the desire of 
belonging to such is a matter of attitudes, perceptions and sentiments.241 For John 
Hutchinson and Smith, the study of ethnicity owes much to the insights of one of the 
former founders of sociology, Max Weber.242 Weber reflected that there are certain 
factors denoting ethnically determined action, determined by the belief in a shared 
blood relationship. Such concepts may include Stamm (tribe) and Volk (people). By the 
very employment of such terms, arguably, the existence of a contemporary political 
community or memories of one are usually implied, such as those articulated in epic 
tales and legends. Clifford Geertz also reasoned that although psychological ties 
stemming from a common linguistic, racial, tribal and regional background are totally 
separable, at the same time, they often reinforce 'fundamental identities'. 243
Whenever Social Democrats referred to the nation, according to Berger, 'they meant a 
nation of equal citizens, not one of the Volk as defined by ethnic origin'. 244 Yet, although 
the ethno-national element has disappeared from official conceptions of national 
identity, an apparent revived ancient national self-awareness suggested it was still very 
prominent amongst some of the German media and public. Nowhere was this more 
evident, at the time of writing, than in the central role accorded to the Varus-Schlacht 
for German national consciousness based on Germany's 'barbarian traditions'.245
Since the opening of a new museum and archaeological park at Kalkriese, evidence 
suggested an enthusiastic embracing of Teutonic tribal culture and heritage has emerged 
within the media as well as amongst German youth. The four German tribes, for 
instance, that participated in the Varus-Schlacht were all referred to with gusto by the 
Kalkriese Museum, the Lippe Regional Museum at Detmold and some of the national
240 Cited from: Smith, A. D. National identity, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
241 See: Ibid., p. 20.
242 See: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (eds). Nationalism, op. cit., p. 368 and: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, 
A. D. (eds). Ethnicity, op. cit., p. 32.
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origins of ethnic groups. In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (eds). Ethnicity, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
244 Cited from: Berger, S. Nationalism and the Left in Germany. New Left Review, 1994 (206), p. 64.
245 Harold Mattingley argued that modern Germany claimed to draw its strength from its ancient 
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press. 46 As well as writing with an undisguised verve about the tribes involved in the 
revolt, more significantly, Matthias Schulz and Helmut Gliick referred to the ethnic 
forefathers of the people of Hesse as the Chatten - described by Tacitus as the Chatti. 2'1
The Modern Valkyries.
German nationalist Max Weber argued cults were the typical concomitant of a tribal or 
Volk consciousness.248 Over time, arguably, certain images of events, heroes, landscapes 
and even cults develop into what A. D. Smith termed a 'distinctive repository of ethnic 
culture 1 . 249 Evidence suggested that, at the time of writing, the latter were being 
selectively drawn upon by the current generation. Old Germanic fantasy worlds have 
become increasingly attractive to German youth, noted Die Zeit and South German 
Broadcasting. 250 Internet sites, such as Wikingerversand, offered the Drink of the Old 
Teutons for sale, and in Holding's Nord Rock shop CDs, T-shirts, mobile phones and a 
perfume for 'nationalist mothers' called Wdlkure (Valkyrie) - named after the nine 
mythical maidens in Scandinavian and Germanic mythology were available for 
purchase.251 At the Kalkriese Museum gift shop there was even a drink named after 
Hermann and a jam after his wife - Thusnelda 's Best - noted Der Spiegel and the 
Berliner Zeitung 252
So why were these developments significant for national memory and identity? 
Although at first sight these reports may appear rather innocuous and insignificant, 
along with Carsten Holm and Toralf Staud, the Berlin Senate for Youth and Family and 
cult expert Renate Rennebach also issued admonishments about such apparent trivia. 
They and the Saxon Minister of the Interior were particularly concerned about the
246 See: Brukterer - Chatten - Cherusker - Marser. Museum und Park Kalkriese [Online]. [Accessed 
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247 See: Schulz, M. op. cit., pp. 152-156 and: Gliick, H. Sprachspiele Hessen. Die Welt, 16.02.04, p. 24.
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growing popularity of heathen worship and Teutonic cults amongst the young - 
allegedly being increasingly infiltrated and exploited by neo-Nazi groups. 253
Following a ban of the nationalist magazine Bravo, for example, Hessian National 
Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) activists, the Zutt family, now sell literature 
instead on the Germanic God of war Wotan and a scent called Aroma of the Greater 
Reich, noted Holm.254 Using neo-Nazi ciphers, such as 14 and 88, representing 
ideological codes and symbols of mutual identification, according to Christina 
Schramm, Toralf Staud and the Saxony-Anhalt Ministry of the Interior, right-wing 
extremists call themselves after the Germanic Gods Thor, Ostara, Freya and Loki. 255 
One group in particular has attracted the attentions of the Lower Saxon and North 
Rhine-Westphalian authorities.
In accordance with the idea of Germanic heathen ancestry and race, headed by Hamburg 
lawyer Jiirgen Rieger, The Society for the Belief in the Essence of Germany 
(Artgemeinscha.fi) wants to ensure racial purity for the health of future German 
generations. In 1995, for instance, Rieger established a collective in southern Sweden 
for members of the 'northern blond race'. And in 2004, Rieger also bought an estate in 
north Germany for the 'research and preservation of the northern race', noted Die 
Welt. 256 Revering the ancient sacred tree grove of the northern Germanic tribes, the 
Irminsul, the Artgemeinschaft wanted to safeguard the German race by encouraging 
females to select carefully their partners for future generations, explained the Lower 
Saxon and North Rhine-Westphalian authorities.257
Their influence within Germany's biggest female right-wing organisation, at the time of 
writing, was clear: 'Only by acting together for the preservation of the German mother 
will the German way of way of life and continuation of the German people be possible',
253 See: Gessler, P. Beten fur die germanische Artgemeinschaft. Die Tageszeitung, 06.01.97 (5120), p. 12 
and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001. Freistaat Sachsen. Dresden: Staatsministerium des Innern, 
Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Sachsen, 31.12.01, p. 13.
254 See: Holm, C. Bin Dorf sieht braun. Rechtsextreme. Der Spiegel, 12.03.01 (11), pp. 76-77.
255 See: Staud, T. Madel, deutsche und rein. Rechte. Die Zeit, 2002 (41), p. 15 and: Staud, T. Runen, 
Bratwurst, Riissel-Skins. op. cit. See also: Schramm, C. Selbstbewusste Kampferinnen in der rechten 
Musikszene. Monitor. Rundbrief des apabiz e. V. Jul 2002 (6), pp. 2-3 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 
Sachsen-Anhalt 2000. Magdeburg: Ministerium des Innern Sachsen-Anhalt, Mai 2001, pp. 15-16.
256 Cited from: Rechtsextremist Jiirgen Rieger erwirbt Landgut. Die Welt, 12.07.04, p. 40. See also: 
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257 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. Dusseldorf: Innenministerium 
des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 28.02.01, pp. 68-69 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002 
Niedersachsen. Hannover: Niedersachsisches Ministerium fur Inneres und Sport, 2002, p. 14.
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declared the Community of German Women (GDF).258 Displaying an image of the 
Hermannsdenkmal, accompanied by comments from Tacitus concerning the tribal status 
of German women, the ideal of an unsullied Germanic line of descent became patently 
obvious within the ideology of the GDF. Throughout their web site, the GDF underlined 
the importance of preserving a consanguineous German identity. In the words of the 
GDF: 'In today's consumer and hedonist world we must continue to emphasise our 
roles as proud mothers and take our responsibility for the national and ethnic 
community.' 259
But was the Artgemeinschaft's ideology merely confined to the GDF? Not according to 
Die Zeit, political scientist Renate Bitzan and others. Bitzan claimed that there had been 
a 'boom of female right-wing extremist groups'. 260 Some of these included The Ruhr 
Comradeship of Maidens (Mddelkameradschaft Ruhrgebiei), the Lower Saxon-based 
League of Free Maidens (FMB) and Cologne's Women's Homeland Association 
(BHF). 261 Die Zeit estimated there were at least 1,500 female members of right-wing 
extremist groups nationwide in 2002, representing a clear increase in overall 
membership of the right-wing scene. 262 Other estimates, such as those from the North 
Rhine-Westphalian Information and Documentation Centre Against Violence, Right- 
Wing Extremism and Xenophobia (IDA-NRW) and the Socialist Youth of Germany 
(SJD), put the share of female membership of right-wing extremist groups at between 
20-30%.263
Female right-wing extremism promoting a nationalist and racist philosophy also 
concerned the Baden-Wurttemberg, North Rhine-Westphalian and Bavarian authorities. 
Known as 'Renees', the female equivalent of skinheads increased from 15% in 2002 to 
19% in 2003 within the state of Baden-Wurttemberg. 264 Bavaria also saw an increase in
258 Cited from: Verfassungsschutzbericht Land Brandenburg 2001. 4.000 ed. Potsdam: Ministerium des 
Innern des Landes Brandenburg, Jun 2002, pp. 128-129.
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Renee activity. Female membership of right-wing extremist groups increased from 10- 
15% in 2000 to 20% in 2004, reported the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior.265 
Promoting National Socialist ideals of 'women as mothers and centre of the family', the 
southern neo-Nazi group Prankish Action Front (FAF) appealed to local females to 
'preserve the honour of the family', noted the Bavarian authorities. 266 A similar appeal 
was made by the right-wing publication Der Stiefeltrager. 261 Along similar lines, the 
Bavarian Chairman of the youth wing of the NPD, the Young National Democrats (JN), 
stated that the 'highest priority that must be constantly conveyed to JN party members' 
was the preservation of the ethnic community.268 Their message also appeared to have 
been accepted by some in North Rhine-Westphalia and Thuringia.
April 2001, for instance, saw the formation of the female equivalent of the JN in North 
Rhine-Westphalia - the Young National Democrats' League of Maidens North Rhine- 
Westphalia.269 Adopting the same ideological stance, portrayed as an amalgamation of 
active National Socialists whose duty it was to ensure the preservation of the German 
race, the Thuringian Ring of Maidens (MRT) was formed in 2004. Another female 
right-wing group, the Weimar Band of Maidens (NMBW), also appeared that year in 
the area. 270 According to the Minister of the North Rhine-Westphalian Interior, Fritz 
Behrens, 'the mere presence of Renees encourages their male colleagues to greater 
levels of brutality. This was particularly the case when females verbally abuse 
foreigners.' 271 Of course, Behrens was only referring to one, albeit most densely 
populated, state of the country.272 Nonetheless, in 2000 and 2003 the Baden- 
Wurttemberg and Bavarian authorities also reported xenophobic motivated acts of 
violence by females. Although the Baden-Wurttemberg Office for Criminality 
maintained that the 792 xenophobic violent incidents were almost exclusively a male
265 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 Bayern. Miinchen: Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, 
Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Bayern, Mar 2001, pp. 72-73 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004 
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Apr 2005, pp. 90-91. 
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Innenministerium das Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Mai 2004, pp. 10-11.
270 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht Freistaat Thuringen 2004. Erfurt: Thiiringen Innenministerium, Aug 
2005, pp. 43-44.
271 Cited from: Rechtsextremismus undFremdenfeindlichkeit in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Bestandsaufnahme, 
Hintergrunde und Gegenstrategien. Diisseldorf: Innenministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Jan
2002, p. 36.
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phenomenon, at the same time, they estimated the female contribution to racially 
motivated violence in 2000 amounted to 5.7%. This represented an increase from the 
previous year of 5.1%.273 During the first half of 2004, the Bavarian Ministry of the 
Interior also recorded racially motivated assaults by females.274
PDS spokesperson Ulla Jelpke also reported an upsurge of females involved in 
xenophobically motivated right-wing extremist violence. According to Jelpke, the 
percentage of females prepared to use violence against foreigners was between 5-20% 
nationwide.275 Although Jelpke's estimate was not officially corroborated, the fact that 
there were any reports at all of female violence directed towards foreigners suggested 
neo-Nazi ideology amongst females was a cause for concern. In that last respect so was, 
arguably, the ongoing quest to defend Germany's Teutonic ethnic origins amongst 
females, highlighting the increasing gulf between official and popular national self- 
understanding.
Indicative of an increase in radical right-wing ideas amongst women, were various 
claims of a rise in female fanzines venerating Germany's ethnic tribal origins, such as 
Walkure, Das treue Madel and Freya-Germanen-Orden. According to various political 
scientists, female serials Triskele, Das treue Madel and Das Storchennest, along with 
their web sites, also promoted the traditional image of mother and child, along with 
affairs of nature, songs of the Homeland and ancient Germanic traditions.276
All well and good perhaps, but along with Dr. Andreas Angerstorfer and Annemarie 
Dengg, the IDA-NRW and the North Rhine-Westphalian Minister of the Interior, Fritz 
Behrens, also warned that these types of publications and web sites were fostering 
female Teutonic cults with clear neo-Nazi overtones. 277 Focussing on the traditions, 
culture and ancient history of the German people, fanzines have increased nationwide
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274 See: Verfassungsschutz Information Bayern. l.Halbjahr. 2004. Munchen: Bayerisches 
Staatsministerium des Innern, Aug 2004, p. 17.
275 See: Jelpke, U. Vom Anhangsel zur Aktivistin. Die Tages:eitung Junge Welt [Online]. 02.03.05 
[Accessed 24.05.05]. <http://www.jungewelt.de/beilage/art/730>
276 See: Das Treue Madel" erscheint zum vierten Mal. Monitor. Rundbriefdes apabi: e. V., Jul 2002 (6), 
p. 4 and Rollmann, A. Hakeln fur das Vierte Reich. Junge Frauen und Rechtsextremismus. Aus Politik 
undZeitgeschichte [Online]. 12.05.00 (B19-20) [Accessed 25.05.05]. <http://www.bundestag.de/ 
dasparlament/2000/19_20/thema/2000_19_20_034_1174.html> See also: Angerstorfer, A. and Dengg, A. 
Rechte Strukturen in Bayern mil Schwerpunkt Oberbayern, Oberplatz und Niederbayern. Munchen: 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bayernformen, 31.08.05, pp. 9-10, 68-70.
277 See: Angerstorfer, A. and Dengg, A. op. cit., pp. 9, 68-70 and: Rheims, B. op. cit. See also: 
Rechtsextremismus undFremdenfeindlichkeit in Nordrhein-Westfalen. op. cit., pp. 35-36.
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from about a dozen in 2003 to 20 in 2004, explained the Bavarian and Brandenburg 
Ministries of the Interior.278 According to the anti-fascist journal Monitor, the female 
magazine Das Treue Model not only had a strong focus on Germanic and National 
Socialist history, but also spread a clear racist and anti-Semitic message. In its third 
2002 February edition, for instance, Das treue Madel protested against the alleged 
'millions flowing into a new synagogue in Dresden'. 279
Writing articles for the party-organ of the NPD, Deutsche Stimme (The German Voice), 
and Jiirgen Rieger's the Nordische Zeitung, the National Socialist and Germanic credo 
of Birka Vibeke's web site and publication Das Storchennest was also clear.280 Within 
an introductory speech by two of its members outlining the organisation's guiding 
principles and values, Thoralf and Henrike Berta stated: 'We believe in Blut und Boden 
[blood and soil] along with the preservation of the ethnic community.' 281
There were similar articles on the Fatherland and implicit adulation of National 
Socialism from Triskele. In 2001, for example, the Hamburg Ministry of the Interior 
highlighted the third issue of the women's magazine Triskele, depicting a young female 
closely resembling a member of the former National Socialist League of German 
Maidens (BDM). 282 Along with the Hamburg authorities, in 2004 the North Rhine- 
Westphalian Ministry of the Interior also expressed concerns about the detrimental 
influence of Triskele amongst females. 283 Given the BDM's past ideology of racial 
purity and increase in fanzines venerating Germany's Teutonic past, the concerns of the 
Brandenburg, Hamburg and North Rhine-Westphalian authorities were self-evident.
278 See: Neonazismus und Rechtsextremistische Gewalt. Der Verfassungsschutz Informiert. Munchen: 
Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innem. Bayerischen Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz, Apr 2005, p. 
21 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht Land Brandenburg 2003. op. cit., pp. 74-77, 142-143.
279 Cited from: "Das Treue Madel" erscheint zum vierten Mal. op. cit., p. 4.
280 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht Freistaat Thuringen 2000. Erfurt: Thuringer Innenministerium, Apr 
2001, p. 20 and: Deutsche Vornamen. Buchbesprechung. Birka Vibeke. Nordische Zeitung. Stimme des 
Artglaubens [Online]. 24.02.05 [Accessed 11.05.06]. <http://www.asatru.de/el07/ 
content.php?article. 103>
281 Cited from: Beispiel fur die Gestaltung einer Lebensleite. Lebensleite Thoralf und Henrike Berta. Das 
Storchennest [Online]. 2000 [Accessed 25.05.05]. <http://storchennest.port5.com/llmuster.htm> For 
similar claims, see: Rollmann, A. op. cit. and: Angerstorfer, A. and Dengg, A. op. cit., pp. 9-10, 68-70. 
See also: Verfassungsschutzbericht Freistaat Thuringen 2004. op. cit., pp. 43-44.
282 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001, Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg. Hamburg: Behorde fur Inneres, 
Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Hamburg, Apr 2002, pp. 116-117.
283 See: Musik - Mode - Markenzeichen. Rechtsextremismus bei Jugendlichen. op. cit., pp. 9-10, 68.
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»284'Untamed land of Barbarians.
Indicative of the continued association with an alleged undiluted Germanic heathen 
ancestry embodying the essence of the ethnic community was, arguably, the re- 
appropriation of pre-modern ethnic symbols. Runes are the oldest Germanic form of 
writing and probably the best known amongst these pre-modern symbols of the 
Germanic era is the double 'Sig' (victory) rune. Re-appropriated by the National 
Socialists, the double victory rune became a symbol of Hitler's bodyguard - the SS.2285
According to the Berlin authorities, right-wing extremists use various types of runes in 
order to honour and celebrate the Teutonic, heathen origins of the German people.286 
Amongst these included the Law and Order, Victory and the Life and Death runes 
utilised as symbols by such groups as The German Heathen Front (DHF), the New 
Order Movement (BNO) and Defence of the Mark Brandenburg (MHS), noted the 
Hamburg and Brandenburg authorities. 287 'These types of Germanic symbols are also 
transmitted via the Internet virtually unhindered', reported the Berlin authorities.288 
Official evidence suggested that Germany's Teutonic origins were also being used to 
foster xenophobia. Internet forums, such as Skadi-net, appealed for attacks on Jewish 
institutions 'in order to awaken traditional Teutonic anti-Semitism', noted the BMI.289 
Saxony, in particular, was a problem area. Since 2000, the Saxon authorities noted the 
use of the Internet as a medium for symbolic and xenophobic agitation had more than 
doubled in the region from around 30 in 2000 to 70 by 2003.29° Serving as self- 
representation and a means of political agitation, overall the BMI estimated 950 right- 
wing extremist Internet sites were operating nationwide by the end of 2003.2"
284 Cited from: Schulz, M. op. cit., pp. 153-154.
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Use of Germanic symbols as a form of self-representation also extended to right-wing 
female organisations, such as the League of Free Maidens (FMB), the Thuringian Ring 
of Maidens (MRT) and the Community of German Women (GDF). Some of these 
symbols were the Wunjo, or Joy, runes and the Black Sun, or Sonnenrad, runes used by 
the FMB and the MRT.292 Symbol of the Essen-based publication and web site by and 
for female right-wing extremists, named after a three-footed Germanic pagan rune, 
another was the Triskele, noted the North Rhine-Westphalian authorities. 293 Highlighted 
in a 2001 report by the Brandenburg Ministry of the Interior, originating from the 
Triskele rune, the Dreierschild rune was also used as a symbol by female right-wing 
group, the GDF. 294
Actively participating in right-wing events and demonstrations, the Skingirl-Circle of 
Friends (SFD) has also assembled to exchange information and work together with like- 
minded groups - particularly those interested in Germanic traditions and a Teutonicism, 
reported the North Rhine-Westphalian authorities.295 Although the SFD disbanded in 
2000 to avoid prosecution and an imminent ban, official reports noted that former 
members of the organisation have since joined other extremist female networks, such as 
Das Braune Kreuz (The Brown Cross) and the GDF. 296 So how else have the myths and 
images of the past in the words of A. D. Smith 'done their work'?297
As well as serving as a focal point for German nationhood and nationalism in 1875, 
according to Konrad Jarausch, Dr. Wolfgang Spickermann and others, the monument to 
'Hermann the German' in the Teutoburg forest celebrated liberation from foreign 
oppression. 298 Whilst it would be an exaggeration to claim that German identity derives 
from the fear of the outsider, nevertheless, evidence suggested that the Varus-Schlacht 
was a major catalyst of nationalist sentiments, consciousness and myths, at the time of 
writing, particularly in the north of the country. Taking into account former Chancellor 
Schroder's and the CDU's position on the core values of the Enlightenment, such as an
292 See: Rheims, B. op. cit. and: Unser Symbol. Mddelring Thiiringen [Online]. [Accessed 05.04.06]. 
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openness to cosmopolitanism, a re-emergence of German nationalist pride in the 
prevention of a 'universalising Roman influence', or western values, suggested another 
significant alternative 'landscape of memory' and perhaps even a revived Sonderweg. 299 
It was perhaps this latest manifestation of ethno-nationalist sentiment that could 
represent a serious threat for current and future public support for European integration.
Along with the celebration of Hermann as a 'national hero', evidence suggested that the 
victory in the Teutoburg Forest appears to have re-manifested itself into the inner life of 
some Germans.300 There was, for instance, an ethno-nationalist and defiant pride 
increasingly being articulated in the current language employed to describe the Varus- 
Schlacht and its historical legacy. This was particularly evident within both local and 
national publications since the opening of the Kalkriese Museum celebrating the site 
where: 'All Germany now believes Rome's power was irretrievably halted at 
Kalkriese', noted NDR cheerfully.301 'At the foot of the Kalkriese hills, the museum and 
park now allows the visitor to experience the humiliating defeat of the Romans, where 
barbarian tribes buried their swords and spears into the Romans', declared Anja Herold 
in Die Zeit. 302 Kai Schoneberg referred to the German-Roman scenario as a: 'David 
versus Goliath conflict' that, according to Matthias Schulz, 'tore a huge hole in Rome's 
forces'. 303 Broadcasting stations NDR and ARD, for example, reported that the Teutonic 
warriors gave their hated oppressors 'a real thumping' that 'shook the Romans to the 
core'. 304 So much so that never again would a Roman legion be allocated the numbers 
XVII, XVIII and XIX - the number of the legions lost in the engagement, boasted the 
Kalkriese Museum and the Berliner Kurier.305 Even the usually liberal-leaning journal 
Der Spiegel seemed to take delight in Teutonic defiance and Rome's defeat. 'What a
299 Cited from: Koshar, R. op. cit., pp. 37-38. See also: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/136. 
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46 and: Schulz, M. op. cit., pp. 152-153, 158.
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hiding! A barbarian that had dared to attack the might of Rome at the height of its 
powers managed to evade capture to the end', noted Matthias Schulz.306
After the battle in AD 9, all Roman camps to the east of the Rhine were lost. 307 
Thereafter, the Romans confined themselves to the left bank of the Rhine and Hermann 
became celebrated as a liberator and national hero, particularly after 1875, noted 
Spickermann, Anja Herold and the Lippe Regional Museum.308 Die Tageszeitung, Der 
Spiegel and North German Broadcasting (NDR) all referred to Hermann as a German 
Asterix.309 Inscriptions within the niches of the Hermannsdenkmal not only contain 
references to all the German tribes united by Hermann, but also to the wars of liberation 
against Napoleon (1813-1815) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), noted 
Friedrich Hohenschwert.310 From the 1800s, the Germanic chieftain's heroism came to 
embody German culture's defence against the 'universalising external influences of the 
arch-enemy France', argued Rudy Koshar. 311 There were similar observations from Ralf- 
Rainer Sass and the Berliner Zeitung about the French as the traditional foe. 312
Not everyone, of course, approved of this nationalism or alleged legacy of the Varus- 
Schlacht. Osnabriick historian Rainer Wiegels derogatively referred to Kalkriese 
Museum's new re-constructed watchtower over the battle site as a 'rust-box', claiming 
it represented a 'miserable symbol of nationalist sentiment'. 313 Others have also 
contested the numerous claims that Hermann is a national symbol and his victory a 
source of great national pride. Minister archaeologist Stephan Berke and West German 
Broadcasting (WDR) argued that Hermann did not unite the German tribes and 
dismissed claims that the Cheruscan prince liberated Germany from Rome. 314
Nonetheless, some in Germany maintained that the battle had wide-reaching 
consequences for nationhood. Archaeologist Bernhard Ortmann, the Berliner Kurier
306 Cited from: Schulz, M. op. cit., p. 154.
307 See: Im Schatten des Arminius. op. cit., p. 29.
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and the Volkswagen Foundation described Rome's decision to recall its legions right of 
the Rhine as a 'turning point in European history'.315 One consequence was the lack of 
Roman influence within northern Germany for a considerable time, noted Osnabriick 
historian Hermann Poppe-Marquard. 316 Another was the alleged failure to transform 
Germany into a Roman province along with the rest of Germany's neighbours, such as 
Batavia (Holland), Gaul (France) and Switzerland (Helvetia) - thereby preserving 
Teutonic independence right of the River Rhine. 317
In response to the eight Roman legions (50,000 men) sent by Emperor Tiberius to 
subdue the recalcitrant German tribesmen in AD 15, the Germans established 
communal defences within the Teutoburg Forest and Wiehengebirge hills. However, 
determined resistance, heavy casualties and the loss of their invasion fleet at the mouth 
of the Ems in AD 16 obliged Tiberius to relinquish designs on extending Rome's 
influence to the River Elbe.318 Consequently, Germany was never conquered, claimed 
Matthias Schulz, Ruhr historian Karl-Wilhelm Welwei and the Lippe Regional 
Museum. 'How could it have been, when Rome could neither find reliable internal allies 
for its expansionary quest, nor overcome obdurate high-ranking tribal hostility?' asked 
Welwei rhetorically. 319
Historian Peter Kehne of the University of Hanover suggested, for example, that the 
Roman campaigns were prompted by reasons of security - not conquest. 320 On the other 
hand, Frankfurt Archaeologist Gabriele Rasbach argued that Rome's influence was 
greater than is usually admitted in Germany. 321 But, at the time of writing, coverage of 
the battle's legacy suggested more than a hint of an exultant compliance with the boast 
by Der Spiegel that: 'Germanic ferocity was never tamed or Romanised in the land of 
barbarians.' 322
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To summarise, despite official recognition of the suffering of many refugees and 
expellees, for some, the trauma of displaced Germans - particularly women - has still 
not been adequately dealt with in German national memory. 323 Implying Germany's 
young have not been informed of the suffering of thousands of women during the Red 
Army's advance, expellee representatives and some of their more outspoken 
sympathisers have insisted that Germans should be allowed to see for themselves the 
fate of these people. Gunter Grass, for instance, spoke of the 'groundless neglect' of the 
theme and there have been many other similar contentions.324 Evidence suggested that 
some of the public, parts of the media, a number of historians and the descendants of the 
expellees themselves still wanted greater official recognition of the history, 'past 
injustices' and identity of those expelled.325
Along with the Air War, it seemed another aspect of repression left yet more ghosts 
from the past, suggesting further divided national self-conceptions. This became 
particularly apparent in the official distancing from the media's and representatives of 
the expellees' demands that German suffering should be placed within a national - not 
European - context. Attempting to avoid antagonising its neighbours, top-ranking 
officials, such as the former presidents of the Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse (SPD) and 
Rita Siissmuth (CDU), wanted any centre dedicated to the theme of expulsion to include 
Poland 'within the list of the dead'. 326 At the beginning of the Second World War, for 
example, 800,000 Poles were expelled from German occupied territory and over two 
million were exploited as slave labourers in Germany. 327 According to former Foreign 
Minister Joschka Fischer and former Chancellor Schroder:
If one wants to dedicate a centre to the German expellees, then it must be in a 
European context and cannot be a national project. Otherwise it would be
323 For official acknowledgement of the suffering of ethnic Germans, see interview with the former 
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and speech by SPD politician Angelika Kriiger-LeiBner in: Hofmann, 
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perceived as a re-writing of history and therefore a reversal of the roles of 
perpetrator and victim, reflected Fischer and Schroder.328
It seemed that international relations took clear preference over issues of internal 
sovereignty that contrasted to the general mood at the time of writing. Challenging 
official understandings of nationhood, wide support across the country for a national 
memorial suggested another alternative to official 'landscapes of memory'. What 
Martina Rathke, Karen Meyer-Rebentisch and others described as a 'suppression of the 
past' and 'inability to mourn' has now 'given way to memory'. 329 Nevertheless, there 
was increasing discord over how collective remembrance of the expulsions ought to be 
interpreted and represented. Indicative of this sense of an inadequate official 
representation of collective memory and, arguably, national identity were various 
articles and publications highlighting the sorrow and sense that the expellees were 
'helpless victims'.330
In 1993, the New Guardhouse was dedicated as a memorial to 'all victims of war and 
repression'. 331 Whilst the inscription on a plaque to the right of the entrance of the 
Guardhouse refers to expulsion in a general sense, judging by the media and public 
demands for a national centre for the German expellees, this was far from adequate.
Publications and articles indicated evidence of what some journalists called a 'reversal 
of the perpetrator-victim' image within recent German collective memory and 
perceptions of the Second World War.332 Bert Hoppe, Christoph KleBmann and Jorg 
Echternkamp criticised, for example, the 2005 publication by historian Hubertus Knabe 
- Day of Liberation? End of the War in East Germany - in which the author and others 
like him placed too much emphasis on the Germans as victims.333 There have been a 
number of publications, articles and radio programmes where this phenomenon was
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particularly apparent. In many tales of flight and expulsion, at the very least, 
perpetrators and victims have become virtually undistinguishable.
According to the Federal Office of Administration (BVA), German national symbols, 
the New Guardhouse and official days of remembrance serve as symbols and national 
memorials to 'the victims of both world wars and tyranny' whose 'basic convictions 
unite the polity'. 334 Numerous reports of continuing anti-Semitic acts of vandalism 
against Jewish memorials on the one hand, and a sense of an inadequate collective 
remembrance for the expellees on the other, suggested a commemorative consensus of 
memory was clearly wanting. 335 Perhaps its most obvious manifestation was the 
perception from the media, expellee representatives and some academics of the failure 
of both the former CDU/CSU/FDP and SPD/Green governments to provide a consistent 
and collective memory. Summarised by Alexander Gauland as a Bilderlosigkeit (lack of 
collective images), arguably, its latest manifestation were the vociferous protests by 
both current and former members of the German Air Force against official vilification 
of'war-hero' and 'historical role-model' Werner Molders.336
Along with a populist defiance to the official 'framing strategies of remembrance', there 
has also been a return to ethnic self-exploration via ancient images, such as the 
Hermannsdenkmal and the battle it commemorates. Evidence suggested the claims of 
the Roman historian Tacitus continued to have a considerable impact on German 
identity. Tacitus wrote, for example: 'I accept the view that the peoples of Germany 
have never been contaminated themselves by intermarriage with foreigners but remain 
of pure blood, distinct and unlike any other nation.' 337
Although often disputed in Germany, the notion that the Germans should remain a pure 
race undiluted by foreign blood have in the words of Alfons Soellner, 'proved to be the 
most persistent of all German ideologies'. 338 The reflections of Tacitus became
334 See: Day of National Mourning. New Guardhouse, Berlin, op. cit. and: National Days of 
Remembrance and Public Holidays, op. cit. See also: German national symbols. Protocol Office. Federal 
Administration Office [Online]. 2003 [Accessed 10.02.04]. <http://www.bund.de>
335 See: Kramer, J. op. cit., pp. 50, 56, 60 and: Berg, N. op. cit., p. 38. See also: Mecklenburg- 
Vorpommern Verfassungsschutzbericht 2003. op. cit., pp. 28-29 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004. 
Rheinland-Pfalz. op. cit., p. 14.
336 See: Gauland, A. op. cit., p. 9.
337 Cited from: Germania. In: Tacitus. TheAgricola and the Germania. op. cit., p. 104.
338 Cited from: Hueglin, T. The orderly and the extremist: understanding German political culture. In: 
Zimmer, M. (ed). Germany: phoenix in trouble? Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1997, p. 139.
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particularly apparent within the philosophy of Jiirgen Rieger's Artgemeinscha.fi, neo- 
Nazi fanzines and some heathen groups at the time of writing. 3. 339
Adulation of Germany's Teutonic past also extended to female right-wing 
organisations, bands and publications, venerating not only the heathen origins of the 
German people, but also the National Socialist agenda of preserving the Germanic race. 
Female bands and singers advocating a clear racist message, for instance, included 
Annett Mock, Monique, Lokis Harden and Froidenspender.  This phenomenon was 
manifest either directly or otherwise in racially motivated acts of female violence, 
reported the Baden-Wurttemberg, North Rhine-Westphalian and Bavarian Ministries of 
the Interior. 341
There have also been instances of an aggressive ethno-nationalism, reflected in the 
claims of the preclusion of Rome's centralising and cultural influences that have been 
increasingly articulated outside the usual neo-Nazi circles. Publication Hermannsruf 
(Hermann's Appeal) and the Bredstedt-based heathen organisation the Northern Ring 
(NR) were both depicted as right-wing extremist by the Lower Saxon and Schleswig- 
Holstein Ministries of the Interior. 342 At the very least, collective remembrance of 
Germany's ethnic origins has become a much more diverse and de-centralised process.
To conclude, according to a statement from the Federal Administration Office: 'The 
historical and political identity of the state and its citizens are concentrated in its 
symbols.' 343 Translated into eight languages, passages on a plaque situated within the 
New Guardhouse, of what the authorities claimed was the central memorial of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, reads:
We honour the memory of peoples who suffered from the war. We remember 
their citizens who were persecuted and lost their lives. We remember those 
killed in action in the World Wars. [...]. We remember the millions of Jews who
339 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999, Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg. 4.000 ed. Hamburg: Behorde fur 
Inneres, Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz, Mai 2000, pp. 98-99.
340 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004 Bayern. op. cit., p. 94 and: Schramm, C. op. cit., pp. 2-3.
341 See: Rechtsextremismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Nordrhein-Westfalen. op. cit., pp. 34-36; 
Verfassungsschutzbericht Baden-Wiirttemberg 2000. Stuttgart: Innenministerium Baden-Wiirttemberg, 
Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Baden-Wiirttemberg, Mai 2001, p. 17 and: Verfassungsschutz 
Information Bayern. l.Halbjahr. 2004. op. cit., p. 17.
342 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 Niedersachsen. Hannover: Niedersachsisches Innenministerium, 
2000, pp. 79-80 and: Rechtsextremismus und Ausldnderfeindlichkeit in Schleswig-Holstein. Kiel: 
Innenministerium des Landes Schleswig-Holstein, Jan 2001, p. 19. 
343 Cited from: German national symbols, op. cit.
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were murdered. We remember all those who were victims of tyranny and met 
their death, though innocent. 344
There were also indications that many in Germany applauded these sentiments and 
accepted other official symbols, such as the national anthem and the Bundesflagge, 
whose tricolour dates back to German democratic liberalism of the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Matthias Zimmer, for example, contended that the former social 
cleavages of Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany have almost disappeared and there is 
now a broad acceptance of the Federal Republic, along with its political culture of 
consensus. 345 Demands for the restitution of the honour of Wemer Molders, a national 
Centre against Expulsion and rejection from some quarters of the victims of fascism, 
however, suggested very different 'landscapes of memory' to those enshrined in the 
New Guardhouse.
But not all in Germany were so conducive to such discriminatory and 
unaccommodating approaches to remembrance. German historians, such as Karl 
Dietrich Bracher, Fritz Klein and Martin Heinzelmann, criticised demands for a national 
memorial to the Vertriebene and their past political rallies as 'revisionist', arguing 
instead for a European centre commemorating all victims of expulsion.346 Underlining 
the background causes of the expulsions, key SPD/Green politicians, such as former 
Chancellor Schroder, Joschka Fischer, and Otto Schily, also rejected such selective and 
populist appeals for a national centre in the capital and a National Day of Remembrance 
for the German expellees.
Whilst there were many official answers as to the origins of the German expulsions, at 
the same time, evidence suggested there were many outstanding questions concerning 
the identity, fates and histories of Vertriebene families. Perhaps the dead and their 
descendants should be allowed to rest in peace. There were those who would rather 
forget the suffering and trauma of the past, as revealed in some responses from former
344 Cited from: Till, K. E. op. cit., p. 273. See also: Day of National Mourning. New Guardhouse, Berlin. 
op. cit. and: National Days of Remembrance and Public Holidays, op. cit.
345 For indications of the popularity of the Neue Wache and a general willingness to commemorate the 
victims of Nazism, see: Till, K. E. op. cit., pp. 254-262 and: Kramer, J. op. cit., pp. 49-50. See also: 
Nolan, M. op. cit., p. 125. For claims of a general acceptance of the national anthem, Bundesflagge and 
democratic liberalism, see: The National Anthem. In: Schulte-Peevers, A. et al. op. cit., p. 73 and: 
Zimmer, M. From the national state to the rational state and back? An exercise in understanding politics 
and identity in Germany in the twentieth century. German Politics, Dec 1999: 8(3), pp. 26, 28-30, 34-35.
346 See: Historiker uneins tiber den Ort des Gedenkens. op. cit. and: Falkner, M. op. cit., p. 4. See also: 
Heinzelmann, M. Gottingen im Luftkrieg 1939-1945. Gottingen: Werkstatt Verlag, 2003, p. 60.
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expellees (Vertriebene) and refugees (Fliichtlinge) in Liibeck and Leer, when requested 
for their testimonies concerning former events in Pomerania and East Prussia.347 It could 
also be argued that, to some extent, the past and one's origins are unavoidable. 
Attempting to capture the essence of individuality, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe once 
wrote, 'you cannot escape from yourself. 348 That said, however, perhaps those 
promoting outdated ethno-national symbols of identity ought to adopt a more liberal, 
progressive and less confrontational stance.
On the 57th anniversary of the German surrender of 8 May 1945, former Chancellor 
Schroder also relegated the significance of common descent, promoting instead a 
Verfassungspatriotismus as an essential medium for national identity. 349 Nevertheless, 
developments suggested that for many in Germany, Hermann and myths of common 
ancestry still lay at the heart of German national identity. When the revival of an ethno- 
nationalism celebrating Germany's heathen Teutonic origins are taken into account, a 
popular identification with alternative sites and symbols clearly exposed further 
disparities between official and popular perceptions of national identity.
347 See: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 5, 13, 41, 106 and: Herterich, P. and Schroder, H. op. cit., pp. 
7-8 109-115, 146-151.
348 Cited from: Gall, L. op. cit., p. 5.
349 See: Nation, Patriotismus, Demokratische Kultur. Debatte mit Gerhard Schroder. News Archive, op.
cit.
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Conclusion
So what has this thesis suggested about German national identity and memory and does 
an answer to the question matter?
Although global interdependence, mass migration, multinational production and mass 
communications erode national boundaries and challenges the ideas of nation as a 
homogenous ethnic and cultural entity, at the same time, a number of Germans have 
resorted to defining Germanness by means of national delimitation. It was evident that 
some Germans still had problems not only accepting immigration, globalisation and a 
Verfassungspatriotismus, but also any moves away from an identity based on what 
German academic Lilly Weissbrod described as an 'ethno/biological understanding of 
the nation 7 . 1
Evidence indicated the mainstream Bundestag political elite could also continue to 
confront problems such as right-wing incitement over whether a multicultural model is 
desirable, or indeed possible, amongst some of the public. The Hamburg, Lower Saxon 
and Brandenburg Ministries of the Interior, for example, were still raising concerns over 
this issue in 2004.2
Despite official claims to the contrary, hostility to foreigners, asylum, sympathy to 
economically or racially motivated violence and even National Socialist ideals was not 
merely a phenomena primarily confined to the former German Democratic Republic 
(GDR). Evidence suggested the extreme right continued to extend its influence in both 
parts of the country. Hostility to incoming migrant workers, asylum-seekers and attacks 
on foreigners by right-wing extremists suggested a genetic determination of citizenship 
and, therefore, race evidently played a significant factor for some in Germany.
' Weissbrod claimed that 'a number of Germans have recourse to define Germanness based on historical 
ethnic/biological patterns of identity by means of national delimitation' See: Weissbrod, L. Nationalism 
in reunified Germany. German Politics, 1994: 3(2), pp. 222-232. For similar contentions see: 
Minkenberg, M. The renewal of the radical right: between modernity and anti-modernity. Government 
and Opposition, Spring 2000: 35(2), pp. 170-188.
2 For these concerns see: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004 Niedersachsen. Hannover: Niedersachsisch.es 
Ministerium fur Inneres und Sport, Mai 2005, pp. 48, 54, 62 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004, Freie 
und Hansestadt Hamburg. Hamburg: Behorde fur Inneres, Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Hamburg, 
Mai 2005, pp. 145-146, 158-159. See also: Verfassungsschutzbericht Land Brandenburg 2004. 4.000 ed. 
Potsdam: Ministerium des Innern des Landes Brandenburg, Mai 2005, pp. 30,47.
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It also seemed the deliberations of Tacitus continued to influence German national self- 
understanding. A renewed interest in the Hermannsdenkmal and battle it commemorates 
suggested some were rediscovering their Germanic roots as an antidote to insecurity, a 
missing identity and even a Verfassungspatriotismus. There have been various claims, 
for example, that what was needed in the face of growing economic problems and 
political disillusionment was a sense of a 'common identity'. 3 Writing in 2003, Bernd 
Ulrich claimed that a general confidence in the economy has been 'shaken to the core 
and as a result, people are beginning to seek alternative forms of identity such as a 
greater affinity with the past'. 4 Or, as Rudy Koshar put it: 'An anxious dissatisfaction 
with the present has led to an embrace of history.' 5
There have also been numerous claims that unfavourable structural and economic 
conditions have fostered right-wing extremist ideologies amongst an increasingly 
disaffected German youth. Along with high unemployment, Germanic symbols and 
ancient history were also being exploited in order to promote a racist agenda amongst 
Germany's young by the extreme right. In March and August 2005, for instance, there 
were still reports of the use of Germanic runes as a means of self-representation by 
various identity protest groups.6
Despite or because of continued immigration, fears of a loss of identity and lack of 
positive direction, the belief in and defence of an ethno-national unsullied Germanic 
race amongst sub-cultural female groups showed no signs of abating at the time of 
writing. Groups within the right-wing umbrella organisation of the Working Circle of 
the German Band of Maidens (Arbeitskreis Mddelschar), such as Germany's Band of 
Maidens (MSD), and female membership of Kameradschaften were still active in 
Hamburg and Lower Saxony during 2004. 7 By the end of 2004, Dr. Andreas 
Angerstorfer and Annemarie Dengg of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung estimated that about
3 See: Berger, S. The search for normality: national identity and historical consciousness in Germany 
since 1800. Providence/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997, pp. 199-200.
4 Cited from: Ulrich, B. Alle Deutschen werden Briider. Die Zeit, 30.10.03 (45), p. 46.
5 Cited from: Koshar, R. From monuments to traces: artefacts of German memory, 1870-1990. 
Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2000, p. 230.
6 See: Versteckspiel. Lifestyle, Symbole und Codes van neonazistischen und extrem rechten Gruppen. 
Willy-Brandt-Haus-Materialien asp. Agenrur fur Soziale Perspektiven e.V. (HG) fur den SPD- 
Parteivorstand, Mar 2005, pp. 1-8, 14-15, 27 and: Angerstorfer, A. and Dengg, A. Rechte Strukturen in 
Bayern mit Schwerpunkt Oberbayern, Oberplatz und Niederbayern. Miinchen: Friedrich-Ebert-Stifrung, 
Bayernformen, 31.08.05, pp. 9, 11, 31,42, 61-68.
7 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004 Niedersachsen. op. cit., p. 34 and: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004, 
Freie undHansestadt Hamburg, op. cit., pp. 141-142.
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a third of all members of right-wing extremist organisations were females. 8 Evidence 
suggested, therefore, that ancient German history was being used to justify a nationalist 
and ethnocentric identity. Summed up by Jan Herman Brinks, for some in Germany, 
ethno-nationalism was 'socially a la mode again'. 9 In some areas of society, it seemed 
that the past was competing with the present in Germany, and, at the time of writing, the 
past seemed to be winning.
Since reunification, a populist culture of remembrance has emerged, apparently 
rejecting the Bundestag elite's conceptions of German collective guilt, memory and 
identity. According to Christian Social Union (CSU) member of the Bundestag Peter 
Gauweiler: 'A sense of historical guilt is deeply rooted within the historical memory of 
the Germans.' 10 Many other representatives of the Bundestag also contended the 
criminal past of Germany was and should always remain in the forefront of German 
national consciousness.
It was evident, however, that German national identity and memory could not simply be 
dictated by the German political elite - particularly when that identity and memory were 
based on collective guilt and atonement. As Andreas Staab put it in German Politics, 
'the third post-war generation no longer accepts the collective shame and responsibility 
so readily as their parents had done'."
Yet, not all in Germany were so reluctant to accept responsibility for the past. Despite 
opposition in Hanover and Berlin for a national memorial to the Holocaust, German 
television presenter Lea Rosh attracted considerable public support by way of a 
'citizens' initiative' for the project in Bonn, Kassel and elsewhere in Germany. 12 Others, 
such as the left-liberal intellectuals Jiirgen Habermas, Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Ulrike 
Jureit of the Hamburg Institute for Social Research (HIS), also insisted that coming to 
terms with the past should be an ongoing process. 13
8 See: Angerstorfer, A. and Dengg, A. op. cit., pp. 68-70.
9 Cited from: Brinks, J. H. Children of the new fatherland: Germany's post-war right-wing politics. 
Translated by P. Vincent. London/New York: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000, pp. 110-111.
10 See: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 15/48. Stenographischer Bericht 48 Sitzung. Berlin, 
05.06.03, p. 4104.
" Cited from: Staab, A. Xenophobia, ethnicity and national identity in Eastern Germany. German 
Politics, Aug 1998: 7(2), pp. 42-43.
12 See: Kramer, J. Letter from Germany: the politics of memory. The New Yorker, 14.08.95, pp. 48-65.
13 See: Fulbrook, M. German national identity after the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, pp. 
125-127 and: Wilds, K. Identity creation and the culture of contrition: recasting 'normality' in the Berlin
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Nevertheless, evidence suggested that many Germans remembered who, what and how 
they wished to and that public commemoration and remembrance had more in common 
with personal and generational experiences than with the reflections of the Bundestag 
elite.
What could be described as a competition of remembrance, how German suffering 
during the latter stages of the Second World War was remembered and collective 
memory have taken on a new significance. Whilst Hamburg and Dresden have always 
been, perhaps, symbols of German national memory, evidence indicated the Air War 
per se has also now become one too. It seemed Germany had a divided memory one 
focussed on the Holocaust and the other on the Allied Air Campaign. Evidence 
suggested another was the expulsion theme.
As a consequence of official taboos in the GDR, general public indifference, individual 
suppression and confrontational stance of some of their leading representatives, many 
expellees developed their own private, and often stigmatised, Erinnerungskultur or 
culture of remembrance. Like the two main characters Tulla Pokriefke and her grandson 
Konrad, the well-received message of Crabwalk was that of anguish, grief and a keen 
sense of injustice concerning events in Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World 
War. Consequently, many former German refugees, expellees and their sympathisers 
became increasingly isolated from the political elites in the former GDR and, to some 
extent, the 1998-2005 Social Democratic Party (SPD)/Green ruling coalition 
government. 14 'How much of this has been dammed up all this time?' asked Giinter 
Grass, referring to the alleged hitherto former public silence and official (GDR) 
indifference concerning the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff and former events in East 
Prussia. 15 In many individual cases, for instance, the repressed trauma of eyewitnesses
Republic. German Politics, Apr 2000: 9(1), pp. 83-102. See also: Ullrich, V. Es ist nie zu Ende. Die Zeit, 
22.01.04 (5), p. 39.
14 See Es gilt das gesprochene Wort ,,Im Zentrum Vertreibung achten." BdV Landesverband Baden- 
Wiirttemberg [Online]. 01.09.01 [Accessed 16.06.05]. <http://www.bdv-bw.de/tdh2001/ 
redesteinbach.htm> and: Noack, H-J. Die Deutschen als Opfer. Der Spiegel, 25.03.02 (13), pp. 37-38. See 
also: Surminski, A. Das Trauma einer Generation. Flucht und Vertreibung. 60 Jahre danach: ein neuer 
Blick auf das Drama im Osten. Geo Magazin, Nov 2004 (11), pp. 112-114 and: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. 
Angekommen. 60 Jahre Fliichtlinge und Vertriebene in Liibeck. Liibeck: Hansestadt Liibeck, Bereich 
Kunst und Kultur. Kulturforum Burgkloster, 2005, pp. 3-5.
15 Cited from: Grass, G. Crabwalk. Translated by K. Winston. London: Faber and Faber, 2004, pp. 159- 
160, 29, 50, 63, 94-95, 103, 105, 119.
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from the Air War and expulsions often culminated in a 'nervous psychological 
disturbance' ' 6
Although usually associated with individuals, as Crabwalk and many other publications 
indicated, the trauma of numerous individuals of the war generation, along with a 
growing populist empathy concerning their past suffering, was also a growing collective 
phenomenon. 17 On the one hand, some may contend that there is no such thing as 
collective memory, only individual recollections of contestable and controversial 
events. Cases in point were the disparities between official and popular perceptions and 
memories of the Red Army, expulsions and the Air War. On the other, whilst many 
individuals have, arguably, very private and distinct memories, the fact that they shared 
similar experiences of the past could be interpreted as collective memory. Making no 
distinction between an individual and collective populist concept of trauma, 
publications such as Crabwalk and The Fire have, therefore, become the self-appointed 
representatives of the hitherto silent children of the war generation as victims.
Emphasising the central role played by history in national identity, Social Scientist 
Gerhard Schmittchen argued: 'A nation's sense of self is the result of appropriated 
experiences and the sum of remembrances of its own political behaviour." 8 
Summarising the roles of National Days of Remembrance and Germany's Day of 
National Mourning, for example, the Federal Office of Administration (BVA) claimed 
the New Guardhouse represented collective memory, grief and identity. 19
Given the quest from some of the media, a number of historians and sections of the 
public for a national Centre against Expulsion, in the light of relatively recent evidence 
this claim seemed rather questionable. Whilst an inscription in the New Guardhouse 
does refer to expulsion, representatives and children of the German expellees, elements
16 Cited from: Schroder, J. Treibgut des Krieges. Flucht und Vertreibung. 60 Jahre danach: ein neuer 
Blick auf das Drama im Osten. Geo Magazin, Nov 2004 (11), pp. 118-125 and: Keller, V. Mannheim im 
Bombenkrieg 1940-1945. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag 2003, pp. 3, 30-31, 34-39, 59.
17 See: Grass, G. op. cit., pp. 29-30, 64-69, 74-77, 103-104, 159-161, 201-208 and: Honold, K. Darmstadt 
im Feuersturm. Die Zerstorung am 11. September 1944. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Wartberg Verlag, 2004, 
pp. 3-15, 59-62. See also: Fuchs, T. and Wittke, S. Zwischen Angst und Alltag. Bomben auf Hannover 
Sommer 1943. Das Buch zur Serie Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung. Gudensberg-Gleichen: Wartberg- 
Verlag, 2004, pp. 3-4, 66-67, 73-74.
18 Cited from: Jarausch, K. H., Seeba, H. C. and Conradt, D. P. The presence of the past: culture, opinion 
and identity in Germany. In: Jarausch, K. H. (ed). After unity: reconfiguring German identities. 
Oxford/Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997, p. 25.
19 See: Day of National Mourning. New Guardhouse, Berlin. Protocol Office. Federal Administration 
Office [Online]. 2005 [Accessed 03.04.05]. <http://www.bmi.bund.de>
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of the public and the media were still searching for answers to and greater official 
recognition of their history, identity and fate. In the meantime, Crabwalk and similar 
publications have become a kind of surrogate memorial to the fate of the expellees.
Although Crabwalk, The Fire and many other similar publications were merely serving 
what could be described as local markets of remembrance, nevertheless, it was evident 
that a new culture of remembrance of the Germans as victims was ongoing at the time 
of writing. 20 Suppression of the past and selective forms of remembrance have evidently 
played a key role in German memory and identity, serving either GDR and expellee 
misrepresentations of the past or, more recently, fostering an alternative cult of victim.
Whilst past taboos have now been broken, along with the victims of the Air War, there 
was a sense that the suffering and history of former displaced Germans - particularly 
women - still has not been sufficiently addressed. As recently as May and October 
2005, for example, there have been claims that the image of the Red Army as heroes 
went unchallenged in the GDR and German women remained silent for many years 
about their rape by soldiers of the Red Army and their mistreatment in Soviet labour 
camps.21
Following in the footsteps of Crabwalk, in 2005 several German newspapers along with 
North German Broadcasting (NDR) reported with considerable empathy about the 
protection or assistance afforded by the Wehrmacht for German civilians fleeing the 
Red Army in 1945. This was either in the form of evacuation or by delaying the 
advance of the Red Army as long as possible in order to win time for German civilians 
to escape. 22 Shown in 400 German cinemas throughout 2004, films, such as Der 
Untergang (Downfall) and Napola, were also part of a culture of remembrance in which
20 See: Gelderblom, B. and TruchseB, W. F. 60 Jahre Kriegsende. Fine Dokumentation uber die letzten 
Tage des Zweiten Weltkrieges in und urn Hameln. Edition Weserbergland. Hameln: C W Niemeyer, 2005, 
pp. 11-29, 46-48 and: 1 434 Tote in der Stadt. Neue Osnabrucker Zeitung, 24.03.05, p. 20. See also: 
Zeitzeugen sollen Erinnerungen niederschreiben. Mindener Tageblatt, 14.05.05 (111), p. 9.
21 See: Dreher, S. ,,Frauen brechen ihr Schweigen, urn kunftiges Leid zu verhindern." Pressemeldung :ur 
Fragebogenaktion. BdV. Frauenvervand im Bund der Vertriebenen e.V. Berlin, 23.01.05, pp. 1-2 and: 
Zimmer, G. ,,Forum." ,J£riegsende in Demmin. " Erinnerung flir die Zukunft. Norddeutscher Rundfunk 1 
Radio MV, Broadcast 03.05.05 20:15 - 21:00. Cd-Rom.
22 See: Die Angst vor den Russen. 12.01.1945 OstpreuBen. Vertreibung. Kriegsende ARD.de. 
Norddeutscher Rundfunk [Online]. 2005 [Accessed 24.08.06]. <http://kriegsende.ard.de/pages_std_lib/ 
0,3275,OID1090754,OO.html> and: Seibold, K. Nebel, Regen und Eis retten den Fliehenden das Leben. 
Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, 18.03.05 (64), p. 14.
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it is gradually becoming acceptable to portray the human and tragic side of the downfall 
of the Third Reich. 23
Changing perceptions of the past seemed to be altering Germany's collective memory 
and, perhaps, even self-understanding. In contrast to the 1998-2005 Bundestag ruling 
political elite, a cult of victim has evidently gained acceptance within significant 
sections of the German media, some of the public and a number of local German 
historians.
Indicative of this shift of a Zeitgeist in Germany was not only the enthusiasm accorded 
to Crabwalk and The Fire, but also the unrestrained manner in which eyewitnesses 
expressed their wartime experiences as victims. Since Crabwalk and The Fire, a new 
need for remembrance of German suffering has emerged with the history of 'the little 
people' becoming increasingly more vocal and important.24 It seemed as if an empty 
void needed to be filled for some and the latest recollection campaign, along with 
outpourings from witnesses, suggested many areas in Germany - including Berlin - were 
still catching up with their past. The liberal use of eyewitness testimonies in various 
articles, publications, films and documentaries testified to the increasing significance of 
a so-called Geschichte von unten as a key source of historical evidence in this new 
culture of remembrance.
With the exceptions of some senior Christian Democratic Union (CDU) politicians, 
such as Erika Steinbach and Erwin Marschewski, statements from key members of the 
1998-2005 SPD/Green ruling political elite indicated they had clear reservations 
accepting the war-generation Germans as national victims. Although many Germans 
have received war damages, since 2001 Erwin Marschewski and others have 
campaigned, albeit unsuccessfully, for greater official recognition and compensation for 
female citizens of the GDR used as forced labour in Soviet internment camps at the end 
of the Second World War.25 In sum, there seemed to be a fundamental difference
23 See: Welzer, H. Was bleibt im Gedachtnis. Frankfurter Rundschau 25.01.05, p. 23 and: Schirrmacher, 
F. Die zweite Erfindung Hitlers: ,,Der Untergang." Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15.09.04 (215), p. 33.
24 Cited from: Raue, P-J. Editorial. Die Bomben-Nacht. Der Luftkneg vor 60 Jahren. Braunschweiger 
Zeitung Spezial, 2004 (10), p. 3.
25 See: Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion der CDU/CSU. Erkenntnisse iiber deutsche Zwangsarbeiter. In: 
Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 14/6478. Berlin, 26.06.01, pp. 1-2 and: Everwien, A. 
Zwangsarbeiterinnen in Sibirien - Deportiert und Vergessen. Kontraste 1. Rundfunk Berlin Brandenburg 
[Online]. 09.12.04 [Accessed 19.02.05]. <http://www.rbbonline.de/_/kontraste/beitrag_druckenJsp/
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between how key members of the then ruling Bundestag political elite and sections of 
the media and public wanted to remember the expulsions and the Air War in the 
aftermath ofCrabwalk and The Fire.
On the one hand, perhaps German suffering should not be the most important factor of 
collective remembrance. Maybe it is more important that disputes over the past 
disappear and the present takes precedence over remembrances and depictions of the 
past. Demands for a national Centre against Expulsion, from the Federation of 
Expellees (BdV) and their supporters, along with criticism of the Red Army, certainly 
provoked protests from Poland, Russia and the Czech Republic. In May 2005, for 
instance, the Russian embassy in Berlin also protested about local demands from 
representatives of the Berlin Steglitz-Zehlendorf district for Russian acknowledgement 
of the 'terror and sorrow' wrought by the Red Army in East Prussia and Berlin in 
1945.26 Perhaps it is more important to share a common remembrance in which all can 
participate, rather than fostering calls for the recognition of German suffering and the 
safeguarding of a historical learning exercise in catching up with the past. Post- 
reunification German governments have endeavoured to include German expellees in 
the process of reconciliation with Germany's neighbours. In 2000, for example, the then 
SPD Chancellor, Gerhard Schroder, attended the BdV's Day of Homeland.27
On the other hand, it could be argued that people can never move on from the past and 
genuine reconciliation can never be comprehensively affected until the war generation 
are fully accepted as national, collective victims - both from their eastern neighbours 
and from many within their own government. A number of articles reported a lack of 
empathy in Poland, the Czech Republic and Russia for assertions that the Germans were 
also victims, for example. 28
'As a result of feelings of past guilt, public indifference and official pressure, many 
expellees have always been harsh on themselves, giving no vent to their feelings',
key=rbb_beitrag_1610533> See also: 22. Hilfen fur Spdtaussiedler. Berlin: Bundesministerium fur 
Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung, 01.01.03, pp. 727-729.
26 Cited from: Russische Botschaft protestiert gegen Feststellung: ,,Der 8. Mai steht auch fur die 
Schrecken und das Leid durch die Rote Armee." BdV Nachrichten. Mitteilungsblatt des Bundes der 
Vertriebenen. Vereinigte Landsmannschaften. Landesverband Baden-Wiirttemberg e. V. Stuttgart. 53. 
Jahrgang E20094, Mar/Apr/Mai 2005 (1), p. 4.
27 See: Kloth, H. M. Zauberwort Europa. Der Spiegel, 15.04.02 (16), p. 75.
28 See: Hahn, E. and Hahn, H. ,,Wir wollen heim ins Reich!" Die Zeit, 2002 (8), p. 90 and: Stibbe, M. 
Women in the Third Reich. London: Arnold, 2003, p. 169. See also: Urban, T. Neuer Drang nach Osten. 
Suddeutsche Zeitung, 23.08.03, p. 12.
319
claimed Lubeck historian Karen Meyer-Rebentisch and East Prussian writer Arno 
Surminski. Consequently, this alleged ' Unfdhigkeit zu trauern\ or an inability to grieve, 
culminated in indifference and, sometimes, even intolerance towards other immigrants 
and refugees, noted Meyer-Rebentisch. 29
Yet, perhaps greater acceptance of the Vertriebene and those lost in the Air War as 
national victims of war from the Bundestag political elite will help to change attitudes 
not only to other refugees, but also to former enemies. Although public antipathy 
towards foreigners is rarely expressed in open violence, nevertheless, there were still 
signs of anti-Semitism along with hostility to asylum-seekers and Poles from some in 
Germany. Between January and March 2005, for example, there were reports of arson 
attacks on asylum centres in Brandenburg and North Rhine-Westphalia.30
There have, however, been genuine albeit very slow moves towards reconciliation 
between ordinary Poles and Germans, noted Polish historian Michal Kaczmarek and 
German investigative journalist Heinrich Jaenecke.31 Whilst some may argue 
comparisons are odious, interestingly, Hans-Ulrich Stoldt maintained that there was 
more empathy towards German claims for greater recognition of German suffering 
amongst Poles than in the Czech Republic.32
Nevertheless, mutual recriminations and bitter memories continued to foster fears and 
inhibit a comprehensive reconciliation, understanding and forgiveness. In April 2005, 
for example, representative of the Association of German Minorities in Danzig (DFK- 
Danzig), Gerhard Olter, reported anti-German agitation in Gdansk, which was organised 
by the Head of the Polish Party for Law and Justice (PiS), Dorota Arciszewska- 
Mielewczyk. Allegedly encouraged by Arciszewska-Mielewczyk, members of the 
Polish Claims Conference and the PiS burnt an effigy on 22 February 2005 of Erika 
Steinbach dressed in SS uniform before the courthouse of Gdansk, complained Gerhard
29 See: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 5, 50-41, 101. See also: Surminski, A. op. cit., pp. 112-114.
30 See: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004. Rheinland-Pfalz. Mainz: Rheinland-Pfalz Ministerium des Innern 
und fur Sport, Apr 2005, pp. 17, 14, 25 and: Maibaum, J. Anschlag auf Asyl-Heim. Neue Ruhr Zeitung 
(Essen), 16.03.05, p. 2. See also: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., pp. 143-154; Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 1- 
5, 101 and: Carstens, P. Vieles schwart noch. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20.12.04, p. 12.
31 See: Jaenecke, H. Der Wahn der reinen Nation. Flucht und Vertreibung. 60 Jahre danach: ein neuer 
Blick auf das Drama im Osten. Geo Magazin, Nov 2004 (11), p. 135 and: Malzahn, C. C. Eine Stadt sucht 
ihre Seele. Der Spiegel, 15.04.02 (16), p. 72.
32 See: Stoldt, H-U. ,,Schlimmes Trauma." Der Spiegel, 08.04.02 (15), pp. 70-74.
320
Olter and CDU representative Erwin Marschewski.33 Although there was evidence of 
growing local interest in the German historical and cultural legacy of the Polish city of 
Wroclaw (formerly Breslau), Claus Christian Malzahn noted that many of the older 
Polish citizens of Wroclaw keep handcarts at the ready in their cellars 'just in case the 
Germans return'. 34 There were similar allegations from the Czech city of Bochov. 
According to Marketa Ebrlova, for instance, 'many Czechs fear that their property in the 
western Bohemian city of Bochov will be returned to the Germans'. 35 Along with many 
Czechs, some former German refugees and expellees still looked back on the past with 
considerable bitterness. 36
Without reciprocal recognition of the Germans as national collective victims and 
perhaps greater acknowledgement of accountability from former adversaries, future 
German generations may not be prepared to bear the responsibility for what Peter 
Brandt referred to as the 'horrors of the past'. 37 During a school-trip to Auschwitz, for 
example, German children were allegedly seen and heard running around the camp, 
'hooting and laughing'. 38 Arguably, the statement 'never again' by various members of 
the Bundestag in the context of Auschwitz has a rather pointless function, or perhaps 
even a self-defeating one, if what is actually thought about remembrance is ignored.39 
As the President of the BdV Erika Steinbach put it: 'If one cannot grieve over one's 
own victims, how can people be expected to grieve over others?'40 Depending on one's 
point of view, justice and logic suggest that victim status should not apply for some and 
not for others. A national Centre against Expulsion and a Day of Remembrance could, 
however, facilitate a coming to terms with the past and alleviate continuing trauma for 
Germans. An apparent need for victim status indicated that many were still coping with 
this particular aspect of Germany's broken past.
33 See: Olter, G. Ein deutsches Haus in Zoppot. Schlesische Nachrichten. Zeitung fir Schlesien. 
Landsmannschaft Schlesien - Nieder-und Oberschlesien, 01.04.05 (7), p. 15.
34 Cited from: Malzahn, C. C. op. cit., pp. 70-74.
35 Cited from: Stoldt, H-U. op. cit., p. 74.
36 For these claims see: Brinks, J. H. op. cit., p. 147 and: Harm, E. and Hahn, H. op. cit., p. 90 and: 
Herterich, P. and Schroder, H. Vertrieben nach Ostfriesland. Leer: Ostfriesen Zeitung, ZGO 
Zeitungsgruppe, 2005, pp. 84-90, 109-120, 166-171.
37 Cited from: Brandt, P. German identity. Debatte, 1993 (2), p. 39.
38 Cited from: Kramer, J. op. cit., pp. 56, 60.
39 For the statement 'never again Auschwitz' by Norbert Lammert (CDU), Christian Simmert (Alliance 
90/The Greens) and Elke Leonhard (SPD), see: Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag, 14/48. 
Stenographischer Benefit 48 Sitzung. Bonn, 25.06.99, pp. 4089, 4104, 4108-4110.
40 Erika Steinbach: Diskussion um Vertreibungen ein ,,heilsamer Prozess." Deutschland Radio Berlin 
[Online]. 04.04.04 [Accessed 16.06.05]. <http://www.dradio.de/dlf7sendungen/idw-dlfy253542/>
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Catching up with the past could also have a liberating effect, not only for those who 
have hitherto suffered in silence, but also for those still unaware of the immensity of 
German suffering. 'One in five of every German family were displaced yet their history 
still remains marginal', claimed the editor of Geo Peter-Matthias Gaede, journalist 
Helga Hirsch and others. 41 So long as the past events of nations and their peoples are not 
fully addressed or comprehended, bitterness, resentment and misunderstanding may 
continue. Along with the dead, evidence suggested that many of the living were still not 
at peace, since they were unable to put the past to rest. An apparent reluctance to leave 
the past behind was particularly evident in Berlin and Wittenberg, for example. In the 
quest for a collective consensual national identity, interpretations of the past were 
arguably crucial.
Discussing the themes of the nation, patriotism and democratic culture in 2002, former 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder declared: 'In order for a nation to be at peace with itself, it 
has to have the courage to establish a common history.' 42 But this 'common history' was 
not that of the Bundestag political elite. 'Through collective remembrance of specific 
historic experiences, the fundamental values upon which the system of government and 
constitutional order are based come alive', claimed the federal authorities.43 However, 
demands for a National Day of Remembrance for the Air War victims and Centre 
against Expulsion for the German expellees suggested the dead, rather than the living, 
symbolised German collective memory at the time of writing.
On the other hand, there are more palatable aspects of the past that continue to have a 
more positive impact on German identity and memory. Many Germans, for example, 
associate Germanness with the country's rich cultural and musical legacy represented 
by figures such as Beethoven, Goethe and Schiller.44 Other symbols of German identity 
include the spirit of the 1848 Frankfurt Parliament and the Weimar Republic (1919- 
1933) in the form of democratic liberalism and the divisive, albeit intellectually
41 Cited from: Ackermann, U. Helga Hirsch. Schweres Gepack. Flucht und Vertreibung als Lebensthema. 
Deutschland Radio Berlin [Online]. 25.02.05 (Broadcast 20.06.05, 12:56) [Accessed 20.06.05]. 
<http://www.dradio.de/dlr/sendungen/politischesbuch/350554> and: Gaede, P-M. Editorial Note. Flucht 
und Vertreibung. 60 Jahre danach: ein neuer Blick auf das Drama im Osten. Geo Magazin, Nov 2004 
(11), p. 3. See also: Olschowsky, H. Im Land der Ahnungslosen. Tagesspiegel, 05.08.03, p. 8. 
42 Cited from: Schroder, G. Nation, Patriotismus, Interesse. Die Zeit [Online]. 08.05.02 [Accessed 
20.04.04]. <http://zeus.zeit.de/text/reden/gesellschaft/200220_schroederjpatriotismus>
43 Cited from: National Days of Remembrance and Public Holidays. Protocol Office. Federal 
Administration Office [Online]. 2003 [Accessed 10.02.04]. <http://www.bund.de>
44 See: Ardagh, J. Germany and the Germans: After Unification. New Rev ed. London/New York: 
Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 298-331, 577-579 and: Roberts, I. German language, life and culture. London: 
Hodder Headline, 2000, pp. 38-46, 62-69, 84-102.
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progressive, 'Weimar culture'. Writers of the Weimar period, such as Erich Maria 
Remarque, Bertolt Brecht and Thomas Mann, continue to have considerable and 
continuing literary and intellectual influence in Germany.45
Nevertheless, it was evident that the buried testimonies of the expellees and the Air War 
have returned to haunt the present and those who seek to deny them collective victim 
status. In other words, Crabwalk and The Fire have become the memory of the 'little 
people' by proxy at the time of writing.46 Taken together, the themes of citizenship, 
immigration and xenophobia, along with the memory of the expulsions and the Air War, 
suggested significant disparities between official and popular conceptions of German 
national memory and identity.
45 See: Roberts, I. op. cit., pp. 49-51 and: Fulbrook, M. A concise history of Germany. Updated ed. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 119-22, 160-178. See also: Overy, R. and Wheatcroft, 
A. The road to war. London: Macmillan London Ltd., 1989, p. 27.
46 For allusions to the importance of the history of the 'little people', see: Raue, P-J. op. cit., p. 3 and: 
Jaenecke, H. op. cit., pp. 134-135. See also: Meyer-Rebentisch, K. op. cit., pp. 5, 50-41, 101 and: Kiihne, 
H-J. Wir Kriegskinder. Zeitzeugen aus Ostwestfalen-Lippe erinnem sich. Gudensberg-Gleichen: 
Wartberg Verlag, 2004, pp. 3-64.
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